

PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHITECTURE  
FILOSOFIA E ARQUITECTURA

Nas nuvens também crescem raízes

Even in clouds roots are born



Edited by Constantino Pereira Martins

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In memory of

***Gonçalo Pereira Ribeiro Telles***

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## **Dedicatória**

Ao Arquitecto Peter Zumthor.

Ao meu filho Guilherme,  
luz dos meus dias.

**AGRADECIMENTOS**  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Foremost, I would like to thank Architect Eduardo Queiroga for all the work we have done together to build the symposium that risks the possibility to bridge Architecture and Philosophy, many times against all odds.

To thank and underline the crucial role that the *Ordem dos Arquitectos* played in making possible the existence of this book, and in particular its Director Conceição Melo.

My gratitude to Rodrigo Tavarela Peixoto for his generosity in sharing one of his beautiful photographs, and Nuno Maia Vilela for his unwavering friendship.

Last but not the least, this book would not have been possible without the financial support of the FCT Foundation regarding my study and time.

Caldas da Rainha, October of 2021

*Non erit vobis in Deum non erit vobis in gratia Dei*

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#### **1. A Linguagem da Arquitetura no Idealismo Alemão\_10**

##### **Resumo**

Esta comunicação destaca alguns aspectos do pensamento de F. J. W. Schelling e G. W. F. Hegel acerca da arquitetura, mostrando que estes autores, transformando a base kantiana de que partem, pela primeira vez tornaram a arquitetura inseparável do pensamento filosófico. A arquitetura passa a ser considerada parte de um sistema da razão humana e das relações desta com a sensibilidade, a natureza, a história e o conhecimento em geral. Schelling define a arquitetura através de uma abordagem tópica, ou seja, do estabelecimento do lugar sistemático que cada arte, e a arquitetura em particular, ocupam no mundo humano. Este lugar é definido em função de três eixos: ideal e real; ação e conhecimento; particular e universal. A arquitetura é, para Schelling, uma linguagem significativa, que referencia e exprime sistematicamente a relação entre a natureza e a consciência humana.

Na continuidade de vários aspectos da sistematização filosófica de Schelling, Hegel desenvolve uma teoria da arquitetura que combina a história da arte com um sistema das condições de representação da consciência humana por si e para si mesma. Na história da arte, Hegel estuda esta tese nas etapas da arquitetura simbólica, clássica e romântica, mostrando que é possível ler em cada pormenor dos diferentes estilos arquitetónicos históricos, uma semântica da consciência de si, individual e coletiva. Procura-se assim mostrar que apesar das grandes diferenças entre os dois autores apresentados, foi a filosofia idealista que tornou pela primeira vez possível pensar a arquitetura, nos seus pormenores artísticos, históricos e contextuais, como uma linguagem, expressiva e referencial.

## **The Language of Architecture in German Idealism**

### **Abstract**

This paper highlights some issues of F. J. W. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel's thought about architecture. It shows that these authors, transforming the Kantian base from which they start, for the first time made architecture inseparable from philosophical thought. Architecture can henceforth be seen as part of a system of human reason, and of its relations with sensibility, nature, history and knowledge in general. Schelling defines architecture by a topical approach, i.e., by establishing the systematic place that each art, and architecture in particular, occupy in the human world. This place is defined according to three axes: ideal and real; action and knowledge; particular and universal. Architecture is a meaningful language, which systematically refers to and expresses nature and human consciousness to itself.

In agreement with some aspects of Schelling's philosophical systematization, Hegel develops a theory of architecture in which history of art is combined with a system of conditions for the representation of human consciousness by itself and for itself. In the history of art, Hegel studies this thesis through the stages of symbolic, classical and romantic architecture, showing that it is possible to read in every detail of the different historical architectural styles a semantics of self-consciousness, both individual and collective.

The paper tries to show that despite the great differences between the two authors, it was the idealism that allowed for the first time to think of architecture, in all its artistic, historical and contextual details, as an expressive and referential language.

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these works, including the passion for knowledge (D: §429), self-cultivation (GS: §335) and his naturalism. Nietzsche calls for an architecture for the search of knowledge (GS §280) which encompasses a naturalistic retranslation of our knowledge and values. His goal is to supply us with both a symbolic naturalism that will replace the otherworldly discourse of churches and a practical environment for studying the natural origins and history of our values.

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In this essay, I deal with Roger Scruton's (1979) claim that "Aesthetic experience [for functionalism] is nothing more than an experience of function - not function as it is, but function as it appears" (p.

38). In particular, I suggest that ‘function as it is’ (i.e. experienced function) must also be taken into consideration when defining a work of architecture, additionally to ‘function as it appears’ (i.e. perceived function). Through promoting the importance of experience through ‘function as it is’, I challenge the notion of a work of architecture as a ‘decorated shed’, and I argue that a work of architecture is more than a functional building with an added aesthetic component. Moreover, I argue that there are aspects of a building which ‘function as it appears’ cannot reveal; namely, potential function – a function which has not yet been actualized but which is inherently tied to ‘function as it is’ and is present in the building’s structure. In addition, I challenge Scruton’s support of the claim that architecture is “inescapably public” (Graham, 2012, p. 166) and I argue that Scruton ignores the interior of a work of architecture, thereby dismissing ‘function as it is’. In contrast to the exterior of a work of architecture, which is only made for the people, I argue that the interior is made by the people too through their usage of a building – something the architect cannot predict nor determine. By examining the definition of a work of architecture as a functional structure which is aesthetically pleasing, I argue that ‘function as it is’ needs to be included in the definition in order to emphasize an important aesthetic aspect through which a work of architecture can attain aesthetic perfection.

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Susana Viegas, *Ifilnova/Universidade Nova de Lisboa*

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Although it is an emerging research field, the philosophy of film has a long tradition of investigating the complex relationship between painting and film, with a special focus on films *about* painting: on how the two art forms encounter each other from a spatial and temporal perspective. In addition, the field has long explored the ways in which films represent the modern city. From the beginning, film has been associated with the representation of the modern city and of other art forms. Focusing on *O Pintor e a Cidade/The Artist and the City* (1956) by Manoel de Oliveira (1908–2015), and grounded in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of film, the following touches on both of these themes. *The Artist and the City* is a short documentary on António Cruz (1907–1983)—a watercolorist known for his landscapes of Porto—the subject of which is not only the painter's life and work but also the city itself, as its title suggests. As the following will show, the film offers a twofold representation of the city: that provided by Manoel de Oliveira, and that provided by the subject of the documentary, António Cruz.

**Paulo Alexandre e Castro, *IEF-Universidade de Coimbra***

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Vítor Alves, *Architect*

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### Abstract

Beatriz Colomina, in her essay “Architectureproduction” (1988), argues, based on Lacan’s text “The mirror stage” (1949), that Le Corbusier’s turning point and the constitution of his “architectural self” was only possible through printed media. Grounded on this hypothesis, it is argued that the publication is a mirror where, under ideal conditions, any architect can build his “architectural self”.

Lacan's “Mirror Stage” as to do with the formation of the “I”, analysing the individual’s relationship with his own body through his identification with an image that is at the origin of his “Ideal-I”. The sensation of a fragmented body experienced by the child who sees himself in the mirror for the first time, is counteracted by the perception of the image of unity and coherence in the mirror image that amazes him, but which he is already able to recognize as his own. What configures the “I”, in this event, even though is the image of oneself reflected in the mirror, is always something that comes from outside, through the presence of an “other”. In the case of architects, this “other” is an image of themselves reflected in the publication’s pages.

The existence of the mirror encourages the child to make a series of (new) gestures, to interact with them, to understand the effects of these movements on the specular image and on the reflected environment. Similarly, in the case of publications, it is their existence that calls for the production of new “movements”, the creation of new discourses, while the production of new knowledge justifies the existence of the publication itself. In the paper space, new ideas are tested, translated into texts, images or projects, and their effects exposed on the reflected environment: either on the authors (child’s reflected image), or on people and things around them (reality that the mirror duplicates).

This process, however, does not distinguish published from unpublished architects. As they share the same type of “body”, meaning, recognizable common features between them, the identification with what is published is not only possible, but enhanced. Given the number of publications, it is likely that the identification with the printed image results from multiple objects and authors, which can lead to the creation of a new “body” or a multiplicity of “selves” in the same “body”: hybrid bodies as the result of crossings of several published architects.

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Susana Ventura, *Center for Studies in Architecture and Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture of the University of Porto, CEAU-FAUP*

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Departing from a landscape located in the cold and icy lands, we analyse the different relations between this landscape and the *Steilneset Memorial*, designed by Peter Zumthor. Simultaneously, we look for the architectonic devices that allow unveiling how the work composes a sensation of silence.

Central to our argument is the link established by Deleuze & Guattari between territory, matters of expression and the composition of sensations. We argue that the latter depends on the metamorphosis of the landscape's natural characteristics, but also of artificial and cultural traces, rituals, and other elements that enter in the plane of composition, resulted from a critical and sensible understanding of the movements, vectors, and points of energy present.

In the end, this example allows us to contribute to the definition of the philosophical, architectural and artistic concept of "Poetic Landscape," borrowing the name from an unrealised project also by Peter Zumthor.

Anna Pontes, *University of Lisbon*

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The appreciation of the national heritage throughout the nineteenth century in Portugal presented the ruins as a recurrent issue, often with criticism by intellectuals – mainly influenced by studies

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Inês Vieira Rodrigues, *Center for Studies in Architecture and Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture of the University of Porto, CEAU-FAUP*

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In 1968, the view of the Earth from the Apollo 8 mission changed our perception of ourselves. However, the finitude of the massive object in which we live had already been apprehended since a "first globalization" or a "liquid revolution", the terms traced from Peter Sloterdijk’s (2008) theory when referring to maritime “discoveries”. Indeed, the ocean appears on the oldest maps, since Ptolemy, nonetheless a significant part remains unknown over the course of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the atmospheric element has been studied and represented in the conditions of the human relationship with the environment, although practically ignored until the nineteenth century. Sloterdijk (2008) characterized the contemporary era as being faithful to its terrain-conservative feature, which, it is claimed in this text, has a clear expression in a major part of the theories and forms of regulation. Therefore, fantasies about the Ocean Sea should give way to new policies and representations. In the area of architecture, urbanism and geographic analysis, the conception and study of the ocean as a territory – in particular as an urban territory and more precisely, as argued here, as a maritory – depends on a complexity of contributions and knowledge, namely Philosophy. The design of the liquid environment, that is, the search to make it readable and, consequently, to claim it as an integral part of a territorial constitution is, from this point of view, one of the greatest contemporary challenges.

Leonardo Oliveira, *Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS*

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No livro *Spectres de Marx*, publicado pela primeira vez em 1993, o filósofo Jacques Derrida aprofunda a questão espectral e trata das temáticas da herança, memória e justiça. Os espectros (le revenants), incorporações paradoxais que não pertencem ao presente, frequentam o pensamento humano desde tempos remotos e estão sempre por retornar a fim de obsediar os vivos. Para o filósofo, o que importa são as condições em que se dá esse retorno. Tendo como alicerce teórico o pensamento derridiano, este estudo introduz a questão espectral para analisar a arquitetura do Campo da Esperança, o primeiro cemitério construído em Brasília-DF, símbolo consagrado da arquitetura e do urbanismo modernos no Brasil. Esse cemitério será operado como um “texto arquitetônico” passível de ser desconstruído e o enfoque será dado nos espectros negativos herdados da modernidade – capitalismo, higienismo e individualização –, que se pressupõe terem interferido nos processos tradicionais das práticas e dos rituais funerários. Sem observar, portanto, o indivíduo contemporâneo é observado por esses espectros e se julga necessário os identificar e examinar não para desconjurá-los, mas, talvez, para viver junto (vivre ensemble) com eles.

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Folded architecture does not lead to a finished formal entity but rather to a flexible assemblage of elements, evolving in time, through upgradeability and repair, exactly like computer software, to meet the people's changing needs and desires. Folded architecture is marked by flexibility because of its adaptation to complexity, namely to the unforeseeable array of events, constantly emerging in contemporary societies and the uncertainty of future situations. Thus architecture seems like a practice of bricolage, the term Claude Levi-Strauss coined to describe one of the typical traits of mythical thought in his seminal *La pensée sauvage*. The concept of folded architecture as it is made responsive to human needs and desires is essentially communicative. I shall attempt to pinpoint two important stations and precedents for the genealogy of such communicative folded architecture: on the one hand, the view that Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour forwarded in *Learning from Las Vegas* that architecture is essentially communication of meaning through the inherent characteristics of form. On the other hand, Le Corbusier's notion of an architecture that may avoid revolution by communicating and understanding people's needs via formal adaptation.

14. Carlo Deregibus, *Politecnico di Torino, Department of Architecture and Design (DAD)*

#### **Designing toward the future. The project as a tactical tool\_200**

#### **Abstract**

The main problem about the future is, quite obviously, that we do not know it: we cannot decide it, nor we can invent it. However, we continuously try to plan it. This planning activity is an obvious practical need, since any action requires some management: but in architecture, the project is both



the creative phase and a document, or rather, a series of documents that constitutes a contract between the client and the contractor. So, on the one hand, the project explores the future; on the other, it tries to fix it, defining and deciding its expected qualities. Thus, in systems theory terms, more than the future-of-the-present, the project sets a future-of-the-present, which means that the project also originates the conditions for its failure – because the future will undoubtedly be different and unexpected. Either due to accidents and anomalies or to main events, the project will have to change, adapt to new conditions, and answer questions that were unthinkable at the time of its completion. We could even say that the design is, somehow, ontologically false, as it tries to model the future: it is, indeed, nothing more than a model of the expectations toward the desired future. Therefore, utopias are impossible to realise not because of their revolutionary nature but because they describe futures: they imagine a future without considering that they are already changing it, just due to their imagining.

Therefore, we could accept this downfall as an ontological flaw of an activity we need (as they say: “plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”). Or, we could overcome the standardised way of intending the project and develop its tactical and strategic power. Using the project as a tactical tool means taking into account the radical contingency of the process, exploiting its potential. That is, the most promising directions that continuously emerge, whatever they may be. This propensity of the situation cannot be imposed nor modelled, but, at the same time, we can influence it with the project by evolving it all through the process. In other words, such design continuously sets inceptions of potential in the process, possibly developing in a plan, instead of trying to define the plan from its very beginning.

Time is a crucial factor in this idea of the project. On the one hand, the project must adapt itself to the ever-changing contingency while, at the same time, influencing it. On the other, this attitude may inspire a new way of intending and shaping utopias, coherently with the concept of “minimalist utopias”. Instead of picturing an ontologically false future, tactical design exploits any occasion for orienting its specific contingency toward that future, shaping it all along the process. This autopoietic character highlights its tactical dimensions, as it must continuously be carried on in what we can call a “formative” way.

15. David Álvarez, *University of Vigo*

**Civilizing sheds: Autopoiesis and the cosmopolitical assemblage of the city\_216**

**Abstract**

By “civilizing sheds” I refer to the particular kind of agency that buildings may have when embedded in the urban fabric. They presuppose a metropolitan existence of globally networked, complex and open systems on which they depend, and therefore, their civilizing agency consist on sustaining the urban fabric on which they rely. This is therefore an explicitly political conception of architecture and architectural practice.

This chapter explores the contrasts between the political philosophies behind two design conceptions, on the one hand, the Autopoiesis of Architecture inspired by Luhmann’s social theory and developed by Patrik Schumacher’s Parametricism and on the other hand, the Cosmopolitical Design based on Assemblage Theory (Latour, Deleuze) as formulated by Zahera-Polo. It concludes that Parametric Urbanism is a limited frame to make sense of the concrete political challenges of our global metropolitan condition and its forms of domination, while Cosmopolitical Design promises local assemblages of actors that open ways for civilizing our urban life.

16. Thomas Froy, *University of Antwerp*

**Dwelling Today: *eruv, sukkah, Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida*\_240**

**Abstract**

No longer can we think of dwelling in merely negative terms. In the work of contemporary political theorists, such as Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler, there is a disavowal of constructions of dwelling which privilege rootedness and origins. We may dwell in exile or placelessness, in different places and no place in particular; if this is the case, it does not, however, compel us to think of our dwellings negatively. In Emmanuel Levinas’ and Jacques Derrida’s thinking on dwelling places, I find a complex thinking on the notion of threshold which remains in step with the negative theorisations provided by Agamben and Butler, insofar as there is a distance taking from the privilege of rootedness and origins; beyond this, however, there is also an examination of the importance of dwelling with others, and of providing for others.

## FOREWORD

## PREFÁCIO

### 0. Preâmbulo

A origem deste livro teve como ponto de partida o *Simpósio FILARCH 2020*, que radicou como base no Porto, cidade portuguesa por excelência dos Arquitectos, e esteve assim focado na relação entre Filosofia e Arquitectura, mas também aberto ao campo de reflexão nas diferentes áreas do conhecimento. O *FILARCH 2020* proporcionou a oportunidade de pensar livremente num ambiente académico aberto, e construiu um horizonte rico para reflexões em diversos campos de estudo. Para estabelecer um diálogo transdisciplinar, com contribuições de todo o espectro do conhecimento académico, contou-se com mais de três dezenas de oradores, que infelizmente não estarão todos transcritos aqui neste volume mas que estão disponíveis em versão audio-visual no *website* da *Ordem dos Arquitectos – Seccção Regional Norte*.

Na pulsão megalómana originária tentou-se abraçar tudo na ânsia de nada perder. Mas o tempo, mestre tirano, não permite veleidades impuras ao academismo. Ainda assim foram abertos os espaços para pensar a relação da Arquitectura, Estética e Arte (passando pelo cinema ao desenho e à fotografia), utopia e o futuro, ecologia e cidades sustentáveis, imagem (imaginário, imaginação), Arquitectura e formas políticas, virtualidade e experimentação, paisagem e natureza, *Olho-Mão-Coração* (Arquitectura Japonesa), Filosofia (filósofos e a cidade, de Kant a Heidegger e Wittgenstein), projectos e processos, Arquitectura formal e informal, ruínas, afecção (singularidade, sensibilidade, emoção), etc. Juntaram-se a nós pensadores e arquitectos de todo o mundo, e sentimos a falta pandémica dos nossos oradores principais Maria Filomena Molder e Ursula Wieser Benedetti, a quem prestamos aqui homenagem e agradecimento pessoal. Gostaria de terminar esta pequena introdução com um redobrado sublinhado de agradecimento ao Arquitecto Eduardo Queiroga que co-organizou o simpósio e com o qual se mantém um trabalho de fundação para um espaço de pensamento livre fora dos muros da universidade e da prática quotidiana do atelier e da obra.



## 1. Passado

*Olhas para trás  
e por entre as ruínas felizes  
e perdidas da infância  
vês rostos, gestos  
restos e nevoeiro  
na beleza cruel e verdade brutal,  
de que tudo acaba  
de que tudo um dia acabará.*

*As ruínas,  
lembrete à arrogância dos homens  
sobre o tempo e as coisas,  
esse exercício físico de humildade.*

*A ruína  
é o que sobra,  
a pequena vitória sobre a morte.*

A mão que desenha a linha entrega-se com o mesmo impulso que a mão que escreve a pauta de música. Na sua nudez mais radical, o mesmo gesto radica na sua máxima simplicidade: uma visão-audição, uma folha branca, uma caneta ou lápis. A raiz virtual de um processo invisível. Por esse mesmo motivo o fascínio que sentimos pela beleza única dos cadernos de apontamentos, os blocos de notas, os pequenos papéis, os rabiscos e as primeiras tentativas que algo faz para nascer. Há algo primitivo neste processo que se dá antes de pensar e depois já dentro do pensamento. Se na relação entre teoria e prática, temos a História como palco do grande gesto arquitetónico e patrimonial, testemunha da linha que se desenha no espaço e no tempo, temos também na Estética a disputa do lugar da Arquitectura entre as outras artes, exibindo a sua natureza ambivalente entre o belo e a função utilitária. Entre a impossibilidade e a criatividade, a hibridez da Arquitectura teve que construir o seu lugar desde o pequeno espaço ao grande lugar majestático. Uma arte que expande e comprime ao mesmo tempo, desde o tempo de pensar o edifício, ao espaço em geral, do lugar à mesa, da tinta à janela, do jardim ao *foyer* do aeroporto, até à contradição da pressão do presente, do desenvolvimento rápido, da economia, dos construtores, dos apartamentos, ou das políticas públicas.


Apesar de tudo o que foi exposto acima, a Filosofia da Arquitectura como um campo autónomo ainda está no seu início. Nesse sentido, apresenta-se como um desafio, tanto para filósofos quanto para arquitectos, de se reunir para pensar sobre arquitectura em toda a sua complexidade ou simplicidade. Esta liberdade que une mão e cérebro, coração e mente, para unir *praxis* e pensamento através da criatividade e abertura. Abriremos aqui o espaço de leitura para lembrar esse elo esquecido e perdido entre essas duas formas para apresentar o estado da arte nesta área. *Nas nuvens também crescem raízes* pretende constituir-se como um livro que mostra esses horizontes de reflexão e desafio face a uma área tão ténue e frágil com a Filosofia da Arquitectura. E se geralmente a Arquitectura é interpretada como uma arte do espaço, faremos aqui uma tentativa de recuperação como arte do tempo, e restaurar um olhar melancólico que radica na não-rendição à tecnicidade funcional, ao postal ilustrado da revista, ou ao ultra-rigor dos puristas.

Há algo primitivo que permanece no gesto arquitetónico. Na luta contra o tempo, no rasgar do espaço, Sísifo comemora um gesto antigo, similar ao da arquitectura, entre esforço e desaparecimento, habitação e morte. O que é essa melancolia? Tal como Chico Buarque nos recorda:

*Amou daquela vez como se fosse a última  
Beijou sua mulher como se fosse a última  
E cada filho seu como se fosse o único  
E atravessou a rua com seu passo tímido*

*Subiu a construção como se fosse máquina  
Ergueu no patamar quatro paredes sólidas  
Tijolo com tijolo num desenho mágico  
Seus olhos embotados de cimento e lágrima (...)*

Contemplação da ruína e melancolia, observação do presente e nascimento prematuro do fim já pressentido. O que é essa melancolia? Um pressentimento, uma suspeita, uma desconfiança, um desengano, um não poder voltar atrás, um saber demais sem nada saber. Matéria e decomposição: a suspensão do olhar. Deixar rasto. A Arquitetura é uma arte primitiva. Incrivelmente pertence a um conjunto restrito de gestos primários como o comer, vestir, proteger, atacar, procriar. Das poucas artes e técnicas a partir das quais conseguimos voltar a uma posição original de sobrevivência tal como o caçar, o deambular na caminhada procurando comida e água, a pintura, mesmo antes de se contar histórias, a grande mãe de todas as palavras na luta contra o silêncio. Parece incrível que o espaço vital da casa, defesa-alimentação-sono, pareça tão delimitado no contraste com a hostilidade natural que nos cercava, e que nos cerca ainda. Uma arqueologia da essência da arquitectura é algo demasiado bruto e longínquo para o gosto actual, demasiado próximo do cheiro, parente desaparecido e longe da vista, uma tentativa inútil de encontrar os vestígios que ainda não habitavam ao som das máquinas. Nesses restos do passado, que ainda vemos vivos os espelhos mais cruéis, podem ainda ser pistas para um olhar melancólico como método. Ultrapassado. Até ver.



## 2. Presente

A arquitectura radica hoje na encruzilhada entre construções e relações. Parecendo que as emoções e as afecções serão todo o palco de batalha do Séc. XXI, a arquitectura como arte das relações terá um lugar privilegiado no desenho e desenvolvimento histórico e social. A solidão como o grande marco do Séc. XXI está hoje a olho nu. A erosão do presente, a ruína do presente, é sempre mais visível para uns do que para outros. Um sinal, para lá do psíquico, social ou histórico, que radica no resultado de um processo ainda em marcha. Enclausurados na ironia totalitária da categoria estético-política de contemporâneo, na procura vaidosa de uma aparência progressista, não deixa de ser lamentavelmente cómico assistir-se à construção lenta e vitoriosa da ditadura do politicamente correcto. Longe de primitivismos ou futurismos, o actual vive do instante, agrilhoado às tendências e incapaz de enfrentar a radicalidade e profundidade dos problemas em mãos. Como se, maquilhando o problema, ou elegendo determinados problemas como centrais, se anulassem os demais. A publicidade, verdadeiro mestre da actualidade, percebeu no design e no marketing, mas

também em muitas outras áreas insuspeitas, aliados implacáveis para o regime das visibilidades de superfície, na instauração do princípio da moda como hegemónico e global. O alfaiate é hoje, paradoxalmente, a grande figura do pensamento. Tendo já sido debatido o regime das imagens à exaustão, e estando hoje a realidade política e social quase totalmente alheia e sobranceira a todas os sábios avisos que surgem de todos os quadrantes académicos, só nos resta esperar que tudo desabe e se desmorone lentamente. Surge então uma necessidade de desenvolver uma arte da paciência. Uma arte compassiva e lenta do olhar. Fechados no presente.

A ruína é simultânea e silenciosa, mas abre espaço para o retorno da comunidade, no recentramento das relações e emoções contra o grande inimigo: a solidão. Colocando no palco central a relação entre pensamentos e sentimentos, a força desse futuro próximo obrigará a arquitectura a repensar o movimento entre a razão e a afecção, enfrentando o isolamento de frente. Na emoção da música das linhas arquitectónicas, os edifícios emanam vibrações. Talvez possa ainda nascer uma teoria arquitectónica das cordas.

Na encruzilhada do presente, onde se sobrepõe já a cidade real e a cidade virtual, a complexidade instala-se e exige que um esforço ético, uma responsabilidade que estará cada vez mais em jogo, na expectativa optimista de que às tecnologias da solidão sucederão as tecnologias do cuidado.

*Existem palavras  
que amamos com mais força  
que outras:  
Metamorfose, vida  
medo, poesia,  
filho, sol,  
beleza, mar,  
infinito, deus,  
silêncio, mãe,  
pai, mulher,  
amor, amizade.  
Escolhe uma palavra  
e ama-a.*





### 3. Futuro

Construção e ligação. A arquitectura como arte das ligações, como mediadora e fio de ligação das diferentes artes, pode instituir-se como uma âncora incontornável, uma base, uma raiz.

Uma Filosofia da cidade é hoje mais do que ver na cidade um corpo, é ver já o seu futuro como espaço de relação, de interligação, interconexão, assumindo a complexidade como desafio à simplicidade, e não como simples motor para a hiper-complexidade. A arquitectura como arte das relações, paradoxo da simultaneidade de *fixidez-determinação* e *abertura-possibilidade*, pode constituir-se como um aliado da saúde e da luz. A sombra utópica que desafia o edificado é sempre como acolher a rigidez e a mudança ao mesmo tempo, essa construção impossível de ser ao mesmo tempo isto e aquilo que amanhã se desejasse. Uma matéria ainda por nascer. A genialidade será , como sempre, a chave desse jogo impossível. Quem terá essa estatura de estar à altura do desafio da regra e da quebra, da construção e desenho de uma nova regra? Que nome terá? O jogo entre o

gosto, sensibilidade e individualidade na busca do novo, empurra a arquitectura para o exercício renovado entre o abstracto e o concreto, caso a caso, paradoxo de singularidade e colectivo. A autoria pode estar ao abrigo desse jogo, ou aberta ao desígnio da funcionalidade. Talvez hoje mais que nunca a arquitectura se possa aproximar da inutilidade da arte, assumindo o seu sentido próprio nessa ambivalência e maldição da imanência e transcendência funcional, num diálogo infinito. Diálogo do arquitecto consigo mesmo (monólogo da procura da beleza e da singularidade) ou com o cliente (espaço de afirmação e cedência na procura da solução elegante e excelente; projecção-visualização-solução), mas sempre e fundamentalmente com o espaço e o tempo, juiz final de tudo e todos. Tendo a imaginação como faculdade regente, diluem-se e fundem-se os sonhos, as utopias, as visões, as possibilidades, as coexistências e compossibilidades. As sombras e a luz que se misturam na religação com o passado, presente, ou com as futuras ruínas, do que já morreu e do que está por nascer, tudo e todas presas num limbo orgiástico de pura força e criação, de máxima potência, origem e fim. Nesse magma vital, olhamos a neblina do futuro à procura de uma cara familiar. Esperemos que alguém abra a porta.

*A paisagem  
espera-te  
independente  
imune  
e indiferente  
aos teus sucessos e fracassos.  
O horizonte  
nivela todos os homens  
Como um velho  
que já viu tudo na vida.  
Sem surpresas  
tudo se torna igual  
ao chegar o silêncio da noite.*

**I.**

**PALAVRA**

**WORD**

1. Diogo *FERRER*<sup>1</sup>

## A Linguagem da Arquitetura no Idealismo Alemão

### 1. Sobre a definição da arquitetura por Kant

Do mesmo modo como transformaram muitas outras áreas da filosofia, os pensadores do chamado idealismo alemão alteraram por inteiro o pensamento filosófico acerca da arquitetura. Com destaque para Schelling e Hegel, encontramos nesse período histórico-filosófico teorias filosóficas da arte em geral, e da arquitetura em particular, em que a arquitetura é ligada de maneira fundamental aos conceitos filosóficos, e passa a ser dotada de significados, constituindo, por isso, um sistema conceptual e uma linguagem significativa. A arquitetura torna-se, por assim dizer, um transcendental da consciência humana.

Embora critiquem fortemente a estética kantiana, Schelling e Hegel recebem, transformando-os, diversos aspetos fundamentais da estética de Kant. Alguns destes aspectos são a compreensão do juízo de gosto, ou da experiência do belo como uma função essencial, indispensável à definição da razão humana; a função intermediária da imaginação artística, entre a sensibilidade e o entendimento; o carácter desinteressado do belo; a noção de finalidade sem fim; o belo como expressão da ideia.

Procurarei mostrar hoje, em primeiro lugar, como Schelling, especialmente a partir do *Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental* de 1800,<sup>2</sup> transforma a estética kantiana, que está centrada na compreensão do modo como o espectador recebe e é tocado pelo objeto estético, numa filosofia da arte. Em seguida, será estudado como a estética da arquitetura de Schelling atribui à arquitetura um significado conceptual, epistemológico e metafísico. Na sua *Filosofia da Arte*, curso proferido em Würzburg em 1802-1803,<sup>3</sup> Schelling inaugura assim a compreensão filosófica da arquitetura. Por fim, uma breve referência à filosofia da arquitetura de Hegel permitirá defender a tese de que o conjunto de transformações conceptuais levadas a cabo por estes filósofos permitiu, pela primeira vez, a compreensão da ligação fundamental da arquitetura à filosofia, a compreensão da arquitetura

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<sup>2</sup>F. W. J. Schelling, *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (ed. H. D. Brandt & P. Müller, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992). O *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* será citado segundo esta edição, seguido da paginação da edição Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart-Augsburg, Cotta: 1856-1861 [=SW], vol. I/3.

<sup>3</sup>F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966) (SW I/5, 353-736). Consulte-se a valiosa tradução em português: F. W. J. Schelling, *Filosofia da Arte* (tradução, introdução e notas de Márcio Suzuki, São Paulo, EDUSP: 2010).

como uma parte essencial da razão humana, como uma estrutura conceptual e como uma linguagem, dotada de um significado e expressão específicos.

Na fase inicial da filosofia do idealismo alemão – filosofia que podemos situar desde a *Crítica da Razão Pura* de Kant, em 1781, até à morte de Schelling, em 1854, – o valor estético é identificado com o belo, entendido como um predicado do juízo de gosto. O problema então é compreender o que este predicado significa, o que ele designa e qual o seu referente. Este predicado designa uma propriedade que não é objetiva como o conjunto de propriedades que cabem aos objetos da experiência, ou seja, o peso, a dimensão, a função, a estrutura, o material, ou quaisquer outros que se queiram acrescentar, mas refere-se a um estado do sujeito relativamente a uma experiência determinada. No entanto, para o tema que aqui nos interessa diretamente, na sua *Crítica do Juízo* que, em 1790, inaugura a estética contemporânea, Kant pouco diz sobre a arquitetura. Limita-se a escrever que se trata da “arte de expor, para um fim arbitrário, mas também de modo simultaneamente estético-teleológico, conceitos de coisas que só são possíveis *pela arte*, e cuja forma não tem como fundamento de determinação a natureza, mas esse fim arbitrário.”<sup>4</sup>

A terminologia kantiana, que pode ser pouco elucidativa à leitura imediata, explica que a arquitetura é, antes de mais, uma exposição de conceitos. Por outro lado, se é uma arte, não tem, como as outras, o seu fundamento de determinação na natureza, ou seja, não se trata de uma imitação de objetos da natureza – segundo a tradicional definição da arte – mas é um objeto prático, subordinado a um fim. A arquitetura não imita, mas serve instrumentalmente as necessidades e os fins humanos. Assim, o conceito da arquitetura, que se inclui nas obras “que só são possíveis pela arte”, ou seja, de objetos construídos, é definido duplamente. É definido a partir da sua função, o seu “fim arbitrário”, mas isto não põe em causa, por outro lado, que a arquitetura expõe esses fins de modo “estético-teleológico”, ou seja, segundo uma teleologia estética, que não está submetida à necessidade e à utilidade.

A lacónica definição de Kant toca no problema da finalidade, ou do que chamaríamos mais recentemente a função, problema essencial para a sua definição de arte e, ainda mais, para a compreensão de que tipo de arte é a arquitetura. Kant não aprofunda as consequências da sua definição da arquitetura, mas coloca um problema que se poderia apresentar e desenvolver como uma verdadeira antinomia da razão arquitetónica. Traduzindo o problema como uma antinomia da arquitetura, na tese afirma-se que a arquitetura *não é uma arte, porque tem de servir a fins* – o princípio da função e do programa. Na antítese, afirma-se que a arquitetura *é uma arte, porque não pode ser avaliada somente a partir do conceito dos fins a que se subordina, mas é necessariamente objeto de um juízo de gosto*, e obedece, por isso, a um princípio estético. Não posso ver, pisar,

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<sup>4</sup>“Kunst, Begriffe von Dingen, die nur durch Kunst möglich sind, und deren Form nicht die Natur, sondern einen willkürlichen Zweck zum Bestimmungsgrunde hat, zu dieser Absicht, doch auch zugleich ästhetisch-zweckmäßig darzustellen” (Kant, AA V, 322).

entrar, percorrer e utilizar um edifício sem integrar as suas partes e pormenores na unidade de uma “finalidade sem fim”, expressão utilizada por Kant como uma das partes integrantes da definição da apreciação estética. Ao lado, mas também além da finalidade determinada para que o edifício serve, exerço o que Kant chama “livre jogo de faculdades” que envolve entendimento e sensibilidade numa unidade de sentido que não está previamente determinada, e experiencio um prazer ou desprazer ‘livres’. Este é um prazer que vai muito além do meramente agradável ou desagradável à minha apreciação e interesses subjetivos, mas um prazer que reivindica universalidade. E pode reivindicar universalidade porque o organismo afetado pela impressão do objeto não é o organismo físico corporal ou animal da observadora, mas o seu organismo racional, as suas faculdades cognoscitivas, a sua sensibilidade e inteligência que são envolvidas assim num livre jogo de faculdades. Em resumo, a experiência da arquitetura inclui enunciar juízos de gosto e reivindica, por isso, uma apreciação estética, sensível e intelectual. O edifício não é agradável ou desagradável ao organismo, mas belo ou não segundo a razão e a sensibilidade.

A antinomia referida, entre os fins úteis, por um lado, e ausência de fins determinados, por outro, aflora na definição de Kant, mas nenhuma solução é proposta, dizendo-se apenas que a arquitetura tem de ser simultaneamente os dois, bela e útil. O leitor dos autores diretamente influenciados por Kant, familiarizado com uma perspectiva comparativista e de desenvolvimento dos conceitos, não estranhará se se disser que também na arquitetura – assim como em quase todos os outros temas filosóficos importantes – esses autores dedicaram-se a resolver antinomias suscitadas pelo pensamento de Kant. Schelling e Hegel trataram de diversos outros temas a propósito da arquitetura, mas uma trave-mestra da sua filosofia da arquitetura é a resolução desta antinomia fundamental.

A principal razão para a profunda transformação que o idealismo alemão trouxe ao pensamento estético em geral e, em particular, à filosofia da arquitetura, foi a concepção do objeto e do método da filosofia que tinham recebido de Kant. A crítica kantiana à metafísica retirou do centro da atenção filosófica a substância e outros objetos metafísicos. E mesmo quando, como em Schelling, uma metafísica objetivista parece recuperar os seus direitos, o objeto e o método são definidos de outro modo. Se quisermos uma definição o mais simples possível, podemos dizer que se tratou de substituir o estudo de objetos suprassensíveis que era levado a cabo com métodos de tipo lógico, por um estudo da atividade da razão que permite conhecer ou “sintetizar” os objetos da experiência, com valor cognoscitivo universal. Ou, dito de outro modo, trata-se da busca das condições de possibilidade desse conhecimento ou produção. Essencialmente, substitui-se o estudo de objetos, causas e princípios suprassensíveis, pelo estudo de atos constitutivos dos padrões da experiência objetiva. A questão dos conceitos, entendidos como atos da razão, e da produção de significado assume então o primeiro plano.

## 2. A arte como esquema da síntese entre real e ideal

No *Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental*, publicado em 1800, apenas dez anos após a *Crítica do Juízo*, Schelling descreve o saber humano, juntamente com os seus objetos, como divididos em reais e ideais. E, supondo que a razão é uma só, é legítimo pressupor um objeto simultaneamente real e ideal, prévio a essa divisão, que deve corresponder ao que denomina o absoluto, absoluta identidade ou absoluta indiferença. Esta absoluta identidade é o objeto de uma intuição intelectual, que nos provê, igualmente, de acesso às ideias. Estas são modos particulares de unificação do ideal e do real, ou seja, são expressões do absoluto, como por exemplo as ideias de verdade, de bem e de belo. Sendo, como se disse, a razão uma atividade, e todo o conhecimento verdadeiro, fundado na identidade absoluta do real e do ideal, Schelling entende que a nossa consciência consiste numa divisão entre atividade real e atividade ideal, divisão de que o conhecimento é o cancelamento relativo. A atividade ideal é a atividade que engloba toda a atividade conscientemente realizada pelo espírito, ao passo que a atividade real é definida como uma atividade inconsciente, que corresponde ao comportamento objetivo da natureza, uma atividade que não depende da reflexão do sujeito.

O conhecimento verdadeiro em geral, e o filosófico em particular, consiste na exposição das ideias, onde real e ideal não são diferentes, e cada objeto conhecido é um modo limitado de exposição dessa identidade. Esse conhecimento acontece do modo mais completo, segundo o *Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental*, no objeto artístico, que exhibe à consciência esse momento prévio à diferença. A arte é, assim, o conhecimento ou a ciência mais completa, de tal modo que “a arte é o modelo da ciência, e onde a arte está, a ciência deve ainda lá chegar.”<sup>5</sup>

A consciência só pode emergir na sua distinção em relação a um inconsciente. Por isso, o “inesperado encontro”<sup>6</sup> do consciente com o inconsciente que constitui a arte, encontro onde a identidade absoluta se expõe, cindida, à consciência, não pode ser, por definição, feito de modo plenamente consciente. A consciência só apreende o resultado desse “encontro”, mas não pode surpreender o momento da sua produção, por definição anterior à consciência. Não há consciência, o que significa tão-pouco reflexão ou controlo conceptual sobre esse momento, razão por que “o artista, por mais intenções que tenha, no que toca àquilo que é propriamente objetivo na sua produção, encontra-se sob o influxo de um poder que o separa de todos os homens e o obriga a enunciar ou a expor coisas que ele próprio não abarca inteiramente, e cujo sentido é infinito.”<sup>7</sup> O

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5“die Kunst sei das Vorbild der Wissenschaft, und wo die Kunst sei, soll die Wissenschaft erst hinkommen” (*Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental* 294/468).

6*Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental* 295/270.

7“scheint der Künstler, so absichtsvoll er ist, doch in Ansehung dessen, was das eigentliche Objektive in seiner Hervorbringung ist, unter der Einwirkung einer Macht zu stehen, die ihn vor allen Menschen absondert, und ihm Dinge

artista resolve, numa intuição intelectual, a contradição entre consciente e inconsciente, que é, diz-nos Schelling, a contradição onde se funda a existência humana, e expõe esta resolução na obra de génio.

Na *Filosofia da Arte*,<sup>8</sup> os princípios da filosofia romântica da arte apresentada no *Sistema do Idealismo* do ano anterior aparecem expostos com alguns matizes importantes e, principalmente, muito mais pormenorizados num sistema das formas artísticas, onde a arquitetura assume um lugar importante.

Lê-se na *Filosofia da Arte*, que a “língua é a mais perfeita obra de arte”.<sup>9</sup> A compreensão da arte como um fluxo de passagem da atividade inconsciente para a atividade consciente, permite equiparar a língua à arte, que realiza uma função similar. Trata-se, conforme a célebre definição da língua de Humboldt poucos anos depois, de produzir uma infinidade de significados com meios finitos.<sup>10</sup> A fonte do significado é também a origem da criatividade que escapa à atividade consciente e a regras conceptuais, dando conta do carácter inesperado da criação artística.

Deve observar-se, entretanto, já no tratamento dado à questão levantada no *Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental*, e no próprio título da *Filosofia da Arte*, uma importante inovação relativamente à *Crítica do Juízo* de Kant. A estética e o problema do juízo de gosto foram substituídos em Schelling pela obra de arte, e o aspecto subjetivo do juízo em Kant está substituído pela plena objetividade da exposição da unidade do consciente e do inconsciente numa obra. O problema desloca-se do jogo das faculdades que operam no juízo de gosto do sujeito da experiência artística para o ato criativo deste, ato que está materializado e só existe na obra. O papel do observador desaparece quase inteiramente da consideração, na medida em que a arte é essencialmente obra, que exprime um conhecimento da absoluta identidade entre inconsciente e consciente, real e ideal, ação e conhecimento ou também, nos termos do autor, entre objeto particular e possibilidade infinita.

Para explicar o significado ontológico e epistemológico da arte, Schelling situa-a então no complexo das relações entre real e ideal. A arte começa por ser inserida num grande esquema analógico do que chama “potências” do absoluto, segundo o seguinte quadro.

Absoluta indiferença

Real:  
real-real: Matéria  
real-ideal: Luz  
Indiferença real: Organismo

Ideal:  
ideal-ideal: Conhecimento  
ideal-real: Ação  
Indiferença ideal: Arte

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auszusprechen oder darzustellen zwingt, die er selbst nicht vollständig durchsicht, und deren Sinn unendlich ist” (*Sistema do Idealismo Transcendental* 288/460).

<sup>8</sup>Ver nota 3 supra.

<sup>9</sup>*Filosofia da Arte* SW, V, 358.

<sup>10</sup>W. von Humboldt, *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 477.



Segundo o esquema, a indiferença absoluta divide-se em real e ideal, o que produz a consciência humana. O ato de exposição a esta de um conteúdo exige a exposição *como* tal, onde o *como* designa o próprio ato de mostrar-se. Assim, o real que aparece à consciência *como* real é a matéria, dotada de gravidade, ou peso, que o organismo supera, superação que competirá à arquitetura expor. O real que aparece como ideal, é a luz, ou seja, um real já sem peso e cujo elemento material está superado. A indiferença entre matéria e luz é o organismo. A compreensão do organismo como indiferença entre luz e matéria, ou gravidade, pode surpreender, mas deriva da ideia de que a luz é pura atividade e o peso a inércia e imobilidade materiais, próprias de um ser sem atividade espontânea. O organismo, assim, participa de ambas, luz e gravidade, no sentido em que a matéria orgânica está atravessada por um princípio de idealidade, de automovimento e de teleologia. “A essência do organismo é a luz conectada com a gravidade. O organismo é inteiramente forma e inteiramente matéria, inteiramente atividade e inteiramente ser. A mesma luz que, na natureza universal, é a atividade intuitiva do universo, está no organismo casada com a matéria.”<sup>11</sup>

Do lado ideal, encontramos uma posição da idealidade como ideal, que corresponde ao conhecimento; uma manifestação do ideal no real e como real, que é a ação; e uma indiferença de saber e ação, que é a arte. A arte é um saber que se dá inteiramente como ação, e uma ação que é puro conhecimento. Schelling pretende refutar assim a tese kantiana de que os predicados que designam o valor estético não têm valor cognoscitivo, porque não designam propriedades objetivas. Pelo contrário, segundo Schelling, visto que a arte expõe objetivamente uma unidade entre real e ideal, ela é conhecimento e ação simultaneamente, indiferenciados. Assim, “a indiferença do ideal e do real como indiferença expõe-se no mundo ideal através da arte. Porque a arte não é em si nem um mero agir, nem um mero saber, mas um agir inteiramente atravessado pela ciência ou, inversamente, um saber que inteiramente se tornou ação.”<sup>12</sup>

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11“Das Wesen des Organismus ist: Licht mit Schwere verbunden. Der Organismus ist ganz Form und ganz Stoff, ganz Thätigkeit und ganz Seyn. Dasselbige Licht, welches in der allgemeinen Natur die anschauende Thätigkeit des Universums ist, ist im Organismus dem Stoffe vermählt” (SW 5, 515). Para a relação da luz e da visão com a desrealização e a idealização de uma perspectiva biologicamente informada v. H. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophy of Biology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Pressy 1966, 146-147). Para a noção do organismo como inteiramente forma, Jonas, *op. cit.*, 80. 93. A compreensão da luz como forma é um *topos* tradicional. V. por exemplo: “Julgo que a primeira forma corpórea, que chamam «corporeidade» é a luz. [...] A luz não é uma forma que derive da corporeidade, mas é a própria corporeidade.” (R. Grosseteste, *Tratado da Luz*, tradução de Mário Santiago de Carvalho e Maria da Conceição Camps. Porto: Afrontamento, 2012, 57). Não menos tradicional é a sua conexão direta com o belo e a arte: “A beleza tem o modo de ser da luz. Isto não quer dizer somente que sem luz não pode aparecer nada de belo, que sem ela nada pode ser belo. Quer dizer também que a beleza do belo aparece nele enquanto [als] luz, como brilho. A beleza manifesta-se a si mesma.” (H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Gesamelte Werke I*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990, 486).

12“Die Indifferenz des Idealen und Realen als Indifferenz stellt sich in der idealen Welt durch die Kunst dar. Denn die Kunst ist an sich weder ein bloßes Handeln noch ein bloßes Wissen, sondern sie ist ein ganz von Wissenschaft durchdrungenes Handeln, oder umgekehrt ein ganz zum Handeln gewordenen Wissen, d.h. sie ist Indifferenz beider.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 380-381)

A arte é a indiferença ou unidade mais completa no mundo ideal, que inclui também conhecimento e ação. E porque o esquema em que o ideal e o real se dividem e expõem reciprocamente se comporta de modo fractal, na arte, que é essa indiferença, vamos encontrar uma reaplicação das potências sobre cada elemento do esquema. Através desta reaplicação chegaremos finalmente à arquitetura, a qual é também ela um modo de expor numa unidade saber e ação, luz e matéria, real e ideal. Atingida a arte, como indiferença já refletida de real e ideal, a mesma é novamente dividida numa potência de exposição real e noutra ideal. A potência ideal corresponde à literatura, onde a arte se move exclusivamente no meio espiritual e ideal da linguagem. Já a sua potência real corresponde às artes onde a linguagem está dotada de um corpo físico: as artes plásticas e a música. Assim, retomando em sucessivas reflexões o final do esquema anterior, Schelling prossegue a repetição fractal do entrelaçamento entre realidade e idealidade:

Absoluta indiferença de conhecimento e ação: Arte

<p>Real: Artes plásticas  real-real: Música  real-ideal: Pintura  Indiferença real: Plástica</p>	<p>Ideal: Literatura  ideal-ideal: Lírica  ideal-real: Epopeia  Indiferença ideal: Tragédia</p>
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Ignorando os ramos que não dizem respeito à arquitetura, dentro da potência real da unidade entre conhecimento e ação, temos uma primeira potência, determinada pelo real-real (ou o real exposto *qua* real), a matéria, que corresponde à música, uma segunda, determinada pela idealidade real da luz, a pintura, e uma terceira, dominada pela unidade ou indiferença entre matéria e luz, o que corresponde, como vimos, a um organismo, que significa a plástica. E prosseguindo então na divisão encontramos dentro da plástica como indiferença real de música e pintura:

Arquitetura (música plástica)  
Baixo relevo (pintura plástica)  
Escultura (plástica integral, plástica enquanto plástica)

A última forma artística, a plástica, está assim dividida novamente numa potência de predominância real, a arquitetura, uma segunda de predominância ideal, o baixo-relevo, e uma terceira, onde domina a indiferença entre as duas, que será a plástica propriamente dita, a escultura. Nesta última, o motivo da sua maior integração e completação da representação real do absoluto é a unidade integral da materialidade sobre si mesma, através do domínio do espaço. A escultura é um todo retirado do meio espacial exterior a ela, permitindo, por isso, a passagem lógica a uma arte puramente ideal situada apenas no tempo, as artes da palavra.

Resulta do esquema, finalmente, que a arquitetura vai repetir, numa potência superior, ao nível plástico, a potência inicial, ainda inorgânica, da arte, nomeadamente, a música. Nesta

potência, “podemos agora estabelecer o significado mais elevado do ritmo, da harmonia e da melodia. Estes são as formas primeiras e mais puras do movimento no universo e, intuídas de modo real, são a maneira das coisas materiais serem semelhantes às ideias.”<sup>13</sup> Schelling aparentemente, e não Goethe ou Schopenhauer como por vezes se supõe, será o inventor da definição da arquitetura como música congelada. “A forma artística inorgânica ou a música na plástica é a arquitetura”<sup>14</sup> e, por isso, ela é “música no espaço,” “música concreta” e “música solidificada.”<sup>15</sup> A arquitetura repete, por conseguinte, as estruturas musicais essenciais, a saber, o ritmo, interpretado como as distâncias que medeiam entre os elementos arquitetônicos, a harmonia como a proporção entre os diferentes volumes, e a melodia, que é a ligação entre o ritmo e a harmonia ou modulação, e que Schelling encontra representada principalmente na ordem coríntia. Nesta, melhor se encontraria presente a ligação entre “o reto e o curvo, do liso com o arqueado, do simples com o adornado.”<sup>16</sup> Em geral, o mesmo domínio que a música exerce sobre o tempo, através do ritmo, a arquitetura exerce sobre o espaço.<sup>17</sup> A arquitetura é então a “música sentida com os olhos”.<sup>18</sup> Ambas são artes não referenciais, dominadas pelo real e onde a idealidade está integrada, no sentido de dominada, no real. Pintura, escultura, baixo relevo ou toda a literatura são artes representativas e, por isso, dotadas de organicidade. Música e arquitetura, por sua vez, vivem somente do seu domínio rítmico, proporcional e harmônico do tempo ou do espaço, sendo por isso determinadas pelo real enquanto real, estando a idealidade reduzida a elementos principalmente quantitativos. Mas, como se verá, ao passo que a música é plenamente inorgânica, a arquitetura é o organismo como inorgânico, o organismo que retorna ao inorgânico ou que coloca a sua marca no inorgânico. Este retorno do organismo que se apresenta como inorgânico traduz-se, entre os viventes, nas produções do inorgânico pelo organismo. Na origem da arquitetura estão pois produtos naturais da teleologia dos organismos, como sejam cascas, ninhos, proteções, cabanas ou troncos que servirão de suportes.

### **3. A arquitetura segundo Schelling**

#### **3.1. Sobre a antinomia de forma e função**

Retornando à resolução da antinomia kantiana, leia-se a argumentação com que Schelling a resolve, integrando a arquitetura entre as belas-artes: “Toda a beleza é em geral a indiferença da

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<sup>13</sup>“Wir können jetzt erst die höchste Bedeutung von Rhythmus, Harmonie und Melodie festsetzen. Sie sind die ersten und reinsten Formen der Bewegung im Universum und, real angeschaut, die Art der materiellen Dinge den Ideen gleich zu seyn.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 381)

<sup>14</sup>“Die anorgische Kunstform oder die Musik in der Plastik ist die Architektur.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 572)

<sup>15</sup>*Filosofia da Arte*, 576, 577. Também: “Daß Architektur = Musik, folgt vorerst nur aus dem gemeinsamen Begriff des Anorgischen. Denn die Musik ist allgemein die anorgische Kunstform.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 574)

<sup>16</sup>*Filosofia da Arte*, 598.

<sup>17</sup>*Filosofia da Arte*, 590.

<sup>18</sup>“ein schönes Gebäude in der That nichts anderes als eine mit dem Auge empfundene Musik” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 595).

essência e da forma. – A exposição do absoluto num particular.” – A essência aqui designa o absoluto, que se manifesta sob diferentes formas, as quais são os modos limitados ou determinados em que a indiferença absoluta aparece. “Ora, o particular, a forma, é precisamente a referência à necessidade [à utilidade]. Mas se a arte coloca nesta forma a expressão da essência absoluta, então olha-se para esta indiferença própria da forma e da essência, e de modo nenhum para a forma *por si*, e caduca inteiramente a relação particular ou a referência particular desta forma à utilidade e à necessidade, dado que ela é unicamente intuída na sua identidade com a essência.”<sup>19</sup> A arquitetura integra pois a forma com a essência, traduzindo esta identidade ou indiferença como uma obra bela. Aliás, como Schelling dirá um pouco mais abaixo, e noutro texto posterior, a perfeição da forma significa a anulação e ultrapassagem da forma. “Só pela perfeição da forma, pode a forma ser anulada.”<sup>20</sup> Ou seja, a necessidade da função e o valor estético não são opostos ou exclusivos, mas resolvem-se numa indiferença. Ou, noutros termos, a função completada corresponde ao belo arquitetónico, do mesmo modo como o belo, ou o valor estético é eminentemente funcional. Claro está que esta solução só pode funcionar na medida em que a arte não é um objeto de agrado contingente e subjetivo, mas entendida como expressão de uma essência e unidade de opostos objetivos, como sejam, a função e a ‘forma’, ou o valor estético (sendo que aqui “forma” é utilizado no sentido oposto à terminologia de Schelling, para quem o que chamamos hoje normalmente função é a forma, o lado útil, e o que chamamos forma é a essência, o lado estético).

No entanto, esta unificação entre a função, que é a forma técnica de responder à necessidade, e a essência, que é a indiferença ou unidade que dela pode fazer uma obra de arte, não ocorre de modo simples. Schelling observa que se a simples “expressão de um conceito de fim [i.e., o útil] se pudesse tornar numa obra bela,”<sup>21</sup> outras artes orientadas por conceitos de fins, como a alfaiataria, poderiam ser belas-artes. Se a arquitetura deve, ou pode ser uma arte bela, a identidade da obra com o conceito de fim não pode ser exterior, subjetiva, pertença de intenções do artista ou do gosto do observador, mas tem de pertencer de modo inerente à obra.<sup>22</sup> A relação de indiferença que unifica a forma e a função (no vocabulário atual), ou a essência e a forma (na terminologia de Schelling), não pode ser expressa na teleologia própria de um artefacto qualquer, e tão-pouco o poderia ser num artefacto para habitar. Num artefacto, o conceito é meramente exterior, permanece subjetivo, pertença de um sujeito que o usa. O que pode fazer da arquitetura uma bela-arte é “uma verdadeira

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19“Alle Schönheit ist überhaupt Indifferenz des Wesens und der Form. – Darstellung des Absoluten in einem Besondern –. Das Besondere, die Form ist nun eben die Beziehung auf Bedürfniß. Allein wenn nun die Kunst in diese Form den Ausdruck des absoluten Wesens legt, so wird nur auf diese Indifferenz der Form und des Wesens selbst, keineswegs auf die Form für sich gesehen, und das besondere Verhältniß oder die besondere Beziehung dieser Form auf Nutzen und Bedürfniß fällt gänzlich hinweg, da sie überhaupt nur in der Identität mit dem Wesen angeschaut wird.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 575)

20SW I/VII, 305.

21*Filosofia da Arte*, 578.

22Daí a limitação do entendimento da arte a partir de uma teoria das “atmosferas”, segundo Gernot Böhme. Cf. G. Böhme, *Atmosphäre: Essays zur neuen Ästhetik* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995).

fusão com o conceito,”<sup>23</sup> nomeadamente com o conceito de fim. E Schelling observa que certamente foi esta exigência que esteve na origem da arquitetura como bela arte. Mas a antinomia da arquitetura mantém-se, e está apenas reescrita como a contradição de que, por um lado, a arquitetura se tem de libertar da teleologia própria ao utensílio se pretender ser arte, mas, por outro, não o pode fazer sem deixar de ser arquitetura, da qual o uso é parte inevitável.

Esta aparente contradição só pode ser resolvida, diz-nos o autor, na condição de que a arquitetura se liberte e ganhe “independência de si própria.”<sup>24</sup> “A arquitetura só se pode tornar bela ao se tornar também independente *de si própria*, como que a *potência* e livre imitação de *si mesma*.”<sup>25</sup> O conceito de uma imitação de si própria, como uma auto-mimese merece uma explicação. O objeto da mimese não é algo de exterior à obra, mas é a própria função intrínseca, e a tese de Schelling é que a arquitetura só pode transformar a função em forma, ou a forma útil em essência, ao expor reflexivamente a função. Na *auto-imitação*, o conceito de fim é mantido explícito, trazido expressiva e tematicamente para a própria obra. Ele é então traduzido numa forma artística que se torna tanto mais independente do fim útil quanto mais o representa. Os exemplos privilegiados no contexto da prática arquitetónica tradicional seriam as colunas do templo clássico, que representam visivelmente as árvores de um bosque e os suportes de uma obra em madeira, assim como nos motivos vegetalistas de coberturas primitivas que Schelling pretende encontrar – não sem alguma razão – no gótico e na arquitetura hindú. E, principalmente, a evidente auto-representação e teatralização enfática da estrutura técnica na ordem arquitetónica ocidental mais antiga, a ordem dórica. O processo é essencialmente reflexivo, ou seja, a ordem natural da necessidade e da utilidade encontra-se exposta reflexivamente como elemento formal. E é nesta reflexão que a arquitetura expõe à consciência a sua estrutura material e recebe um sentido espiritual, tornando-se arte bela. O material e funcional, a luta contra o peso, é representada e como tal, criado um sujeito representante e idealizador, que surge exibido objetivamente na própria obra. Só assim é possível a unidade de real e ideal, o que irá remeter, como se verá em seguida, inevitavelmente ao organismo e à vida.

Poderíamos talvez encontrar na arquitetura moderna o retorno à concepção original da arquitetura, em que justamente se trata de sublinhar o conceito funcional da utilidade, de modo a reconstruir o belo arquitetónico nas suas fontes primeiras, de auto-imitação reflexiva das suas próprias condições utilitárias. O modernismo, segundo esta concepção Schellinguiana, deve ser entendido com um retorno à origem da ideia arquitetónica.

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<sup>23</sup>*Filosofia da Arte*, 578.

<sup>24</sup>“so wird sie schön nur, indem sie zugleich von *sich selbst* unabhängig, gleichsam die *Potenz* und die freie Nachahmung von *sich selbst* wird” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 578).

<sup>25</sup>“so wird sie schön nur, indem sie zugleich von *sich selbst* unabhängig, gleichsam die *Potenz* und die freie Nachahmung von *sich selbst* wird” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 578).

### 3.2. O organismo arquitetônico

A libertação da finalidade exterior de si mesma, pela sua representação e objetivação miméticas é o que permitirá superar a forma útil – e também, acrescentando-se, o formalismo inútil – trazendo para o interior da própria obra funcional a sua referência ao belo, através do frisar reflexivo da utilidade e da estrutura construtivas, o que corresponde a uma teleologia interior. Esta é a teleologia própria dos organismos, dirigida para a auto-constituição e manutenção de si. E por isso os organismos não são construídos com vista a um fim ideal exterior, como acontece com os artefactos. Na solução da antinomia da arquitetura, somos conduzidos então à teleologia interna do organismo. A teleologia imanente está realizada e é visível no organismo, mas na arquitetura, como vimos, é exposto como inorgânico. Por isso, a arquitetura prefigura e indicia, no seu ritmo, proporção e modulação internas, o orgânico no inorgânico.

Porque liga então a utilidade com a libertação de toda a utilidade, libertação que é própria da arte, a arquitetura é uma arte essencialmente orgânica. Dentro do esquema conceptual das potências de expressão da identidade absoluta, – indiferença entre particular e universal, entre ideal e real, entre consciente e inconsciente, entre ação e conhecimento – a arquitetura é o momento inorgânico do organismo, ou uma organicidade exposta como inorgânica. A arquitetura é explicada então como uma potência de exposição, ou retorno do orgânico ao inorgânico, onde o ser humano, dotado tanto de corpo orgânico quanto da consciência da divisão entre real e ideal, se expõe no e como inorgânico. A arquitetura desempenha a função de um corpo humano inorgânico. Isto está declarado aliás na arquitetura como uma alegorização do orgânico no inorgânico, conforme os exemplos já referidos. Segundo Schelling, esta referência da razão ao inorgânico só pode ocorrer através do organismo, que é o corpo próprio [*Leib*] da razão.<sup>26</sup> Este retorno significa então a alegorização de ideias orgânicas, e do próprio corpo a partir da obra inorgânica. Schelling concebe assim a arquitetura como uma linguagem representativa do orgânico no inorgânico, interpretando-a sobretudo a partir dos motivos primeiros vegetalista, como se viu, mas depois também animalista que encontra nas diferentes formas arquitetônicas. A arquitetura então, só pode ser arte bela pela integração da organicidade na própria obra. Apenas nesta integração ela pode exprimir a sua autonomia como obra e, por conseguinte, expressar o absoluto como identidade do real e do ideal, da natureza e da consciência humana, ou seja, exprimir verdade, conhecimento e auto-conhecimento. Ora, a teleologia imanente é real somente no organismo. Em consequência, “a arquitetura como arte bela tem o organismo como a essência do inorgânico, e por isso deve expor as formas orgânicas como preformadas no inorgânico,”<sup>27</sup> o que pode ser lido em diferentes pormenores das ordens arquitetônicas tradicionais, onde aparece tanto a referida auto-imitação dos elementos

<sup>26</sup>Cf. *Filosofia da Arte*, 577.

<sup>27</sup>“die organischen Formen als präformirt im Anorganischen darstellt.” (*Filosofia da Arte*, 580)

construtivos, quanto os motivos orgânicos ou até mesmo ideais, como no templo dórico, onde o edifício tem o frontão como uma “testa do edifício”, que é o lugar preferencial “das ornamentações com baixos relevos, onde a frente, por assim dizer, significa exteriormente o pensamento.”<sup>28</sup>

A arquitetura exprime, por conseguinte, na matéria inorgânica, a totalidade orgânica que a habita. Ela resolve, por conseguinte, não só o problema da proteção e abrigo do ser humano, como também faz ver e experienciar a integridade deste na sua totalidade natural e consciente de si. Assim, segundo Schelling, no plano epistemológico, a arquitetura é uma expressão artística, o que significa, a identidade entre ação real e conhecimento ideal. Esta identidade é realizada pela exposição da matéria inorgânica como orgânica – o que permite compreender muito das formas aparentemente supérfluas das ordens arquitetônicas tradicionais. E, do mesmo modo, como vimos, a automimese dramatizada dos fins úteis e da estrutura construtiva, eleva-os até ao nível da representação consciente, onde passam a desempenhar a função de um fundamento que se mantém sempre presente na obra arquitetônica, mas presente sob a forma do que é deixado para trás, assimilado e ultrapassado. Os elementos úteis são, assim, integrados numa unidade espiritual que resolve – como sempre resolveu, desde que existe a arquitetura, – a antinomia arquitetônica que começámos por encontrar enunciada na *Crítica do Juízo* de Kant.

#### **4. Conclusão: sobre a arquitetura segundo Hegel**

Como conclusão, e a título de simples indicação do desenvolvimento da filosofia da arquitetura no período do idealismo alemão, refiro apenas alguns dos principais desenvolvimentos que Hegel apresentará acerca da filosofia da arquitetura nas suas *Lições de Estética*, mais de duas décadas após a *Filosofia da Arte* de Schelling.

A arte em geral tem a função de objetivação e reconhecimento do espírito humano, que lhe permite representar-se objetivamente. A arte não tem, por isso, qualquer ligação com o juízo de gosto, sendo uma representação objetiva do espírito por si mesmo, sujeita sobretudo a uma história formativa, em que o espírito busca representar-se objetivamente de forma cada vez mais verdadeira. Com a integração da arquitetura na história do espírito, é o juízo da história que faz a distinção entre a boa e a má arquitetura, entre a boa e a má arte, sem ser preciso – porque isso é evidentemente impossível, e um problema mal colocado – estabelecer critérios gerais e necessários para os juízos de gosto. Aquilo que é representado na arte é a própria liberdade e manifestação, características do espírito ou da consciência humana. Os elementos arquitetônicos constituem, por isso, uma linguagem que refere os conceitos principais característicos da auto-compreensão humana a cada momento.

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<sup>28</sup> “[...] Stirne des Gebäudes. Dieß ist der Ort der vorzüglichsten Verzierungen durch Basreliefs, wo die Stirn gleichsam als Sitz der Gedanken äußerlich angedeutet wird. (*Filosofia da Arte*, 589)

A arquitetura é apresentada por Hegel como a primeira das artes, no sentido da mais próxima da origem da obra de arte, aquela mais ligada à utilidade e à materialidade, da qual as outras artes progressivamente se afastam. Em geral, a arte é libertação e, no caso da arquitetura trata-se da libertação da matéria como gravidade – tema que é uma constante da compreensão da arquitetura desde Schelling até Schopenhauer. Esta libertação vai sendo realizada pela coluna, pelo arco, pelos vãos e pelas abóbodas. A arquitetura está então dividida em três grandes períodos históricos, o simbólico, onde predominam as referências às forças naturais que dominam o homem, o clássico, que descreve a autodescoberta do espírito como diverso dessas forças naturais, e o romântico, que é o período culminante da arquitetura, em que o espírito descobre a sua negatividade e infinidade próprias, e a arquitetura desenvolve todas as suas potencialidades. Este estágio final coincide com a arquitetura gótica. Neste sentido, Hegel apercebe-se com razão, e antecipadamente, do esgotamento das formas arquitetónicas no séc. XIX, situação que só pôde ser superada pela revolução técnica do metal, do betão e do vidro, que veio a libertar as formas arquitetónicas de todas as definições tradicionais.

A solução hegeliana da antinomia kantiana consiste, de modo até certo ponto análogo ao de Schelling, em mostrar que a obra arquitetónica não é um meio útil para um fim, mas uma expressão objetiva e direta da figura com que o espírito em cada momento histórico se concebe a si mesmo. Neste aspecto, o desenvolvimento posterior a Hegel da arquitetura no seio do chamado fim da arte não parece ter desmentido as principais teses destes pioneiros da filosofia da arquitetura.



## 2. Daniel PACHECO

### **Knowledge, Self-Cultivation, and Naturalism: Nietzsche and Architecture in the Middle Works (1878-1882)**

#### **Introduction**

In this chapter I explore the role of architecture within the overall project of Nietzsche's middle works (1878-1882).<sup>29</sup> These writings, far from the Wagnerian and Schopenhauerian influences of the early writings or the more destructive and critical force of later works, instead present a positive formulation of many philosophical ideas and ideals which pave the way for the Nietzschean 'free spirit', which is why *Human All too Human*, *Dawn* and *The Gay Science* are also known as the "Free-Spirit Trilogy". Nietzsche himself had no doubts regarding the essentially positive task of these works. As he retrospectively puts it in *Ecce Homo, Dawn* "is a yea-saying book, deep, but bright and kind and the same applies once more and in the highest degree to the *gaya scienza*" (GS, *Why I Write Such Good Books*).

This chapter explores Nietzsche's formulation of an architectural ideal in these works which helps bring about a joyful science, self-cultivation, and a "naturalistic" turn. I have divided the paper into three parts. First, I show how Nietzsche's use of architecture in HAH reflects the harsh tone of this work in which art and metaphysics are no longer considered sufficient to sustain the increasingly atheistic and scientific world of late modernity. Architecture here mostly mirrors a crisis in Nietzsche's thought, whereby he will now value a more naturalistic and positivistic sort of knowledge which will substitute earlier quests for metaphysical certainties. In the second part of this chapter, I show how in GS architecture seems to gain a renewed importance in Nietzsche as part of his 'positive' philosophical project. Here I will present many of the characteristic insights of Nietzsche's use of architecture in his middle writings, including Nietzsche's call for an architecture that fits the ideal of the seeker of knowledge (GS, §280) and the relationship between architecture and self-cultivation (*ibid*, §291).

In the third and final part I will focus on Nietzsche's claim that "we wish to see *ourselves* translated into stone and plants" (GS, §280), arguing how it highlights Nietzsche's naturalism not only as a methodological one, but also as both symbolic and practical. I then dedicate a subsection

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<sup>29</sup>For Nietzsche's published works, I generally use the Cambridge University Press editions. GS, D and NCW are the exceptions, for which I use Kauffman's, Smith's and Ludovici's translations respectively. For unpublished fragments I use KSA, and for unpublished works (e.g. PTAG), their existing English translations. I use cite sections rather than pages for Nietzsche's works, abbreviations can be found in the bibliography.

to what it could mean to be translated into stone and another into plants. The former will reveal how stone is a primordial symbol of the natural world in Nietzsche, while the latter, besides reinforcing our turn towards the naturalistic plane of existence, will give us an understanding of the practical role of architecture, and within it of gardening, in Nietzsche's project of a *gai saber* and self-cultivation.

In my analysis, I will mostly be using Nietzsche's published writings from 1878-1882, though the reader may find my argument complemented by exegeses of Nietzsche's published and unpublished fragments from this or other periods, not to mention any literature relevant to the topic. I will try to read Nietzsche as he himself proposes in the preface to *Dawn* (P, §5): slowly, approaching the selected passages in constant communication with Nietzsche's philosophy and biography while giving special attention to the nuances of the language he uses.

Finally, a word on the choice of this topic. Architecture broadly conceived is found in the history of Western philosophy since at least René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, namely as a metaphorical device for laying down epistemic foundations and building philosophical systems (Lacour: 1999). Nietzsche, however, famously claims that he does not trust any systematisers, finding "the will to a system. . . a lack of integrity." (TI, *Arrows and Epigrams*, §26). Yet, Nietzsche will refer to architecture and architectonic language throughout his writings. This is especially true of his middle writings, and I will claim that it gains a special relevance as part of Nietzsche's positive project of these writings. In the conclusion, I hope to come back to the relevance of architecture in Nietzsche's free spirit project. In the meantime, the reader will find in this paper an attempt at a general contribution to the scholarship on Nietzsche's middle writings with unprecedented attention to his thoughts on architecture.

## 1. **Architecture in *Human All too Human*: The Monument of a Crisis and the Crisis of our Monuments**

Architecture in Nietzsche's middle period evolves in two distinctive moments. The first mirrors Nietzsche's intellectual and personal condition at the time of HAH, a book that he himself called the "monument of a crisis" (EH, *Why I Write*, HAH §1). It is a book that marks an intellectual liberation from Wagner and Schopenhauer, a turn from the metaphysical to the human, all-too-human. This period culminates in GS, where we find the second phase of Nietzsche's thoughts and use of architecture in the middle period, the development of an architectural ideal consistent with

some of the main ideas from these writings.<sup>30</sup>

*Human All too Human* opens with a chapter on the *First and Last Things*, in which Nietzsche calls us to turn away from our investigations into the metaphysical world and turn to the “closest”, natural things. Even if a metaphysical world existed, he claims, “knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge” (HAH, §9). This book, then, bears the mark of a new sort of knowledge which demands great discipline and resilience in the face of our loss of metaphysical foundations. At this point, Nietzsche’s thoughts on architecture are mostly a reflection of our condition of an all-too-human humanity, the monument of a crisis reflected in the crisis of our monuments:

“*Stone is more stone than it used to be.* – In general we no longer understand architecture; at least we do not do so nearly as well as we understand music. We have grown out of the symbolism of lines and figures, just as we have weaned ourselves from the sound-effects of rhetoric, and no longer imbibe this kind of cultural mother’s milk from the first moment of our lives. Everything in a Greek or Christian building originally signified something of a higher order of things: this feeling of inexhaustible significance lay about the building like a magical veil. Beauty entered this system only incidentally, without essentially encroaching upon the fundamental sense of the uncanny and exalted, of consecration by magic and the proximity of the divine; at most beauty *mitigated* the *dread* – but this dread was everywhere the presupposition. . .” (HAH, §218)<sup>31</sup>

The very title of the aphorism presents a challenge: why exactly is stone more stone than before? In the third part of this chapter I will explore this assertion in more detail. For now, I want to focus on what is explicit and clear about this passage, which is that it is presented as a lament about the perceived loss of meaning in our great buildings. Our understanding of architecture has decreased because these buildings (the Greek or Christian temples) have lost their religious or magical meaning, which means that they no longer supply the metaphysical and existential comfort they used to. Our modern worldview does not even take the latter as a “presupposition” anymore. What is there to mitigate then? What are these buildings *for* in modernity?

This passage, in keeping with the whole of HAH, presages the great crisis of the ‘death of

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<sup>30</sup>It’s also important to note that Nietzsche’s thoughts on architecture in this period are vastly different than what we find in his early and later works. In his early works architecture is associated to philosophical and stylistic building, cf. PTAG: 112-13; KSA: 8, 18[23]. In later works it is associated to great culture building. Cf. TI: *Skirmishes of an Untimely Man*, §11 and AC §58. See also Buddensieg (1999) for an appreciation of Nietzsche’s biographical evolution of architectural taste and Lacour (1999) for an interesting overview of the use of philosophical architectonics in Plato, Descartes and Kant.

<sup>31</sup>The Cambridge University Press translation for HAH renders the title as: “Stone is more stony than before”. Because Nietzsche simply writes “*Der Stein ist mehr Stein als früher*” I will always render “stony” as “stone”, which is more literal and conveys a clearer meaning for what I will later propose about this sentence.

God' which will not appear until GS. In a note from the time in which Nietzsche was writing GS, we find an explicit connection between the death of God and the loss of architectural meaning:

“Where has God gone? What have we done? Have we drunk up the ocean? What sponge have we used to obliterate the whole horizon around us? How have we managed to erase the fixed, eternal line to which in the past all lines and measurements referred to, by which all life’s builders [*alle Baumeister des Lebens*] did their buildings, and without which there seemed to be no perspective, no order, no architecture [*Baukunst*]?” (KSA 9, 14[25])

With the ‘Death of God’ it is not only buildings that lose their meaning, not only have the figures and lines lost their symbolic power, but the very rules of architecture have lost their foundation with the withdrawal of the “eternal line” that guided architecture. We have “lost all gravity, because for us there is no up or down” anymore (ibid.) Nietzsche shows a deep concern with the lack of meaning resulting from this event, reinforcing the tone of lamentation as it relates to architecture when he writes of the

“aura of [Christian] architecture, which, as the abode of divinity, reaches up into obscurity, in the dark spaces of which the divinity may at any moment make evident his dreaded presence – who would want mankind to experience such things again, now that the presuppositions behind them are no longer believed in?” (HAH, §130)

Here Nietzsche recognizes that religion was important for man to cultivate inner spiritual feelings. The problem is that we lack solid foundations for these feelings, something which is also valid for our *contemplation* of buildings. In a note from this period, Nietzsche tells us that one of the origins of art is to be deceived, including by architecture (KSA 9, 11[51]).<sup>32</sup> The problem, as we saw, is when we lose the foundations for this deception. What sort of building or architecture should we moderns identify with, then? In GS, Nietzsche offers us an alternative to despair.

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32“... to be harmlessly deceived (conjurer, actor, storyteller, etc.), or in architecture, *as if* the stones could talk”.

## 2. An Architecture for Knowledge and Self-Cultivation

### A. Architecture and the Passion of Knowledge

Nietzsche's path towards his positive project culminates in GS, and his architectural ideal is summarised in GS §280, the central section for analysis in my paper:

*Architecture for the search for knowledge [Architektur der Erkennenden].— One day, and probably soon, we need some recognition of what above all is lacking in our big cities: quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection. Places with long, high-ceilinged cloisters for bad or all too sunny weather where no shouting or noise of carriages can reach and where good manners would prohibit even priests from praying aloud—buildings and sites that would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside. The time is past when the church possessed a monopoly on reflection, when the *vita contemplativa* always had to be first of all a *vita religiosa*; and everything built by the church gives expression to that idea. I do not see how we could remain content with such buildings even if they were stripped of their churchly purposes. The language spoken by these buildings is far too rhetorical and unfree, reminding us that they are houses of God and ostentatious monuments of some supramundane discourse; we who are godless could not think *our thoughts* in such surroundings. We wish to see *ourselves* translated into stone and plants, we want to take walks in *ourselves* when we stroll around these buildings and gardens.*

This aphorism can be divided into three distinct yet interconnected subsections. First, there is the call for an architecture for knowledge-seekers. Then, a contrasting opposition between this sort of architecture and the type of architecture which has dominated contemplative life for the past two millennia, religious (Christian) architecture. Finally, we find Nietzsche's wish to see ourselves "translated" into elements such as stone and plants as part of the new type of architecture he is calling for. What I want to do now is to briefly frame the first and second subsections of this aphorism within the context of the ideas of Nietzsche's middle period. The second subsection will be revisited in the final part of my paper, which will also deal with the third one.

As we saw, starting from HAH Nietzsche turns towards a more scientific type of knowledge away from the first and last things. At the root of this new attitude is Nietzsche's reading of the new place knowledge has come to occupy among human beings. This is what, in *Dawn* §429, he calls our passion for knowledge:

*The new passion. . . our drive for knowledge* is too strong for us to be able still to value happiness without knowledge or the happiness provided by a strong, deeply rooted delusion; we find it painful even to imagine such a state!. . . Knowledge has been transformed into a passion in us that does not shrink from any sacrifice and, at bottom, fears nothing but its own extinction; we honestly believe that under the pressure and suffering of *this* passion the whole of humanity must believe itself to be more sublime and more consoled than previously, when it had not yet overcome its envy of the cruder pleasure and contentment that result from barbarism. Perhaps humanity will even be destroyed by this passion for knowledge!

Knowledge now finds the condition of a passion amongst humans, one which we accept to pursue at the cost of our potential perishing. Not even deeply rooted delusions can pull us away from this new passion. In *Dawn*, then, Nietzsche seems to fully accept the pressures that come along with superior knowledge, and although he admits *Dawn* may have overtones of a harsh book, he ultimately casts it as an affirmative one (EH, *Why I Write, D* §1-2). But to truly survive the audacity of knowledge inaugurated in HAH, Nietzsche will need more than *Dawn*, he will need his project of a joyful science: “Gay Science”: that signifies the saturnalia of a spirit who has patiently resisted a terrible, long pressure” (GS, *Preface*, §1). *The Gay Science* is presented as a cure to the disease – physical, spiritual, intellectual – that was afflicting Nietzsche at the time. This is the intellectual context to Nietzsche’s call for an architecture for knowledge-seekers as Nietzsche realizes that the project of a joyful science must be accompanied by an architectural ideal: architecture must facilitate the coming of the gay or joyful scientist.

The second part of GS §280, which deals with the opposition between *vita contemplativa* and *vita religiosa*, is also presaged in *Dawn*, where Nietzsche speaks of the “religious natures, who preponderate in the *vita contemplativa*” (§41). In *Dawn*, Nietzsche is clearly pushing for a new version of the contemplative life, one unfettered from the figures it has hitherto been associated to, including the priest or the philosopher as he is traditionally conceived (ibid.) Nietzsche’s view of the contemplative life is one turned towards *this* world, not away from it:

To relinquish the world without knowing it, like a nun — that leads to an infertile, perhaps melancholic solitude. This has nothing in common with the solitude of the thinker's *vita contemplativa*. . . (D, §440)

In GS §280, a new ideal for the *vita contemplativa* is contrasted to the contemplative life understood in terms of a religious life. The thoughts of the new contemplators cannot be thought

within churches, those houses of supramundane discourse which in GS §125 Nietzsche calls the tombs of a dead God. The “thinker’s *vita contemplativa*”, unlike the Christian one, is a life by which the thinker “leaps into *his* water” and thus “attains *his* serenity” (D, §440). Architecture for Nietzsche is constitutive of the conditions for this new sort of serene contemplative life, “where good manners would prohibit even priests from praying aloud” in the thinkers’ buildings (GS, §280).

In GS §280, then, Nietzsche’s architecture finds a direct relationship to ideas of earlier books from the middle period. There is, moreover, a strong biographical dimension to GS §280: as we know, in 1880 Nietzsche began to make the discovery of secular urban and palace architecture in Italy, especially in Genoa and later Turin (Bacqué, 1986; Buddensieg, 1999). I now want to give a closer look to Nietzsche’s admiration for the architects and architecture of Genoa, through which we will see how, for Nietzsche, architecture appears as integral to the ideal of self-cultivation.

## **B. Architecture and Self-Cultivation**

This is the passage in which Nietzsche declares his admiration for the Genoese:

“*Genoa.*— For a long while now I have been looking at this city, at its villas and pleasure gardens and the far-flung periphery of its inhabited heights and slopes. In the end I must say: I see faces that belong to past generations; this region is studded with the images of bold aristocratic human beings. They have *lived* and wished to live on: that is what they are telling me with their houses, built and adorned to last for centuries and not for a fleeting hour; they were well-disposed toward life, however ill-disposed they often may have been toward themselves. I keep seeing the builders, their eyes resting on everything near and far that they have built, and also on the city, the sea, and the contours of the mountains, and there is violence and conquest in their eyes. All this they want to fit into *their* plan and ultimately make their *possession* by making it part of their plan. This whole region is overgrown with this magnificent, insatiable selfishness of the lust for possessions and spoils; and even as these people refused to recognize any boundaries in distant lands and, thirsting for what was new, placed a new world beside the old one, each rebelled against each at home, too, and found a way to express his superiority and to lay between himself and his neighbor his personal infinity. Each once more conquered his homeland for himself by overwhelming it with his architectural ideas and refashioning it into a house that was a feast for his eyes.” (GS, §291)

This passage follows a celebrated section about self-cultivation in which Nietzsche speaks of the need to “give style” to oneself, by surveying one’s “strengths and weaknesses” and “fit them into an artistic plan” (GS, §290). Nietzsche proposes that we observe ourselves daily and attempt to transform and cultivate ourselves, removing, for instance, “a piece of original nature” here, or concealing a piece of ugliness that cannot be removed elsewhere (ibid.) The Genoese, for Nietzsche, appear as great masters of this self-fashioning, something Nietzsche saw in their buildings and gardens; a self-fashioning manifested in the way they cultivated their surroundings: “[a]ll this they want to fit into *their* plan and ultimately make their *possession* by making it part of their plan.” (§291) By emphasising possessive pronouns and using the same language throughout both aphorisms, Nietzsche delineates the intimate connection between the self and surroundings as sites of cultivation.

The importance of buildings and therefore architecture as something that must stand as an image of ourselves is already obvious in GS §280 when Nietzsche writes that “we want to take walks in *ourselves* when we stroll around these buildings and gardens.” It is also a theme that is taken up again in *Zarathustra*: “[w]hat do these houses mean? Truly, no great soul placed them here, as a parable of itself!” (Z, *On Virtues that Make Small*, §1). The novel idea is that self-cultivation is not only about what we can do with ourselves, but also, quite paradoxically, with our surroundings which we, like the Genoese, want to transform according to *ourselves*; to remove, add and alter according to our own character. To include our surroundings into our artistic plans is to simultaneously make them part of that “self” which is an object of cultivation.

The idea that these men wanted to conquer “the sea, and the contours of the mountains”, furthermore, gains substance in an unpublished fragment from this period of Nietzsche’s thought, where he attempts to predict the future of humanity as creators: “humanity will, for a few hundred years, work to beautify nature herself instead of fashioning works of art” (KSA 9, 4[136]). Self-cultivation will not stop at fashioning ourselves into works of art, nor simply at producing artworks; it now includes making nature itself an object of beautification, a place to *conquer*, like the Genoese did with their mountains, according to our character. Let us now advance to the final part of my paper, which argues that in this architectural ideal some sort of naturalism seems to be at work.

### **3. Naturalism in Nietzsche’s Architecture: Reconquering nature.**

#### **A. Naturalism and Architecture**

That in GS §280 Nietzsche calls us to leave supramundane discourse and “translate ourselves” into stones and plants is more than a call for knowledge or self-cultivation. What



Nietzsche wishes with this “translation” is to be read next to his more general aspiration to see us translated back into nature. This we find well fleshed out in a later aphorism from BGE, where Nietzsche expresses his desire

“[t]o translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic text of *homo natura* so far” (BGE, §230)

This passage presents a development of the idea presented in GS §109, in which Nietzsche calls for a reintegration of humanity into nature. For Nietzsche, humans are natural beings, our “spirit” shares with other organisms that which “physiologists have established for everything that lives, grows, and propagates” (BGE, §230). It is in the middle works that Nietzsche can be said to become a naturalist<sup>33</sup> as he starts paying attention to the drives of our organisms and “physics” (or the necessities of nature) instead of “metaphysics” (GS, §335). This implies a battle against values and philosophical notions posited in the transcendent. As Christopher Janaway puts it:

“He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, instead emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of human beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking drives, instincts, and affects which he locates in our physical, bodily existence.” (2007, p. 34)

Nietzsche, then, rejects the idea of values and an existence rooted in a transcendent or metaphysical world, instead focusing on our bodily affects and drives. The whole fabricated distinction between this world and a “real” one Nietzsche finds as early as in Plato’s forms, Christianity’s Kingdom of God and up to Kant’s thing-in-itself. We find this critical insight of Nietzsche’s philosophy expressed in the second part GS §280, which I promised to revisit. Similarly to his critique of the ascetic ideal in the third essay of GM, Nietzsche here casts his rejection of a *vita contemplativa* as *vita religiosa*, with churches as its architectural habitat:

The time is past when the church possessed a monopoly on reflection, when the *vita contemplativa* always had to be first of all a *vita religiosa*; and everything built by the church gives expression to that idea. I do not see how we could remain content with such buildings even if they were stripped of their churchly purposes. The language spoken by these buildings is far too rhetorical and unfree, reminding us that they are houses of God and

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<sup>33</sup>Although this interest is not new. In early years Nietzsche was deeply interested in the natural sciences and even his lectures on the “Pre-Platonic” thinkers offer constant comparison with the sciences of his day. See Emden 2013.

ostentatious monuments of some supramundane discourse; we who are godless could not think *our thoughts* in such surroundings.

But Nietzsche's task is not merely a negative one. As I mentioned, his general focus on the drives and affects, especially starting with *Dawn*, reveal a philosopher who has the positive project of grounding our self-understanding within naturalistic explanatory accounts of our values. The specific type of naturalism one finds in Nietzsche, according to Leiter, is a (speculative) methodological naturalism (M-naturalism), which means Nietzsche models philosophical inquiry in the inquiry of the empirical sciences (2002, p. 3; cf. 2013, p. 577), attempting to give (speculative) accounts of the origins and causes of our values, i.e. a natural history of morals,<sup>34</sup> not to mention a purely evolutionary account of things such as our consciousness (cf. GS, §11).

If Nietzsche does wish to highlight our full participation in nature and to shift our self-understanding to this participation, he is sometimes also cautious to note that we should will to differentiate ourselves from nature: “[t]o live – is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is living not valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?” (BGE, §9) Nietzsche's emphasis on “valuating” informs readings which highlight his “normative” commitments (Clark & Dudrick: 2012) and apparently limit the definition of Nietzsche as a strict naturalist. However, according to Leiter, Nietzsche's valuating project of creating new values, which Nietzsche defends as the task of the philosopher proper, isn't opposed to his naturalism: it just *isn't* part of the naturalistic project understood as *method* (Leiter 2013, p. 582). Instead, to the Nietzsche who provokes us into creating new values, Leiter calls the “therapeutic” Nietzsche (ibid: 583). The “Humean” (i.e. methodological naturalist) Nietzsche speculatively exposes the natural roots of our values and philosophical notions while the “therapeutic” Nietzsche arouses our affects and senses so as to enable us to create new values.

There is, I claim, a supplementary sort of naturalism at work in Nietzsche's architectural call to translate ourselves into stones and plants, one which, although not clearly philosophical, is instrumental to Nietzsche's project of naturalistic retranslation. While it is true his architectural ideal of this period cannot be said to be properly naturalistic, i.e. what architects usually call the use of naturalistic elements in ornamentation such as carved vegetal motifs, Nietzsche's architecture at this point has the clear role of supplying us with a sort of naturalism which is both symbolic and practical. It is symbolic in that it replaces the otherworldly architecture of churches with a new places for reflection amidst stones and plants. Just like in so much of his naturalistic imagery, Nietzsche entices us to reconquer not only our natural status, a feature of the “Humean” Nietzsche, but also nature itself. Sometimes Nietzsche means this quite literally as some sort of mastering over

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<sup>34</sup>Leiter also claims we find a splinter of substantive naturalism (S-naturalism) in Nietzsche's will to have a “results continuity” between philosophy and the sciences, which means mostly physiology in his day (2002: 5; 2013: 578)

nature, going as far as far as mentioning the Alps as a new site to reconquer (KSA 9, 4[136]). And it is practical because this is precisely the sort of atmosphere Nietzsche deems necessary for the flourishing of the free spirits who are to study the natural and human, all too human origins of our values. The bottom line is that translating ourselves into stone and plants—and we shall see what exactly Nietzsche means by that—supplies us with a symbolic and practical atmosphere for us to become students of our values and philosophical notions qua developments of a species inserted in the natural realm.

To the effect of leaving the unfree discourse of churches behind, then, we need not only an architectural alternative, places “with long, high-ceilinged cloisters”, but also “to see *ourselves* translated into stone and plants” so that we may “take walks in *ourselves* when we stroll around these buildings and gardens.” (ibid) Thanks to GS §291, we partly know what it means to see ourselves in these buildings and gardens; it is a matter of projecting ourselves into our surroundings, of styling them according to our character and making them part of our cultivation. But this does not exhaust the meaning of translating ourselves into “stones” and “plants”. The rest of my paper will have as its goal to unpack what this could mean both at a philosophical and a more practical level. For now, let us note that translating ourselves into stone and plant is an important, indeed a crucial step to translate humanity back into nature, something evidenced by the fact Nietzsche talks about the need to translate ourselves into plants and stones *before* BGE §230, which suggests the architectural part of this project is not a mere epiphenomenon to the task of translating ourselves back into nature and reconquering it, but rather constitutive of it.

### B. ‘*Der Stein ist mehr Stein als früher*’: Nietzsche on reconquering our natural status

Let us go back to the title of aphorism §218 of HAH, which I previously promised to unpack: “*Stone is more stone than before*”. As I mentioned above, this could be misleading at first as one could contrast it with the content of the aphorism, in which Nietzsche claims that the stones and buildings of our architecture have lost their meaning. This is to be understood within the context of an architectural meaning that used to be transcendent, divine and magical. I claim that for Nietzsche, stone is now *more* stone than before because what has been lost in transcendent meaning has been gained in immanent, fully naturalized and rediscovered “stoniness”.

The place of stone in Nietzsche’s philosophy is not always easy to pin down; in *Zarathustra* alone the word “stone(s)” appears three dozen times with many different meanings. Here, we want to understand which uses of “stone” and related terms by Nietzsche best illuminate my claim that in HAH §276 stone symbolizes our riddance of transcendent meanings, which we have now naturalized into *this* plane of existence. We find one such passage right after the aphorism on our

translation into nature (BGE, §230). Nietzsche, who had just been talking about how our “spirits” are geared towards mastery of the self and surroundings, now talks about those things which we cannot change:

in our ground, at the very “bottom”, there is something unteachable, a granite of spiritual *Fatum*, of predetermined decisions and answers to predetermined questions. . . an unchangeable “this is Me” (BGE, §231)<sup>35</sup>

Granite represents the most unmovable, solid form of stone. As Nishitani Keiji (1990) and Graham Parkes (1994) have shown, Nietzsche’s use of *Granit* is informed by his acquaintance with Goethe’s essay (“*Über den Granit*”). Nietzsche follows Goethe in his appreciation of granite as part of a “continuum of life stretching from stone to human beings” (Graham Parks 1994, p. 135). This discussion becomes even more clear if we go back to the first instance in which Nietzsche urges us to turn into stone, which is not GS §280 but actually D §541: “*How one should turn to stone. — Slowly, slowly become hard like a precious stone — and finally lie there still and silent, to the joy of all eternity.*” Nietzsche uses the symbolic turning into stone as the way to inscribe ourselves into *this* natural world, for all eternity. Indeed, eternity is already in this world of eternal becoming, not in a promised, “real” world. We therefore make sense of this passage by taking into account that for Nietzsche, following Goethe, granite is the crudest incarnation of stone and a basic symbol of natural life, and that already in the title of HAH §218 Nietzsche wants to make of stone the greatest symbol of an existence understood in purely natural terms.

The task of translation into stone, therefore, is more than simply projecting ourselves into our buildings, as the Genoese did. We are not only after conquering our surroundings, we are after reconquering nature, *including* finding and reinterpreting the “eternal text” of *homo natura* which we have lost amongst priestly and all too idealistic scribblings. Stone represents this most basic and crucial element of natural life with no relation to supramundane discourse. The naked building stones of our architecture, then, appear as a promise for reconquering the natural world of which we are part.

### **C. Translating Ourselves into Plants: Gardens and the Shoots of our Drives**

One of the dimensions of our translation into plants is practically identical to our translation into stones. Michael Marder (2013) and Vanessa Lemm (2016) give us ample evidence that Nietzsche saw a kind of continuity between plants and humanity. Lemm, particularly, shows how plants and

35My translation. Our Cambridge University Press translation renders *Granit* as “brick wall”. My decision to keep “granite” is justifiable on the grounds that Nietzsche was well acquainted with Goethe’s essay “*Über den Granit*”.

humans share in their “freedom to creatively form and transform their forms of life” (2016, p. 71). From plants, which are both determined by their soil but can also adapt and transform around them, Nietzsche gains the insight that we can learn to “cultivate a moral character without having to deny the instincts of life and nature” (ibid: 72), that is, to be value creators (valuators) without denying those things which are necessary and unchangeable to us as organic beings involved in nature.

At an architectural level, however, Nietzsche’s most important figuration of translating ourselves into plants is in the form of *gardens*. Gardens, of course, also represent another rhetorical instance of Nietzsche’s call to turn towards the natural world: “the world awaits you like a garden” (Z, *The Convalescent*, §1). The garden is no longer the melancholic Edenic image of perfection which we have ruined through original sin, but a new promise for redeeming and affirming the world. This is another instance of symbolic naturalism used by the “therapeutic” Nietzsche to help advance some of the basic premises of the “Humean” Nietzsche. Surrounding ourselves with such naturalistic imagery is supposed to help us understand ourselves in natural terms.

What kind of gardens does Nietzsche have in mind? Ansell-Pearson (2014) has emphasized the importance the model of the Epicurean garden had in Nietzsche’s middle period, citing one of Nietzsche’s letters to his friend Peter Gast from 1879, where the former asks: ‘*Where* are we going to renew the garden of Epicurus?’ (2014, p. 244). In these gardens Nietzsche sought to cultivate a modest existence of emotional joyfulness and withdrawal from public life (ibid, 239). This conception of the garden, where Epicurus and his followers sought to further their understanding of the world and to moderately cultivate pleasure, therefore, is what in GS §280 Nietzsche imagines as one of those architectural “sites that would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside.”

To be translated into plants, like in the case of stones, is a matter of translating ourselves back into nature. But it is also more than that. By reading Nietzsche next to Epicurus, or by simply following GS §280, we understand that it is a matter of creating for ourselves gardens in which our passion for knowledge may be practiced as we step aside from the noise of the public market: architecture in general and the garden in particular have immediate practical effects. Moreover, in *Dawn*, the image of the garden and gardener emerges numerous times as a metaphor for self-cultivation. In D §174, for instance, Nietzsche writes of “*fashioning* out of oneself something the other will behold with pleasure, a lovely, peaceful, self-enclosed garden”, which lays the image of the garden as a possibility for the great self-fashioning we find in GS §290 while also casting the ethical ideal of focusing on the self as a replacement to Christian compassion (*Mitleid*) turned solely towards the other (Ansell-Pearson, 2014, p. 254; Ure, p 2006, p. 84). Nietzsche also writes specifically of the self-cultivation of the thinker: “Woe to the thinker” he declares, “who is not the

gardener but only the earth for the plants that grow in him!” (D, §382). Finally, this call for being gardeners of ourselves is complemented by D §560:

*What we are free to do.* — One can handle one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of one’s anger, pity, musing, vanity as fruitfully and advantageously as beautiful fruit on espaliers. . .

In Nietzsche’s turn towards the closest things, such as our drives and the necessary “physics” of the world, the garden metaphor allows us to visualize a place where, on top of those necessary things, we find space for those things which we are “free to do”: to cultivate the shoots of our drives and passions, a world of possibilities which demands an endless process of cultivation.<sup>36</sup> Architecture, be it in the forms of stony, all-too-stony buildings with high ceilings or in the welcoming plants of Epicurean gardens, presents itself to Nietzsche as the possibility to incarnate the ideals of his middle period, including a gay science, self-cultivation, and a naturalistic retranslation of humankind.

### **Conclusion: Temples of knowledge and *The Gay Science***

Through the course of this paper, I have attempted to offer a detailed account of the place of architecture within Nietzsche’s middle writings, showing how architecture has a constitutive role in the ideal of the knowledge-seeking, self-cultivating free spirit. I also hope to have shown how, for Nietzsche, architecture has a both a symbolic and practical role in re-establishing humanity as part of a natural realm of existence detached from otherworldly meanings, with stone being a particularly strong symbol of this and gardens presenting the ethical possibilities that such a retranslation entails.

The type of architecture Nietzsche is calling for is seldom to be found, least of all in the campuses and spaces of many of our universities, which rarely invite the “sublimity and thoughtfulness of stepping aside.” (GS, §280) But these temples of knowledge and self-cultivation do exist, mostly in the form of richly funded foundations or research centres. In places like the *Getty Center* in Los Angeles or the *Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation* in Lisbon, two hubs for science and culture, the knowledge-seeker and self-cultivating individual will be protected from the roaring buzz of the city and immersed in the organic complicity of an all too stony stone and welcoming gardens. Defining Nietzsche’s ideal of architecture as naturalistic of some sort is also a

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<sup>36</sup>Aaron Ridley (2017) attempts to show how gardening in Nietzsche’s thought apparently resolves the paradox between his claim that we are fated as we are and that we can become creators, thus showing how our “freedom” is built on a base of necessity.

timely topic in architecture. As of July 2019, UNESCO has recognized eight of Frank Lloyd Wright's buildings as World Heritage Site. Wright's concept of an "organic architecture" often lends itself to resemblances with what I have argued is Nietzsche's ideal for architecture.

This said, let us go back to Nietzsche one last time. His detailed account of architecture, as we saw, appears in *The Gay Science*, which is the book in which Nietzsche's middle writings project culminates.<sup>37</sup> Those who have closely analysed GS, however, have not given much importance to the role architecture plays in it as a culmination of Nietzsche's positive project. Monika M. Langer (2010) offers her reading of §280 in her attempt to read the book with a "dancing" (rather than rigid) coherence. Her method is based on finding such coherence between an aphorism and the ones that precede and follow it. In the case of GS §280, the prior aphorisms are about accepting fate and lost friendships, and the ones after about "knowing how to end" in style and metaphorical war-making. Faced with this, Langer's (2010, p. 170-71) attempt to show how these aphorisms are in communication remains extremely unconvincing, and they tell us nothing about architecture's role in Nietzsche's GS. In Robert Pippin's reading of GS (2010, p. 23-44), architecture is not featured once. Pippin, nonetheless, does well in coming up with the question, *What is a Gay Science?*, and at least partially with the answer: "to sustain the intellectual conscience constitutive of a *philosophical life*" (ibid, p. 44). My paper has shown how architecture is constitutive of this "philosophical life", by which we understand a life practiced by Nietzsche's ideal of the free spirit, which includes self-cultivation, a turn to our new object of passion (knowledge), and the natural world to which we belong.

How can architecture, however, inform our own appreciation of what a gay or joyful science is? Walter Kauffman, in his translation of GS, has dealt with the specific problem posed by the title (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*). As our translator notes, "*Wissenschaft* does not bring to mind only – perhaps not even primarily – the natural sciences but any serious, disciplined rigorous quest for knowledge" (GS: *Translator's Introduction*, p. 2). In what is perhaps the most influential work in the history of architectural theory, the Roman military engineer Gentile Vitruvius' *De architectura libri decem* ("Ten books on architecture"), which was rediscovered during the Renaissance and gave architects from this period numerous insights into ancient architecture and informed all architectural treatises thenceforth, one of the main working axioms was precisely that "*architectura est scientia*" ("*architecture is a science*"). But architecture today is not just a "science" as we understand it. Architecture, which embraces the necessary "physics" of the world while opening the doors to creativity (GS, §335), is indeed a *fröhliche* or "gay" science in which scientific precision is paired with artistic playfulness; the latter aspect of a gay science Nietzsche found as early as with those

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<sup>37</sup>As he put it in the back cover of the 1882 edition: "with this book a series of Friedrich Nietzsche's writings comes to a close".

great masters of the *gai saber*, the Provençal knight-poets (BGE, §260). To finish my paper, I will leave my reader with the thought that there is perhaps no stronger representation to what a gay science is than architecture, which we can easily associate to Nietzsche's great promise, presented in GS §113, of a "higher organic system" in which "artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life will join with scientific thinking".

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### ***List of Abbreviations:***

- AC: "The Antichrist", in *The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- BGE: *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- BT: *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, trans. R. Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- EH: "Ecce Homo", in *The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005
- D: *Dawn*, trans. B. Smith, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- GS: *The Gay Science*, trans. W. Kauffmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- HAH: *Human all too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996.
- KSA: *Kritische Studienausgabe*, eds. G. Colli and M.azzino, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988.
- NCW: "Nietzsche Contra Wagner", in *The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, and Selected Aphorisms*, trans. A. M. Ludovici. Salt Lake City, UT: Project Gutenberg Literary Archive



Foundation, 2008.

PTAG: *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. M. Cowan. Washington D.C.: Regnery, 1962.

TI: “Twilight of the Idols”, in *The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

UM: *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Holingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1997.

Z: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans A. Caro, eds. A. Caro and R. Pippin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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3. Marco DAMONTE

## Wittgenstein's House and Architecture as a Gesture

### 1. Philosophical interpretation of the Kundmannngasse House: the *Tractatus*

The first philosophical analysis on the house built by Ludwig Wittgenstein for his sister Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein in Kundmannngasse was published in 1965, in the Italian review "Aut Aut" by Ugo Giacomini (Giacomini, 1965). From then on, the interest for that building has become relevant in Wittgensteinian studies. During the Seventies of the past century a group of young architects under the supervision of Thomas Sperling and Ottokar Uhl carried out decisive enquiries on the Kundmannngasse House, which, at the end of the war, the Russians used as barracks and stables, and where Margarete returned from 1947 to her death (1958). The house was saved from demolition at the last minute by being declared a national monument by the Viennese Landmark Commission after that its last owner, Thomas Stonborough, sold it and which is now the seat of the Bulgarian Cultural Institute. Moreover, in the same years, William Johnson (Johnston, 1972), Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (Janik & Toulmin, 1973) illustrated the Austrian culture between the Nineteenth and the Twentieth century. These two factors gave rise to three points of view: considering the Kundmannngasse House an architectonic object, studying in depth its relationship with Wittgenstein's thought, or, finally, interpreting it in the light of cultural history in which it rises. About the second of these perspectives, the article *La casa di Wittgenstein* by Francesco Amendolagine and Massimo Cacciari can be considered a pioneering attempt (Amendolagine & Cacciari, 1975), since it has offered, on the one hand, a morphological and semiotic analysis between Wittgenstein's philosophical style and his architectonic conception and, on the other hand, comparing Wittgenstein's architectonic style with examples derived from the history of architecture. In this way *La casa di Wittgenstein* anticipated Günther Gebauer's, Rüdiger Ohme's and Lothar Rentschler's contributions<sup>38</sup> aimed at showing that the Kundmannngasse House represents an essential passage between Wittgenstein's philosophy written before his architectonic effort and the one written after it. In quite an unavoidable way, this separation overcame the manual distinction between the so called *first* Wittgenstein, the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and the so-called *second* Wittgenstein, the author of *Philosophical Investigations*. As a consequence, the

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38 Contained in G. Gebauer, A. Grünwald, R. Ohme, L. Rentschler, T. Sperling & O. Uhl, *Wien, Kundmannngasse 19*, Wilhelm Fink, München 1982.

Kundmannngasse House is usually considered either the exemplification of the *Tractatus* or an anticipation of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Those who insist on a parallelism between the Kundmannngasse House and the *Tractatus*, as George Henrik von Wright did in an essay in 1982, underly some stylistic analogies based on the notion of simplicity and staticity: «the building is Wittgenstein's work down to its smallest detail and is highly characteristic of its creator. It is free from all decoration and marked by a severe exactitude in measure and proportion. Its beauty is of the same simple and static kind that belong to sentences of the *Tractatus*» (Von Wright, 1982, p. 24). Actually, attention to details is a theme that is common to Wittgenstein's work in philosophy and architecture, but it would be a mistake to see this simply as a matter of personality or temperament. Wittgenstein's method of examining specific examples in detail is achieved notwithstanding an explicit awareness that philosophy resists this sort of attention in its quest for universal explanations: in matters of aesthetics, he demonstrates a similar concern for detail even if for other reasons.

Otherwise, and more accurately, Peter Galison connects the aesthetic doctrine of the Kundmannngasse House design to the Tractarian one of logical atomism, according to which all meaningful propositions are built up of truth-functional combinations of basic logical units and their logical connections. In this way, the *Tractatus* and the House are comparable for the methodology: «a modernism emphasising [...] “transparent construction”, a manifest building up from simple elements to all higher forms that would, by virtue of the systematic constructional program itself, guarantee the exclusion of the decorative, mystical or metaphysical» (Galison, 1990, p. 710).

Von Wright's and Galison's interpretative keys are both undermined by some problems. The first: is it possible in this simple way to compare an architectural style to a literary one? Or are these activities so different that it is impossible? Or perhaps don't they belong to two very different *games*? The second and more circumscribed one: on the one hand it is questionable if simplicity and static-ness can be ascribed to the *Tractatus* whose sentences are highly compressed, often of great poetic force and extremely difficult to understand; on the other, in Wittgenstein's architecture there is no simple proportional system and his building is not constructed as a repetition of simple structures. The Kundmannngasse House is anything but transparent: Wittgenstein does not reveal the load-bearing structures, he does not exhibit the functional role of the spaces within. Moreover, the devices he designed for the building such as the window screens, the elevator, door latches and so on are wholly or partially concealed as a way of simplifying the visual impression they make. Finally, the inside and outside of the Kundmannngasse House manifest quite different architectural languages: the former appears to be modernist, the latter echoes certain features of neo-Renaissance Viennese *palais* architecture.

Also Lothar Rentschler's semiotic interpretation discussed by Paul Wijdeveld<sup>39</sup> aims at a parallelism between the *Tractatus* and the Kundmannngasse House through the notion of “attempt of precision” and the effort of simplicity so introduced in the *Tractatus*:

*5.4541 The solution of logical problems must be neat for they set the standard of neatness.*

*Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of questions whose answers – a priori – are symmetrical and united into a closed regular structure.*

*A sphere in which the proposition, simplex sigillum veri, is valid (Wittgenstein, 1922).*

The criteria of simplicity, regularity and symmetry which in the text have to match the solution of logical problems, should become the solution of architectural problems in the building<sup>40</sup>. Actually, in the Kundmannngasse House precision seems to go against simplicity.

The *Tractatus* introduces a perfect language, the crystalline language of logic, which appears to be a flat, ideal, delimited construct. It is possible to extract from the text some crucial propositions that reveal a connection between spatial limits and the limits that define subjectivity, world and language:

*1 The world is all that is the case.*

*5.6 The limits of my language mean the limit of my world.*

*5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also the its limits. So we cannot say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this, but not that”.*

*5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.*

*7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (Wittgenstein, 1922).*

The *Tractatus* ability to locate limits to language, to the subject and the world suggests it has both a complete and clear view of language, yet its viewpoint is as restrictive as it is omniscient. The very propositions neatly designating aligned limits are both the product and the enabler of these restrictions. These circumscribed limits demarcate language into that which is logically determinate (meaningful) and logically indeterminate (non-sense): actually the *Tractatus* draws these same limits distinguishing what language is able to say sensibly, from what it can only show. The cold severity of the Kundmannngasse House could be interpreted as an attempt to showing off this distinction between what can be said and what must be silent. What can be said is what can be built following the rules of a plan. In this case the language exhibited by the Kundmannngasse House is

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39 See Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 17.

40 See Wijdeveld, 1993, pp. 146-151.

the *picture theory* language. This theory sets forth a parallel between language and the world in which linguistic propositions depict possible states of affairs in the world, proposing a logical isomorphism between representation and that which is represented, or comparing the concept of a logical picture with a spatial one. Accordingly, the particular components in a proposition mirror the things they stand for in a direct correlation between words (the plan) and facts (the building). Even Nana Last grants that the project of the Kundmannngasse House follows the philosophical intuitions of the *Tractatus* and that, only in their practical realization, can they make Wittgenstein's mind change:

*broadly speaking, the house's inter-working of vision, space, and movement allow for exactly what the Tractatus sought to disallow: the interchange between philosophical and spatial constructs. As such, the house's design inserts a place where the Tractatus's restricted spatiality necessarily intersects with a three-dimensional, inhabitable space. Evidence for such sites in the Stonborough-Wittgenstein house include its situated perspectives, use of various degrees of transparency, and competing centers that defy singular logics or rules. In providing such a forum, the practice of architecture initiates the Investigation's formation of a practice-based, spatial understanding of language that again and again turns to this shared territory between architecture and philosophy as the means to examine the meaningful workings of language* (Last, 2019, p. 529).

In any case, the last sentence of the *Tractatus*, the seventh, makes clear that this view of language leaves no place from within it for self-reflection. The *picture theory* is not the whole of the story, as the erection of the Kundmannngasse House shows, both in the difficulties to follow the original plan and in the effort to give a global sense to the building.

Rather, the aesthetics of simplicity and coolness that characterized the Kundmannngasse House could have some other ends, namely, to lead one along the path of ethical self-knowledge. Following Roger Paden, I suggest the idea that the Kundmannngasse House has a relationship to speaking beyond the limits of language, but with a difference. The Kundmannngasse House cannot be considered an explicit attempt to reveal “the Mystic” of the *Tractatus*, nor to indicate the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. On the contrary, this revelation is an unexpected outcome of the architectural work originally conceived independently from philosophical speculation. In the *Tractatus* what is unsayable, and aesthetic is a kind of this sort, is merely nonsensical. The claim is that despite being, strictly speaking, nonsense the sentences expressing these things somehow point to deep insight about the world that can only be gestured at precisely, because they transcend the limits of sense: «the house is an expression of the same worldview that lies behind his philosophical work» (Paden, 2007, p. 163). In addition to this

allusion to the notion of gesture, Paden introduces the relevance of a source of Wittgenstein's thought. In fact, his claim is that the *Tractatus* and the Kundmannngasse House share a common aim to lead one to overcome a self-aggrandizing individual will in order to embrace a Schopenhauerian ethic of universal compassion. Both the philosophical and architectural works – at least in so far as they are successful – give rise to a mystical experience of seeing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* as a «limited whole» (Paden, 2007, pp. 99 and 158). Nonetheless, it is difficult to consider Wittgenstein as a moralising prophet of philosophy and architecture, also because this implies imputing to him a belief in unsayable mystical truths about the good, the beautiful and the necessary. Even if Paden seems to consider ethics in terms of a doctrine, he makes a significant advance over other interpretations by locating the philosophical import of the Kundmannngasse House in the realm of an ethical and Schopenhauerian gesture. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, ethics does not have to do with moral, but is an attitude to the world or life as a whole that can show up in anything and everything that we do, say and think. These suggestions will be taken into consideration further on. For now, let's pay attention to connections that other scholars suppose being between Wittgenstein architect and Wittgenstein author of *Philosophical Investigations*.

## **2. Philosophical interpretation of the Kundmannngasse House: the *Philosophical Investigations***

On the contrary, Last appreciates Wittgenstein's architectural work as a decisive contribution to a transition from his early to his later philosophy. In her opinion Wittgenstein's practice of architecture does not merely precede his return to philosophy, but rather it enters the late philosophy as the lens through which his view of language is cast. Last affirms: «through architecture, Wittgenstein found a way to overcome the idealised solipsism of the *Tractatus* so as to reintegrate both the subject and practice of philosophy within the wider culture» (Last, 1998, p. 39). The problem with this passage is that it seems to misread what is a target of Wittgenstein's solipsism as a view that he endorses. Furthermore, it depends on dubious and misleading spatial analogies between the logical space of language and philosophy, and the architectural space of the building. Nevertheless, Last dwells on this aspect:

*the lens of architecture does more than provide a way of seeing: it manifests how each philosophy's fundamental constitution is indebted to a particular visual – spatial – linguistic association. Apprehending how philosophy and view are formed together makes it apparent that early and late work alike rely upon specific spatially located views of language to form their philosophical positions: the Tractatus is the product of the view from outside and above language (what might be*

thought of as the “view from the ladder”) while the post-practice of architecture (given by the Philosophical Investigations) develops the view from within language (Last, 2019, p. 521).

In an analytic way Last takes into consideration some passages from *Philosophical Investigation* in order to show how they are carried out in the Kundmannngasse House. She starts from the analogy between a rule and a sign-post: *a rule stands there like a sign-post* (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 85). This analogy associates the concepts of a linguistic rule, of a visual image, and of a spatialized artifact. It is crucial to explain what we have to follow and how we can understand what we have to follow. In particular, it is crucial to appreciate the language as a phenomenon fully spatialized: «talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm» (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 108). In *Philosophical Investigation* not only the theory on the language changes, but also the tentative to explain the process of comprehension:

*125 It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affair before the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty).*

*The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.*

*This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).*

*It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “I didn't meant it like that”.*

*The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 125).*

This new way to appreciate language, process of comprehension, and so on, starts from the beginning of *Philosophical Investigation*, where Wittgenstein reacts to a quotation of *Confessions*, where Augustine presents a theory of what the essence a human language is. Augustine, in Wittgenstein's view, states that learning a human language is possible linking words to object, but, at this stage of his reflection, Wittgenstein denies that language is so explicit and regular as a mere description. He proposes the following counter-example:



*Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; – B brings the stones which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. – Conceive this as a complete primitive language (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 2).*

If Wittgenstein's acting out of Augustine's description is designed to show how it constrains the functioning of language, the builders' example is meant to show the potential of language to transcend itself. Slab, pillar, block, beam, and so on, are expressly shown to do more than designate objects in a one-to-one correspondence. They also function as calls, as shorthand for the phrases “bring me a...”. These words far exceed the awkwardness exhibited by a mere list of word-meaning correlations. Although the builders' words are object nouns, the example shows how they become meaningful in relation to their context, namely, the particular language-game of building with building stones. In the subsequent passages, Wittgenstein explains that what appears to be an ostensive use of language, is really a more complex language, where the words can be understood only because they are linked to a implicit rules and to an explicit practices<sup>41</sup>. If the same words are associated to different instructions (or, better, used in a different context), they have a different meaning. A scene like this was probably very familiar to Wittgenstein during his presence on the building yard of the Kundmanngasse House and so we can suppose that this expansive ability of language emanates, in Wittgenstein's experience, from an explicitly architectural practice. The constructive aspect underscores the language-game's implicit potential to evolve beyond its initial four words. It is an example that, by design, exceeds its own parameters. Starting from here, *Philosophical Investigations* expands both this specific language-game and this theory of how language is meaningful. In Last's words:

*beginning with the builders and the idea of practice, and continuing with myriad architectural and spatial examples, architecture emerges throughout the pages of the Investigations in any numbers of ways. From the start, the builders example shows how language comes to be meaningful, not in isolation, but by virtue of its basis within practice-based language-games. The text then returns periodically both directly and indirectly to this example, to show how it and other language-games are inherently expansive as they encounter various new needs, run into problems, gain new tools, develop new purposes, and so on. In such ways, the builders' language-game grows from its original four words by accruing new tools and aims. This culminates in Wittgenstein positing an*

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41 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 6.

amazing list of some of the endless “kinds of sentences” (PI §239. These span from the commonplace “assertion, question, and command” to “countless kinds” that include specifically architectural, e.g., “describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements” and “constructing an object from a description (a drawing)” (Last, 2019, pp. 524-525).

The experience as an architect enabled Wittgenstein to renounce the regulative approach of the “view from without language” and to accept an open-ended approach. In this “view from within language”, a language is based on everyday practices through which it becomes bound to the subject. Spatial and temporal bodies, as with those of the builders, are at odds with a fixed limit holding together thought, language and view. On the one hand, this holistic conception of the language<sup>42</sup> matches the theory of the language *as use* (and so the awareness of the plurality of the possible uses of language)<sup>43</sup>; on the other, it turns the conception of language as a mere image of thought into a problem<sup>44</sup>. To sum up: during the design and the construction of the Kundmannngasse House, Wittgenstein abandoned the *picture theory* of language and he started to pay attention to the ordinary language, changing his previous conception of *following a rule*<sup>45</sup>, turning the meaning of *to comprehend*, and conceiving a theory of *linguistic games*<sup>46</sup>. If logic previously provided the standard of clarity, *Philosophical Investigations* must, after its removal, search for other criteria. To do this, Wittgenstein returns vision to everyday language, demanding not to think, but rather to look at how language-games in actual fact operate.

Wittgenstein often uses a metaphorical language which is *latu sensu* borrowed from architectural work, to explain his philosophical position. Consider, for example, how he posits the need to change our perspective turning to the analogy of a spatial rotation:

*108. We see that we call “sentence” and “language” has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. – But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be given way here. – But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear? – for how can it lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. – The preconceived idea of chrystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need) (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 108).*

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42 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 7.

43 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 23.

44 See Wittgenstein, 1968, §§ 96 and 115.

45 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 88.

46 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 66.

Even if this language is an architectonic one, it is not clear if Wittgenstein's experience as architect caused his philosophical shift, or if he used this experience to explain what he was maturing. Actually, it is not clear if here we have something as a relationship of cause-effect. Last seems quite sure about that:

*Wittgenstein's practice of architecture provided a spatial forum for the examination of spatio-linguistic philosophical constructs central to his philosophy, including rule-following, boundaries, limits, practice and resemblance. The lens it produces, consolidates a collection of what Wittgenstein later defines as language-games: venues or instances of language's practice-based functioning. As he writes in the Investigations, "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'" (PI §7). This is what the house does as well (Last, 2019, p. 529).*

Last suggests to pay attention to the spatial conundrums as those of the glass doors occur throughout the Kundmannngasse House with the location and alignment of the floor joints, location of window and door openings on the inside and out, and problems of localized symmetry within the overall asymmetric plan, all of which provide spatial forums to engage related linguistic and philosophical concepts as they play out in space. Finally, she concludes:

*it is this set of problems, introduced to Wittgenstein in the practice of architecture, which, in spatializing limits, boundaries, relations, practice and correspondence, literally demands that Wittgenstein reconsider the functioning of language and philosophy. Their spatial manifestations make clear that spatial concepts cannot be discarded and leave philosophical problems intact. The Investigations acknowledges this in regularly turning to related examples to show that their insistent spatiality pervades language (Last, 2019, p. 533).*

Coherently with this interpretative line, Last does not have any qualms about considering the complex spatial and visual configuration of the central hall of the Kundmannngasse House – which is the pre-eminent spatial collector and orchestrator of the house – a representation of the structure typical of the *Philosophical Investigations*; the disposition of the door in the central hall as an amalgam of the spatial-philosophical-linguistic issues Wittgenstein contends with throughout his philosophy; the design of the doors which, thanks to panes of glass, allow them to mutate according to context and use, a representation of the notion of family resemblance; the use of less transparent material placed on the more private side of the doors and the more transparent on the more public side a rather straightforward approach, a representation of the notion of following a rule; the spatial

dilemma created by the position of the doors in the dining-room, a representation of the complex boundary questions; and so on.

Approaching the Kundmannngasse House through *Philosophical Investigations* has the advantage of appreciating the shift the attention from the edifice considered as an accomplished object (or, better, a text), to the different steps of its ideation, planning, construction and finishing touches. It is not the finished object of the house that is of interest, so much as Wittgenstein's engagement within the practice of architecture. Architectural practice, it seems, allow Wittgenstein to rise above the *solipsism* of his early works in order to present a more holistic account of the practice inherent to language-use from which his philosophy develops<sup>47</sup>. However, the exclusive connection between the architectonic text and the philosophy of the so-called second Wittgenstein does not result convincing at all. His new conception of language is presented not only referring to his life in a building yard, but also, for example, to his experience as a primary-school teacher. In this regard the practice as an architect can be considered a mere exemplification of his language theory, on the same level of the example taken from the observation of the children's games or of a game of chess. During the intermission between his early and later works, Wittgenstein undertook many different sorts of work, including at one time school-teaching and, at another, gardening. It might be true to say that the practice of architecture is partly responsible for leading Wittgenstein back to philosophy, but whether architecture was more significant for the developments in his thinking than other influences at that time, above all sculpting and a growing interest in mathematics, is debatable.

Examples of Wittgenstein's survey of the ordinary language populate *Philosophical Investigations*, most notably with the examination of the notion of games, culminating in the concept of family resemblance and its explicit abolition of any single shared aspect underlying all usages of a word. Wittgenstein's reflections confront the restricted view of language with spatial and temporal examples. This yields an unfolding terrain of examples and varying view-points that bridge philosophical and spatial constructs, from boundaries to methods of viewings, forms of representation, visualizations of rule, and sign-posts amidst myriad paths. But is it so certain that the crucial importance of spatializing and temporalizing concepts is a lesson learned by Wittgenstein only in the building yard of the Kundmannngasse House?

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47 See Last, 2008, pp. 92-93.

### 3. The construction of the Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein House in context

Recently, a middle position between the two previously considered, has been proposed by David Macarthur<sup>48</sup>. For this scholar, the care of Wittgenstein as an architect coincides with the effort of *working on himself*, by overcoming the temptation to instruct others, from some imagined higher plane, about how to live, but following the motto «just improve yourself, that is all you can do to improve the world» (Monk, 1990, pp. 17-18). Some interpreters have argued Wittgenstein is a sort of philosophical therapist who considers his intellectual activity a matter of elucidating what he calls the grammar of language in order to overcome the temptation to essentialistic metaphysics and that of scepticism. Consequently, his intellectual effort is a clarificatory activity with an ultimately ethical point. He always tends to a kind of self-transformation: to get us to see that the timeless over-general explanations that we are strongly tempted to endorse when we reflect upon things or their denial in world consuming scepticism, actually stand in the way of seeing reality for what it is. This effort is a perfectionist one: changing or transforming oneself (and hopefully his own readers or the inhabitants of the Kundmanngasse House) for the better by helping to overcome illusions, empty explanations and consoling fantasies of authority and control for a more realistic conception of oneself, the others and reality. In this line, the Kundmanngasse House is not an exception, but it shows the connection between Wittgenstein's life and thought.

Wittgenstein's desire to improve the world passes through a judgement on the spirit of the culture of his time (and Wittgenstein considered architecture one of the most relevant aspects of it)<sup>49</sup>, but, above all, it implies to improve oneself bringing back words from their metaphysical use to their everyday use<sup>50</sup>. Do not forget that, for him, on the one hand, linguistic questions overlap to existential troubles and, on the other, that architecture can be appreciated as a paradigmatic case of language. Peculiar to his research is that its aim is not to learn something new which was hidden before, but to understand with insight what is already in front of us<sup>51</sup>. In this regard, every effort to appreciate the Kundmanngasse House in relation to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is limiting, because his philosophy of language cannot be separated from his metaphysical and existential conceptions. This observation does not oblige us to insist on psychological or even psychoanalytic explanations in order to indicate a dependence of Wittgenstein's architectural choice on features of his personality as «perfectionism, parsimony, austerity and persistence» (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 18); nonetheless it suggests we should pay attention to the context of his biography.

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48 See Macarthur, 2014b, pp. 124-140.

49 See Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 26.

50 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 116.

51 See Wittgenstein, 1968, § 89.

After the complex and evervating publication of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein considered his philosophical engagement terminated. So, he decided to become a qualified teacher in an elementary school. His experience as elementary teacher ended bluntly in April 1926, when he was accused of inflicting corporal punishment to his young students. Moreover, he was assailed by a sense of guilt because during the humiliating trial to which he was subjected he minimized the facts, perhaps lying. The sentiment of moral defeat that took possession of him, prevented him from returning both to his friends at Cambridge, and to his family in Vienna. He preferred to work as a gardener in a monastery near Hütteldorf, living for more than three months in a depot. The third of July of the same year his mother died and he decided to return to the family house in Alleegasse. In these circumstances his relatives thought of a therapy-work that obliged him to work with others, helping him in his attempt to reintegrate in society<sup>52</sup>. At the end of 1925, Gretl<sup>53</sup> commissioned Paul Engelmann to construct a villa in Vienna to be the main place of residence of Wittgenstein sister's own family<sup>54</sup>, after her marriage to Stonborough. Engelmann designed the basic scheme of the three-storied house in close consultation with Gretl, his client, over a two-month period<sup>55</sup>. Wittgenstein had taken a great interest in the project even if he was working as an elementary school teacher at a remote location in the Austrian Alps, in the little village of Otterthal. Each time that Wittgenstein made a flying visit to Vienna, he was called to mediate between Gretl's desires and Engelmann's projects<sup>56</sup>. Finally, he was invited to participate in the design of the house. In the 1926 autumn this occupation became the main one and assumed a new meaning. During the spring and the summer, Wittgenstein had an existential crisis that led to complete loneliness, so his participation in the projecting of the Kundmangasse House may be considered a real therapy to support his reintegration in society helped by his closest sister, Gretl, and one of his dearest friends, Paul. Some other details must be considered. After an initial hypothesis to build Gretl's villa at the back of Alleegasse (Wittgenstein's family house), she decided to buy a land in one of the less elegant Vienna suburbs (on the Kundmangasse, in the third district) and to erect the villa there., After the rejection of his inheritance, Ludwig resided in that area in 1919 to attend the *Lehrerbildungsanstalt* and to obtain the qualification as an elementary teacher. In short: the Kundmangasse House symbolized the emancipation from Alleegasse. In any case, Wittgenstein had the opportunity to display his aesthetic conception and his competence as an engineering student, more than his philosophical speculations and his architectural training, which he never had<sup>57</sup>.

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52 See Monk, 1990, pp. 236-238.

53 Gretl is the nickname with which Margarete was called by her family.

54 See Wijdeveld, 1993, pp. 73-96.

55 See Wijdeveld, 1993, pp. 45-61.

56 See Pisani, 2013a, pp. 121-131.

57 See Wijdeveld, 1993, pp. 35-44.

Actually, Wittgenstein did not have “no cognition in architecture” at all. He was a friend of Adolf Loos, one of the most influential modernist architects of the twentieth century, whose buildings and influential critical writings spurned the *Art Nouveau* movement, particularly its expression in the so-called Viennese Secession. Paul Engelmann – from whom Wittgenstein took over in the construction of the house – was a student of Loos. When his father died, Wittgenstein assigned a large sum of money to artists without funds and Loos received 2.000 Austrian kronen. Wittgenstein asked von Ficker's to help him to distribute the money since he didn't really care who the money went to. However, he knew Loos was a beneficiary. They both felt empathy for each other<sup>58</sup>. Thanks to Loos, and, through him, to Karl Krauss, Wittgenstein matured his own ideas about the supposed progress of his time, preferring to consider post-war culture the culture of an age of Spenglerian decline. If an unrestrainable decline, rather than a self-confident progress, characterized culture, so arts, including architecture, had the task to take a position because, in a Spenglerian fashion, the style, being the necessary expression of humankind, had to be the bearer of a new language.

It is a fact that Wittgenstein's ideas of architecture were influenced by Loos's criticism, which gave him a theoretical platform from which to reject the taste of his father who was a major patron of the Secession. In spite of his agreement with Loos's criticism and nonconformism, Wittgenstein's taste in architecture, contrarily to the modernist appearance of the Kundmannngasse House which is unadorned and with somewhat asymmetrical cubic geometries, is decidedly anti-modernist. He says: «it is not as though I did not know that what today represents itself as architecture is not architecture [...]» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 16). The Kundmannngasse House is to be understood as a rigorous application of Loos's ideas «beyond Loos himself» (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 28). For Loos there is a sharp separation between art and architecture. The first is a question of transcendence from the everyday, a personal expression of an uncomfortable prophetic or revolutionary message. In contrast, the latter, is a craft, a matter of good engineering with the aim of satisfying straightforward functional requirements, preferably in a classical manner: a house should be, above all, warm, comfortable and safe<sup>59</sup>. Wittgenstein is inclined to merge these aspects and to consider architecture a form of art because, differently from Loos, he does not think the importance of architecture consists above all in expressing emotions appropriate to each circumstance. Nonetheless, both consider art something concerning transcendence. Saying that «art captures the world *sub specie aeterni*» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 5) echoes Loos's claim that the purpose of art is to make man more like a God. Seeing something as a work of art is seeing *as* from God's point of view, as an aspect of eternity, as if art were a world unto itself, outside time. The greater agreement between Loos and Wittgenstein is to be seen in the polemic against ornament. Loos argues that

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58 See Monk, 1990, cit., pp. 112-115.

59 See Biraghi, 2013, pp. 55-60.

ornament in modern times has become a sign of cultural decadence and should be eliminated not only from buildings, but everywhere. Loos's attack on ornament is largely an attack on applied ornament and decorative embellishments. In particular, in his buildings, ornament has not been eliminated so much as absorbed into the material fabric and interior structure. In fact, he is not adverse to creating illusionistic spaces, sometimes giving a feeling of warmth and sumptuousness. Wittgenstein is a keen disciple of Loos's anti-ornamentality. The simple unadorned white planar surfaces and cubic volumes of the exterior of the Kundmannngasse House, its flat roof and terraces (all fashioned from the standard modern materials of reinforced concrete, glass and steel) are strongly reminiscent of Loos's domestic architecture. But, with regard to the matter of ornament, Wittgenstein applied Loos's ideas even more systematically and scrupulously than Loos himself. The interiors Wittgenstein planned are characterized by an overwhelming impression of austerity, simplicity and stillness. To luxuriosness and coziness, he preferred a bare and serene style. The spaces are non-illusionistic, monumental in scale, symmetrical, well-proportioned and quite static. The walls and ceilings are off-white, the main floors consist in dark, almost black, stone, the doors and windows are neutrally painted metal and for lighting there are naked light bulbs. In the original house there were no carpets, chandeliers or curtains. The walls have no cornices or mouldings (skirtings, architraves etc.). For security and warmth metal screens could be pulled up out of hidden recesses in the floor and walls to cover windows and doorways.

Another relationship with Loos's thought regards the idea of progress. Wittgenstein lived during a revolutionary and proselytizing period of modern architecture, which, in its efforts to reconstruct a post-war devastated Europe, adopted a pontifical role, claiming that its new forms and materials inaugurated a new way of life for modern man. The modern house had to solve general social ills by bringing about a new way of life: one of democracy and freedom through mass production and the freeing up of the floor plan; of hygiene through opening the house to sunlight, air and plentiful washing facilities; of technological progress in construction and the adoption of modern conveniences; and of beauty in the enjoyment of simple white geometrical forms that seem light and airy in comparison with older building types. Loos can be considered an interlocutor with these positions, while Wittgenstein shared with Spengler a pessimistic attitude to progress and, in particular, he was deeply sceptical of the grandiose and utopian ambitions of architectural modernism:

*the spirit of [the prevailing European and American] civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music of present day fascism & socialism, is a spirit that is alien & uncongenial to [me] [...] Is it all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work, since he will, in any case, not understand the spirit in which I write. Our*



*civilization is characterized by the word “progress”. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features* (Wittgenstein, 1998, pp. 8-9).

Wittgenstein regarded the age of technology in which he lived – and upon which architectural modernism depended – as a regression of the human spirit and he preferred to repeat to his friends: «just improve yourself, that is all you can do to improve the world» (Monk, 1990, pp. 17-18).

Another contact between Loos and Wittgenstein is the value of ornaments. Loos cannot be considered a precursor of rationalism, in fact he declared he took inspiration from tradition. Nonetheless, his choices often appeared very modern, for example in his ideas about the necessity to avoid ornaments. This choice has material and economic reasons and it also has ethical and aesthetic motivations, but, above all, it is a message addressed to aristocrats. The Loosian aristocrat is a person for whom the absence of ornament does not represent only a question of taste, but a question of spiritual vigour. In this fashion only an aristocrat is able to renounce ornaments, because ornaments mean something even if only for him. For an aristocrat, an ornament is not an ordinary indication among others that can be confused with the numerous signs that are chaotically amassed in a modern metropolis, but it is something given, handed on, something that cannot be created again. Nevertheless, the Loosian aristocrat is not a mere conservative, nor an enemy of progress: he can find an ally in the modern man. Wittgenstein's family was one of the wealthiest and the most sophisticated hautbourgeois families in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, during the reign of the Hapsburgs. Wittgenstein, in a certain sense, is a Loosian aristocrat who, thanks to the economic means of his family, wanted to design a new house able to express a moral and spiritual vigour renouncing ornaments and synthesizing traditional and modern styles.

Summing up, Wittgenstein was in the highly unusual position of having a very sympathetic client and almost unlimited time and money to realise his intricate designs which included internal fixtures and appliances, many of which had to be custom built at great effort and expense. But what was Wittgenstein's aspiration? And what was his inspiration?

#### **4. Schopenhauerian Suggestions**

A biographical detail often neglected by the Kundmanngasse House scholars is Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein. Gretl was not only the one who commissioned her house to Wittgenstein and who took care of him in one the most difficult periods of his life, but also the one who gave to his sixteen-year-old brother the present of a copy of *The World as Will and Representation*. This book made a very great impression on Wittgenstein<sup>60</sup>, who quoted it both in the *Tractatus* and in the

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<sup>60</sup> See Damonte, 2019, pp. 112-131.

*Philosophical Investigation*. In his masterpiece, Schopenhauer presents architecture as something that pertains, on the one hand, knowledge and, on the other, will:

*if we consider architecture merely as a fine art and apart from its provision for useful purposes, in which it serves the will and not pure knowledge, and thus is no longer art in our sense, we can assign it no purpose other than that of bringing to clearer perceptiveness some of those Ideas that are the lowest grades of the will's objectivity* (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 215).

Architecture is a sort of pure knowledge, but in the end, it is at the service of will or, perhaps, it is at the service of will because it is a form of knowledge. It is an art only because these two dimensions clash against each other. Schopenhauer explains in detail what ideas are at the service of will, because thanks to them architecture regards the suitability, the stability and the wholeness of a building:

*such Ideas are gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, those universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest, and dullest visibilities of the will, the fundamental bass-notes of nature; and along with these, light, which is in many respects their opposite. Even at this low stage of the will's objectivity, we see its inner nature revealing itself in discord; for, properly speaking, the conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic material of architecture; its problem is to make this conflict appear with perfect distinctness in many different ways. It solves this problem by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest path to their satisfaction and keeping them in suspense through a circuitous path; the conflict is thus prolonged, and the inexhaustible efforts of the two forces become visible in many different ways. The whole mass of the building, if left to its original tendency, would exhibit a mere heap or lump, bound to the earth as firmly as possible, to which gravity, the form in which the will here appears, presses incessantly, whereas rigidity, also objectivity of the will, resists. But this very tendency, this effort, is thwarted in its immediate satisfaction by architecture, and only an indirect satisfaction by roundabout ways is granted to it. The joists and beams, for example, can press the earth only by means of the column; the arch must support itself, and only through the medium of the pillars can it satisfy its tendency towards the earth, and so on. By just these enforced digressions, by these very hindrances, those forces inherent in the crude mass of stone unfold themselves in the most distinct and varied manner; and the purely aesthetic purpose of architecture can go no farther. Therefore, the beauty of a building is certainly to be found in the evident and obvious suitability of every part, not to the outward arbitrary purpose of man (to this extent the work belongs to practical architecture), but directly to the stability of the whole* (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 253).

Adjusting the tension between architecture as art (knowledge) or as subjected to utility (will), is the task of the architect, a task that Wittgenstein assumed consciously:

*the great merit of the architect consists in his achieving and attaining purely aesthetic ends, in spite of their subordination to other ends foreign to them. This he does by skilfully adapting them in many different ways to the arbitrary ends in each case, and by correctly judging what aesthetically architectural beauty is consistent and compatible with a temple, a palace, a prison, and so on* (Schopenhauer, 1958, pp. 217).

Moreover, Schopenhauer separates architecture from sculpture, a separation that Wittgenstein bore in mind and overlapped with Loos's conception of ornaments: «ornamental work on capitals, etc., belongs to sculpture and not to architecture, and is merely tolerated as an additional embellishment, which might be dispensed with» (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 215). What is relevant for Schopenhauer is exactly what was relevant for Wittgenstein's plans about the Kundmannngasse House: «*all this proves that architecture affects us not only mathematically, but dynamically, and that what speaks to us through it is not mere form and symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature, those primary Ideas, those lowest grades of the will's objectivity*» (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 215). Schopenhauer's thoughts on architecture are quite detailed. For example, they concern the choice of materials: «from what has been said, it is absolutely necessary for an understanding and aesthetic enjoyment of a work of architecture, to have direct knowledge through perception of its matter as regards its weight, rigidity, and cohesion» (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 215). In spite of the materials of the building, whose characteristics seem to be the heaviness and the opposition caused by the force of gravity, another much more ethereal element characterized architecture: the light. It is relevant above all because it determines the knowledge of the building, conditioning its perception:

*now architectural works have a quite special relation to light; in full sunshine with the blue sky as a background they gain a twofold beauty; and by moonlight again they reveal quite a different effect. Therefore when a fine work of architecture is erected, special consideration is always given to the effects of light and to the climate. The reason for all this is to be found principally in the fact that only a bright strong illumination makes all the parts and their relations clearly visible. Moreover, I am of the opinion that architecture is destined to reveal not only gravity and rigidity, but at the same time the nature of light, which is their very opposite. The light is intercepted, impeded, and reflected by the large, opaque, sharply contoured and variously formed masses of stone, and thus*

*unfolds its nature and qualities in the purest and clearest way, to the great delight of the beholder; for light is the most agreeable of things as the condition and objective correlative of the most perfect kind of knowledge through perception* (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 216).

Other elements that oppose the heaviness of the building materials are the artistic arrangement of water. This sensibility perhaps explains the precision – sometimes obsessive – with which Wittgenstein planned radiators. Actually, also the other installations he attended to, as the electric and the plumbing one, can be considered an effort to govern forces alternative to the one of gravity<sup>61</sup>. The stairs and the lift can be interpreted in the same way:

*in this way architecture is bound to suffer great restrictions through the demands of necessity and utility. On the other hand, it has, in these, a very powerful support, for with the range and expense of its works and with the narrow sphere of its aesthetic effect, it certainly could not maintain itself merely as a fine art unless it had at the same time, as a useful and necessary profession, a firm and honourable place among men's occupations. It is the lack of this that prevents another art from standing beside architecture as a sister art, although, in an aesthetic respect, this can be quite properly coordinated with architecture as its companion; I am referring to the artistic arrangement of water. For what architecture achieves for the Idea of gravity where this appears associated with rigidity, is the same as what this other art achieves for the same Idea where this Idea is associated with fluidity, in other words, with formlessness, maximum mobility, and transparency. Waterfalls tumbling, dashing, and foaming over rocks, cataracts softly dispersed into spray, springs gushing up as high columns of water, and clear reflecting lakes reveal the Ideas of fluid heavy matter in exactly the same way as the works of architecture unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. Hydraulics as a fine art find no support in practical hydraulics, for, as a rule, the ends of the one cannot be combined with those of the other* (Schopenhauer, 1958, pp. 217-218).

Bearing in mind Schopenhauerian thought, we can easily understand why, in spite of Loos, Wittgenstein's use of the term architecture presupposes that it falls within the category of art. This explains how Wittgenstein can say that «what today represents itself as architecture is not architecture» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 49). He is also of the opinion that, in more propitious times, architecture is a highly exalted artform: «architecture immortalizes & glorifies something» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 74). In this fashion, the Kundmanngasse House must not have fine elements, because it was planned to show its intrinsic beauty. The partition between the surfaces of the wall and that of the floor are determined by the harmony of proportions exclusively: the absence of

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61 See Wijdeveld, 1993, 123-130.

skirting boards and of other devices useful to remedy little construction defects made it essential to finish off the building with «exceptional accuracy» (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 36).

Following these Schopenhauerian suggestions, let's visit the Kundmannngasse House underlying, in particular, the features able to grasp its architectonic identity. In what follows, I will use Last's analysis, but without giving too much importance to what she considers the strongest evidence for her reading which can be found in a minor, yet pivotal, decision by Wittgenstein: to make the pattern of floor joints on the ground floor of the Kundmannngasse House «symmetrical only from within the boundaries of each room» (Last, 2008, p. 119). I will integrate her statement with Leitner's<sup>62</sup>. From the exterior, the Kundmannngasse House appears as an unadorned, white, modernist, asymmetric cubic building with a main central section and a largely regular grid of vertical windows which bestow on the house its «particular character» (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 97). Internal spaces are «organized and dimensioned wisely» (Pisani, 2010, p. 394). On the main floor are to be found a salon, a library, a dining room, breakfast room and Gretl's private rooms. The upper floor contains private rooms for other family members and household workers. Without doubt, the quintessential space of the house is its central hall, which connects the rooms on the main floor. To enter the house, Gretl's guests first pass through a pair of glass doors and enter a small vestibule. They then proceed through a second set of paired glass doors and ascend dark stone stairs into the brightly lit space of the central hall. Engulfed by a series of eight paired glass and steel doors on six different surfaces and three sides, the central hall is luminous. To the left of the stairs, a glass wall and doors leading to the south-west terrace admit light into the hall and create peculiar light effects, so important in a Schopenhauerian perspective. On the right of the stairs, paired metal doors lead to the main salon. On the wall, directly opposite the entry, are two sets of paired translucent glass doors. Those on the left lead to the dining room; to the right, the pair opens on to a hallway and private rooms. Turning around one hundred eighty degrees to face the entry, guests are presented with four sets of glass doors: the two center pairs on axis with the entry, a left-hand pair that provide entry to the library, and on the right, elevated by two steps, doors connecting to the breakfast room.

The central hall thus sits poised between the simplicity and austerity of the exterior and the almost maze-like series of reflections produced by paired glass doors that burst out on nearly all sides. Set into both solid wall and glass doors are tall, structured by thin metal frames with one vertical division in each glass panel and no horizontal divisions. The one exception to this is the pair of doors connecting vestibule and hall in which the glass is not sub-divided, allowing for an unobstructed view of the main entry doors beyond. These so-designed doors each reflect and reiterate the others; their repeated image absorbs the focus of the house, inside and out, yet they are

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62 See Leitner, 2000.

not exactly repeated, but are subtly transformed from one instance to the next. Across the central space, the doors' continual changes, relocation, recalibrations of light, transparency, opacity, proportion and spatial and social function speak to a range of issues. They connect both interior and exterior, one room to another and owing to their construction, create spaces between one another, yielding a dialogue of possibilities and purpose: a sort of Schopenhauerian will seems to have the task to give a sense to the building. The house becomes a reality at the mercy of the will of those who live in it. The spaces and their role wait for a will that decides for them. Let's think about the doors. Largely occurring in pairs, the doors create complex boundaries between the spaces they connect. Because of the climate, double exterior windows were common in Vienna. But Wittgenstein, extended this doubling to the interior, throughout the central hall and into the salon. With the exception of the doors to the breakfast room, and those connecting vestibule and hall, all of the glass and steel doors in the interior are bi-paneled, double doors that always open out into the rooms they connect in both directions. On the exterior, where these double glass and steel doors occur, both sides are transparent glass. That it is not always the case with the interior's more multifarious conditions and relations. While the doors connecting living room and hall have clear glass on both sides, those between dining room and central hall or staircase and central hall are transparent on the hall-side and translucent glass on the other. This allows for varying degrees of separation and privacy dependent upon where one is located, which way one is looking, and which panels are open, or which closed. In each of the artifacts in the hall where two materials or degrees of transparency are brought together, the less transparent material is placed on the more private side of the doors and the more transparent on the more public side. This would seem to form a sort of rule. But what seems to be a simple declarative principle confronts, in spatial practices, a complex series of relationships that disrupt the direct implementation of a present or fixed rule. Examples occur both in the dining room and salon. In the dining room, the doors to the hall are on a wall with three similar sets of paired glass and steel doors that lead directly outside to the south-west terrace. This sets up a series of four such pairs. The situation creates a dilemma as to whether the dining room-to-hall doors should exactly match the other three sets along the same wall, as they do in size and detail, or whether they should also mark what is on their side. So: to which room and which wall do the doors belong? What boundaries do they define? And, above all, who decided it? In the dining room, Wittgenstein chose to place translucent glass on the dining room side and clear glass on the hall side. This distinguishes two spaces even as it connects them, presenting distinct faces as approached from the opposite sides, as to say, in a Schopenhauerian fashion, that reality is only a representation and that it – necessarily and originally – depends on the will of who takes it into consideration. A similar situation to that in the dining room-terrace-central hall connection occurs with the double doors leading from the salon to Gretl's private living room. The twist here is that all

of the interior doors leading to the salon are metal, so that these doors combine not two types of glass to create the transparent/translucent pairing, but rather glass and metal to form a transparent/opaque combination. As with the dining room, the doors in question occur along a plane that also contains a series of exterior doors opening onto a terrace. The choice of material becomes even more significant in the salon, as it is the only room in the house to possess metal doors. The connection between salon and Gretl's private living room thus had to navigate a series of three conflicting regularities: the continuation of the glass doors along the exterior wall, the placing of the more opaque material on the more private side, and the constant that all interior doors to the salon, and only to the salon, are metal. All of these could not be satisfied at once. Ultimately, Wittgenstein opted to place metal on the salon side and clear glass on Gretl's private living room side. This allowed the metal doors to remain solely associated with the salon, but it disrupted the series of glass doors along the same wall and left the private living space designated by the more transparent material. In this and other related design decisions, what initially suggests a singular and repeated image gives way to a multitude of possibilities arising from the specifics of site and the complex demands of use and occupation.

A relevant element, often omitted, is the presence, around the building of a park and, at the back of it, of an elegant garden, perhaps a reminiscence of Wittgenstein's immediately previous occupation as a gardener. In this way, the Kundmannngasse House becomes a deliberately and complementary whole of nature and culture. The role of nature in architecture is another element analysed by Schopenhauer:

*the landscape-beauty of a spot depends, for the most part, on the multiplicity of the natural objects found together in it, and on the fact that they are clearly separated, appear distinctly, and yet exhibit themselves in fitting association and succession. It is these two conditions that are assisted by artistic horticulture; yet this art is not nearly such a master of its material as architecture is of its, and so its effect is limited. The beauty displayed by it belongs almost entirely to nature; the art itself does little for it. On the other hand, this art can also do very little against the inclemency of nature, and where nature works not for but against it, its achievements are insignificant (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 218).*

From late 1926 to the completion of the house in 1928 Wittgenstein personally took sole the responsibility for the detailed refinement of the plan and its execution, which included significantly altering the entrance, various small changes to the proportions of the rooms and the design and construction of the central elevator, windows, window screens, locks, doors, doors-handles,

radiators, plumbing and electrical wiring. Wittgenstein spared no effort in the design of the interior fittings of the house, spending a year on the design of the door handles and another year for the radiators, which are designed to fit into the corners of the room by at an angle of 90 degrees. The mostly-metal fittings have an unadorned industrial quality and are expressive of Wittgenstein's mechanical ingenuity and the know-how that came from his study of engineering. This modern industrial aesthetic is married to an older aesthetic more reminiscent of Renaissance than modern architecture. A first example is in the entrance of the Kundmannngasse House: Wittgenstein changed it and its proportions to place there Gretl's copy of the Discus Thrower<sup>63</sup>: this statue, a special favourite of hers, had pride of place at the head of the main staircase. The second example is the plausible Wijdeveld's conjecture, for which Wittgenstein's integration of mechanically ingenious, visually simple, fixtures and appliances with the architecture recalls ancient «Greek and Roman construction» (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 160) and the classical age his sister venerated. This aesthetic synthesis between modern and ancient elements is articulated in the careful proportions of the rooms, the grand rather intimidating heights of the ceilings, and an overall concern for a sense of harmony and symmetry in the arrangement of the interior spaces.

The general impression is that when a guest comes in to the Kundmannngasse House, he/she – being subject to the space – becomes view and viewer at the same time. In a nutshell, reality does not emerge outside a subjective will – an I – but in relation to it.

## 5. A gesture of what?

Thanks to what has been displayed in the previous paragraphs, it is now possible to really appreciate the famous and largely quoted note written by Wittgenstein in 1931:

*working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them)* (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 16).

Wittgenstein appreciates his philosophical activity and his experience as an architect as two different ways that have, unexpected and unforeseen, clarified the same point for him, i.e. what language is: it is the main feature of a human being thanks to which he is able to take care of others will working, first of all, on one's own will. The plans for the Kundmannngasse House dated November 13, 1926, are signed by both Paul Engelmann and Ludwig Wittgenstein *architects*. At this time and for several years later Wittgenstein was listed in the Vienna city directory as a

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63 The original is housed in the Vatican Museum and is said to be the *Pentathlete* of Alkamenes.



professional architect and his letters of the period bear the title «*Paul Engelmann & Ludwig Wittgenstein Architects, Wien III. Parkgasse 18*» (Monk, 1990, p. 238). All these are symptoms not only of zeal, but also of a careful identitary choice. Wittgenstein's biographers, as Ray Monk's, have drawn attention to the intricate and intimate connection between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the life he led, and this allows us to appeal to the notion of style to cast light on his work in architecture. As Wittgenstein wrote «the style is the man himself» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 89), so understanding his style is nothing short of understanding his life as a whole and everything significant within it. Given the seriousness, time and energy Wittgenstein devoted to the architectural project for his sister, it is plausible to suppose that we cannot come to know his style independently of coming to an understanding of his architectural achievement. Nonetheless, philosophy and architecture do not operate one on the other in a causal way. On the contrary, both – but each in its own field and with its own aim – have helped Wittgenstein to appreciate what a human activity is. Engaging in architecture, as engaging in philosophy, requires handling what exists and giving it a meaning that previously did not exist. This manipulation, whose nature is performative, implies working on oneself, evaluating the perspective on which reality is appreciated and aiming to improve our own relations. In a nutshell, the ethics side of philosophy makes it possible to distinguish the good philosophy from the bad one. And the same occurs in architecture, as Wittgenstein annotates in 1930:

*today the difference between a good & a poor architect consists in the fact that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation while the good one resists it* (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 89).

Wittgenstein's interpretation of the architectural problems and what sort of understanding is required to respond to them is similarly a matter of overcoming the temptations of a false authority with respect to the question of how to design living spaces. Wittgenstein as architect and Wittgenstein as philosopher have to be distinguished, because only thanks to their respective autonomy and independency, is it possible to appreciate, so to say, a convergence between the meta-philosophical conception and the meta-architectonical one. In this respect, Last's conclusion is true: «Wittgenstein's movement outside philosophy into practices such as architecture, ultimately serves to form the basis for both his re-engagement with, and re-conceptualization of, the discipline» (Last, 2019, p. 534). But it is true only in part. Really, on the one hand, the opposite is also true, in fact his speculative thought and his philosophical ideas influenced his conception of architecture. On the other hand, architecture was not the sole activity that determined the form of his new conception of language, but it had a role at least equal to that of his passion for sculpture, maths problems and, above all, music:

*within all great art there is a wild animal: tamed. Not, e.g., in Mendelssohn. All great art has primitive human drives as its ground bass. They are not the melody (as they are, perhaps, in Wagner), but they are what gives the melody depth & power. In this sense one may call Mendelssohn a 'reproductive' artist.- In the same sense: my House for Gretl is the product of a decidedly sensitive ear, good manners, the expression of a great understanding (for a culture, etc.). But primordial life striving to erupt into the open – is lacking. And so you might say, health is lacking (Kierkegaard). (Hothouse plant) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 43)<sup>64</sup>.*

The Kundmanngasse House is not the mere expression of philosophical notions because its relevance does not lie so much in the final result, as in the intellectual rigour with which Wittgenstein planned and realized it. During the activity of building that edifice as the house for his sister, Wittgenstein clashed against the rules that do not adjust to reality when one wants to respect them, with the difficulty to express meanings using a pre-existing linguistic code and with the setback of a communication that made every attempt to express oneself «incomplete» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 43). We can say that Wittgenstein as an architect shows a tension without solving it<sup>65</sup>. This tension is a *human* tension that characterized his personality, but also the age in which he lived. For this reason, the relationship Wittgenstein's experience suggests there is between architecture and philosophy is the following: they are independent from each other, but both, despite the cultural climate at the beginning of the Twentieth century, have an intrinsic trans-formative capacity. In fact, both are able to re-modulate the perspective of a reflection and the configuration of an artefact. When philosophy is considered an activity and not a theory, as Wittgenstein appreciated it, it is impossible to put a clear boundary line between a speculative thought and architecture, even if they are never overlapping.

In his reflections on architecture Wittgenstein himself likens architecture to a «human gesture» (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 42), a version of the Renaissance idea that architecture is akin to the human body<sup>66</sup>. A gesture does not explain something as a theory, but it expresses a meaning and shows a reality. Wittgenstein's philosophical thought already went in this direction. In the *Tractatus* he says:

*philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations (Wittgenstein, 1922, § 4.112).*

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64 This point is underlined in Guter (2011), pp. 7 and 11 and Guter (2019), pp. 18 and 30-31.

65 See Pisani, 2013b, p. 313.

66 See Macarthur, 2014a, pp. 88-100.

And *Philosophical Investigations* makes clear that:

*if one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them* (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 128).

Wittgenstein allowed for a greater range of expressive power to architecture than mere expression of feeling. Like a gesture, a work of architecture is capable of communicating certain thoughts and ideas as well:

*remember the impression made by good architecture, that is expresses a thought. One would like to respond to it too with a gesture* (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 26).

Here, expressing a thought, does not mean to explain something or to realize an idea – even imposing it –, but to show or to indicate something:

*we want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem, in some sense, not to understand* (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 89).

Following Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein retains that «the purpose of all art is the communication of the apprehended Idea» (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 277), but in the sense that art always shows a will. Moreover, he is aware of the singleness of architecture, which is distinguished from the other arts by the fact that it gives us not a copy, but «the thing itself» (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 216). So, part of the task of the architect is not to impose oneself on others from some supposed higher plane, but to try to understand them and allow them to achieve their own voice, their own way of living. Working on oneself involves attempting to overcome the endless self-assertion of the self and its various fantasies of power and control, precisely the opposite of the modernist architect's role of self-imposition. In a Schopenhauerian fashion, Wittgenstein does not want architecture to become an occasion for a blind will to impose itself. Consistently with this statement, in architecture, Wittgenstein, resisted imposing simplified ideas of human or of human well-being upon his client Gretl. Some confirmation of this motivation can be found in a remark from 1929, just after the completion of Kundmanngasse House:

*my ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them* (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 2).

Wittgenstein's way of seeing things is expressed through the attention to his client, the wealthy aristocratic class to which she belonged, as well as an understanding of Viennese culture and its history; and also the age in which he lives. The Kundmannngasse House speaks primarily for her rather than for his philosophy or for some ideal of human progress or ethical betterment. As Wittgenstein himself said:

*the house I built for Gretl is the product of a decidedly sensitive ear and good manners, an expression of great understanding (of a culture, etc.)* (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 38).

His effort has been successful, considering what their eldest sister Hermione testified: «the house fitted my sister Gretl like a glove as soon as she had furnished it in her own idiosyncratic way and filled it with her personality. The house was simply an extension of her personality, a subtle emanation from her, just as from childhood onwards everything surrounding her had to be original and on a grand scale» (Leitner, 2000, p. 63). Wittgenstein desired the Kundmannngasse House to show Gretl's will. Wittgenstein's architectural plan is to offer unfurnished spaces designed with an acute eye to Gretl's furnishings, artworks and lifestyle, one which frequently involved hosting literary and musical salons for the many artists, musicians and literati of her social circle. Wittgenstein consciously designs Kundmannngasse House to present his sister's way of living as a representation of a good life: «through the design of the Palais Stonborough sought to present Gretl's life as a paradigmatically good life; one informed by spiritual and cultural values, a life of spontaneous creativity and altruism, a life... of “genius”» (Paden, 2007, p. 162). Kundmannngasse House – if we imagine it furnished with Gretl's eclectic collection of artworks – might be said to express a feeling of reverence and, by letting these works speak for themselves, glorifying past human achievements in art.

It's time to sum up with a final question. Having ascertained that the Kundmannngasse House is a gesture independently from a philosophical theory, it is a gesture of what?<sup>67</sup> Does it make the *Tractatus* tangible? Does it anticipate *Philosophical Investigations*? Does it show the culture of its time? Does it reveal the will? And, if so, the will of what? Schopenhauer's will as a blind force, Wittgenstein's will or the will as his sister's desire? To understand how the notion of *gesture* might relate to the Kundmannngasse House, consider the following questions: when is a house a *home*? Is a *home* to be understood as an object (the aesthetic, for instance) to which we react? Or as a reflection of our lives and our practices (with which we engage)? I think the answer to these questions is found in Wittgenstein's design of his sister's house, in which its function as her future home is reflected. Aesthetic concerns are not relegated or elevated above these issues, but

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67 In a different way, this is the question posed by Pisani, 2011.

complement and inform the practice. From the positioning of door handles, to the height of ceilings and the use of clear and opaque glass, doors and walls – all seem employed to further delineate the living space that the house shelters. The attention to details is not a philosophical metaphor, but it is a reflection on a broader social interest in which we live, facilitating public spaces, and protecting more intimate ones. It is how we live in a building and what the space is used for, which is central, and not the way in which it might reflect or represent life. Language might be interwoven in the construction of buildings, but while construction ends somewhere, language does not. Likewise, further changes and developments occur to a building once it is inhabited by building-users. Indeed, the meaning of a building (as with the meaning of language) is located in its current use, and this often has less to do with the initial design of the house than the way in which its meaning is established and determined by the will that occupies its spaces.

Glossing Macarthur's conclusion, we can say that philosophy and architecture achieve their ethical purpose by way of their sensitive responsiveness to the will of another<sup>68</sup>. I think this relationship between architecture and philosophy topical and I wish it could be rediscovered in the present time when the debate seems to concentrate on architects who address themselves to philosophers as experts of *theoretical containers*<sup>69</sup>, revealing in this way a conception of architecture and of philosophy as two incomparable worlds. The Wittgensteinian perspectives previously considered help us to take another direction, because they teach us that every datum is a relational entity. The problems about home and about inhabitation belong to architects as well as to philosophers. Both are engaged in the experience of living and of the public sphere of a way of life. In these experiences the questions of the meaning of life (the Wittgensteinian ethics), and of beauty are rooted; in these experiences the considerations about the relationship between architecture and aesthetics start; finally, in these experiences the discussions about the possibility to include engineering in a sensitive world take their vitality<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>68</sup> See Macarthur, *Working on Oneself in Philosophy and Architecture*, cit., p. 140.

<sup>69</sup> In this way Wittgenstein's thought about *context* and about *form* has been taken into consideration. See Tamburelli, 2010, pp. 240-246 and Pinotti, 2010, pp. 348-356.

<sup>70</sup> In the Italian context, considerations of this sort has proposed by Paci, 1956, pp. 41-46 Rovatti, 2007, pp. 3-6.

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#### 4. Angelos SOFOCLEOUS

### **Scruton's aesthetics and functionalism: The distinction between 'function as it is' and 'function as it appears'**

In his book, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, Roger Scruton claims that "Aesthetic experience [for functionalism] is nothing more than an experience of function - not function as it is, but function as it appears" (1979, p. 38). In this essay, I deal with these two forms of function – 'function as it is' and 'function as it appears' - to argue that they should both be included in the definition of a work of architecture. In particular, I will present the case as to why experiencing function, expressed by 'function as it is', is an important aspect of a building and an aspect which determines whether that building can be considered a work of architecture.

#### **The definition of architecture and the 'decorated shed'**

For the Renaissance thinkers, such as Alberti, a separation between 'building' and 'architecture' was inconceivable, as there was no distinction to be made between building as art and building as craft. However, the notion of a building which conforms to certain aesthetics standards and through which it distinguishes itself from a building which is a "mere craftsman's activity" (Scruton, 1979, p. 23) can be attributed to Kant who gave rise to the aesthetic approach in architecture. Through the aesthetic approach, the beauty of a work of architecture presents itself as an additional aspect to the functional aspect of a building (Harries, 2016). That is, it is seen as decoration which presents itself through the structure of a building.

Kant (2017) argues that a work of architecture is aesthetically incomplete if it lacks the aspect of beauty. Without the aspect of beauty, Kant thought, a building cannot be considered a work of architecture, even if functional. As Pevsner (1958) writes, "A bicycle shed is a building, Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture" (p. 23). Here, one can see the distinction in the understanding of architecture that has been made since the 18th century – that is, the understanding that architecture has additional characteristics to a mere building.



This distinction between building and architecture gives rise to the question “What is architecture?” Harries (2016) considered a work of architecture to be a comprised of a building with an added aesthetic component. For example, a bicycle shed on Pevsner’s terms would be a building, but a decorated shed on Harries’ terms would be a work of architecture.

The term ‘decorated shed’ was introduced by Venturi (1977) to describe structures which, despite the fact that they are functional and that they can be fully utilized, are seen as aesthetically incomplete through Kant’s aesthetic approach. The incompleteness rises from the fact that human beings had always demanded more than function in their buildings - they demanded that “they also give pleasure as aesthetic objects” (Harries, 2016, p. 29). Thus, through the eyes of 18th century theorists, it was considered that functional buildings which were also aesthetically pleasing attained “sensible perfection” as structures (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 12).

However, I argue that one should not be that quick in defining a work of architecture as a functional building with an added aesthetic component. It would be a reductionist approach to regard Lincoln Cathedral simply as a decorated shed. What makes Lincoln Cathedral a work of architecture is not merely the aesthetic component that is added to the building itself and is not what distinguishes it from ordinary buildings. As Harries (1997) mentions, what makes Lincoln Cathedral different is the fact that the component which establishes it as a work of architecture “has a re-presentational function” (p. 118). That is, it allows the individual to not merely be a spectator either to the structure or to its perceived function (i.e. function as it appears), but to experience what transformed a building into an aesthetic object: the experienced function of the work of architecture (i.e. function as it is).

However, Harries (2016) uses the term ‘decorated shed’ in a broad sense and regards functional buildings as complete works of architecture which “have no need for [an aesthetic] component” (p. 31). But this is a reductionist approach as it disregards the aesthetic beauty of a building and the experiential aspect of its function and makes them redundant when it is the case that a work of architecture can, in fact, be appreciated for its aesthetic beauty and for its experienced function.

As Scruton (1979) says, “It is doubtful that a purely visual experience could reveal to us the full power of St Peter's in Rome” (p. 96). Although Scruton’s point is made against the sculpturalist approach to architecture, I argue that it can also be applied to the case of ‘function as it appears’. An individual who visits St Peter’s is not able to have a full aesthetic experience of St Peter’s if she merely observes its structure from a distance. Scruton “regards a purely visual contemplation or

touristic gaze as inadequate, since it expresses a disembodied aestheticism that divorces architecture from everyday life” (Hamilton, 2012, p. 185). Similarly, St Peter’s would not be able to present itself as a work of architecture which had attained “sensible perfection” if it had only been a structure which *looked* functional.

As Graham (2012) also says, “to see a building as having architectural value is to want to use it, and not merely contemplate it” (p. 172), providing support for the significance of experienced function. Hence, describing a building simply as a ‘decorated shed’ is not enough to explain how it is transformed into a work of architecture, nor a ‘decorated shed’ is a core example of architecture (Hamilton, 2012).

### **The symbolical aspect of a work of architecture and anti-functionalist sculpturalism**

In fact, asserting that aesthetic qualities can rise from function is a position which ties function not to its experiential aspect but to its symbolical (perceived) aspect. As Venturi and Scott Brown (1972) point out, “functionalist architecture was more symbolic than functional [...] It looked functional more than worked functionally” (p. 109). Venturi and Scott Brown here establish the distinction between ‘function as it is’ and ‘function as it appears’. For the functionalist, aesthetic qualities arise from the symbolical aspect of function (‘function as it appears’), but the experiential aspect of function (‘function as it is’) is, once again, ignored.

It is worth mentioning, however, that even if this position aims to present itself as ‘anti-aesthetic’, as it takes function symbolically, it does not fail to be aesthetic itself, as Hamilton (2012) points out. Because, as a matter of fact, the functionalist takes function to give rise to the form (structure) of a work of architecture, and thereby to its aesthetic qualities. This is the position that Scruton (1979) supports - namely that it is through its functionality that a building can come to satisfy certain aesthetic criteria. However, I argue that Scruton mistakenly considers this to be ‘function as it appears’ and not ‘function as it is’. By advocating ‘function as it appears’, Scruton follows the same path as the anti-functionalist sculpturalist who claims that a full aesthetic appreciation of a work of architecture can be attained merely by a visual contemplation of it, despite the fact that Scruton essentially rejects anti-functionalist sculpturalism.

Anti-functionalist sculpturalism, I argue, is tied with Scruton’s ‘function as it appears’, as it rules out the experiential aspect of a work of architecture without which it cannot attain aesthetic completeness. ‘Function as it is’, however, has the ability to transform a building to a work of

architecture. Considering, that is, that a decorated shed is a work of architecture leaves experience out and establishes a perception of pseudo-perfection by only considering ‘structure’ and ‘function as it appears’ as the work of architecture’s only components. Indeed, a decorated shed does not offer much room for ‘function as it is’, but it is naive to expand the notion of a ‘decorated shed’ to works of architecture such as St Peter’s or Lincoln Cathedral, where the experiential aspect is of primary importance.

The state of pseudo-perfection that is reached through considering that a work of architecture simply is a ‘decorated shed’ “entails that the aesthetic observer should keep his distance from such a work, leave what he observes just as it is, that he should contemplate its aesthetic plenitude, absorbed in its presence” (Harries, 2016, p. 30). “Their very perfection”, Harries continues, “threatens to render aesthetic objects uninhabitable” (ibid.). I take that he means ‘uninhabitable’ literally, as one, taking the example of follies, can see that even structures which do not have a clear ‘function as it is’ - as it conjoins its ‘function as it appears’ - can still be considered works of architecture. Contrary to Graham (2012), I would not say that follies are “mere ornaments [because] no one had or has any reason to worship in them” (p. 172). It is not true, as Graham further mentions, that “the greatest works of architecture can cease to have a function and become simply spectacles” (p. 174), for their functionalist aspect does not only depend on ‘function as it appears’. Instead, a work of architecture can also have a potential function, due to its structure - a function which has not yet been actualized.

### **Function as a potential property of a work of architecture and anti-functionalist sculpturalism**

The distinction between potential and actual function is an important distinction to make as it is one which goes beyond ‘function as it is’ and ‘function as it appears’, making the case against the functionalist approach which gives ‘function as it appears’ a position of prominence.

There is also a non-experienced function - or a potential function of an object, beyond what Scruton called ‘function as it is’ and ‘function as it appears’. The structure of a building reveals functions which are currently not active in the building’s structure and can therefore not be experienced. For example, the fact a church which became a concert hall without undergoing a change in its structural appearance entails that, throughout its being as a church, the building was also a concert hall, aesthetically and potentially. Its function as a concert hall could not be experienced, however this was a non-actualized aesthetic property of the church.

Scruton criticizes anti-aesthetic functionalism as he argues that there is more to a building's aesthetic beauty than its function. Similarly, Parsons and Carlson (2012) criticize a solely functionalist view of the beauty of artefacts as, as they mention, functions change and can therefore not be the sole component of a work of architecture's aesthetic properties. I do not wish to defend the functionalist approach here, however distinguishing between actualized functions and potential functions might provide the functionalist a reply to the critique of Parsons and Carlson, and also unveil the dimension of 'function as it is'.

The potential function of an object also offers a response to the structuralist who allows a building or a work of architecture to be solely regarded as a 'tourist attraction'. If we say that the beauty of an object is, along with its appearance, its perceived function and its experienced function, then a work of architecture with a particular structure cannot simply become a spectacle or a 'tourist attraction' for it will always have a particular function which follows its structure. A spectator might simply perceive the appearance of a building and see its perceived function as a tourist attraction but fail to see its potential function as something else. Nevertheless, the potential function is always there, in virtue of the structure of the building and its potential utility.

Therefore, on seeing architecture as something functional, Scruton argues against the sculpturalist view which ignores function, but does not wholly disregard the sculpturalist approach, as he continues to regard the appearance of a building as an important factor in its aesthetic beauty. However, Scruton (1979) argues, its aesthetic beauty is incomplete without a function.

Thus, even though Scruton (1979) challenges anti-functional sculpturalism and promotes the importance of experience in architecture, the fact that he maintains 'function as it appears' brings back the notion of the 'decorated shed' which, I argue, is not a sufficient term to describe a work of architecture as it divorces the aesthetic observer from the observed structure and ignores the experiential part of its aesthetic qualities, that is, 'function as it is'.

Nevertheless, Scruton's criticism of anti-functional sculpturalism is worth considering, as it gives rise to the importance of 'function as it is'. Lacking the experiential aspect of function, I argue, a building would end up being what Scruton calls a 'walk-through sculpture'.

In challenging anti-functional sculpturalism, Scruton (1979) criticizes the idea that a work of architecture is simply a 'walk-through sculpture' and argues that "to take a merely sculptural view of architecture [...] is to treat buildings as forms whose aesthetic nature is conjoined only

accidentally to a certain function” (p. 7-8). Although Scruton says that his functionalist approach focuses on ‘function as it appears’ and not ‘function as it is’, this should not be meant to say that he disregards experiencing a work of architecture. However, his distinction between ‘function as it is’ and ‘function as it appears’ gives rise to a misunderstanding of the term ‘experience’ - one which allows the decorated shed and the walk-through sculpture to reemerge. As Graham (2012) mentions, “if our aesthetic experience of a building lies in our apprehension and appreciation of its appearance, then function is once more relegated to the hidden structure upon which this appearance is imposed” (p. 170).

What reveals the error at the walk-through sculpture, according to Graham (2012) is that it regards the aesthetic beauty of a work of architecture as being distinct from the structure itself. However, as Scruton (1979) mentions, “our sense of the beauty in architectural forms cannot be divorced from our conception of buildings and the function that they fulfil.” (p. 10). However, this can only be attained with ‘function as it is’, not with ‘function as it appears’. Therefore, contrary to Harries (2016), aesthetic content in a work of architecture will be found in its structure and in ‘function as it is’, but there is a limited amount of completeness and aesthetic pleasure to be found in ‘function as it appears’.

In order to avoid the problem of the walk-through sculpture, then, there must be a distinction between ‘function as it is’ and ‘function as it appears’ so that the notion of ‘experiencing architecture’ implies the former. Scruton (1979), instead, by promoting ‘function as it appears’, reaches a contradiction as he establishes function as submissive to structure while at the same time he maintains his objections to anti-functional sculpturalism, aiming to elevate the notion of experiencing architecture, albeit only for ‘function as it appears’.

### **Architecture as “inescapably public”**

Exploring the public and vernacular status of architecture will allow me to expand more on the experiential aspect of a work of architecture and to how it is tied with its structure. In contrast to other arts, such as poetry, music, or painting, which can be reserved for private consumption, architecture is “inescapably public” (Graham, 2012, p. 166) and it “imposes itself whatever our desires and whatever our self-image” (Scruton, 1979, p. 13). According to Ruskin (1990), architecture is the most political of the arts.

In being public, a work of architecture includes structure, perceived function, experienced function,

and potential function. More specifically, by looking at experienced function, I argue that function at a work of architecture presents itself as fluid. The architect of a particular work of architecture might design the building with a particular purpose or function in mind, but it's the public which will determine the experiential function of the building. Contrary to Sullivan's (1896) claim that "form follows function", the structure of a building does not determine its utility. The architect cannot have full control over the uses of his work. He might design a concert hall for music or for theatre plays but the concert hall can also, through its potential function, be used as a bunker, or church. There is nothing that limits a concert hall from being used for these purposes. The scope of the potential function of a work of architecture is much wider than perceived by Scruton and is inherently tied to 'function as it is'.

When we say that architecture is "inescapably public" and that it "imposes itself whatever our desires and whatever our self-image", we do not only mean that a work of architecture imposes itself to the environment and people. Scruton's view here is essentially sculpturalist - he ignores the functionalist aspect of a building, especially experienced function, and claims that architecture can impose itself simply through its status as a structure.

However, part of architecture being "inescapably public" and it having a functional component is that it is left at the mercy of the public to use it as it wishes. Thus, despite the structure of a work of architecture and its perceived function - things on which the architect has almost full control, the experienced function of a work of architecture remains to be determined by its users who, through their usage, will reveal the building's potential functions.

### **A work of architecture's interior and its relation to 'function as it is'**

Another aspect of a work of architecture that Scruton (1979) disregards when he describes architecture as vernacular and public, and one which shows how his insistence on sculpture and to 'function as it appears' provides an incomplete aesthetic theory, is the interior of a work of architecture. By stating that a work of architecture is public, Scruton ignores the structure's interior which is made with a specific audience in mind. The interior of a work of architecture cannot be described as public in the same sense as its structure or 'function as it appears' look to a spectator, but it is still a substantial aspect of the work of architecture.

Furthermore, Scruton's description of architecture as a "process of arrangement in which every normal man may participate" (p. 16) is not particularly true if one considers the interior of a work of

architecture. A work of architecture, if defined through its structure and its perceived function, imposes itself to the environment and tries to make itself as appealing as possible, and has a wide scope which encompasses the general public. On the contrary, the scope of the interior of Sydney Opera, Notre-Dame, Apple's Headquarters, for example, is limited to the users of those structures and remains largely independent on the environment in which it exists, in contrast to its outer appearance or its perceived function which are inherently tied to the structure's location and the surrounding environment.

For example, as a concert hall imposes itself onto the city, it must consider this imposition and be appealing to the general public (even to those who would never attend an event at the concert hall), fitting itself into the environment. This is another sense in which a building is public - public not for the individuals but also public in terms of fitting into the environment into which it is built. However, even though its exterior is universally appealing, this is not the case with its interior. The function of a building is largely not universal, as it has a more limited scope than its external appearance. Thus, the extent to which a building is public, and thus 'inescapably public' varies significantly.

Thus, when Scruton (1979) describes architecture as a "process of arrangement in which every normal man may participate" (p. 15), he ignores an important aspect of a work of architecture which is not designed with the normal man in mind but with a specific group within the public. Compared to the other arts, architecture has the claim of the art which is the most publicly present. However, "nor is all architecture public", as Hamilton (2012, p. 191) states.

Scruton (1979) does recognize that a private aspect to a work of architecture exists. He says, "our aesthetic understanding [...] embraces a relation between interior and exterior, between content and facade. [...] Public buildings [...] have a self each corner of which may be invaded" (p. 249). However, he does not go further than that and does not recognize this aspect as defining of a work of architecture despite the fact that it is the interior of a structure which can provide an individual with the experienced function of a work of architecture.

Thus, the notion of architecture as "inescapably public" can have different meanings depending on which aspect of a work of architecture one is looking at. I would argue that while the interior of a work of architecture is made *for* the people and *by* the people, the outside of a work of architecture is made *for* the people, and not *by* the people. Understanding this allows someone to see how

'function as it is' arises when we consider the value of experienced function which is revealed through a building's internal structure.

An architect, I argue, primarily designs the structure and the perceived function of a work of architecture *for* the people through her own need for self-expression. However, as Hamilton (2012) says, "If public opinion were allowed a veto on architectural construction, some of its greatest works might never have been built" (p. 192). It is in this way that a work of architecture is imposing itself to the public and to the surrounding environment. A work of architecture, Hamilton continues, commenting on Scruton's aesthetics, "imposes a vision of humanity independent of any personal agreement on the part of those who live with it" (p. 190), promoting the view that a work of architecture is created *for* the people, without their previous consultation. Nevertheless, it is not the case that, in designing for the people, the architect remains wholly unconstrained, but as Spinoza (2000) argues, the architect is constrained by the obedience of necessity. The architect, then, must "unite his building with an order that is recognizable not only to the expert but also to the ordinary uneducated man" (Scruton, 1979, p. 250).

However, the view that a work of architecture is created for the people does not take into consideration experienced function, and this is a view which Scruton (1979) ignores, endorsing sculpturalism. The external appearance of a work of architecture and a sculpture are similar in that they appeal to the public in the same manner. An individual, in her everyday life, has to confront both a work of architecture and a sculpture in the same way. However, the work of architecture has certain properties which a sculpture does not have, such as experienced function. Experienced function cannot be revealed by structure nor by perceived function, but by the people who, at the time of experiencing function, also mold the experiential aspect of a work of architecture's functionality. Hence, it is in this sense that a work of architecture (its internal structure and function, in particular) is created *by* the people.

In fact, the spectator has the ability, through her "knowledge of, and sympathy with, a particular state of mind, [to] modify and enrich his perception of a building" (Scruton, 1979, p. 113). "The validity of such an attempt must rest not in the architect's intention but in the transformation of the spectator's experience" (ibid.). Here, the power of the spectator to transform not only her experience of the work of architecture but the work of architecture itself through her experience is emphasized by Scruton. However, I would further emphasize that this transformation is not limited to the spectator's perception of a work of architecture but is based on her experience of all its aspects, including 'function as it is'.



## The architect and the public

Further, although the architect has a duty to create a building that is also successful as an aesthetic object (Harries, 2016), she also has to consider how the building will be used. However, I argue that the architect can only speculate, or guide, the uses to which a building will be put - she cannot determine them. Scruton (2012), in particular, in challenging the functionalist approach argued that those who endorse a purely functional approach to architecture “will not know *what they are doing*” (p. 6). More specifically, he endorses the view that architects cannot know each and every use to which their structures will be put, as function is fluid and continuously changes without necessitating a change in a building’s structure. In addition, even though Scruton promotes the view that architecture is public, he mentions that it is difficult to know how each individual member of the public will utilize the building, as those who interact with it can be users, passers-by, neighbours, or other groups of people, and it is impossible to predict or determine how, or if, these groups of people will interact with the building.

Moreover, I argue, the architect cannot know the ‘what it is like’ of experiencing a particular building. That is, while the architect might be able to set the structure of a work of architecture and its perceived function, she will be unable to set its experienced function, a view which Scruton endorses. More importantly, Scruton’s approach opposes scientific rationalism in architecture - the view that one can build rationally without considering aesthetic or experiential aspects. An example which Scruton (1979) gives to illustrate this is the following: Suppose that an architect could develop the optimal plan for an office block which would provide the safest and fastest route through it. However, he points out, “it may be that the optimal solution defies our capacity to envisage it” (p. 29). Therefore, ‘function as it appears’ here cannot even be realized in the actual structure of the building, but only in theory. It is only ‘function as it is’ - experiencing the office block - that will reveal its true functionalist aspect.

The focus on the experiential aspect of architecture can also challenge the idea that “form follows function”, which Sullivan (1896) introduced – an idea which has gained significant ground within functionalism. According to Sullivan, the form of a work of architecture should reflect its intended function. However, as shown in this section, it is difficult, or impossible in some cases, for an architect to determine how a particular building will be utilized. Despite her attempts to reflect intended function through structure, which might be visible through ‘function as it appears’, experiencing function can be wholly different from the intended or perceived function and it is not

necessary for it to be reflected on structure either. Instead, function can be defined through the relations of individuals to the structure, which are revealed through experience (Abrahamson, 1978).

Beginning with an understanding of the definition of architecture as a ‘decorated shed’, I provided reasons as to why the term is incomplete and does not establish a definition which allows a work of architecture to attain ‘sensible perfection’. In particular, I argued that the understanding of functionalism that is expressed in modern architectural aesthetics puts emphasis on ‘function as it appears’ (i.e. perceived function) and not on ‘function as it is’ (i.e. experienced function). In addition, I showed how there is also an additional functionalist aspect in a work of architecture, which is part of experienced function – namely, potential function. In introducing potential function, I showed how the functionalist aspect of a building can only be revealed through experience and also how a building’s form remains, to a degree, independent from its function as it allows a structure to have a wider scope of functionality than the one for which it was designed. In fact, I argued, the architect can only speculate or provide guidelines on how a building is to be used, but it is up to the public to determine, the functional aspect of the building, through experiencing it. Further, I argued for a revision of the conception of architecture as ‘inescapably public’ – in particular, the fact that the internal structure of a building is not public but is made with a specific audience in mind, an audience which will, again, determine the experienced function of the building. In conclusion, by assessing the current understanding of a work of architecture as a functional structure which is aesthetically pleasing, I suggested that an additional functional component, ‘function as it is’. needs to be included in the definition, as the aspect of experiencing a work of architecture is of primary importance and it is one which, once considered, will act to establish the aesthetic completeness of a work of architecture.

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## 5. Joaquim BRAGA

### O tempo das ruínas no espaço da arquitectura segundo Denis Diderot

A par das considerações estéticas sobre o crime, Diderot, nos seus *Salons du Louvre*, traz à expressão inúmeras reflexões sobre as ruínas, que adensam a predilecção do enciclopedista quer pela mutilação dos corpos quer pela devastação dos objectos. Nas suas múltiplas descrições dos *Salons*, as reflexões relevantes sobre as potencialidades estético-artísticas das ruínas estão, porém, maioritariamente centradas no âmbito das representações pictóricas, nomeadamente na figuração das ruínas enquanto objectos imagéticos.

No verbete da *Encyclopédie* dedicado às ruínas, redigido, supostamente, por Louis de Jaucourt, estabelece-se uma distinção entre duas formas de representação das ruínas: aquela que é autenticamente artística e que recebe o nome de *belles ruines*, concerne, somente, à figuração pictural de “palácios, túmulos sumptuosos ou monumentos públicos”; logo, no campo oposto, a representação de “uma casa particular de camponeses ou nobres” não cumpre os necessários critérios estéticos para ser objecto da pintura de ruínas (Jaucourt, 1751, p. 433). O pressuposto da distinção é dado pelo valor estético do monumento histórico, em detrimento do valor estético e realista dos “edifícios em ruínas” (*bâtiments ruinés*).

Diderot não partilha, inteiramente, da concepção monumentalista da pintura de ruínas. No *Salão* de 1767, referindo-se à excisão da opulência arquitectónica infligida pelo tempo, o enciclopedista afirma, assertivamente, que os nobres poderosos “que acreditavam estar a construir para a eternidade, que construíram excelentes casas para si e que as destinaram, no delírio dos seus pensamentos, a uma sucessão ininterrupta de descendentes, herdeiros dos seus nomes, dos seus títulos e da sua opulência, tudo o que resta dos seus labores, dos seus enormes dispêndios e dos seus majestosos cenários é o entulho que serve de asilo aos mais necessitados, à parte mais infeliz da espécie humana, mais útil como ruínas do que quando estavam no seu primeiro esplendor” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 251). Independentemente do estatuto arquitectónico do edifício – seja ele majestoso palácio ou humilde casa –, o que, com a sua gradual destruição, desperta fascínio tem que ver com o reforço das possibilidades evocativas atinentes à imaginação.

Ora, para que essas possibilidades sejam compreendidas e exemplificadas pelas ruínas, torna-se necessário colher a intuição do espaço segundo dinâmicas temporais não-lineares, contingentes, como as que são dadas pela erosão. Na pintura, a conjugação das sensações do espaço

com as do tempo é assaz potenciada pela figuração de paisagens com marcas de devastação; mas é, verdadeiramente, no plano da *ekphrasis* que melhor se manifestam os nexos estéticos entre ambas. O que Diderot intenta trazer à expressão, por meio das suas descrições efrásticas sobre as belas-artes, é já uma tensão estética entre a simultaneidade das sensações e a sucessão presente nas formas de compor, perceber e descrever os objectos artísticos em geral (Braga, 2020).

Tal tensão é assaz intensificada com a introdução das vivências do tempo estimuladas pelas ruínas, cujo maior efeito estético reside tanto na decomposição do espaço substancializado pela arquitectura quanto no esbatimento da promessa de eternidade que o mesmo espaço sugere. Fazendo do êxtase a verdadeira expressão da destruição contemplada, Diderot confessa as arrebatadoras sensações que atingem a organização mental dos seus pensamentos e que nestes deixam um rastro de plena desarticulação: “As ideias que as ruínas em mim despertam são incomensuráveis. Tudo se aniquila, tudo perece, tudo passa; somente o mundo permanece; somente o tempo dura. Como é velho esse mundo!” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 229). Logo, a “idade” do mundo vem agrilhoadada com os vestígios da erosão, com os fragmentos adstritos quer à presença de criação quer à presença de destruição.

Fruto dessa natureza bipolar dos vestígios, o efêmero é, portanto, acoplado às dimensões estéticas da arte arquitectónica, em virtude de permitir uma observação imediata do *tempo no espaço*, mas sem comprometer o distanciamento reflexivo que nutre a condição do observador. Pelo contrário, como evidenciam os *Salons* de 1765 e 1767, o efêmero incute silêncio e solidão, deslaçando a experiência do observador do ruído das suas acções quotidianas e, num verdadeiro processo de ataraxia, restituindo-lhe a serenidade da contemplação, Constantin-François de Volney, poucos anos mais tarde, inicia a sua reflexão sobre as ruínas com tons diderotianos, recorrendo às ideias de solidão e silêncio, assim como às possibilidades reflexivas que os fragmentos arquitectónicos expressam: “Eu vos saúdo ruínas solitárias, túmulos santos, paredes silenciosas. Eu vos invoco! (...) Quantas lições úteis, reflexões fortes ou tocantes, ofereceis ao espírito que vos sabe consultar!” (Volney, 1791, pp. XII-XIII). Apesar das influências de Diderot, a narrativa de Volney está, sobremaneira, centrada no passado e assume a dupla forma de evocação e lamento das causas que levaram ao desaparecimento de edifícios, monumentos, casas, aldeias, vilas e cidades.

Para Diderot, inversamente, não se trata de moralizar a acção humana segundo uma visão negativa do que do passado aparece como destroço. Silêncio e solidão são, com a pintura de ruínas, elevados a categorias estéticas e qualificam, simultaneamente, as obras picturais que delas se aproximam ou afastam. Numa descrição de um quadro de Hubert Robert, Diderot insurge-se contra o preenchimento excessivo da superfície de inscrição, alertando para a ideia de que o desregramento das figuras e dos seus movimentos expressivos anulam os efeitos estéticos da vacuidade. A esse respeito e sob a forma de imperativo artístico, enuncia Diderot a sua crítica, a qual em muito

repousa sobre a teia conceptual da ideia de sublime, tecida por Edmund Burke: “Emprega, apenas, as figuras que contribuam para a solidão e o silêncio. Um único homem que errasse por essa escuridão, com os braços cruzados sobre o peito e a cabeça caída, ter-me-ia afectado mais. Bastariam, para me fazer estremecer, a escuridão, a imponência do edifício, a grandeza da fábrica, a extensão, a tranquilidade, o eco sombrio do espaço” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 229). Tal como uma paisagem recortada pelo tempo, também a pintura, na sua materialidade, deve ter a força sensível do vazio e inscrever uma ruptura com o modelo da irrefreável continuidade dos acontecimentos mundanos. A ideia diderotiana de “génio” artístico está ancorada na disrupção do sensível e não tanto na capacidade de perfazer e consumir o que deverá surgir como belo. À pergunta “Por que é que apreciamos mais um belo esboço do que uma bela pintura?”, responde Diderot que tal se deve ao facto de, no primeiro, “haver mais vida e menos formas” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 245).

A mais genuína observação das ruínas requer, por isso, uma supressão do fluxo da vida quotidiana. É quando o dia cessa que a percepção dos observadores é iluminada pela intermitência; ou, nas palavras de Diderot: “As ruínas são mais bonitas ao pôr do sol do que de manhã. A manhã é o momento em que a cena do mundo se torna alvoraçada e barulhenta. A noite é quando ela se torna silenciosa e pacífica” (Diderot, 1876b, p. 308). O reencontro do sublime da noite com o do poder de devastação da natureza gera, neste sentido, a perfeita cenografia para a contemplação.

Diderot procura na poética das ruínas o que já não pode encontrar na arte pictural religiosa – a eternidade soprada pelo tempo histórico substitui-se à da soprada pelas divindades sagradas. No lugar do templo como lugar de meditação e introspecção, surge, com a poética das ruínas, o espaço do fragmento como verdadeiro motor do “sonho” e da “melancolia” (Diderot, 1876a, p. 137). Contudo, como bem refere Roland Mortier, no seu estudo sobre a poética das ruínas, a natureza da meditação, em Diderot, “pretende ser mais prospectiva do que retrospectiva.” O sonhar que as ruínas expressam não é “com o que foi”, mas, antes, “com o que não será mais.” Há, assim, uma inversão mental, por meio da qual a “memória” é suplantada pela “antecipação” (Mortier, 1974, p. 93).

Logo, a poética das ruínas começa por dar voz à reentrada do observador na esfera ilimitada da imaginação, o que implica a saída virtual do espaço articulado pela arquitectura e a antecipação espaço-temporal de um mundo que, acusando, duplamente, preenchimento e devastação, deixa de apresentar vestígio. Segundo Diderot, “as grandes ruínas devem suscitar emoções mais intensas do que os monumentos inteiros e preservados” (Diderot, 1876d, p. 43). Ampliando o espectro estético da imaginação, por meio de um efeito de estremecimento nos sentimentos, o observador tem um campo ilimitado e indeterminado de sensações para poder explorar. Tal “como a estátua que a mão do artista deixou imperfeita”, interroga-se Diderot, “o que não consigo ver lá?” (Diderot, 1876d, p. 43). Imaginar o elemento ausente é, por conseguinte, um acto estético que transcende a beleza dos

elementos presentes. O que, materialmente, está *em falta* abre-se como possibilidade do que *faz falta* sentir.

A emancipação da subjectividade estética do espectador é, por via da vacuidade e do não-preenchimento, assaz favorecida pela pintura de ruínas. O espectador, perante o quadro, é sugestionado pelas marcas de ausência no objecto representado, pelas formas elípticas que o desenho dos monumentos em ruínas implica, interiorizando, positivamente, os sentimentos de devastação e solidão sugeridos pela contemplação das ruínas como autênticas condições subjectivas da experiência estético-artística. Mas, para que tal suceda, a obra de arte deve ser capaz de duplicar o ponto de observação do espectador. Como bem refere Michael Fried, para Diderot, “a essência fantasiosa das representações de ruínas exigiam que o observador fosse compelido a entrar na pintura, a meditar não, apenas, sobre mas entre os vestígios das civilizações antigas” (Fried, 1980, p. 130). No momento em que é lhe sugerida a entrada no espaço da superfície de inscrição, o espectador torna-se actor, deixa-se encenar pelo enredo dramático visual e nele participa como se fosse uma das suas personagens.

As ideias de sublime, herdadas de Longinus e Edmund Burke, permitindo pôr num autêntico jogo de tensões e contradições todas as possibilidades fisiológicas dos sentimentos, determinam o êxtase do espectador perante a decadência expressa pela arte. É pela imaginação emancipada do espectador que a decadência se transforma em transcendência. O que, aparentemente, poderiam ser considerados meros fenómenos negativos – como “a imobilidade dos seres”, “a solidão”, “o silêncio profundo” –, inversamente, “suspendem o tempo” e tornam “eterno o homem” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 106).

Para Chateaubriand, inversamente, a estética das ruínas serve o desígnio religioso e cristão de remeter os seres a uma condição instável, plena de indefinições e limites, deixando-se cada ser retratar como um verdadeiro edifício em colapso. Esta visão trespassada pela moral religiosa está bem presente em *Le génie du Christianisme*, quando o escritor assevera que “Todos os homens têm uma atracção secreta pelas ruínas. Tal sentimento deve-se à fragilidade da nossa natureza, a uma conformidade secreta entre esses monumentos destruídos e a brevidade da nossa existência” (Chateaubriand, 1866, p. 239). Ao não enfatizar nem moralizar o *memento mori*, Diderot, como já se viu, transforma as sensações provindas da passagem do tempo em verdadeiras alavancas da experiência estético-artística.

Com efeito, o que provém da contemplação das ruínas é um processo de restituição da vitalidade – tendencialmente refreada pelos códigos culturais –, por meio do qual os seres têm acesso às dimensões psíquicas recalcadas e as projectam, livre e instintivamente, nos objectos contemplados. Tal processo de restituição é exemplarmente sugerido por Diderot, quando, no *Salon* de 1767, comentando um quadro de Hubert Robert, se entrega a um registo evocativo das paixões

incontroláveis que nutria por aquela que aparenta ser Sophie Volland: “Se eu te perder, ídolo da minha alma, se uma morte repentina ou um infortúnio inesperado separarem-te de mim, é, aqui, que gostaria que as tuas cinzas fossem depositadas e que viria dialogar com a tua sombra” (Diderot, 1876c, p. 230). A devastação nas ruínas não só traz à expressão os sentimentos de ausência, como, também, permite os da sua exteriorização antecipada. O liame da destruição com a paixão desenfreada surge-nos, pois, como um vislumbre dos efeitos psíquicos que, no coração dos amantes, marca a tensão entre tempo e imaginação, finitude e infinitude. Poderiam as vicissitudes amorosas ser vivenciadas sem esses cenários de assolação, tão bem representados pelas ruínas? – eis a pergunta que devemos fazer a Diderot.

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**II.**

**IMAGEM**

**IMAGE**

6. Susana VIEGAS

## Cinema, the City, and Manoel de Oliveira's Logic of Sensation

### Film and Painting

Gilles Deleuze left an important theoretical legacy in the form of a conception of a cinema of the senses and his thoughts on the affective intersection between images and sounds, broadly understood as blocks of sensations and blocks of space-time.

The theme of the senses and the visual arts has had a strong impact on sensory documentary films on the works of renowned artists such as Alain Resnais's *Van Gogh* (1948) and *Le mystère Picasso/The Mystery of Picasso* (1956) by Henri-Georges Clouzot. These types of films are directly addressed to the problem of creating new aesthetic sensations, non-human affects and percepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), in particular those related to films on painting and art works. From this perspective, a central question concerns how the filmmaker imagines the sensations of the painter and how the film expresses and supports those new sensations.

Within this line of inquiry, and before I explore Oliveira's film in more detail, I wish to briefly consider André Bazin's thoughts on film and painting, which are part of a longstanding debate on the quality and suitability of films on art in which film, with its automatic and unhuman techniques, was often seen as a betrayal of the spiritual, unique, and subjective efforts of the painter. In his most famous essay on the topic, "Painting and Cinema", Bazin (1967, p. 164–169) states that these types of films have educational and aesthetic value since they bring together high culture and popular culture.

Bazin highlights several problems that the "impure medium" of cinema encounters and that form the foundation of his criticism: 1) film's form as a horizontal montage that disturbs the extensive, in-depth perspective of the painting's 'time'; 2) an editing technique that fragments and creates new synthesis, new connections; 3) black and white images that betray the features of the painting and cinema's general inability to be true to colour; and 4) the problem of space, the extent to which the frame of a painting, its canvas, delineates a pictorial space that is destroyed by the film screen. In short, according to Bazin, the representation of time, space, and colour is problematic in film, due to its very nature.

Following the typical Bazinian conceptual framework, Angela Dalle Vacche observes that "[c]olor in painting is geological and centripetal, hence even more alien to the centrifugal nature of

film and its screen” (1996, p. 306). Indeed, film, with its centrifugal screen, changes the nature of the other art form, which is characterized by its centripetal canvas; film imposes its spatiotemporal qualities on any art form it portrays. As for the transition from the painted canvas to moving images, the Bazinian perspective clearly highlights the *dominant* and *transformative* nature of film in relation to painting. Even so, with this problematic relation in mind, at the end of his essay Bazin argues that the encounter between the two art forms can create a “newborn aesthetic creature, fruit of the union of painting and cinema”, and that films such as Alain Resnais’s *Van Gogh* and Pierre Kast’s *Goya, Disasters of War* “are works in their own right. They are their own justification” (Bazin, 1967, p. 168).

Rather than comparing the differences between the two art forms (film and painting), including their ontological differences, I wish to pursue this affirmative line of thought—the idea that a new creature is born in films about art. Indeed, *The Artist and the City* reinvigorates this longstanding debate by introducing new problems. The first is the question of its genre. How ought we to classify *The Artist and the City*? As a documentary film it aims to depict the work of a watercolorist, Antonio Cruz, and as a city symphony film it aims to portray a day in the life of a modern city, Porto, from dawn to dusk. The film belongs to both genres, although not in a conventional way. By reconceiving these genres, the film provides us with a new aesthetic interpretation from each perspective, which I will explore below.

## **The City Symphony**

Film history has shown that movies have always had a special connection to the city. They have created new city views and celebrated iconic skylines, establishing the city as the main character of many films. When thinking about the relationship between cinema and the city, many ideas come to mind. We have all had the experience of visiting a new city for the first time and in a sense “remembering” it from a movie we’ve seen. In other cases, we feel that we already know a city, even though we’ve never been there, simply because we’ve seen it on screen. This phenomenon had already been experienced in the context of paintings, however: David B. Clarke quotes Jean Baudrillard’s comparison of the connection between certain European cities and Italian or Dutch paintings and the connection between American cities and film (1997, p. 1). It seems that the modern city is inseparable from the screenscape, from the way it is filmed and represented by cinema—as if the city itself emerged out of movies.

Nevertheless, the cinematic city is far from being a truthful representation of the “real” city. Paraphrasing Paul Klee’s famous aphorism—art’s purpose is “[n]ot to render the visible, but to render visible” (1985, p. 34)—film likewise seems not to render the visible, but to render visible.

However, by making its subject visible and perceptible, an image is not thereby limited to what is there to be represented, nor is it reduced to the present dimension of seeing it.

Moving images are not limited to showing reality as it is because their connection and editing techniques transcend simple representation: cinema is driven by sensations, not representation. After all, cinema has changed the way we perceive reality: it gives us new perspectives on reality, new points of view, that challenge our natural perception of the world.

In a sense, the cinematic city was born in 1895 with the Lumière brothers. One of the first movies ever publically screened was *Place des Cordeliers*, which depicts a minute in the life of the famous French square. It is interesting to note that the specific urban public space is itself a place of transit: we witness this through the intense movement of its elements, from public transportation to several urban activities.

In the 1920s, the city itself became the main character of a popular genre: the city symphony. Such is the case in *Manhatta* (1921) and *Berlin: Symphony of a Great City* (1927), movies that aimed to provide scopophilic experiences, portraying the city from the outside, as an object of pleasure and amazement.

This close link between cinema and the city was noted by Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin, mostly because, as Graeme Gilloch argues, cinema “is able to capture the flux and movement of the urban environment, to record the spontaneous and the ephemeral” (1996, p. 18).

Yet the popularity of the genre did not make it immune to philosophical criticism. Some criticized it, including Kracauer and Benjamin, claiming that the films offered a superficial and formalist image of the life of the city, an exterior portrait of what the modern city looked like, as the expression of new sensations, new rhythms, but also of the new forms of alienation that were so typical of modern urban life. For Kracauer (1995), for example, the attraction that cinema has always had to the city and street life is grounded in their common nature: both are expressions of transience and ephemerality.

Consider, for example, Kracauer’s (1995, p. 318) criticism of Walter Ruttmann’s most acclaimed city symphony: “But does it [*Berlin: Symphony of a Great City*] convey the reality of Berlin? No: it is just as blind to reality as any other feature film (...) Ruttmann leaves the thousands of details unconnected, one next to the other, inserting at most some arbitrarily conceived transitions that are meaningless.” Kracauer reproaches *Berlin* for its superficial portrait of an “ornamented” life, for its fragmented edited sequences without meaningful direction, since its formalist techniques (the use of eccentric angles, camera movements and speeds, and even the self-consciousness of the editing work) prevail over everything else. He reproaches Ruttmann’s film, in particular, for its lack of soul.

The superficiality and formalism of these attempts were therefore not received without criticism, as a manifestation of a *deeper* quotidian phenomenon to be discovered. But the inner relationship between the city and cinema has been met not only with criticism but also with more constructive reactions. As Nélío da Conceição observes, “technology increased an element which is fundamental in Benjamin’s relationship with the city: physiognomy and, implicitly, the idea of decipherment” (2018, p. 304). The filmmaker shares the role of a Benjaminian physiognomist, especially when understanding, examining and expressing a paradoxical realities with a critical gaze, at the time both superficial and profound.

Thus, although we might view these movies as poems or tributes to large, modern cities, the life of the city has not always been represented truthfully. With that said, however, how *can* film provide a truthful representation of the city?

As Giuliana Bruno (2002, p. 56) has argued, movement is common to both cities and movies. In each filmic experience, the viewer follows an imaginary path, one designed by the film’s montage sequences. With Dziga Vertov, for example, moving images became an art form that created its own city, a mental and imaginary space that Kuleshov called a “creative geography”. The idea of a path and of walking, together with the sensorial affects and percepts that constitute the nervous system, allows us to understand the great similarity between walking down a city boulevard and watching a film: both experiences are based on the idea of a fragmented, discontinued and shocking point of view on reality itself.

If fragmentation and shock are synonymous with modernity, how can art express that experience? Is this fragmentary experience partially or entirely reconfigured by the ‘spectatorial movement’ of the *flaneur*, the moviegoer or the filmmaker? Can we really say that we come to know a city better by seeing it on screen? What does the (superficial) screen show us on a deeper level? In the following, via a film analysis of Oliveira’s *The Artist and the City*, I will attempt to look beyond the limits of abstract and formalist city symphonies for an alternative to the above criticism.

### ***The Artist and the City: A Film Analysis***

The Portuguese filmmaker Manoel de Oliveira has always expressed his own concerns about these questions, at least in his first movies, in a straight dialogue with the contemporary European avant-garde. For Iván Villarrea Álvarez, *The Artist and the City* is the last film in a single cinematic composition that he calls a “modernist trilogy about everyday life and the banks of the Douro river” (2015, p. 156), a trilogy that begins with the short documentary *Douro, Faina Fluvial/Labor on the Douro River* (1931), followed by the fictional film *Aniki Bóbó* (1942).

The cinematic qualities of the city of Porto are the main characters of Oliveira's first three movies, along with the city's iconic historical landscapes, its lively crowds sharing public and modern spaces, and the anonymous human beings who live, move around and work there.

This trilogy has shaped our collective imagination regarding the city of Porto in all its photogenic qualities. Interestingly, it begins with a film that in many ways replicates the model of the city symphony, for example by showing the chaotic and disorienting rhythms of the new experience of a modern city and of urban life. In this sense, Oliveira can be regarded as a formalist: he reveals his own cinematic visions by emphasising the film's formal elements, such as the editing work. He did not want to create a film that gave the illusion of not having been created or manipulated, as if it were reality itself.

The trilogy of films ends with *The Artist and the City*, a short poetic documentary that explores an imagined city of Porto through the complex relationships between the individual and the collective, the fragmented and the whole, painting and film itself. My aim here is to question the relationship between the artistic practice of moving images and the experience of the modern city towards a logic of sensation. This objective is not limited to the film's aesthetic qualities, for I also aim to analyse its social, economic, and political structure, just as Kracauer claimed (1995, p. 318). Could *The Artist and the City* be the soul that was lacking in other city symphony films? Does it give us an innovative perspective on its social, economic, and political structure?

In a way, as mentioned above, *The Artist and the City* revisits many of the subjects presented in both *Labor on the Douro River* and *Aniki Bóbo*, and it seems at first to recover the city symphony genre in the sense that it portrays a conventional working day in a big, modern city. In this case, the journey is that of a painter, the watercolour artist António Cruz, who takes the viewer on a tour of his favourite city landmarks while painting them.

The film is not limited to depicting a painter at work, however. As a film, it creates a particular space and a particular time for that cinematic experience. What I wish to explore here is how the portrait of a modern city is assembled in a montage of fragments and the differences between painting and film. *The Artist and the City* was not only Oliveira's first colour film, exploring the full sensorial potential of polychrome, but also a film about the powerful forces of the moving image.

At the age of forty-eight, Oliveira directed his first colour film—colour being the only reason offered in explanation of his choice to portray this artist in particular, a watercolourist. On the one hand, we might say that the film explores contemplative 'representation' and the transition from the painter's urban watercolours to the filmic image of the urban landscape. On the other, however, the filmmaker was aware of the enormous responsibility of his ingenuity, since a comparison would doubtless be made between his cinematography and the canvas.

António Cruz and the city, Porto, are the film's two protagonists. According to André Bazin (1957, p. 48), this “film d’art” is a “poetic documentary about the city of Porto.”<sup>71</sup> The film portrays the modern mundanity that surrounds the artistic work, showing the painter surrounded by anonymous crowds snooping at his work, but also by the city's soundscapes.

But *The Painter and the City* is more than a poetic documentary about a city; it is more than a short documentary on an artist and his work. It is not a biopic about a watercolourist—we are not introduced to the painter's life and work, to his techniques and influences, or to his importance to the Portuguese art world. In the end, we learn nothing about António Cruz himself.

Whereas *Labor on the Douro* was clearly inspired by Ruttmann's film and structured by different film editing techniques, *The Painter* is quite different, as if the filmmaker were rejecting his earlier work as overly centred on editing methods. Whereas classical city symphonies move from the periphery towards the city center, like the journey taken by a commuter, *The Painter* moves from the artist's studio to the outdoors, a visual metaphor for the worldview we are about to experience, but also a literal movement from painting to film.

This first movement gives us the illusion that we are about to see the artist immersed in his inspiration, the city of Porto. And at first, we are not deceived. Soon, however, after the first few minutes, the film reveals itself as having other purposes. We do not leave with the artist; we leave his studio through one of his works, through a slow panoramic movement from the door to one of the paintings, precisely a painting of a steam train (a symbol for cinema itself), entering into a cinematically imagined other place, other than the portrayed city of Porto (Figs. 1–4).



Figs. 1–4: Screenshots from *The Painter and the City* (© Manoel de Oliveira)

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<sup>71</sup>Author's translation.



The next shots are of trains, crossing bridges or arriving at São Bento train station, a clear reference to the Lumière brothers. Here, we can see that Oliveira is fully aware that cinema has radically changed the way we view the urban space. As Oliveira continues with this tribute, *looking back* into cinema's history but also to the city's historical landmarks, he is also *looking forward* by creating a new image of a modern, dynamic, fragmented city. This opposition is very important to understanding the structure of the film. Even if we recognize a time and a place (1950s Porto), the film has another subject: a sensorial aesthetics that reveals the passages between art forms, between different techniques. The film's objectivity—and indeed its music—sometimes mimics the canvas's point of view, thus perpetuating the classical hierarchy between spaces: sacred and profane, urban and rural, etc.), although it generally moves beyond imitation by creating new points of view, framing the city in a fragmented way and creating a cinematic space that is unsettled and disconnected, with slow and disorienting vertical camera movements that depart from the human point of view.

Spatiotemporal fragmentation follows the contemplative gaze of modernity, confronting the viewer with the painting's presentness, emphasised by Lessing's idea of the "pregnant moment". Time is a disruptive element in the relationship between painting and film. It is in terms of time that, in a 1989 interview, Manoel de Oliveira explained how the film was conceived: "I made *The Painter* in opposition to *Labor on the Douro River*. If *Douro* is a film of montage, *The Painter* is a film of ecstasies. We were ecstatic with those images, for a long period of time. Within *The Painter and the City* I have discovered that time is a rather important element. I mean, there is colour, there is framing, there is the shot object, but there is, most of all, time. I have discovered that a fast image has an effect, but when the image persists, then it gains another form" (1989, p. 56).<sup>72</sup>

The avant-garde use of a temporal dimension that has freed itself from movement (against a cinema of montage), and the intersections between still and moving images and sounds—the simplicity of the city's noises (trains, trams, ...), the intermittent use of an extradiegetic soundtrack and the absence of traditional voiceover, which could contextualize the film or introduce the main character (the film also has no intertitles )—will be important in analysing how cinema becomes a technique that is closer to art than a neutral mechanical reproduction of reality. Oliveira also inserts the appropriate sounds for some of the elements portrayed in the paintings, such as the noise of a train passing or the sound of church bells. Sound plays a specific role in the film, shifting between religious music by Luis de Sousa Rodrigues, a madrigal choir, and the city's own soundscapes. This cinematic mode of thinking and feeling explores the ontological connections between different media and the sensual qualities of the compound of affects and percepts.

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<sup>72</sup>Author's translation.

The city's social space is inhabited by an anonymous crowd, circulating in a homogeneous space, an anonymity and homogeneity that is only disturbed by art in the figure of the painter, who stands out from the crowd, drawing attention to himself as an outsider to the city's anonymous rhythm and movements. The painter's presence interrupts the quotidian and distracts passersby from their usual routines, thus fragmenting the homogeneous urban space. At one point in the film, a police officer approaches to disperse the crowd.

But Oliveira takes advantage of editing techniques to insert his own vision of Portuguese society at that point in time, expressing his own social and political concerns about the extra-cinematic city and society. This is exemplified in a poetic sequence in which Oliveira alternates fixed shots of flowering trees with fixed shots of modernist buildings, thus using the concepts of spring and modernism as metaphors for the awakening of a new society (Figs. 5–8):



Figs. 5–8: Screenshots from *The Painter and the City* (© Manoel de Oliveira)

It is also exemplified in a sequence in which the crowd “follows” directions given by mute statues, moving to the right and to the left, unquestioningly (Figs. 9–10). In these examples, we see Oliveira’s notorious interest in the anonymous human beings who inhabit, work in and move through the city.



Figs. 9–10: Screenshots from *The Painter and the City* (© Manoel de Oliveira)

The filmmaker inserts his own vision in a movement from images to ideas. Far from being empty and artificial, Oliveira’s formalism is full of meaning, directing us to notice and to think about the visual contradictions of modern society (also strengthening this perspective are shots of poverty and of people living in sheds at the periphery of the historical city center).

*The Artist and the City* is also an experimental art documentary, and this aspect is important when it comes to blocking the criticisms levied against city symphonies’ ostensibly superficial and formalist features, adding new layers of interpretation. In this respect, it is also worth noting the film’s color palette: its sunny yellows, misty greys, and reds and oranges of the afternoon. The watercolor technique aims to render its subjects visible, capturing their impreciseness and fuzziness rather than copying reality. At first sight, this conjugation may seem anachronistic; as Bernardo Pinto de Almeida argues (2015), watercolor was an artistic resistance to modernism itself and its transformations, whereas cinema was the best expression of a modernist demand. Oliveira is able to bring both watercolor and cinema together as a study on light. Film is the perfect medium for reproducing watercolors since both depend on the suspended, almost ghostly, materiality of light, fog, and mist: a “luminous film.”

### **The Spiritual Automaton: Images and Ideas**

It is with regard to the film’s temporal dimension that Oliveira distinguishes himself. The filmmaker argues that there was a great difference between *Labor on the Douro River* and *The Painter and the City*, a film in which he wanted to use time in a very different way: instead of

relying on montage sequences, in *The Painter* he wanted to extend the duration of each shot to create an unconventional perception of time, almost more than necessary, turning a distracting experience into a possibly contemplative one. In this way, the persistence of the shot, its duration distended more than is “narratively” necessary, becomes the spirit of the spectator. More than giving fleeting and rapid impressions, the film *materializes* new, persisting sensations. In a footnote to the second volume on cinema, *The Time-Image*, Deleuze appeals to Cézanne’s idea of a “materialized sensation”, saying that “a film is not understood as offering or producing sensations for the viewer, but as ‘materializing them,’ achieving a tectonics of sensation” (2008, p. 316 n.44).

This “new aesthetic creature” thus creates a strange aesthetic experience, half contemplation and concentration, half shock and distraction. This awkward combination is not located temporally in the present, however, mainly because of the *dominant* and *transformative* role of film in relation to painting.

Of course, painting’s simulation of eternity (its presentness) creates a stronger experience that concentrates the viewer’s attention, which seems to be the exact opposite of the distraction produced by moving images. This new creature contradicts the temporal tension between the painting’s eternity and the film’s ephemeral character: Oliveira stretches the duration of certain shots to counteract the ways in which film (with its characteristic editing techniques) distracts us. Time endures in *The Painter and the City*.

Together with the idea of cinematic time, this perspective challenges our natural approach to ‘motionless’ artistic images, especially our ordinary expected understanding of the present moment: the actual chronological sequence of present moments according to what is represented [immobile image = eternal present]. The general use of the parallel montage (of the variable present) in classical cinema highlights this idea. Although this overemphasis on the eternal present of the “now” can give us a certain indirect image *of* time, it is an intra-temporal image that exists *in* time and that results from a natural and unconscious understanding of the continuous contraction of the past and the future [past presents ← living present → future present].

As noted above, Manoel de Oliveira’s *The Painter and the City* goes beyond the canvas’s point of view by creating new perspectives that from the human point of view, for example by framing the city in a fragmented way, thus creating a cinematic space that is unsettled and disconnected, with slow and disorienting vertical camera movements.

This brings us to one last Deleuzian concept that I wish to mention, if only briefly, because it sums up what is in question here: the concept of a “spiritual automaton.”<sup>73</sup> Grounded in Spinoza’s philosophy, the concept of a spiritual automaton plays a central role in Deleuze’s philosophy of film since it synthetizes his idea that cinema thinks and feels by itself: “We can no longer say ‘I see, I

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<sup>73</sup>For a better understanding of this concept’s philosophical origins, see Viegas 2014.

hear’, but I FEEL, ‘totally physiological sensation’. And it is the set of harmonics acting on the cortex which gives rise to thought, the cinematographic I THINK: the whole as subject” (Deleuze, 2008, p. 158). Claire Colebrook (2001, p. 29), for example, observes that “[o]nly with cinema can we think of a mode of ‘seeing’ that is not attached to the human eye. Cinema, then, offers something like a ‘percept’: a reception of data that is not located in a subject.” As Richard Rushton argues, “[w]hile at the cinema, we are able to encounter that which is genuinely *new*” (2012, p. 11).

Deleuze describes film as a new experience, as a possible field for creating new percepts and new affects, the elements that constitute his logic of sensation. Although he does not conceptualize the role of the viewer, he defines the creation of a new subjectivity that is particular to the cinematic experience, one that is not reducible to psychological analysis (the question of the gaze, voyeurism, identification, empathy, etc.) but that centres on new ways of thinking and feeling, which he identifies with the film itself. Concerning the visual arts in general, Deleuze was not interested in studying movement as the simple dislocation of moving bodies, as in the spatial movement from point A to point B, or cinematic photograms as immobile images to which abstract movement is added by the mechanical and rhythmic sequencing of still images. Instead, he was interested in the inception of movement into spirit, which is precisely what Oliveira attempted to achieve. Thus, the essence of moving images can be better described by their capacity to create a shock in thinking, to directly touch our nervous system, and less so by their narrative and imaginative communication skills.

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## **Sobre Eco Houses e outras arquitecturas do pensamento**

### **1. Viagem iniciática: *arkhé* e *techné***

Na história civilizacional tudo parece indicar que o homem garantiu a sobrevivência da espécie porque desenvolveu superiormente as suas capacidades cognitivas em detrimento de outras menos preciosas. A sua capacidade de arquitectar estratégias de sobrevivência garantiu-lhe um posicionamento inigualável entre as espécies animais. Pode, pois, dizer-se que é devido à arquitectura do seu pensamento que ele começa a erigir-se e a erigir aquilo que o dotará de habilidades técnicas (únicas) no reino animal. Ou melhor, não apenas de capacidades extraordinárias, mas do desenvolvimento exponencial delas.

As edificações tomadas enquanto conjunto estruturado e moldado de divisões erigido no mundo físico, não é uma invenção (leia-se criação) humana. Espécies diversas já o faziam muito antes do primeiro homínido que, em boa verdade, segundo as análises da pré-história, se limitaria a procurar um abrigo em edificações já existentes (grutas e afins). Ora, tais construções eram efectivamente ecológicas: das colónias de térmitas ou formigueiros às colmeias, os exemplos abundam e fornecem a exacta noção da integração dessas construções numa sintonia perfeita com o ambiente.

No mundo humano primordial, aquilo que é conhecido como sociedades pré-históricas e o respectivo sistema das três idades (em Antropologia e Arqueologia), isto é, a caracterização da pré-história humana segundo a metodologia empregue na criação de utensílios e ferramentas, portanto, da idade da pedra (depois idade do bronze) até idade do ferro, faz com que se atente nesta última. É com ela que se introduzem grandes alterações na forma como se conquistam os materiais, como se manejam, como se despojam os excessos, como se inicia no fundo, um paradigma de utilização do meio e, por consequência, de uma certa desveneração. O crescimento das civilizações que marcam este período e a difusão (aprovação) de crescentes movimentos místicos e religiosos veio acelerar e validar esse paradigma, uma vez que a colocação do homem no centro do mundo (a própria antropomorfização da natureza corresponde a essa exigência hierárquica) e a submissão de todas as espécies (animais e vegetais) aos seus objectivos se torna uma afirmação de poder. E erigir uma casa é uma demonstração de poder.

Aquele que arquitecta a construção de uma casa conforma os desígnios de um desejo ancestral de edificar obra humana. Repare-se que a arquitectura, essa arte ancestral, vai procurar uma adequação entre os diferentes juízos de gosto e de valor, entre os seus desejos e ambições que o homem manifesta na sua demanda poiética e filosófica e assim, a arquitectura é um intento metafísico de prima ordem, pois que o *arkhitékton* (cuja raiz *arkhé* remete para primeiro, originário) aquele que assume a busca primeira, a chefia, se faz *tékhton*, construtor de desígnios. O arquitecto do mundo que conhecemos da filosofia helénica, nada mais é que um construtor engenhoso (*demiurgo*, construtor) que desenhou, dividiu, providenciou formas, concebeu ideias para a harmoniosa arquitectura terrena e celestial. Arquitectar é neste sentido uma tarefa tanto da *phusys* como da meta-*phusys*.

É neste cenário que se encontra a obra *De Architectura* de Marcos Vitruvius (século I a.c.), que faz a apologia dessa demanda e fusão entre as diferentes áreas, mas que acima de tudo nos permitimos destacar os dois primeiros livros (a obra é composta por dez livros). Se no primeiro livro, o autor se indaga sobre a própria definição de arquitectura e qual o seu propósito, no segundo livro coloca a questão da habitação dos primeiros homens e (do progresso) das suas construções.<sup>74</sup> Deixando de lado, as preocupações teóricas de Vitruvius (a definição da arte que arquitecta passaria pela harmonia entre a beleza, a firmeza e a utilidade, respectivamente, *venustas*, *firmitas* e *utilitas*) importa perceber as implicações que esta obra já anuncia, sobretudo a partir do livro segundo, a saber, o conjunto de alterações e modificações que se operam no meio ambiente (a extração de matérias disponíveis para construção), na paisagem para atender ao crescimento das populações.<sup>75</sup> Na verdade, a relação não estabelecida entre paisagem e natureza durante séculos (note-se que segundo Anne Cauquelin a palavra paisagem não existiria),<sup>76</sup> revela a dialéctica de manipulação ambiental, só quebrada pela invenção do jardim como lugar de meditação.<sup>77</sup> Uma manipulação que surge nesse quadro de receita e proveito do mundo, da natureza no seu estado de abertura (para usarmos uma abordagem heideggeriana) que instaura à *techné*. Nessa arte de fazer com saber (precisão e equilíbrio) a instituição desse ofício que arquitecta o pensamento da construção dá-se como administração da forma e da matéria, como gestão e exploração do espaço, afirmando o seu

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74Por exemplo, ver aqui: <http://www.civil.ist.utl.pt/~hrua/Publica/Vitruvio.pdf>

75Ver: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20239/20239-h/20239-h.htm>

76«Algumas pessoas têm dificuldade em acreditar nisso, e tentam contornar a dificuldade de mil maneiras. É que, entre os Gregos antigos, nem palavra nem coisa se assemelham de modo nenhum àquilo a que chamamos “paisagem” ... Estupefação profunda quando comparada com a nossa admiração secular em relação a este céu e a esta terra, às ilhas ao longe, às costas, àquelas colinas áridas e àquelas florestas agradáveis e à luz. (...) É isto a Grécia. Será possível que nenhuma ideia da “paisagem” tenha sido formada, formulada, elaborada? A cisa parece impensável. No entanto, é assim. Para nossa grande confusão». (Cauquelin, 2008, 33).

77«Eis a longa teoria dos jardins, *kepos-hortus*, locais de repouso e de meditação que, rompendo com o espaço indeterminado ou sobrelotado de marcas por e através de uma história, constroem os seus traços distintivos longe da cidade. Esta forma, que os Romanos levaram à perfeição, encontra-se próximo de uma noção ainda não estabelecida, a de paisagem. Trata-se, de facto, de uma aspiração a uma natureza, de um recolhimento no seio de elementos naturais, contudo os traços característicos do jardim distinguem-no claramente daquilo que ele toca assim ao de leve – a paisagem está fora dos seus desígnios». (Canquelin, 2008, 46).



lugar nas artes e ofícios. Naquilo que é considerado uma filosofia da arquitectura, que diga-se, é apenas uma leitura modelada através da estética (como as preconizadas por Gilles Deleuze ou Robert Venturi) e que poderia trazer luz a estas questões, é ainda e só uma perspectiva refeita através do valor estético dado pela arquitectura ou das suas relações socio-culturais; prova de tais leituras revelam-se pela visão despendida que a semântica lhes proporcionou entre arquitectar (capacidade intelectual) e construir (natureza) e que pouco adiantam, diga-se, em relação à reflexão sobre arquitectura, dada a partir das *Lições sobre Estética* de Hegel.

O que importa destacar neste cruzamento entre natureza e construção, entre arquitectar a habitação e habitar a natureza é a transmutação metamórfica dos materiais que viriam a modelar o desenvolvimento das cidades; no fundo, a transformação da paisagem e a transmutação dos materiais vieram alterar a própria forma de pensar a arte e o espaço, pois as matérias da arte e as matérias da natureza sofrem uma ruptura substancial:

Assiste-se à instauração de uma nova ordem. São dois domínios, mesmo não havendo intervenção dos artificios e do fabrico. A madeira da estátua já não é a madeira da árvore; o mármore esculpido já não é o mármore da pedreira; o ouro fundido, martelado, é um metal inédito; o tijolo, cozido e moldado, deixou de corresponder à argila do barreiro. A cor, o grão e todos os valores que afectam o tacto óptico, mudaram. (...) Por vezes, de entre alguns povos, as correspondências entre as matérias da arte e as matérias estruturais foram objecto de estranhas especulações (Focillon, 2001, 57).

Tais especulações (místicas) permitiam, no entanto, a construção de abrigo e de traços artísticos (construção asiática e africana) com sustentabilidade e respeito pelo meio; os materiais que algumas tribos (africanas e asiáticas) utilizam feitos apenas com restos de madeira e argila, sem recurso a qualquer tipo de maquinaria (tudo feito com trabalho manual e geralmente e ainda de forma rudimentar) são o exemplo de uma construção totalmente ecológica.

## **2.As eco-houses e o pressuposto ecológico**

A arquitectura transforma o meio e o homem. Toda a arquitectura humana faz uma modelagem artificial do meio ambiente e como tal, a construção interpõe elementos, *grosso modo*, não naturais na paisagem e no ambiente; diga-se que abstractamente considerada, tal configura uma trans(a)gressão do ambiente. Pensando o seu contrário significaria *per se*, uma perfeita e equilibrada

harmonização entre natureza a edificação. Interpelação mais filosófica que arquitectónica dirão muitos e ela voltaremos.

A preocupação com o ambiente, a preocupação de respeitar os sistemas ecológicos exigiria mais e melhor, mas tem havido, parece-nos, um esforço crescente de criar edifícios e casas mais sustentáveis, ou como soi dizer-se, com menos pegada ecológica. As eco-houses parecem ser um desses exemplos embora muitas dessas construções (pode arriscar dizer-se, na larga maioria dos casos) acentuem ainda a vertente económica em detrimento da vertente ecológica.

A definição de eco-house começa com a seguinte descrição: é uma construção de baixo impacto ambiental que usa materiais e tecnologia que reduz a pegada ambiental e menos energia. A sua construção é desenhada tendo em conta alguns factores que são passíveis de mensuração de acordo com o parâmetro da sustentabilidade, tais como a conservação da água, redução de resíduos (e reciclagem de materiais), controlo da poluição e redução de Co2 (para travar o aquecimento global), regeneração de fontes de energia.<sup>78</sup> De acordo com esta (possível) definição as Eco-houses (também designadas Eco-homes) são vendidas/publicitadas geralmente apelando aos seguintes elementos: isolamento térmico acima da média, boa exposição e orientação solar, ventilação mecânica com recuperação de calor, aquecimento da casa através de fontes renováveis, painéis fotovoltaicos, uso de materiais naturais, reaproveitamento de águas pluviais, vidros duplos nas janelas, uso de turbinas eólicas, aplicação de elementos geotérmicos e aplicação de plantas no telhado para regulação de temperatura e produzir oxigénio, fornecimento de pequeno terreno agrícola para plantação de vegetais, etc. De notar, no entanto, que em muitos casos, o uso de materiais naturais pode significar a destruição progressiva de um habitat ou eco-sistema. Dois exemplos podem ser fornecidos, dispensando desde já o recurso continuado a madeira que estas casas usam geralmente (começam a surgir outras composições sobretudo em modelos pré-fabricados mas que mantêm o mesmo problema de base).

Um exemplo prende-se directamente com o espaço. Quantas mais casas ecológicas existirem (casas individuais) maior é o impacto no meio ambiente (a estimativa aponta para 9 biliões de seres humanos numa década). Isso significa uma maior área de construção e conseqüente diminuição de habitats. Neste sentido, não se configura como uma solução sustentável (repare-se ainda que a orientação solar que publicitam significa em muitos casos, a obstrução solar de outras áreas). Mas desde logo a fabricação das células fotovoltaicas que implicam a extração e transformação do silício (note-se que este cristal aparece geralmente na forma de dióxido de carbono – sílica – e silicatos, o que implica um processo complexo de transformação). Ainda sobre isto, os próprios painéis solares

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<sup>78</sup>Por exemplo em Hassan Almed refere-se: « This project aim is to construct a prototype of an eco-friendly house which is constructed and powered with minimal CO2 emissions which replacing cement in construction. The main focus on reducing the production of CO2 is by utilizing an innovative material known as geo-polymer cement and the usage of a solar panel to power the prototype fully using a clean and renewable energy source. This will in turn reduce our dependency on fossil fuels». (Almed et al., 2016, 1)

no seu conjunto: prefiguram um quadro de possibilidades para as eco-houses mas a sua construção tem implicações directas no ambiente. A utilização de plásticos como a backsheet (que é um plástico branco colocado atrás do painel solar como isolamento eléctrico em três camadas) e a caixa de junção, significa quase sempre o uso da indústria petrolífera. Para terminar este exemplo, a moldura de alumínio anodizado utilizada na junção de todos os elementos. Ora, muitas destas considerações que hoje estão implicadas na concepção de casas ecológicas estão contempladas naquele que foi apelidado de médico da arquitectura (e pintor rei) cujo nome é Hundertwasser.

### **3. O médico da arquitectura e a sustentabilidade**

Ressalve-se desde já que Hundertwasser não nos fala de uma utopia futurista, mas de uma filosofia prática, que é a um só tempo estética, ética e política. O seu pensamento parte da estreita ligação entre homem e mundo, isto é, dessa primeira instância do sentir que é a sua pele, e, que estenderá (este conceito) até ao limite, sendo que o limite é o próprio mundo, relacionando a prática do acto criativo individual (dimensão estética, ética e política pois todos teriam direito a afirmar o seu poder criador) até à prática generalizada de uma ecologia global que não se subsume na mera reivindicação de práticas ambientais mas se coordena com a ambição de uma nova arquitectura, acaba por afirmar o lugar de uma política educativa ao mesmo tempo que reenvia a uma ética ambiental auto-sustentável. Recordamos aqui a tese de Herbert Read quando nos diz que “a arte deve ser a base da educação” (Read, 1982, 13).

O homem está no centro do sistema para Hundertwasser não para reivindicar um antropocentrismo de qualquer forma abstracta ou científica mas para ser o ser criador da harmonia com a natureza, e portanto, para ser a chave para o bem-estar, para a felicidade e para nos indicar a beleza do caminho para lá chegar. Não há beleza sem arte, diz-nos, e essa é a “arte de viver”. Hundertwasser quer devolver-nos os espaços e os tempos da intimidade, contra as ideologias dominantes (numa clara resistência à globalização), ao procurar reivindicar o lugar de descobrimento do homem, da sua criatividade, da sua identidade, no respeito pela natureza e beleza do mundo. Hundertwasser percebe que os gestos, as acções, a praxis de cada sujeito produz efeitos no tudo de todos. Esse constitui de facto o grande desafio para o futuro da humanidade e do mundo: recuperar a densidade e a intensidade dos tempos e espaços, segundo a estruturação da teoria das cinco peles, para engendrar um mundo melhor, de que já daremos explicação.

Na sua primeira exposição (1952) no Club de Arte em Viena, Hundertwasser daria o primeiro sinal daquilo que seria um ciclo de protestos públicos, ao referir que queria ser «independente da

ameaça gigantesca da nossa civilização». <sup>79</sup> De facto, é a partir desta consciência apurada contra a estruturação e generalização, diríamos, de um certo juízo de gosto que se queria impor sobretudo na arquitectura, que o pensamento de Hundertwasser se começa a esboçar. Uma das suas grandes contestações é a sua insurgência contra a linha recta, quer dizer, contra a rigidez de uma geometria que afasta o homem do seu poder criativo e o arrasta para um horizonte de indefinível espiritualidade, ou se preferirmos, contra o racionalismo que estrutura o homem para ser de uma certa forma, limitando-lhe o poder criativo. Assim, a linha recta é como que um *fetish* de conveniência, uma imoralidade. <sup>80</sup> Naturalmente a “Casa Wittgenstein” seria uma elegia desse *fetish* para Hundertwasser, mas vai ao encontro da personalidade do filósofo (os traços de personalidade e racionalidade lógica que caracterizam o seu *Tractatus* são disso evidência clara), <sup>81</sup> não deixando de ser curioso verificar que ambos (Hundertwasser e Wittgenstein) desenharem casas que vão contra o estilo antidecorativo de Adolf Loos.

No manifesto *Loose from Loos – a lei que permite a construção individual ou o manifesto de boicote à arquitectura* (este manifesto é uma reacção declarada à posição de Adolf Loos, defendida em Viena no ano de 1908, contra os excessos florais do Jugendstil, e que poderia ser traduzido na máxima de que todo o «ornamento é um crime»), pronunciado no Concórdia Hall de Vienne em Fevereiro de 1968, Hundertwasser refere que a «linha recta é a única linha não criativa. A única linha que não corresponde ao homem como a imagem de Deus» <sup>82</sup>. Mas já em 1953 Hundertwasser declarava que a «linha recta conduz o homem à queda da civilização», tal como em 1956 na *Gramática de Observação* incitava o homem a desenvolver os seus impulsos criativos individuais.

Em Julho de 1958 o *Mould Manifesto Against Rationalism in Architecture*, pronunciado em Seckau Abbey, o *Addendum* em 1959, a que se seguiria o *Pintorarium* nesse mesmo ano, até chegarmos ao mais famoso dos discursos: *Discurso nu pelo direito a uma terceira pele*, pronunciado na Hartmann Gallery, em Munique em 1967. Aí Hundertwasser declara a arquitectura moderna como uma prisão imputando ao próprio homem a cobardia dessa vivência, sobretudo na pessoa do arquitecto. <sup>83</sup> Mas é sobretudo a partir do manifesto de 1958 - *Manifesto do Bolor contra*

<sup>79</sup>Cf. Koschatzky, Walter, «Hundertwasser» in Catálogo «Hundertwasser – obra gráfica (1951-1978)» [para a exposição que ocorreu na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 9 Janeiro a 18 Fevereiro de 1979, numa organização conjunta com a Embaixada da Austria], Printed in West Germany, 1978.

<sup>80</sup>«The straight line is a heathen, immoral thing. The straight line is a reproductive and not a creative line. Neither God nor the spirit of humanity resides in it, but rather a brainless, anti-like collectivism which makes a fetish of convenience». Citado por Bockelmann, Manfred, *Hundertwasser – Rainy Day*, Munique, Pub. Bruckmann, 1972, p. 42.

<sup>81</sup>A este propósito ver, por exemplo: Wilson S.J. «The Play of Use and the Use of Play: an Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Comments on Architecture», In *Architectural Review*. 180.1073 (July 1986); Macarthur, *David* (2014). «Working on Oneself in Philosophy and Architecture: A Perfectionist Reading of the Wittgenstein House». *Architectural Theory Review*. 19 (2): 124–140.

<sup>82</sup>Citado in *Hundertwasser architecture: for a more human architecture in harmony with nature*, tradução inglesa de Philip Mattson, introdução de Schmied, Wieland, Taschen, 1987, p. 58.

<sup>83</sup>«And these architects, like everybody who as gone to university, are so over-educated. By virtue of the machinery they have been thought they are no longer capable of conceiving an idea of their own. They are legally qualified but are totally incapable of thinking creatively, and these people are responsible fou us all. [...] They don’t even have the nerve to stick their nose out the window, they even have the nerve to tack a thumbtack in the wall – for fear of losing

*o racionalismo na arquitetura* –, que a defesa do bem-estar, do direito à re-criação da sua janela, o direito a habitar condignamente, ganha sentido nos sucessivos manifestos e atitudes filosóficas de Hundertwasser: *Inquilino Albero*, (Milão, 1973), *As retretes de Húmus* (Munique, 1975), *O manifesto da santa merda* (Pfäffikon, 1979).

A metáfora do ‘bolor’ é usada por Hundertwasser para designar o poder criador da natureza, ao mesmo tempo que reivindica a inevitabilidade do seu aparecimento, isto é, tal como o bolor que aparece ao fim de algum tempo quando tudo parece certo, ordenado e/ou estagnado, também o poder criativo do homem necessita de um espaço de afirmação, de um espaço propiciador ao seu aparecimento. Já no manifesto da “santa merda”, embora a metáfora esteja também presente e apele ao poder de transformação, de transubstanciação da matéria, trata-se de revelar o poder dinamizador dessa matéria orgânica como potência de geração, quer dizer, como um poder dialéctico e, portanto, cíclico de gerar o novo: trata-se de re-aproveitar, de re-ciclar para gerar de novo, para propiciar um novo acontecimento da matéria.

Mais do que simples presença polémica, mais do que gerar a controvérsia pela controvérsia, Hundertwasser pensa o ambiente global e o lugar do homem nele, ao mesmo tempo que procura esgrimir uma estética de contornos éticos, ou uma ética para uma estética cosmológica, fazendo por isso lembrar as palavras de Wittgenstein quando referia no *Tractatus* que «a ética e a estética são uma só» (aforismo 6.421). Assim, o conceito que melhor serve este propósito é o de pele: pensado como o que envolve e protege, como fronteira e periferia, mas também como o que (se) proporciona às descobertas de novos lugares e olhares. Assim, o conceito de pele alarga o horizonte íntimo existente entre o homem e o mundo, na exposição (i)limitada dos múltiplos *corpus*.

Hundertwasser estrutura o mundo, na teoria das cinco peles, do seguinte modo: a primeira pele configura-se como a epiderme (sentido genérico), a segunda pele como vestuário, a terceira pele como a habitação, a quarta pele como identidade (meio social) e a quinta pele como Terra (mundo). Significa isto que a primeira pele é aquela que envolve o sujeito, que protege o sujeito (mas que ao mesmo tempo lhe confere identidade). A segunda pele protege a primeira pele, na mesma medida em que a terceira protege a segunda. Ora, a quarta pele é já da ordem da identificação dos valores, quer do homem consigo mesmo quer com os seus semelhantes, pois trata-se já de uma pele que envolveria a identidade (lacto sensu), dada por exemplo pelos valores da família e da identidade. A quinta pele afirma-se como meio global, isto é, como o meio onde se congregam as diferentes peles na medida em que eleva e institui à categoria de valor supremo a humanidade e a ecologia. Mas não será esta apresentação demasiado redutora do pensamento do nosso autor? Como se articulam entre si estes níveis? A teoria das cinco peles congrega a articulação das diferentes camadas, não de modo hierárquico (como se poderia ser levado a pensar *their lease*). Citado in *Hundertwasser architecture: for a more human architecture in harmony with nature*, tradução inglesa de Philip Mattson, introdução de Schmied, Wieland, Taschen, 1987, p. 55.

numa primeira abordagem) mas entre si. Significa isto que tudo está pensado a pensar no todo, ou como refere Restany «o pensamento teórico de Hundertwasser impressiona pela evidência lógica da sua progressão empírica. A reflexão sobre o bolor vai fatalmente desembocar na conclusão do ciclo biológico da natureza» (Restany, 2004, 28). Tome-se por exemplo o ciclo biológico da merda. Esta matéria torna-se terra, que por sua vez gera (fertilizando) relva, jardim, floresta, o que por sua vez permite a purificação do ar e da água. O círculo como que se fecha, não havendo desperdícios. Repare-se por exemplo, como estudos relativos à gestão de resíduos não contemplam soluções de sustentabilidade, que passem muito além do processo de recolhimento, transporte e tratamento, mas que desconsideram processos caseiros como a compostagem.<sup>84</sup>

Hundertwasser adapta este esquema ao seu projecto de habitação ecológica. Tratar-se-ia de uma espécie revelação alquímica da matéria, o que segundo Hundertwasser, permite compreender a condição de habitar o mundo. Com este ciclo biológico estabelece-se uma articulação perfeita entre as diferentes peles. Repare-se na “árvore-locatária” (a árvore pagaria a ‘renda’ com a produção de ar):<sup>85</sup> a concepção é de que a implementação/integração espacial de árvores nas janelas, varandas, mas sobretudo nos telhados, permite não só melhorar o meio ambiente, como devolve-nos o contacto à natureza, ao mesmo tempo que deixa acontecer a livre criação natural que embeleza por si própria. São os terraços-jardim, os telhados-florestas, as barbas nas janelas, etc., a proporcionar a vivência integrada do ambiente. Segue-se que o sujeito se sente bem nesta sua primeira e terceira pele, nas suas acções concertadas, e influencia positivamente todos os outros níveis (melhora a sua habitação, o meio social, o meio ambiente, o mundo).

#### **4. Em conclusão: a arquitectura do pensamento e o ambiente**

Hundertwasser re-inventa a arte, e nessa acção re-inventa a consciência crítica do artista. Assim o objectivo do nosso artista é, nas palavras de Walter Koschatzky, desenvolver «a consciência crítica como uma alavanca para a mudança, formular a anti-arte, incitar à revolução: Hundertwasser inicia

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<sup>84</sup>É um processo aeróbico controlado, efectuado por uma população heterogénea de microorganismos (bactérias, fungos e alguns protozoários) que actual em várias etapas». Martinho, Maria da Graça Madeira, Gonçalves, Maria Graça Pereira, 1999. Gestão de Resíduos. Lisboa: Universidade aberta, p. 148.

Citando: «Compostagem é a degradação biológica aeróbia dos resíduos orgânicos até à sua estabilização, produzindo uma substância húmica (composto) utilizada como corrector dos solos (Faria, 1997, 22).

<sup>85</sup>Refere Restany a propósito deste projecto: «é assim que funciona o ciclo orgânico da casa-tipo, eco-naturista de Hundertwasser, a casa do telhado de relva, por exemplo: o húmus das retretes alimenta a relva sobre o telhado e as árvores locatárias nas janelas. Essa vegetação capta a água da chuva que se junta ao circuito de fornecimento doméstico. As águas de esgoto são posteriormente purificadas pelas plantas aquáticas de filtragem. No plano ecológico é difícil fazer melhor; resta apenas pôr vacas a pastar no telhado, seguindo o exemplo da casa de telhado de relva de Ivan Tarulevic na Nova Zelândia» (Restany, 2004, 79).

a criação da imagem dum futuro em que a vida se torna mais digna, na qual ele pode ter fé, onde a sua imaginação poética e o seu respeito pela dignidade humana podem ser revelados».<sup>86</sup>

Hundertwasser pode assim ser desconcertante, quando refere por exemplo, «que as pessoas não estão preparadas para ver qualquer coisa de belo», e que por isso, ele mesmo pode ser um traidor, uma vez que «em vez de criticar ou destruir, eu tento construir qualquer coisa e mostrar às pessoas um caminho no mundo, como eu gostaria de ver um mundo melhor».<sup>87</sup> O seu carácter interventivo, seja na pintura, na arquitectura, na ecologia, revelam o artista comprometido mas também o artista admirado (os austríacos no dia da inauguração da Casa Hundertwasser, criaram uma fila de 70 000 pessoas).

Não se pense que estão esquecidas as concepções do nosso artista. Os selos, tal como as bandeiras, as chapas de matrícula dos automóveis ou simplesmente as capas de livros (como fez no caso da enciclopédia Brockhaus) que também realizou, são elementos identificativos que favorecem o enquadramento com a quarta pele. Aliás, toda a produção do artista nos anos 80 e 90 acentuam o seu carácter de intervenção social: autocolante «Mais verde em Viena», 1980; cartaz para a Greenpeace Pacific Southwest e para a Cousteau Society, São Francisco, 1981 «Salvem as Baleias – Salvem os Mares»; cartaz de 1989 para Budapeste «usem os transportes públicos – salvem a cidade», entre outros revelam bem a coerência intelectual de Hundertwasser e as suas preocupações ambientais. Ganham assim sentido as palavras de Restany quando refere em conclusão, acerca das considerações de Hundertwasser que a «catástrofe que prevê não é, no fim de contas, senão a dramatização do seu mais sincero desejo: o fim do totalitarismo da cultura global.

Os espaços felizes que nos propõe a partir de hoje o médico da arquitectura são efectivamente destinados a assegurar a felicidade de uma humanidade finalmente libertada da tirania racional do funcionalismo» (Restany, 2004, 95). Mais do que a instauração de um sistema filosófico, do que o legado estético da sua imensa obra pictórica, Hundertwasser deixa em aberto uma leitura mais profícua do seu pensamento: o poder da arte como motor de transformação social das mentalidades (porque a arte tem o poder não de reproduzir o visível, mas de tornar visível, como dissera Paul Klee). Hundertwasser parece subscrever, na medida em que o poder da arte parece abrir as portas não para sobreviver, mas para viver, e para viver melhor, entendido aqui como estratégia existencial tal como Albert Camus o dissera: «viver não o melhor possível, mas o mais possível». Viver o mais possível é viver em harmonia com o meio circundante, é viver na felicidade da construção da beleza, é procurar viver segundo esse impulso vital e criador que o homem tem à sua disposição.

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<sup>86</sup>Vide, Koschatzky, Walter, «Hundertwasser» in Catálogo «Hundertwasser – obra gráfica (1951-1978)» Exposição itinerante na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 9 Janeiro a 18 Fevereiro de 1979, Printed in West Germany, 1978.

<sup>87</sup>«People have no preparation for looking at what is beautiful. If you offer a glimpse of Paradise before the revolution has triumphed, you are branded a traitor. Perhaps I'm a traitor when, instead of going in for constant criticism or destruction, I try to do something constructive and to guide people to a world that is- well, just how I like to picture a better world». (Bockelmann, 1972, 63).

Refere Restany,

do bolor à santa merda, ao ritmo da sua experiência vivida e pontuada por exposições e manifestos, a visão teórica de Hundertwasser estruturou-se em volta de uma equação central: natureza + beleza = felicidade. O homem está no centro do sistema: a harmonia com a natureza é a chave para a felicidade e a beleza o caminho para lá chegar. Não há beleza sem arte, que é a arte de viver. (Restany, 2004, 30).

Hundertwasser quer devolver-nos os espaços e os tempos íntimos, contra as ideologias dominantes (numa clara resistência à globalização), ao procurar reivindicar o lugar de descobrimento do homem, da sua criatividade, da sua identidade, no respeito pela natureza e beleza do mundo. Hundertwasser percebe que os gestos, as ações, a praxis de cada sujeito produz efeitos em todos. Esse constitui de facto o grande desafio para o futuro da humanidade e do mundo: recuperar a densidade e a intensidade dos tempos e espaços íntimos (segundo a estruturação da teoria das cinco peles), para engendrar a utopia naturista de um mundo melhor, que no fundo revele a verdadeira arquitectura do pensamento do homem com o ambiente que habita.

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## 8. Vítor ALVES

### Singularities of the mirror

With the theoretical background provided by Jacques Lacan's text "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience"<sup>88</sup>, this paper explores the possibility of construction of the architect's self in confrontation with an "other", reflected on the pages of a specialized publication.

Since the 1970s, the connexions between architecture and the media, especially the printed one, have been extensively explored. In this specific universe, the work of Beatriz Colomina and the way she interprets the published images as ideological instruments<sup>89</sup>, is particularly relevant. For example, in her 1994 book, *Privacy and publicity*, Colomina examines how Le Corbusier manipulated the photographs of his Villa Schwob, built in 1916 and published in the 6<sup>th</sup> issue of *L'Esprit Nouveau* magazine (1921), in order to produce or emphasize a particular argument. These images have been tampered to underline very specific formal qualities: by removing the pergola, some vegetation and the landscape itself, the building depicted, because detached from the place which it belongs, acquires a more autonomous, purist and ideal character.<sup>90</sup> One could say that the manipulation of these representations, anticipates, on the printed page, something that only would be fully accomplished with Villa Savoye in 1929.

However, this example is also useful to clarify an argument that Colomina presented a few years earlier in her essay "Architectureproduction" (1988), where she states that: *As in Lacan's famous analysis of the "mirror stage" of psychological development, the printed media provide for Le Corbusier both a turning point and a moment of constitution of his architectural "self"*.<sup>91</sup> In this brief sentence, Colomina equals the printed page with the Lacanian mirror, assigning to the paper sheet the same effects of the specular image. She points out that, unlike the classical conception of the mirror as an instrument that reproduces an imitation of an original and already constituted self, *Lacan posits that the mirror constructs the self, that the self as organised entity is actually an imitation of the cohesiveness of the mirror image*.<sup>92</sup> Nonetheless, Colomina does not consider this to be an exclusive of Le Corbusier, claiming that:

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<sup>88</sup>Lacan, J. (1995), "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience", in *Écrits: A selection*. London: Routledge, pp. 1-7. The final version of this text was delivered at the 16<sup>th</sup> International Psychoanalytical Congress, in Zurich on July 17, 1949, and published in the *Revue Française de Psychanalyse*, n° 4, October-December, 1949, pp. 449-455.

<sup>89</sup>Jannière, H.; Vanlaethem, F. (2008) "Architectural magazines as historical source or object? A methodological essay", in Sonin, A., Jannière, H.; Vanlaethem, F. (eds.), *Architectural Periodicals in the 1960s and 1970s*. Montreal: IRHA, p. 51.

<sup>90</sup>Colomina, B. (1994), *Privacy and publicity: Modern architecture as mass media*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 107-111.

<sup>91</sup>Colomina, B. (1988), "Architectureproduction", in Rattenbury, K. (ed.) (2002), *This is not architecture. Media constructions*. Oxon: Routledge, p. 213.

<sup>92</sup>*Idem*, pp. 213-214.

[...] anybody actively involved with publishing is familiar with this experience. The printed media are the mirror wherein the bits and pieces of one's writings and work (often unrealised) return miraculously to their author in a "complete" image. The exhilarating effect on one of the press is not unlike the jubilation of a six-month-old baby in front of a mirror.<sup>93</sup>

Despite of the unexpected but intriguing analogy between the construction of what could be called the "architectural self", or "architect-I", and the psychoanalytic perspective of the formation of the "I", Colomina mentions nothing more on the subject.

The "mirror stage" belongs to the "imaginary", one of the three constituent dimensions of the human condition and psychoanalysis (the other are the "symbolic" and the "real"), the one that deals with images – those that exist and those that are formed, whether they are real or virtual. The text's object is the alienation of the "I", a kind of fundamental fiction, occurring before any social determination, regarding the individual's relationship with his own body through his *identification* with an image. Although Lacan uses the example of an eighteen-month-old baby to illustrate how the "mirror stage" is a crucial moment in the child's mental development and representative of the essential libidinal connection with his body, he insists on highlighting that it also reveals *an ontological structure of the human world [...] in which the "I" is precipitated in a primordial form*<sup>94</sup> and defines the *ideal-I*. Meaning that the "mirror stage" is not a phenomenon that occurs at a certain stage of the child's development, but a kind of permanent structure of human subjectivity. The mirror, in addition to being the first moment with oneself, through a specular image that is an "other", also illustrates the conflict character of the I/other attachment as an insuperable condition of the individual.

The experience of the mirror provides the child with a sense of body unity that does not find correspondence in his proprioceptive experience. The lack of motor coordination, the inability to control his own body or the *fragmented body* sensation, are opposed by the perception of a body unity (the mirror image) that amazes him, but that can already recognize as his own. In other words, it is the identification with the specular image unity of a total formed body (a *Gestalt*), that causes strangeness and generates anguish, by grounding the constitution of the "I" on the illusion of an image that can never correspond to its faithful reflection, for it forms a subjectively non-existent unity. Therefore, and according to Lacan's description, the operation that allows the constitution of the "I" is the same that condemns it to a condition of alienation, shaped by the identification experience of the mirror image as an external and discordant image, suggesting a harmony contrary

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<sup>93</sup>*Idem*, p. 214.

<sup>94</sup>Lacan, J. (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.

to the uncoordinated sensation experienced by the child's body. Hence, one can understand the *Gestalt* as the way by which the human being anticipates the maturation of his power in a *mirage* that gives the "I" its rigid and alienated structure. What this experience also allows us to realize is that what constitutes the "I", even though it's an image of oneself reflected in the mirror, is always something that comes from the outside, by the presence of an "other".

It is the encounter with the specular image, in front of an image of harmony and coherence, an "ideal-I", and regardless the inability to control his own body, which allows the child to experience the jubilant sensation that resides in the hope to overcome this lack of coordination, anticipating at a mental level the ability that has not yet mastered at the physical level due the triumph of the "imaginary" dimension.

Thus, it is understandable how the "mirror" articulates the relation between the human being and the environment in which he operates. The fact of being born without the ability to dominate his own body and the difficulty in establishing connections with the surrounding context, presents to the child as an obstacle to overcome. It is this gap, the *primordial discord* in Lacan's words, which the image in the mirror aims to solve as a mediator between the organism and the world through the creation of the "ideal-I". In this way, the "I" is revealed as an essentially paranoid instance, since its origin is external to the individual, at the same time that is marked by the aggressiveness that the whole identification process entails, since it highlights the lack of real unity with which the individual rivals. The identification process means acquire to the "I" the characteristics of the "other", to take his place and, eventually, deny his existence. Accordingly, the relation with the "other" is always an ambivalent one, both erotic and aggressive.

In *Privacy and publicity*, Beatriz Colomina draws attention to the fact that for Le Corbusier *architecture is a conceptual matter to be resolved in the purity of the realm of ideas, that when architecture is built it gets mixed with the world of phenomena and necessarily loses his purity.*<sup>95</sup> However, Colomina argues that this effect is reversed when the same built object is published, thereby returning to the world of ideas.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, printed images, rather than representing buildings, present ideas. Faced with the impossibility of accessing the built work through a printed page, when publishing architecture (in its different representations: text, drawings, photographs, etc.), what is being published is an ideal (an imaginary set of perfections – the ideas – which cannot be fully realized). In the universe of publications, more than the dissemination of a particular object, is the dissemination of its idea and its different meanings. In this sense, it is possible to situate this conception of *idea* as close to the *Gestalt* notion as Lacan describes it (in the form of a specular image of harmony and coherence with significant totality).

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<sup>95</sup>Colomina, B. (1994) *Op. Cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>96</sup>*ibidem*.

The energy of “The mirror stage” lies not only in creating an image of oneself, but in its instrumental use; when establishing a productive relation with the image, it is possible for the child to see the impact of his movements. Similarly, it would be possible, through the publication as a mirror, to perceive the extent of the author’s thoughts and their impact on reality. It is the existence of the mirror that leads the child to make a number of new gestures, to interact with them, to perceive the effects of these movements on the mirror image and the reflected environment. Equally, in the case of specialized publications, is its existence which calls for new “movements”, the creation of new discourses, while the creation of new knowledge justifies the existence of the publication itself. Publications are the space where new ideas are translated into texts, images and projects, where their effects can be seen and the impact they have on the reflected environment: both on the authors (the reflected child’s image) and on the people and things around them (the reality that the mirror duplicates). An architectural publication, as a mirror, functions as a *virtual complex* and the *reality it duplicates*; it does not belong to the world of phenomena, but it is a reality in itself, a virtual reality.

The child, during the struggle that occurs to master his own body, uses props, human or artificial, which allow him to overcome his difficulties (to stand or walk, for example). It is through other elements, which do not belong to the individual’s own organism, that he is allowed to understand his potential. But for these potentialities to be fully achieved, they have to be recognized as tangible realities – realities provided by mirror images. The same effect will be possible to recognize in the case of publications. The printed work provides their authors with the same *mirages* of tangible realities. This effect is perhaps more intense in the cases of unrealized projects, which is often a sufficient reason for its existence (once published, will it be really necessary to build it since it always falls short of its “pure idea”?). It is through the published “props” of the architectural work that individuals are allowed to believe in the tangible reality (considering the drawings, texts, images, models and other devices that represent the project as “props” since they allow access to the unbuilt object, in the same way the walker allows the child to walk, even if he cannot master this ability<sup>97</sup>).

There is an *identification*<sup>98</sup> with the image on behalf of the author who believes that is through the publication that the real becomes possible. And this “assuming an image” is crucial for the transformation of the author to take place. It is in this sense that Colomina speaks of *jubilation*, in the same way that Lacan describes the experience of *jubilation* felt by the child in front of the

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<sup>97</sup>“Unable as yet to walk, or even stand up, and held tightly as he is by some support, human or artificial (what, in France, we call a ‘*trotte-bébé*’), he nevertheless overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image.” Lacan, J. (1995), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>98</sup>“We have only to understand the mirror stage as an *identification*, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image – whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term *imago*.” *Idem*, p. 2.

mirror. Faced with the (specular) image of harmony and coherence – the “ideal-I” – provided by the publications, authors are allowed to experience joy, which is nothing more than the recognition on them the power to master an ability that they did not believe it was viable (yet). To identify with the published image is to (fully) believe in the possibility of that reality – they are that reality. But, despite the jubilant sensation, the identification generates both a sense of anguish and strangeness, as this experience provides the author a disagreement with his own reality. Through the identification process, he recognizes himself as the author of that “ideal-I”, at the same time he is not sure if he is (since the “ideal-I” is an “other” outside the individual). Hence the reason for his anguish, generated in the precise moment before the choice with which to identify, when he is pure possibility, but where there is also no possible choice other than his identification. Although he can never take his place, he is his referent, his complete double, but precisely for this reason, a strange one. That is why Lacan describes these mirages as forms imbued with significant totality (*Gestalt*) to be *more constituent than constituted*<sup>99</sup>. Therefore, as the “mirror” is a key element of the *Ego* constitution, publications would also be fundamental, although not exclusively<sup>100</sup>, in the construction of the “architect-I”.

The publication of a particular work allows its architect-author an opportunity to confront himself with an image that can provoke contradictory feelings. The fact that what is published is its author, and this is the way others see him (including himself), can result in the need, sometimes obsessive, to control what is represented since there is a risk of not recognizing oneself in what is printed. Hence the “struggle” for the place where authors can build their “I”, since what the publications allows is not only a moment to produce a statement, but an opportunity for architects to be recognized, an opportunity to exist, transforming the printed page in a place of desire. A desire that is nothing more than a particular form of identification: a temporary fixation of a certain image that the author seeks and assumes, territorializing the object of his desire. But this not mean that identification works in a linear manner, on the contrary, identification is an ambivalent place (it can produce certain desires as it prevent others) and in constant negotiation between what it incorporates and what it rejects. It is essentially an articulation process, a continuous and never complete construction; rooted in contingency, it is always below and beyond its referent, also incorporating what is constitutively different. This insinuate, the existence of multiple and parallel identifications by the individual, producing conflicts, convergences, dissonances and new configurations, which call into question the unity and stability of the “I”.

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99“The fact that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a *Gestalt*, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which appears to him above all in a contrasting size (*un relief de stature*) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him.” *Ibidem*.

100Strictly speaking, this formative effect is not exclusive to publications, but it can also occur in other media (radio, television, exhibitions, conferences), or on other platforms where someone’s work is presented as an “image of harmony and coherence”. However, in the case of specialized publications, this effect seems evident.

Nevertheless, this process does not occur only in those who are published. It is likely that the same identification effects exist on architects other than those who publish, since they share the same type of “body”: both are architects, have the same academic education, the same type of production, belong to the same architectural culture. Like the mirror, as a physical object, is not essential for the identification process (it is the device that illustrates it), likewise, for the construction of the “architect-I” to take place, it is not necessary to have published work, just the identification with what is published.

The reader always accesses what is reproduced on the printed page in an incomplete way, either because of the difficulty in providing all the information necessary for its understanding, or because of the impossibility of transmitting, for example, through a representation on a two-dimensional support, a three-dimensional reality. In this impossibility, the reader, when imagining the object, unconsciously fills the information gaps in order to be able to form a complete and coherent image.<sup>101</sup> In doing so, he invests something of himself in the published element, transforming it. Departing from the printed page, it is always another object that is built. In a way, it is at this precise moment that the reader, when mentally building the object, becomes its author. The published works are thus invested with an affection that enables the identification by readers, believing now they have the ability to produce objects like those too. Therefore, in the case of readers, it can be considered a similar process to the effect that the “ideal-I” has on authors when their work is published. In other words, what is published allows both authors and, with the same degree of intensity, readers, to believe that they can also be producers of that reality. Meaning that this process potentially causes the same referent to produce different effects depending on each careful reader, that is, variations of “I’s” that are based on the (supposed) same “ideal-I”.

But publications, especially periodicals, are not made through dissemination of a single object or a single author. While identification with an image can lead the reader to identify himself with the author of the published object, increasing the erotic/aggressive relation, the identification with the images of various objects and authors can lead to the creation of a new “body” or a multiplicity of “I’s” in the same “body” – hybrid bodies as a result of combination and blending of various authors or objects. Faced with the *primordial discord* between the organism and its environment, the individual, when confronted with his *insufficiency*, relies on the *anticipation* of the abilities of “others” as a mechanism to relate to reality, as a kind of *armour* that covers the body as Lacan calls it. This breach, between organism (*Innenwelt*) and reality (*Umwelt*), as Lacan says, will never be perfectly restored, which is why it *generates the inexhaustible quadrature of the ego’s*

<sup>101</sup>The imagination’s ability to fill information gaps in order to give meaning to images, and the viewer’s investment in the observed object, is noted by Pedro Bandeira when he refers to Bernard Voïta work, particularly in the collection of photographs entitled *Architectures* (1994) where the artist, using objects he collects from the trash, builds models of places that do not exist, but that in its apparent banality, are easily recognizable as common places. Half of these images are constructed with scale models and the other half completed by the viewer’s memory and imagination who, without much effort, identifies pieces of cities in these works. Bandeira, P. (2007), *Arquitetura como imagem, obra como representação: Subjectividade das imagens arquitetônicas* [PhD thesis]. Guimarães: Departamento Autônomo de Arquitectura da Universidade do Minho, p. 28-29.

*verifications*<sup>102</sup>, in an always impossible attempt to be in harmony with its natural reality again. It is the separation of these two entities that allows the individual to build his own (denaturalized) body. The body is thus constituted as a form, with its limits defined and contained in a surface (the mirror), that which is capable of receiving the projections of the individual. Consequently, Lacan establishes a morphology of the body on which *ghosts* (the idealizations) can be projected, placing the (*orthopaedic*) body-image as a totality at the control core of the “I” endless constitution. This means that the body’s specular image does not represent any pre-existing biological or anatomical body (to be true, it would have to be a fragmented one as experienced by the child), but an extremely plastic, contingent, artificial and constructed form.

Considering this possibility, the conditions are created for the individual, and the architect, to be several or, in other words, for the components of the constructed *armour* to be able to come from several authors, or for there to be several *armours* mixed according to the readers-authors unconscious, poured over the form circumscribed by the body limits.

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102Lacan J. (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.



# **III.**

## **PAISAGEM LANDSCAPE**

## The becoming-poetry of the icy-cold landscape through architecture

In the beginning, there is a bird: the brown stage-maker that lives in the mountain forests of northeast Queensland in Australia.

This particular bird is the touchstone of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's thought about art. For these authors, art begins with the animal when the animal traces a territory and makes a house, what the two authors define as "the territory-house system."<sup>103</sup> As they recall in *What is Philosophy?*: "Every morning the *Scenopoetes dentirostris*, a bird of the Australian rain forests, cuts leaves, makes them fall to the ground, and turns them over so that the paler, internal side contrasts with the earth. In this way it constructs a stage for itself like a *ready-made*; and directly above, on a creeper or a branch, while fluffing out the feathers beneath its beak to reveal their yellow roots, it sings a complex song made up from its notes and, at intervals, those of other birds that it imitates: it is a complete artist" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 184). In *Mille Plateaux*, they had already stated: "The brown stage-maker (*Scenopoetes dentirostris*) lays down landmarks each morning by dropping leaves it picks from its tree, and then turning them upside down so the paler underside stands out against the dirt: inversion produces a matter of expression. The territory is not primary in relation to the qualitative mark; it is the mark that makes the territory" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 348).

The appearance of a territory implies a becoming-expressive of the milieu components whenever a territorial or qualitative mark is produced. However, a milieu component only becomes a qualitative mark when it does not fulfil any function (a function would be a bird's song when the bird is trying to seduce a lover or dispel an enemy) or ceases to fulfil it, comprising an auto-objective purposeless, and liberating instead a proper expressiveness, a rhythm composed of colours, sounds, postures, and gestures, as it happens with the performance of the brown stage-maker. "The territory-house system transforms a number of organic functions - sexuality, procreation, aggression, feeding. But this transformation does not explain the appearance of the territory and the house; rather, it is the other way around: the territory implies the emergence of pure sensory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expressive features, making possible a transformation of function" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 183). In the desert, informal paths, traced by animals, shepherds, nomads, human and non-human, appear in close relation to singularities (vegetation, patterns of winds, topographical features, etc.) drawing an intensive map of lines and multiplicities independent of any

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<sup>103</sup>Perhaps art begins with the animal, at least with the animal that carves out a territory and constructs a house," Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 183.



Image 01. Straw Hut, Niamey desert, Lacaton & Vassal. Courtesy of the architects.

function of guidance through the smooth space of the desert. These are usually opposed to the stratified pathways (which in their turn are defined after negotiations, either geographical, socio-political or commercial). The vegetation combined with the winds, combined with the undulating dunes or flat sandbanks, combined with the lines drawn through time by animals and people *create* a house in which its planes are sensations.

Artists of the Land Art movement are familiar with these processes, understanding the emergence of expressive qualities or qualitative marks as the appearance of a territory, using them as matters of expression of their own work that, nevertheless, differs from the formers and produces something new. As Colette Garraud points out, for example, of Michael Heizer's *Double Negative* (1969), an earthwork located on the Nevada desert consisting of two long, straight trenches the artist excavated moving about 240,000 tons of desert sandstone: "The artist appropriates, in a way, the characteristics of the site, making the immensity and silence of the desert penetrate the artwork" (Garraud, 1994, p.18).<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Translation by the author.

The architects Anne Lacaton and Jean-Philippe Vassal proceeded similarly when they looked for a place to build their house on the Niamey desert, a straw matting hut. The architects took six months to choose its location. During this period, they understood the desert as a tactile or haptic space,<sup>105</sup> identifying its singularities: an elevated sand dune, located at the intersection of fresh air currents that run through the desert following the direction of the river, the Niamey's city lights at the horizon, and the celestial dome right above. These singularities defined the precise location of the small hut. They belong to its architectural composition more than the functions that the hut fulfils (of shelter, cooling or of providing basic amenities such as electric power it didn't have). For Vassal, the location and the building allowed for another form of inhabiting: inhabiting the landscape of the desert through its *sensibilia* (the desert as a sensible and sensitive landscape, a plane populated by intensities), through the sensations it holds, now built up in the form of a hut.<sup>106</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari's thought about the territory-house system and its implications on art theory are vast and hold several implications (including the definition of the origin of the work of art with the animal). We'll argue that the link between territory, matters of expression, and the composition of sensations opens up the possibility of creating a "Poetic Landscape," which borrows its *name* from an unrealised project by the architect Peter Zumthor.

In 1998, the Detmold's Literature Group invited several authors (Inger Christensen, Peter Waterhouse, Michael Hamburger, Yoko Tawada, among others) to write a poem for a place in the rural landscape near Bad Salzuflen, in Germany. This landscape is characterised by smooth and wide humid green hills, rolling lines of trees on the horizon and dense forest areas, where glades born to pay tribute to the sky and the stars. Each poet chose a specific place in the landscape and Zumthor was responsible for designing a collection of buildings to house each poem, allowing for anyone who sept in to read it. Each place was doubly interpreted: by the poem and the building, and both could be experienced in the place that gave birth to them. The various places, accessible on foot, would form a *Poetic Landscape*, implying an intensive walk between landscape, architecture, and poetry. Not strangely, the poets selected singular moments in the landscape - where trees geometrically align in the plain, where a large horizontal plane is covered with leaves during the autumn and turns into a hill, where several paths tear the dense forest, encountering in a glade - in an approach that Zumthor called of "seismographic work," as if these places corresponded to points of energy, points of ecstasy of the body of the landscape, which then brought the form of the building. However, as Zumthor denotes: "The text and the building do not touch. The poem is not in the building, the building says nothing about the poem. The poem does not

105 "The same terms are used to describe ice deserts as sand deserts: there is no line separating earth and sky; there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour; visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology that relies not on points or objects but rather on haecceities, on sets of relations (winds, undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the creaking of ice, the tactile qualities of both). It is a tactile space, or rather 'haptic', a sonorous much more than a visual space," Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 421. Jean-Philippe Vassal was born and raised in Casablanca, Morocco, thus, he had already developed a bond with Africa during his childhood.

106 There are also other elements and singularities which also enter into the plane of composition of the small hut: the materials, the use of these as *objets-trouvés*, the Tuareg nomad tent, the space as a form of gathering and, of course, the rituals and celebration. All these take part in Vassal's becoming-desert.




Image 02. Model for Poetic Landscape, Peter Zumthor. Courtesy of the architect.

know the building and does not talk about it. But both the text and the building speak of the same place.”<sup>107</sup>

Looking at the drawings and the models made, the buildings emerge in moments of tension, on a steep slope, defying the very laws of gravity as those of the underground aquifer flows; or on the threshold of a plane, where the landscape changes nature and two meadows encounter; or between an open meadow and the beginning of the dense forest, in which part of the building hides. Rather than enhancing or intensifying the landscape’s characteristics the buildings compose with these *territorial motifs* while transforming themselves into *territorial counterpoints*. “On the one hand, expressive qualities entertain internal relations with one another that constitute *territorial motifs* (...). On the other hand, expressive qualities also entertain other internal relations that produce *territorial counterpoints*: this refers to the manner in which they constitute points in the territory that place the circumstances of the external milieu in counterpoint.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 350). The building’s aesthetic composition (which presupposes placement, form, materiality, atmosphere, etc.) is born out of the expressive qualities’ inner impulses (for example when a building’s placement depends of a territorial mark such as the top of a dune or a hillside or the materials resonate the milieu’s components such as in rammed-earth). The buildings produce a territory, that results from both the internal impulses and external circumstances. “Rela-

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<sup>107</sup>Peter Zumthor, lecture presented at the 9th Literature Meeting, Schwabenberg, 21 January 2001; consulted at Zumthor’s *büro* (December-February 2010-11).

tions between matters of expression express relations of the territory to internal impulses and external circumstances: they have an autonomy within this very expression. In truth, territorial motifs and counterpoints explore potentialities of the interior or exterior milieu” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 350).

According to Deleuze & Guattari, territorial motifs are *rhythmic faces* or *characters* and territorial counterpoints are *melodic landscapes*. In the first case, rhythm is a character born of the expressiveness of the qualitative mark instead of a rhythm linked to a character, impulse, or other. In the second case, rhythm emerges as a sonorous landscape in counterpoint to a virtual landscape (instead of associating the latter to a melody). In both cases, rhythm possesses an expressive autonomy. It is through rhythm that the milieus’ components are transformed into matters of expression or qualitative marks. However, they remain contained in their own expressiveness. They are placards or posters, as the two authors write. The rhythm made of motifs and counterpoints, in its turn, create a style. “In the motif and the counterpoint, the sun, joy or sadness, danger, become sonorous, rhythmic, or melodic” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 351).

This happens with poetry (as with music, one of the examples by Deleuze & Guattari). Words possess a rhythm in their own. They are, by principle, language’s answer to chaos. When combined, they form another rhythm through relations between matters of expression, creating characters and landscapes. In the poetic form, this rhythm has its own plane, an autonomy from description and representation, conquering an expressiveness that thrives the word back to the pure forces, those that in the beginning belonged to chaos and are now crystallised.

Perhaps like no other form of artistic expression, poetry appropriates the force and the singularities embedded in the landscape through its rhythm, allowing those who read the poem to penetrate the landscape and feel it within their bodies, that are transformed, in their turn, by the words in the landscape. The rhythm of words, of the voice, of the air that rises and descends through the vocal cords inside the body, joining the lungs to the brain, turns into a gust of wind, perfume of flowers or moist soil. Poetry reacts immediately to the singularities of the landscape, transforming these into sensations. This idea is pursued, for instance, by Matsuo Bashō, considered one of the masters of the Japanese poetic form of the haiku. The haiku does not describe a landscape, instead, it allows the reader to see herself or himself contemplating a landscape that *magically* appears as if in front of their eyes. Only a very skilfully poet can achieve this effect, which involves a transformation of the reader’s body in the landscape through the tactility of the word (poetry is closer to the oral language than any other literary form as well) so that the reader becomes-landscape, becomes-wind, becomes-flower.

The local government changed and Zumthor’s project for a Poetic Landscape was not fulfilled. However, it is from that moment on that Zumthor changes his own thinking about the relationship between landscape and the work of architecture.<sup>108</sup> In his essay “Architecture and Landscape,” while

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<sup>108</sup>Years later, Zumthor admits it on his compendium of Buildings and Projects edited by Thomas Durisch. “The Poetic Landscape project opened new spaces for me, new spaces to think about the connection of architecture to landscape and the creation of

evoking Caspar David Friedrich's painting *The Monk by the Sea*, Zumthor mentions: "An aesthetic experience: I see a man looking at the horizon line of the ocean with his back to the painter. Like the painter and the man in the painting, I look at the landscape, at the painted horizon, and feel the grandeur and vastness. A certain melancholy comes to the fore, imbued with the sense of a world that is infinitely bigger than I am but offers me sanctuary. In addition to the feeling that nature is close to me and yet larger than I am, landscape also gives me the feeling of being at home" (Zumthor, 2017, p. 95).

Aware that the work of architecture transforms the landscape, Zumthor seeks to understand it from its mysteries and its invisible matter. "First I have to look hard at the landscape, at the woods and trees, the leaves, the grasses, the animated surface of the earth, and then develop a feeling of love for what I see - because we don't hurt what we love. Secondly, I have to take care. That is something I have learned from traditional agriculture, which uses the soil but is, at the same time, sustainable. It takes care of the things that nourish us. Thirdly, I must try to find the right measure, the right quantity, the right size and the right shape for the desired object in its beloved surroundings. The outcome is attunement or possibly even tension. (...) This kind of sensing is not a theoretical task; first and foremost, it means having faith in sensual perception" (Zumthor, 2017, pp. 98-99).

Zumthor's sensual perception resembles the molecular perception defined by Deleuze & Guattari, that is closer to matter and its invisible fluxes and forces. One of the examples given by the two authors is the effect of drugs that opens the perception to a micro perception,<sup>109</sup> that can be of the body itself, of its matter, but also its unconsciousness, or of things, from music to landscapes. The molecular perception renders visible the invisible structures of reality, understanding its components from the molecular processes that happened before form, segmentation or stratification, but are kept in the internal structures, allowing to follow the fluxes, vectors, and gradients that envelop matter towards specification (its molar structure). In the landscape, the molecular perception allows to penetrate the landscape, the animism of its components, and to follow its invisible fluxes, determine the singularities that punctuate it and give a name to the vastness and infinite, to understand the ruptures and fissures of the earth, the thickness from which life is born, and, most importantly, to become landscape as in the poem: to lose one's consciousness while becoming-flower, earth, the Cosmos.<sup>110</sup> Zumthor reveals his procedure to ac-

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buildings that serve less a practical purpose than a spiritual need," Peter Zumthor, *Peter Zumthor. Buildings and Projects 1998-2001. Volume 3* (Zurich: Scheidegger & Spiess, 2014), 11.

109"Castañeda illustrates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception of which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure," Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 251.

110The process of becoming (*devenir*, in French) as defined by Gilles Deleuze is an *a-parallel evolution* between two ideas, an encounter between two heterogeneous entities that form a bloc irreducible to either of the terms. As he explains to Claire Parnet, in *Dialogues*: "Les devenirs ne sont pas des phénomènes d'imitation, ni d'assimilation, mais de double capture, d'évolution non parallèle, de noces entre deux règnes. (...) La guêpe et l'orchidée donnent l'exemple. L'orchidée a l'air de former une image de guêpe, mais en fait il y a un devenir-guêpe de l'orchidée, un devenir orchidée de la guêpe, une double capture puisque "ce que" chacun devient ne change pas moins que "celui qui" devient. La guêpe devient partie de l'appareil de reproduction de l'orchidée, en même temps que l'orchidée vient organe sexuel pour la guêpe. Un seul et même devenir, un seul bloc de devenir, ou comme dit Rémy Chauvin, une "évolution a-parallèle de deux êtres qui n'ont absolument rien à voir l'un avec l'autre". Il y a des devenirs-animaux de l'homme qui ne consistent pas à faire le chien ou le chat, puisque l'animal et l'homme ne s'y rencontrent que sur parcours d'une commune déterritorialisation, mais dissymétrique. C'est comme les oiseaux de Mozart: il y a un devenir-oiseau, les deux formant un seul devenir, un seul bloc, une évolution a-parallèle, pas du tout un échange (...)," Gilles Deleuze in Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), 8-9.

cess this sensual or molecular perception: “I have to love the earth and the topography. I love the movement of the landscape, the flow and the structure of its forms; I try to imagine how thick the humus is; I see the hard bump in the meadow and sense the big boulder underneath all the other things I don’t know very much about, but that give me a wonderful feeling. (...) And when I build something in the landscape, it is important to me to make sure my building materials match the historically grown substance of the landscape. The physical substance of what is built has to resonate with the physical substance of the area” (Zumthor, 2017, p. 99).

Although not a lodestar to Zumthor, his description of the projects made for the Poetic Landscape resemble the photographic series *Mimesis* (1972-73), by Barbara and Michael Leisgen. The German artists noticeably pay homage to Caspar David Friedrich in their work, being the latter’s painting *Morgenlicht* the main starting point for this series. In *Mimesis*, the silhouette of Barbara Leisgen appears in the middle of the photograph, emphasising the landscape’s components through gestures and postures. In some photographs, she is stretching her arms in different positions and degrees, to hold the sun around her, or create a vessel to the clouds, or point the meeting of two mountains in the horizon, or follow the contours of the undulating countryside. The body becomes a territorial mark within the landscape, transforming the latter’s components into expressive elements. Plus, in the space of the photographs, these form territorial motifs or characters to which the body pays a homage with a song made of postures, gestures, colours, and sounds (we *hear* the mountains’ echo through Barbara’s body as she embodies its vastness and majesty). The artists refer that their action pretended to mimic nature’s language through the body. “In a time without words the coercion to behave mimetically was enormous. Reading clouds, stars, the sun, mountains and dances is reading beyond language. (...) The faculties to resemble and to behave similar are faculties of man. (The attempt to imitate is always magic, too)” (Barbara and Michael Leisgen, 1974). However, we recognise the composition of a melodic landscape formed by territorial motifs (when the artists operate a selection of nature’s components - moments of inversion of patterns, points of tension or confluence, fissures - they are turn these into matters of expression, and then, through their *mise-en-scène* in territorial motifs), and territorial counterpoints (i.e. the postures and gestures of Barbara’s body). “Reading beyond language” reveals an attempt to trace a territory (which implies the emergency of expressive qualities) through the becoming expressive of rhythm. In the series of photographs, this rhythm also augments, expands, contracts...

Looking at the German’s couple photographs and Zumthor’s drawings and models of the Poetic Landscape projects, the resemblance becomes evident. Zumthor might not be familiar with the formers’ work, but an identical understanding of the landscape and nature is recognisable, probably because Zumthor also proceeds in a similar way to Land Art artists. He makes several expeditions to the site, spending long periods walking, collecting and documenting singularities, including the passage of time and the chaos that nature embodies (for example, perceived in the light of a place). These expressive



qualities will be metamorphosed into the work's composition to create spatial sensations (the house's planes). Among several descriptions provided by Deleuze & Guattari, a sensation is a bloc of affects and percepts, that might also be described as territorial motifs and melodic landscapes, respectively. It is through rhythm that these form compounds of sensations, and determine becomings. "But it is not just these determinate *melodic compounds* (...); another aspect, an infinite *symphonic plane of composition*, is also required: from House to universe. From endosensation to exosensation. This is because the territory does not merely isolate and join but opens onto cosmic forces that arise from within or come from outside, and renders their effect on the inhabitant perceptible" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp. 185-186). The sensation fills a territory - the house, postures, colours - while simultaneously evokes and embraces cosmic forces. Of course, there is a continuity between sensation and cosmos as they belong to the same impulses that gave origin to territorial characters and melodic landscapes, traces of an original chaos.

In the Poetic Landscape project, Zumthor unconsciously inherits the poets' approach (albeit each artistic form proceeds with its means, they share a *vision* of the landscape), creating a rhythmic and polyphonic landscape filled with territorial motifs and counterpoints, where the space between buildings is just as important as the buildings themselves. The operating distances belong to rhythm. The buildings serve as landscape's counterpoints. They do not belong to the landscape, but rather create a landscape within themselves where the former is *kept* as vibrations, forces, and sensations. The Poetic Landscape will constitute itself as an aesthetic approach to the landscape-architecture relationship not from the point of view of function (shelter or inhabiting), but as an assemblage or, as Deleuze and Guattari name, as a refrain. "We call a refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes (there are optical, gestural, motor, etc., refrains)" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 356). The landscape no longer refers to a specific landscape, but to the melodic landscape produced by territorial motifs and counterpoints. And poetic refers to the rhythm that belongs to the compound of sensations.

In 2011, Zumthor completed the *Steilneset Memorial to the Victims of the Witch Trials in the Finnmark*, located in Vardø, where we recognise the production of a Poetic Landscape just as it happened when the architect designed the Bruder Klaus Kapelle. At the exhibition held in *Kunsthaus Bregenz*, in 2007, it was possible to read in the description of the Poetic Landscape project: "But then the district government changed from one party to another, and the project died. Did it really? Perhaps not, as it is still showing signs of life."<sup>111</sup> It was a rhetorical question as the architect was just finishing the Bruder Klaus Kapelle. In his latest monograph, Zumthor confirms it: "The stock of architectural images I dreamed of and worked on for this project [Poetic Landscape] later found expression in the Bruder Klaus Chapel in Wachendorf in the Eifel" (Zumthor, 2014, vol.

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<sup>111</sup> Consulted at Zumthor's *büro* (December-February 2010-11).

3 / p. 12). However, Zumthor is thinking here of the similarity between forms attained for both projects - the excavated mass within an organic and sinuous internal enclosure and a straightforward and clear-cut external form — that he afterwards attributes to Brigitte Labs-Ehlert.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, the forms are unquestionably similar, but the question of form is secondary. It is the Poetic Landscape as an aesthetic theory and a form to trace a territory (following Deleuze & Guattari) that allows this proliferation of built works as we witness again in the Steilneset Memorial.

Vardø is an island located in the Barents Sea, north of the Arctic circle, where the land meets its end and we feel earth's curvature and nature's power so strongly. During the summer, the days are endless while, during the winter, the sky is of the darkest blue as a constant night, only punctuated by the lights in the streets and in the houses' windows. Every house has a light suspended at the window to lit at nightfall according to an ancient tradition (a gesture Zumthor repeats inside the memorial, which we also find in Sigurd Lewerentz churches). The island's terrain is a continuous carpet of rock, grass, small flowers, with the buildings standing in between. There are almost no fences and the houses have a direct relationship with this geological and topographical stratum. Some of the buildings even have informal green roofs camouflaging themselves in the landscape. And there isn't any tree at the vast open horizon. Only the infinite horizontal planes of earth and sea. The community is mainly dedicated to fishing and related industries, and while walking around the island to enjoy its extraordinary nature (in the very way of the northerners), we may still find the old wooden structures used to dry fish.

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<sup>112</sup>“The germ cell of the design for the Bruder Klaus Chapel can be found in the ‘poetry houses’ (individual structures designed to relate to a specific poem) I had worked on two years before in the context of the Poetic Landscape project. It was only later, after the chapel was built, that Brigitte Labs-Ehlert, the author of the Poetic Landscape Project, pointed out the similarity of the spatial innovations in both projects.” *Idem, Ibidem*, 121.



Image 03. Vardø, H el ene Binet, 2012. Courtesy: ammann // gallery.

The memorial stands above the terrain through a wooden structure similar to those to dry fish, allowing the natural untouched landscape to flow underneath: flowers, rocks, stones, empty sea urchins houses. It perpetuates the walking through the landscape, however changing the sensation. In the composition of sensations, there are always thresholds of intensity - when a sensation reaches a limit and changes its nature (for instance: the perfect balance or its immediate fall) - and, in the memorial, these coincide with the ones of the entrance and the exit of the building, as a long walk through the northern landscape already took place (and a person is already immersed in the landscape). Albeit being apparently symmetric, from whatever side we reach it, the sensation changes by the very act of crossing the space. The entrance, independently of the side, is marked by the heavy door (clearly understanding the door as a threshold, Zumthor always pays extreme attention to the doors and all their details: how our hand grasps the handle, the movement that the door describes when we push it or close it, its weight, the texture of the materials mixed with the time of use, and the time of nature, etc.) and once inside the dark corridor, it's difficult to go back. The memorial becomes a sheltered passage or a dark tunnel in the middle of the northern icy landscape. Its form inherits the quality of its material: it is a flexible textile form, stretched and fi-

xed on the wooden structure that sways with the constant coastal winds and breezes just as the suspended lights inside. The milieu's components - the terrain, the walking, the suspended lights, the wooden structure, the wind, the colours, the exquisite birds - are metamorphosed into matters of expression. Instead of framing them, the building uses them as expressive qualities in its aesthetic composition.

Inside the Memorial, the atmosphere is silent and quiet. It is a concentrated and saturated space, where the black canvas (an artifice that Zumthor creates again in the 2011 Summer Serpentine Pavilion, and, in former projects, we may identify with the double wall or corridor that envelops the internal space, preparing the body before inhabiting) abruptly cancels the visitor's senses so that she or he gradually concentrates on the rhythm that belongs to the building itself. This rhythm composes a polyphonic landscape where we recognise the *territorial motifs* or *rhythmic characters* (the matters of expression created by Zumthor after his selection of the landscape's singularities) and to which the window-light devices (and it's important to observe that these don't follow any order or cadence), the suspended silk cloths (where the visitor can read the story of each one of the ninety-one victims), the elevated wooden floor (that seems to float), and the visitor's own steps and reading pauses belong to.

Inside the memorial, the silence becomes expressive (what denotes the composition of a spatial sensation), and we are *envisioned* with a *melodic landscape*. Zumthor kept the presence of nature's elements inside the tunnel. We hear and feel the wind, the Arctic's icy cold, the cries of the seagulls and the birds flying in circles, the waves crashing against the rocks. The tunnel is crossed by nature, by all its elements. As in John Cage's 4'33", all the subtle differences of sound in the interior increase the attentive listening of our bodies, because the space forms an envelope for the body, at the same time making the body concentrate on all the subtle sounds coming from the exterior, in their intensive bodily presence. This dichotomy between external and internal space (and we should notice that many of the openings are unreachable to the visitor's eyes, so the presence of the exterior happens mainly through hearing) plays an important role in the composition of silence as a spatial sensation. Writing about the Poetic Landscape projects, Brigitte Labs-Ehlert notices: "Who enters the building arrives in an optically closed, but atmospherically open space to the surroundings. The landscape cannot be seen from here, but light, noise, temperature, humidity, and smells penetrate the interior through the fine-meshed cavity walls" (Labs-Ehlert, n.d.). Deleuze and Guattari point, precisely, to the sonorous quality of the refrain. In this case, the refrain results from the transformation performed by the bloc of sensations (a coupled sensation of silence and contemplation): a visual sensation is given through hearing - what happens whenever we are in the presence of a melodic landscape.



Image 04. Vardø model, Peter Zumthor. Courtesy of the architect.

The sound of the landscape has always been present in Zumthor's memorial as a matter of expression. One of the models made represents Vardø during the Winter with the terrain transformed into a flat icy surface as if covered in snow. The buildings are dark to contrast with the white of the terrain and the memorial's solitude and dignity, gently perched on the ground. As it happens with several Zumthor projects' models, the model holds a sensation or compound of sensations within itself. Sometimes this sensation is close to the one that the built work sustains; other times it is another sensation that, notwithstanding, defines an atmosphere or an expressive quality of the built work. In this case, the model becomes a sonorous plane and, contrary to what happens in the memorial, is the visual image that produces a sonorous landscape (we hear the ice cracking and the vibrations and resonances that echo in the landscape through the model).

Zumthor's memorial is the stage-maker's *mise-en-scène*, the refrain that captures nature in its most intense expressiveness, assembling it in a different way (nature as *ready-made*, as Deleuze & Guattari would point out). It's the melodic composition of nature's joy and despair. It's a performance

when we cross the tunnel perpetuating a continuous movement through the landscape that ties up the whole island. It's a chaosmos: a Poetic Landscape.

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## 10. Anna *PONTES*

### **The concept of ruins in the work of Alexandre Herculano and Almeida Garrett**

#### **Introduction**

It is undeniable that ruins have raised a significant number of interpretations and conceptions over the centuries, whether perceived as deformed or fragmented structures, deprived of their original form and use, or as a state of degradation. In addition to these perceptions of ruins, there are also the preservation efforts or the appeals for them to be undertaken – also becoming crucial moments for theoretical development on the subject.

The references to ruins in Portugal as historical and artistic objects adopted different features, in consonance with the chronology and the architectural function. For this reason, Miguel Tomé differentiated these historical remnants by origin, dividing them into «[...] archaeological ruin - prehistoric or ancient (source of scientific knowledge and bearer of important documental value); and medieval ruin, which can be subdivided into religious, military and civilian»<sup>113</sup> (Tomé, 2002, p. 59).

The preservation trajectories of monuments from different backgrounds attest to the development of the theme depending on political, intellectual, and socio-economic decisions. In this sense, the memories of the Lisbon earthquake (1755) and the violent events of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century «[...] deepened the relationship of the Portuguese with the material remains of the past and kept, in essence, the predominance of the archaeological value of the monuments, which were valued mainly for their antiquity and for what they made known about the past that had created them [...]»<sup>114</sup> (Rodrigues, 2010, p. 21-22).

The degraded patina of medieval monuments urged for interventions, in which rebuilding was accepted provided that the primitive architecture was respected<sup>115</sup>. Medieval ruins were, above all, conceived as a state of degradation and abandonment, caused by various reasons, among which

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<sup>113</sup>Translated by the author. Original text in Portuguese «[...] a ruína arqueológica – pré-histórica ou antiga (fonte de conhecimento científico e portadora de importante valor documental); e a ruína medieval, que se pode subdividir em religiosa, militar e civil» (Tomé, 2002, p. 59).

<sup>114</sup>Translated by the author. Original text in Portuguese: «[...] aprofundaram a relação dos portugueses com os vestígios materiais do passado e mantiveram, no essencial, o predomínio do valor arqueológico dos monumentos valendo estes sobretudo pela sua antiguidade e por aquilo que davam a conhecer do passado que os havia criado [...]» (Rodrigues, 2010, p. 21-22).

<sup>115</sup>As seen in Herculano in 1937, as we shall detail.

we highlight the neglect in the heritage management, with monuments being subjected to vandalism, abandonment, and poor repairs.

It is worth remarking that the degradation of national buildings, a matter much disapproved throughout the nineteenth century, is distinct from the passion for fake ruins, from the same century, whose scenic fallen columns were built to meet pre-Romantic and Romantic appreciation, especially in England and Germany. In Portugal, the fake ruins were presented with Gothic and Manueline references (Rosas, 1995, p. 55-56), like those in the Évora Public Garden (1867)<sup>116</sup>.

The criticism of the ruins in 19<sup>th</sup> century Portugal was expressed in articles, narratives and essays published in periodicals and books, under the influence of intellectual instruction received abroad, mainly by exiles, the European culture and, primarily, the Romantic movement. In this work, we investigate specifically the articles that Alexandre Herculano<sup>117</sup> published in the magazine *O Panorama* in 1837 (n. 1), 1838 and 1839 (n. 69-70 and 93-94), of which the last four were assembled under the title *Monumentos Pátrios*, in the book *Opúsculos* (1873), and the book *Viagens na Minha Terra* (1846), by Almeida Garrett<sup>118</sup>, initially published in chapters, in the *Revista Universal Lisbonense* (1843). The emphasis of this work is to understand their thoughts on the ruins' conception developed in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but which still produced its branches throughout the following and the current centuries.

## A hectic 19th century

The early 19<sup>th</sup> century represented a period of massive destruction of medieval monumental buildings in Portugal. The French invasions (1807-1811), the diffusion of the revolutionary theory itself, developed since the beginnings of the French Revolution, and the discomfort of the English domination (1810-1820) enabled questionings and changes in the Portuguese political conjuncture.

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116On the fake ruins of the Romantic movement in Portugal, see Santos & Braga (2016).

117Alexandre Herculano de Carvalho e Araújo was a writer, historian, archivist, journalist, editor of historical documents, farmer, and politician (he served as a deputy and president of a municipality). He had technical instruction at the Aula do Comércio and attended the diplomatic course at Torre do Tombo (1830-1831). After the civil war, he worked at the Oporto Library until 1836, taking over the editorship of the weekly magazine *O Panorama* the following year and the direction and editorship of the unofficial sections of the *Diário do Governo* in 1838. Literary, essayistic, and journalistic work remained fruitful in the following years for Herculano, who became a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Lisbon, the Royal Academy of History, and the Academy of Sciences (Assis, n. d., p. 1–15).

118João Baptista de Almeida Garrett graduated in law from the University of Coimbra (1816-1821), where he stood out as a liberal student leader. He took part in the Oporto Liberal Revolution (1820) and in the Vilafrancada (1823) and then went into exile in England. In Paris, he published the poems *Camões* (1825) and *D. Branca ou A Conquista do Algarve* (1826), regarded as milestones of Portuguese Romanticism. Although he returned to Portugal, Garrett went back into exile in England between 1828 and 1832, during Miguel's government. After the Civil War, Garrett returned to being involved again in journalism and politics and was also one of the writers of the 1838 Constitution. Garrett was an opponent of Cabralism who kept up his political and social criticism when he started writing *Viagens na Minha Terra*. Over the years, he became more moderate, earning the title of Viscount. The writer, poet, journalist died on December 9<sup>th</sup>, 1854 (Domingos & Hohlfeldt, 2013, p. 208–209; Alves, 1997, p. 1–5).



According to Sérgio Matos, the nationalist conscience arose in contestation to the French presence and the British power, and since the end of 1808, the use of the term «nation» was noticed, an alteration from the previous terms, «Kingdom» or «Monarchy». Then, «The concept already appears in the sense of a singular collective (‘the mass of the Nation’ that ‘wields the weapons’), an entity endowed with its own will, autonomous in relation to the figure of the monarch who was far from the European theatre, although associated to it»<sup>119</sup> (Matos, 2008, p. 114).

The escape of the royal family to Brazil (1807-1821), at the time of the French invasions, the collapse of the colonial system between the two regions (1815-1822) and the Oporto Liberal Revolution (1820) are marks of the internal conjuncture, in which liberalism firstly ascended in Portuguese politics, the «vintismo» (1820-1823)<sup>120</sup>. The conflict between absolutists and liberals, even after the Treaty of Évoramonte (1834), marked an agitated, oligarchic period, accentuated by civil war (1832-1834) and by absolutist coups (1823, 1824). Many monuments were occupied or degraded during this period, whereby their deterioration and abandonment increased after the disentanglement of the Church property.

In the context of the liberal regime reforms, the systematization of laws guided by Mouzinho da Silveira (1780-1849) led to the extinction of the religious orders and the incorporation of Church property into the National Treasury (decree of May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1834)<sup>121</sup>. The effect of these laws for the moveable and built heritage of the Church was detailed in a sequence of laws and ordinances<sup>122</sup> in order to organize the material set integrated into the State, in a reformist process initiated at the end of the government of D. Pedro IV and legalized in the reign of D. Maria II (Neto, 2019, p. 194).

The buildings of notable antiquity<sup>123</sup> that would be excluded from the alienation process, according to the law of April 15<sup>th</sup>, 1835, should be surveyed, inventoried, classified as public monuments and conserved – as also requested in the following year, in a circular of February 19<sup>th</sup>, 1836. Despite the financial incentive approved in the Parliament, with an annual sum for the conservation of monuments, in February 1838, the government inertia in the matter was noted (Neto, 2019, p. 196-199).

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119Translated by the author, original text in Portuguese: «O conceito surge já num sentido de colectivo singular (‘a massa da Nação’ que ‘empunha as armas’), entidade dotada de vontade própria, autónoma em relação à figura do monarca que se encontrava longe do teatro europeu, embora a ele associada» (Matos, 2008, p. 114).

120On the subject, see Monteiro (2019, p. 31–65).

121On the same subject, Rui Branco argues that these and other laws of Mouzinho da Silveira (for example, the extinction of the tithe, the guarantee of individual property, the elimination of tolls, the allocation of judgements to the courts) were not only intended to overcome the Old Regime, but rather the development of a liberal and capitalist policy (Branco, 2019, p. 99).

122We highlight, for the year 1834, the ordinance of June 4<sup>th</sup>, which presented the guidelines for the procedure of the transfer of religious goods; the ordinance of June 20<sup>th</sup>, intended for the Cardinal Patriarch on the conservation of extinct convents; and, among others, the ordinance of August 18<sup>th</sup> on the deposit of the convents' libraries (Neto, 2019, p. 193).

123Therefore, in line with the law of April 15<sup>th</sup>, 1835, resembling great achievements of national epochs or artistic excellence.

Moreover, the abandonment, sale, or reuse [of buildings or just their architectural pieces] contributed to the destruction or degradation of a more significant number of monuments in Portugal. Faced with this situation, Jorge Custódio points to the extinction of religious orders and expropriation of religious property, institutionalized in liberalism, as another earthquake [of 1755], however, caused by individuals – relating to new cultural values and in opposition to the economic and political structures at the time (Custódio, 1993, p. 36).

### **From destruction to criticism**

In recognition of the historical and national values, the affirmation of the cultural heritage in the nineteenth century occurred within the liberal and Romantic society, mobilizing the public opinion (Custódio, 1993, p. 33). This consecration was possible in this period because of the press<sup>124</sup>, used for debate and theoretical formulation, in addition to its mediatization (Rosas & Vasconcelos, 2004, p. 212-213). In this context, attitudes of protest and indignation took place in the face of the ruin or disfigurement of national monuments in the writings of Alexandre Herculano and Almeida Garrett. With these authors, the appreciation of medieval monuments, as representative of the nation's past, and the disapproval of its ruins were accompanied by dismay and criticism towards the state of monuments.

### **Alexandre Herculano**

Alexandre Herculano presented a brief report on the Carmo Ruins along with an illustration in the first issue of the magazine *O Panorama* (1837), in which he was redactor. The valorization of the medieval monuments as national roots<sup>125</sup> was pronounced together with the warning about the few vestiges of national buildings and the alterations that hid the primitive architecture in its glory. Therefore, he called on the Government and the Municipalities to prevent such destruction, as it was already occurring in England and France (Herculano, 1837, p. 2). The condition of the Carmo Ruins' columns confirmed the attempt of rebuilding, seen as positive for having respected the unity of the architecture (Herculano, 1837, p. 4).

Influenced by the debate on the subject at the time<sup>126</sup>, Herculano called on his readers to

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124In the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the deportation and exile of political personalities contributed to the first steps of the Portuguese press in London. Academic training or life abroad was not unusual among the circle of readers, writers and groups associated with cultural heritage. Nevertheless, Nuno Monteiro points to this context as decisive for the cultural environment of 1820 (Monteiro, 2008, p. 100) and the development of a new heritage knowledge outside the national tradition after the liberals' victory (Maia, 2007, p.14).

125It is worth mentioning that there were archaeologists, like Francisco Martins Sarmiento (1833-1899), who defended the Lusitanian origin of Portugal, particularly during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Fabião, 2011, p. 126).

126As Ramalho Ortigão argued in *Culto da Arte em Portugal*, Romanticism was introduced to Portugal

raise their voices against what he called the destructive spirit of their generation, in support of the «[...] monuments of history, of art and of national glory, which every day we see crumbling into ruins»<sup>127</sup> (Herculano, 1838a, p. 267). In the history of architecture's ruins, the previous destruction resulted from ignorance and carelessness, at that moment «[...] we destroy because of exaggerated and false ideas: we actively destroy; we destroy because destruction is the vertigo of time, a fever that devours, not bodies, but spirits. We can consider ourselves happy if we can cure anyone of it; save even a single stone from the hands of the modern Huns»<sup>128</sup> (Herculano, 1838a, p. 268).

The acts of vandalism against the monuments were confirmed by letters from readers from all over the country, who bemoaned the ruins or reported the vandalism that caused them, according to Herculano (1838b, 276; 1839a, 44). In this broader view of the monuments' situation in the country, Herculano warned that to abandon monuments, however, would be to disown the national past testimonies, disregarding memory, conservation, history, and religion. Santarem, rich in monuments, was an example of this vandalism against monuments (Herculano, 1839b), whose ruins were also later described by Almeida Garrett.

To this end, he advocated the creation of an Association to denounce the demolition of monuments: the National Monument Conservation Society (Herculano, 1838b, p. 275-77), founded in 1840, with a brief but relevant activity (Rodrigues, 2010, p. 25). In the same sense, Herculano called out for attention to monuments relevant to the nation until a heritage law could solve the vandalism issue (Herculano, 1839a, p. 45).

### **Almeida Garrett**

Almeida Garrett's criticism of the ruins was made in opposition to the alterations, degradation, and destruction of the monuments, as it is possible to comprehend in the book *Viagens na Minha Terra* (1846), whose chapters were previously published in *Revista Universal Lisbonense* (1843)<sup>129</sup>. The disapproval of the ruined state of the monuments in Santarem – or, as far as we can

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through Chateaubriand and Victor Hugo. The choice of the monuments theme and, within these, ruins, is contextualized with the scientific productions and discussions of that time (Ortigão [1896] 2009, 13). The articles written in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* by Victor Hugo – *Guerre aux démolisseurs* (1832) – and by Montalembert – *Du Vandalisme en France. Lettre a M. Victor Hugo* (1833) and *Le Vandalisme* (1838) – read by Herculano, played a relevant role in his narrative on monuments (Rosas 1995, p. 23–24; Rosas & Vasconcelos, 2004, p. 215–216).

127Translated by the author, text in Portuguese: «[...] monumentos da história, da arte, e da glória nacional, que todos os dias vemos desabar em ruínas» (Herculano, 1838a, p. 267).

128Translated by the author, text in Portuguese: «[...] nós destruímos por ideias exageradas e falsas: destruímos ativamente; destruímos, porque a destruição é a vertigem do tempo, uma febre que devora, não os corpos, mas os espíritos. Felizes nós se pudermos curar alguém dela; salvar ainda que seja uma só pedra das mãos dos modernos Hunos» (Herculano, 1838a, p. 268).

129The weekly magazine *Revista Universal Lisbonense* presented general subjects regularly between 1841 and 1853 and intermittently until 1859. The first chapters of *Viagens na Minha Terra* began to be published on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 1843, a month after the writer carried out the travels. The publications of the narratives were interrupted and later reissued in 1845, being fully published in the journal until 1846 (Domingos & Hohlfeldt,

infer, in Portugal – is interspersed by the accounts of the journey that begun on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1843. The book also featured the author's reflections and thoughts, written as it were a dialogue with the reader, and stories such as the romance of Joaninha, the girl of the nightingales, and her cousin, Carlos. According to Clara Soares and Maria João Neto, it was an examination of both the country and itself, given that the September Revolution did not correspond as it should have regarding heritage (Soares & Neto, 2015, p. 121).

The writer distinguished, in the book, the ruins of time from those profaned by human beings, so we assume that he was inspired by François-Auguste Chateaubriand<sup>130</sup>. The beauty of the ruins of time would carry with it the ability to learn about the past. Garrett reflects on how much better he would understand the history of the great writers, such as Titus Livius and Tacitus when visiting the eternal city and sitting in the immortal ruins of Rome. However, being in Santarem, the book of stones, he remembered that the people there had not yet fallen, like Nineveh or Pompeii. Therefore, ruins were also the term used to describe what the government had been doing in Santarem, removing the architecture of its buildings through alterations (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 126, 141).

The ruins of time are sad but beautiful; those that revolutions bring are marked with the solemn stamp of history. But the vulgar degradations and the cruder repairs of ignorance, the petty repairs of parasitic art, these profane our solemn history, take away all prestige<sup>131</sup> (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 141).

The author's defence of the monuments' historicity, which overrides its ruined condition, condemns the renovations that distort the building's architecture, often referred to as bad repairs. The additions and transformative interventions were worse than the ruins themselves. They were considered destructive to the history behind the stones, a criticism also existent in *Lírica de João Minimo* (1829), published in London, about the alterations in the Monastery of Odivelas. Thus, referring to the beginnings of the defence of the 'unity of style' in Portuguese restoration (Soares & Neto, 2015, p. 120-126).

2013, p. 210-218).

130For Chateaubriand, there were the ruins caused by time (or ruins of nature) and the ruins caused by man – while the former would not be disturbing, for being an effect of time itself, the latter, of devastations, coming from the most violent destructions, were not susceptible of restoration (Chateaubriand, [1802] 1966, p. 41).

Although Chateaubriand's best-known work, *Génie du Christianisme*, was translated into Portuguese by Camilo Castelo Branco in 1845, Garrett, who lived in Paris, had praised it since 1824, stating that the book was an ingenious work and that it had left him somehow persuaded (Garrett 1824 *apud* Maia, 2007, p. 19).

131Translated by the author, text in Portuguese: «As ruínas do tempo são tristes mas belas, as que as revoluções trazem ficam marcadas com o cunho solene da história. Mas as brutas degradações e as mais brutas reparações da ignorância, os mesquinhos concertos da arte parasita, esses profanam, tiram todo o prestígio» (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 141).

Garrett pointed out, at that time, the reflection of political conflicts concerning the idea of the nation's past<sup>132</sup>. The heritage crisis, perceived in the book, involved the context that followed the extinction of the orders in 1834: the sales, alterations and depredations deemed undue, the dismantling and the use of materials. He described this indignation throughout the book while travelling from Lisbon to Santarem. Once in the city, he deplored the abandonment of local monuments, as «What an amazing and dismal mess of rubble, of stones, of heaps of earth and plaster! There are no streets, no paths, it is a labyrinth of ugly and torpid ruins»<sup>133</sup> (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 133-134).

### **The influence of intellectuals**

Intellectuals of the first Romantic generation, Herculano wrote about monuments theoretically and systematically, while Garrett reflected about them in his literary productions, with refined aesthetic knowledge (Rosas, 1995, p. 30–31). The importance of the two intellectuals to the reflection on Portuguese heritage is remarkable, even with different ways of communicating with their readers. The criticism of ruins and bad repairs remained in texts published throughout the century, of which we mention those by Joaquim da Costa Cascaes and J. P. Fernandes Thomás Pippa.

Despite the «demolimania» – Cascaes' concept – losing power in Portugal, the conservation process should have had people with artistic and archaeological knowledge in leading the interventions so that it would not have resulted in architectural mutilations<sup>134</sup>. In this sense, Cascaes confessed his preference for the maintenance of monuments as ruins rather than being recklessly repaired: «The ruins of an unmangled monument can often enrich the treasures of art; but never through architectural nonsense»<sup>135</sup> (Cascaes, 1854, p. 210).

Thomás Pippa, in a text published in the issue n. 4 of the *Jornal de Belas-Artes* (1857), joined the set of intellectuals who advocated the formation of a Commission of National

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132The disenchantment with the political situation of which he was part appears in several passages of the book. We underline the current use of the term ruins to describe the situation both in material terms (degraded buildings) and in the metaphorical sense: «In Portugal, there is no religion of any kind. Even its false shadow, which is hypocrisy, has disappeared. Stupid materialism has remained, stupid, ignorant, debauched and shameless, to show off its hideous cynical nakedness amidst the desecrated ruins of all that elevated the spirit [...]» (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 201). Our translation from the original text (Portuguese): «Em Portugal não há religião de nenhuma espécie. Até a sua falsa sombra, que é a hipocrisia, desapareceu. Ficou o materialismo estúpido, alvar, ignorante, devasso e desfaçado, a fazer gala de sua hedionda nudez cínica no meio das ruínas profanadas de tudo o que elevava o espírito [...]» (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 201).

133Translation by the author, original text in Portuguese: «Que espantosa e desgraciosa confusão de entulhos, de pedras, de montes de terra e calça! Não há ruas, não há caminhos, é um labirinto de ruínas feias e torpes» (Garrett, [1846] 1999, p. 133-134).

134On the subject, see Chalante (2008).

135Translated by the author, original text in Portuguese: «As ruínas de um monumento, não mutilado, podem muitas vezes enriquecer os tesouros da arte; as parvoíces arquetónicas nunca» (Cascaes, 1854, p. 210).

Monuments, which was created in the mid-nineteenth century, and the formation of a court that would be able to investigate cases of demolition or intervention in the built heritage (Maia, 2007, p. 173; Rodrigues, 2010, p. 25).

## **Brief Conclusions**

Medieval ruins were a reason for criticism and denunciation to Herculano and Garrett, but, mainly, a condition of ephemeral degradation, for which solutions were expected. The valuation of the ruins in their fragmented aspect was reserved to the archaeological ones, although with difficulties regarding their protection and research. The ruins of time, as Garrett argued, remained beautiful. As for the ruins of men, both authors dedicated their criticism to them. Those ruins signified destruction, made by human beings in power or on duty – and the Portuguese monuments should be saved from it, but not by being wrongly repaired.

The disapproval of the degraded state of the Portuguese heritage was an alarm to the nation since the ruins attested to the condition of forgetfulness of the national past. Also, the intellectuals' reproach of the acts of vandalism, including those made by people with sufficient knowledge not to do so, could be understood as a statement of political disenchantment. Moreover, the criticism of the intellectuals reached the architects and restoration technicians, so they disapproved the bad repairs and additions made up to that point in time – worse than the ruin itself.

The appeal for heritage preservation occurred facing the iconoclastic fury that silenced the country's history (Herculano, 1839a, p. 44), whose voids bothered the two writers. An evaluation of the country followed the denunciation of the ruins in the light of the destruction caused by liberal struggles and the extinction of the religious orders in 1834, accompanied by disenchantment at the neglect and abandonment of the cultural heritage, in which reports of destruction came from all over the country, as in letters addressed to the editorial staff of the magazine *O Panorama*, or in journeys around the country. Otherwise, the degradation of medieval monuments, original symbols of the nation, was also interpreted as the resulting product of poor repairs, i.e., the renovations and transformations of buildings by nineteenth-century architects or restorers.

The void stated in the degraded patina of national buildings affected the national glory. Therefore, the complaint to rulers, politicians and peers evidences an institutional concern for the preservation of the past, as occurred in other countries with records of revolutionary destruction of absolutist monuments, such as France. However, the practical counterpart was evidenced in the

recommendation of the creation of an association or the approval of laws in favour of monuments (Herculano, 1839a; 1839b).

The influence of Herculano and Garrett on the discussion about heritage in Portugal is undeniable, reverberating through the 19<sup>th</sup> century and in the following centuries. The leading role they both had in the scrutiny of the ruins caused by the Portuguese people – in civil war, through neglect, or by bad repairs – presented the voids of the medieval ruins as the voids of history, for which they cried out and for which they sought to enunciate the heritage policies to come.

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## Ocean – From mythical *space* to urban territory

### 1. The image of a *finished* world and the illiteracy about the oceans

In 1968, the view of the Earth from the Apollo 8 mission changed *our perception of ourselves*. In line with Latour's (2017, p. 130) theory, "it is from this Great Outside that the old primordial earth will now find itself known, weighed and judged. What was only a virtuality becomes, for both large and small minds, an exciting project: to know is to know from the outside."<sup>136</sup> It is important to mention Bragança de Miranda's (2005, p. 26) assumption, according to whom all images are vehicles for circumnavigating and the Earth is only visible *in the image*, furthermore spatial photographs confirm it. Continuing to draw upon the same argument," the 'real' maps, based on photographs taken by satellite, would take a lifetime to travel"<sup>137</sup> and the image of the Earth as seen from Apollo *leaves us out of it*. However, the finitude of the massive object in which we live had already been apprehended since a 'first globalization' or a 'liquid revolution', the terms traced from the theory of Peter Sloterdijk (2008) when referring to maritime "discoveries".

Indeed, the ocean appears on the oldest maps, since Ptolemy (see fig. 1), and even if nautical charts are an *intellectual* appropriation of maritime space (Vagnon, 2018), a significant part remains unknown over the course of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the atmospheric element has been studied and represented in the conditions of the human relationship with the environment, although practically ignored until the nineteenth century. In addition, it is important to note that it was only in 2009 that some representations such as underwater topography and data related to the oceans started to appear on Google Earth.<sup>138</sup>

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136All translations from French are the author's.

137All translations from Portuguese are the author's.

138According to The Guardian, 2009.



Fig. 1 – Leinhard Holle, *Map of the World*, represented in the second projection proposed by Ptolemy 1482. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain.

Contemporaneity is characterized by the exploration of the “vertical”, that *immersion* in the atmosphere in a way as much or more intense than that which has been investigating the liquid environment (namely with flights and space explorations), even though the ocean makes up about 93% (Martín-Merás, 2014) of the Earth-body<sup>139</sup>. Currently, as Sloterdijk (2008, p. 151) argued, after half a millennium on Colombo's four voyages, the circumnavigated, discovered, represented, occupied and *used* Earth “presents itself as a body anchored in a dense fabric of traffic movements and telecommunication routines.”

For that matter, as Paul Valéry claimed, we live in the time of the *finished* world (1945), in which the uniform census of all points on the surface of the Earth-body is technologically possible (Sloterdijk, 2008). However, this methodological ideal does not seem to apply to the ocean, perhaps because the *liquid medium* is the target of disregarding distances, reduced to *almost nothing* – practically diminished as a *connection* between territories of different nation-states. There is still an illiteracy about the oceans, announced has a global challenge among international and, more specifically, European institutions and organizations.

<sup>139</sup>Term acquired from Peter Sloterdijk's (2008) theory.

## 2. The need for a new system of governance in the “post-historic” regime

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Philip Steinberg (2001) wrote one of the first studies dedicated to the ocean, arguing that the sea, like nation-states, has been built over time. The author warned of the convention deeply rooted in social theories that the limits of “societies” coincide with those defined by nation-states and, consequently, this assumption reduces territories like the ocean to a second level, in which “society” is not formed. Steinberg's reflection intersects that of Peter Sloterdijk's (2008), insofar as the German philosopher characterized the contemporary era as being faithful to its *terrain-conservative* feature, which, it is claimed in this text, has a clear expression in a major part of the theories and forms of regulation.

A decade ago, when interviewed, Paul Virilio (2013) declared that the moment of romantic contact with the sea was over, calling for a new system of governance to replace the old geopolitics, the latter guided by a territorial extension that designated an interval of “space” between the nations of the different states. The French philosopher invoked a “metropolitics” that considers “permanent confrontation” and “chronic instantaneity”. Moreover, Virilio (2013, p. 39) highlighted the need for a commitment with the globalization in our territories, by means of considering the geopolitical contexts and “the *continuum*”, as well as through identifying the culture of the sea and the flows.




Fig. 2 – Albrecht Dürer, *Draughtsman Making a Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman*, c. 1600. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain.

Subsequently, this appeal for a new governance regime needs an inevitable change within its frame of reference, which involves withdrawing the concept of “nature” from theories and practices and recognizing that the relationships are not unidirectional. The call for a change in perspective seems evident when thinking about images such as Masaccio's *Holy Trinity*, Dürer's *Draughtsman*

*Making a Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman* (see fig. 2), or even Malevich's *Black Circle*, since the questioning of axioms seems to be present in each one of these *oeuvres d'art*. As claimed by Virilio (2013), it is proposed here to alert to the reinvention of a geopolitics, in recognition of the alteration of the limits and the so-called “last frontiers”. In addition, it is considered as essential to uncover the distracted – or, at times, disenchanted – position of architecture and urbanism in relation to *the commons*.

Actually, it conveys the impression that we currently live in a “post-historic” regime, an expression used by Peter Sloterdijk (2008, p. 19) as a follow-up to the period designated by the concept of “history” which, according to the author, designates the succession of phases of unilateralism. It is argued in this text that the research on the oceans is one of the milestones of this “post-historic” era, oriented towards “supra-regional futures”<sup>140</sup>. In this sense, and subscribing to Bragança de Miranda’s (2005, p. 34) approach, it is fundamental to emphasize that a new sharing of the common is outlined, “which will take little advantage of the previous one that has prevailed.” It is important to continue to draw from the theory of the same author the idea that this is “a dynamic that does not fit within any legal system, and that pressures them all intensely. The *problem of the common* refers to something more radical: the relationship with *nature* and the *flesh*, that is, with the “Earth”<sup>141</sup>” (Bragança de Miranda, 2005, p. 33).

### **3. *Flesh and terrain, a material identification***

Returning to the need for a new perspective, it is argued that the act of mapping plays a key role in this revolutionary approach. Naturally, regarding cartography, it is of paramount importance to pay attention to the various means and forms of representation, taking into account Sloterdijk’s (2008, p. 109) argument, according to which “the discovery aims at capturing: that is what gives cartography its function in the history of the world.”

In general, contemporary cartography still represents the sea in a simplified way. The maps are dominated by the blue, homogeneous color, almost without “imperfections” and without “background” – apart from maps based on bathymetric information. The exterior white of the maps, as an old representation of the unknown and the terrifying, might be today the blue of the oceans, a blue *without meaning*. The liquid *milieu* is still seen as *another* environment, a place without a subject, oblivious to human actions. We are facing a phenomenon of apparent contrast, within which human beings, generally, “do not develop cultured relations with the maritime environment and still less try to practice an identification” (Sloterdijk, 2008, p. 164). In fact, – and it must be

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<sup>140</sup>An expression taken from Peter Sloterdijk’s theory (2008, p. 153).

<sup>141</sup>The italics in the sentence are added by the author of this text.

clarified that this refers to a panorama mostly inscribed within a western perspective, – it seems that still today the ocean is largely perceived as *a place without self*. However, when the image of the Earth-body was possible, *we* realized that the “other”, the blue, after all, *was us*. The blue *is us*.



Fig. 3 – Francisco Goya, *Saturn Devouring His Son*, c. 1819 - 1823. Madrid, Museo del Prado.

Source: Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain.

In a practically opposite way, the relationship of humans with the terrestrial environment is conferred with an immense significance and conformation. This is because “in the matter of the Earth, the destiny of the flesh is immediately present, in its immense fragility. The flesh has a terrestrial origin” (Bragança de Miranda, 2005, pp. 13-14), since the *terrestrial absolute* is the *absolute that belongs to the earth* (Molder, 2020, p. 48). With a view to go further in explaining this symbolic relationship, Bragança de Miranda (2005, p. 26) states that “the body is a form of individuation of the flesh, as the site is a form of individuation of the Earth.” Within the same deliberation, the Professor refers to the absolute abyss, Tartarus, as the summit of the underground in an apparent undifferentiation between “Earth” and “body”. Georges Didi-Huberman (2011, p. 25)

also writes about “the symmetrical chasms of the visceral world”, the undoubted “monsters” that originate the human being. Additionally, using an expression of Alessandro Baricco (1996), the sea was itself *an abysmal anthropophagic monster*. Goya’s *Saturn Devouring His Son* (see fig. 3) is here considered as a sublime depiction of this anthropophagy, and to a certain extent, as a representation of a *body-earth* material commonality. Undeniably, the monsters themselves depicted in maps and stories are part of the maritime imagery. In this line of thought, the return to Bragança de Miranda’s theory (2005) is appraised as essential to identify a fundamental remark: that “the private property regime and its relation to the commonality of the Earth is at stake” (p. 27), bearing in mind that “our<sup>142</sup> language uses the word “earth” for the *earth-matter* and for the *earth-planet* which we inhabit” (p. 26).

Indeed, the ideas formulated about the ocean tend to be (re)produced in discourses, legislation and cartographic representations. In general, the lack of knowledge and the simultaneous romanticization of oceanic space have direct consequences for urbanism and its practices. Maps are the symptom of these views since ultimately, a map is always contingent to interpretation.

#### 4. Claiming the sea as a territorial constitution – a maritory

During the seventies, Henri Lefebvre wrote that the *urban problem* was imposed on a worldwide scale (1970, p. 25), announcing the “urban era” as a new, unknown and little appreciated field. The philosopher and sociologist went further, stating that with this new period, what was understood as absolute would be relativized: reason, history, the State, and “man” (Lefebvre, 1970, p. 52). Recently, the authors of the publication entitled *Implosions / Explosions* (2014), influenced by Lefebvre's thinking, called for a new theory of urbanization. Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid warn about the fact that urban ideologies and consequent *visualizations* persist, namely in administrative discourses, planning and culture.

However, in the Portuguese context – in particular, within the area of architecture and urbanism – the consolidation of research practices that are hesitant to approach *other* geographies begins to be called into question with some analyses that are emerging about oceanic space, which are nevertheless sparse. Therefore, it is claimed here that it is fundamental to take into consideration the establishment of other perspectives to question the condition of the urban and the role played *in the ocean and by the ocean*. Indeed, today, fantasies about the Ocean Sea<sup>143</sup> should result in new policies and representations. One of the greatest contemporary urban challenges is the planning of

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142Referring to Portuguese language.

143Here is an example of the reference to the Atlantic Ocean as the “Ocean Sea” from the XVI century, written by the Azorean priest and historian Gaspar Frutuoso (1522-1591, p. 159): “(...) because in fact, any of these islands, in this very long and wide ocean sea, is nothing but a somewhat spacious prison (...) a very narrow and much shorter grave.”

maritime territory, hence it is important to focus the analysis on the space of the networks, in the geopolitical context, in a perspective of *a rearrangement* that designates urbanism as a policy and urbanization as a domain.

In the light of the last couple of years, it is important to emphasize the still very recent, although rapidly increasing discourse on the *importance of the sea* – and, specifically, one that addresses the Azorean Region. The political discourse has been given particular emphasis to the geostrategic position of the archipelago, as attested by the document “Strategic Vision for the Plan for the Economic Recovery of Portugal 2020-2030”. The motto is easily recognizable: the “Blue Economy”, the “Blue Generation” and even the “Blue Entrepreneurship”, as if the “blue” had an almost soothing, peaceful and even sanitizing effect in relation to any noun that precedes it. Within this reasoning, “blue” operates a political role, very similar to “green”. The latter, when used in speeches or regulations, seems to automatically guarantee an ecological and moral duty. In this sense, “blue” and “green” appear to have some redeeming effect.

In a still timid way, within an international perspective, the urban and territorial dimension of the *liquid environment* begins to erupt in urbanism studies. In 2021, the ocean is far from the mythical and the bucolic territory of bygone days. It is also no longer characterized only as a means of communication or as a network of infrastructures, that is, only as a connection axis. Currently, climate change and the absurd amount of plastic in the seas are examples of themes that trigger the exchange of information between various areas of knowledge.

However, environmental concerns, by themselves, do not free the understanding of the seas from the dimension inherited from the romantic period. As Nathalie Roelens (2018) points out, drowning in the Mediterranean Sea today transforms the mythical imaginary into a frightening reality without redemption, a reality that has the boy Aylan Kurdi as its symbol. Roelens impeccably summarizes the simultaneously brutal and metaphoric duality that is intended to emerge in this text, when she claims that the Ocean Sea combines two imaginaries: that of failed bodies and that of epiphany, affirming that the coast is a place of ethical violations.

To conclude, the etymological epicenter in “Architecture” underlines the Greek term *árkhō*, which elects the “principle”, the “rule”, and it is consequently the magnificent epistemological field for considering the (de)construction of *space* and its order. In the area of urbanism and geographic analysis, the conception and study of the ocean as a territory – in particular, as an urban territory and, more precisely as it is argued, as a maritory – depends on a complexity of contributions and knowledge, and as Sloterdijk (2011, p. 81) asserted, “only from philosophy can the intelligence learn how its passions find concepts.” The design of the *liquid environment* – that is, the search to make it readable and, consequently, to claim it as an integral part of a territorial constitution – seems to be, from this standpoint, one of the greatest contemporary challenges.

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12. Leonardo *OLIVEIRA*

## **Espectros da modernidade no cemitério Campo da Esperança (Brasília-DF)**

### **1. Modernidade**

Walter Benjamin disse, da modernidade, que ela nasceu sob o signo do suicídio; Sigmund Freud sugeriu que ela foi dirigida por Tântatos – o instinto da morte. (Bauman, 1998, p. 21).

O termo modernidade não possui uma definição única e precisa, como também são imprecisos os limites cronológicos do que se convencionou chamar, de um ponto de vista histórico, de Idade Moderna. Com finalidade didática, a historiografia ocidental geralmente aponta que a transição da Idade Média para a Moderna foi marcada pelo fim do sistema econômico feudal e pela tomada de Constantinopla pelos turcos otomanos, em 1453, entre outros fatores. No entanto, o historiador da arte suíço Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) sustenta que os antecedentes históricos do que poderia ser chamado de “espírito moderno” datam do século XIII, quando, ao passo que em alguns países (como a França, Espanha e Inglaterra) o sistema feudal era tão organizado que naturalmente se transformou em uma monarquia unificada, a Itália se desvencilhou quase que inteiramente do feudalismo. Talvez essa seja a razão pela qual, nesse país, tenha sido mais evidente o surgimento do que se comumente entende no Ocidente por modernidade, cujos sinais emergiram no período chamado de Renascimento (ou, mais recentemente, Renascença), no século XIV; nessa época, os imperadores já não eram reconhecidos como senhores feudais e o Papado era poderoso o suficiente para impedir uma unidade nacional. Em ambos os conjuntos de governantes – imperadores e Papado – pôde ser detectado pela primeira vez o “espírito político moderno da Europa”,

[...] entregue a seus próprios instintos e, muitas vezes, exibindo as piores características de um egoísmo desenfreado, ultrajando todos os direitos e matando todos os germes de uma cultura mais saudável. Entretanto, onde quer que essa tendência cruel seja superada ou de alguma forma contrabalançada, um novo fato adentra a história – o Estado como o

resultado da reflexão e do cálculo, o Estado como uma obra de arte.<sup>144</sup>  
(Burckhardt, 1937, p. 1-2).

Difundido pela Europa nos séculos seguintes, o Renascimento foi um período caracterizado por transições, entre as quais se destacam o surgimento de mudanças profundas nas relações sociais; uma nova postura do homem frente ao trabalho e a si mesmo; a organização do sistema bancário; e o advento do capitalismo comercial, que também pode ser chamado de capitalismo mercantil ou pré-capitalismo. Segundo a filósofa húngara Agnes Heller (1929-2019), o Renascimento foi a “aurora” do sistema econômico capitalista e os modos de vida dos indivíduos renascentistas tiveram origem no processo por meio do qual os primórdios desse sistema “destruíram a relação *natural*” entre indivíduo e comunidade”, “dissolveram os elos *naturais*” que ligavam o homem à família, à situação social e ao seu lugar previamente definido na sociedade, e “abalaram toda a hierarquia e estabilidade social”, tornando as relações humanas instáveis tanto no que se refere à organização das classes e dos estratos da sociedade como ao lugar dos sujeitos nesses estratos (1982, p. 11, grifo da autora).

Também no Renascimento houve certo abandono dos ideais católicos dominantes na Idade Média para que o homem se tornasse o centro das atenções. A religião não foi olvidada por completo, mas o indivíduo renascentista se afastou das explicações do mundo criadas antes da Idade Moderna e, mais crente em si mesmo, passou a olhar para as próprias conquistas, engendrando uma autoconfiança que naturalmente favoreceu o desenvolvimento de novas habilidades. No âmbito das artes, mais especificamente literatura e pintura, podem ser apontados o gênero da biografia<sup>145</sup> e a técnica do retratismo<sup>146</sup> – tarefas que objetivam descrever um sujeito humano – como sintomas do surgimento de uma nova ideia de individualidade. Heller (1982, p. 15) aponta que, nessa época, o destino dos homens passou a depender das realizações individuais e já que este se formava no cerne de uma sociedade,

[...] foi precisamente o aparecimento de uma relação individual com a

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144 Do original: “[...] *surrendered freely to its own instincts. Often displaying the worst features of an unbridled egotism, outraging every right, and killing every germ of a healthier culture. But, wherever this vicious tendency is overcome or in any way compensated, a new fact appears in history – the State as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the State as a work of art.*”.

145 Destacam-se as contribuições do escritor francês Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), criador desse gênero literário. O historiador inglês Peter Burke (1937-) assinala que o período histórico do Renascimento “testemunhou um perceptível aumento do interesse tanto pela escrita quanto pela leitura de biografias, primeiro na Itália e depois em outros lugares”, sendo que “Na Itália do século XVI, a biografia se tornou um componente ainda mais importante da paisagem cultural” (1997, p. 85). Burke, P. (1997). A invenção da biografia e o individualismo renascentista. *Estudos Históricos*, 10(19), 83-97.

146 Essa técnica pode ser observada na pintura da Mona Lisa, concluída na primeira década de 1500, do polímata italiano Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).

sociedade, a escolha do seu próprio destino por cada indivíduo, que tornou necessários uma perspectiva, um sentido dos valores e um modo de comportamento cada vez mais individualista – numa palavra, aquilo a que chamamos, com um excesso de simplificação, o “individualismo do Renascimento” [...].

A autora ressalta ainda que, nesse sentido, talvez fosse melhor falar em um “culto do homem que se faz a si próprio”, esclarecendo, porém, que aquilo que ele fazia de si não era necessariamente sinônimo de posses, poder ou dinheiro (embora muitas vezes o fosse), mas consistia basicamente em avaliar até que ponto deixara a sua marca no mundo (1982, p. 15). O advento desse novo tipo de individualidade, portanto, estava associado ao irrompimento da dimensão intelectual renascentista e possuía certo compromisso com o mundo exterior e a humanidade.

Ainda no século XV, reinos europeus lançaram-se nas Grandes Navegações na busca de riquezas em nome da fé cristã. De acordo com o geógrafo Francisco de Assis Veloso Filho (2012, p. 5-7), entre os anos de 1487 e 1522 foram completadas a exploração do contorno da África e a primeira circunavegação da Terra; a exploração do litoral africano até a Serra Leoa foi alcançada em 1460 e, em 1469, o rei Afonso V de Portugal (1438-1481) arrendou a utilização comercial das terras além da Serra Leoa pelo prazo de seis anos. Assim, no início do século XVI, o desenvolvimento econômico europeu levou ao processo de colonização de outros territórios, que, marcado pelo caráter de dominação dos povos colonizados, ocupava terras e explorava seus recursos naturais. Esse processo iniciou na América, onde houve, a princípio, saques de metais preciosos anteriormente acumulados pelos povos nativos: os ameríndios. Ainda nesse século, as terras americanas passaram a ser economicamente exploradas por meio dos sistemas de plantação de açúcar, algodão e outros produtos tropicais, que eram cultivados para exportação, contando com a força de trabalho escravo dos ameríndios e, posteriormente, africanos, trazidos pelos colonizadores do outro lado do Atlântico. De acordo com os pesquisadores da University College London Mark Maslin e Simon Lewis (2020), foi a partir da expansão europeia, nos séculos XV e XVI, na era da colonização e subjugação dos povos indígenas em todo o mundo, que o capitalismo se desenvolveu<sup>147</sup>.

Nas primeiras décadas do século XVI, começou a pairar sobre a Itália uma aura de

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147 *“This was capitalism, which itself grew out of European expansion in the 15th and 16th century and the era of colonisation and subjugation of indigenous peoples all around the world.”*. Disponível em: <<https://theconversation.com/why-the-anthropocene-began-with-european-colonisation-mass-slavery-and-the-great-dying-of-the-16th-century-140661>>. Acesso em: 24 jan. 2021.

instabilidade proveniente dos âmbitos econômico, religioso e social: o aquecimento do comércio italiano, em razão das riquezas levadas das Américas para a Itália, ocasionou uma alta nos preços das mercadorias, de um modo geral; a Reforma Protestante, que iniciou em 1517, acarretou no comércio abusivo de indulgências pela Igreja; e o Saque de Roma, em 1527, abalou o sentimento de ordem nutrido durante o Renascimento, que durou até cerca de 1600; assim, o mundo renascentista se viu quase que repentinamente abalado. Tais fatores contribuíram para o surgimento de uma crise generalizada que, em algumas décadas, viria a evidenciar a necessidade de uma nova fundamentação para a ciência e novos princípios filosóficos.

Em 1603, quando o poeta inglês William Shakespeare (1564-1616) publicou a tragédia *Hamlet*, os países do Ocidente europeu estavam próximos daquela crise, que não foi apenas econômica<sup>148</sup>, mas espiritual. A Revolução Científica<sup>149</sup> iniciada no século anterior introduzira novas teorias científicas e novos instrumentos, gerando um descompasso entre as mudanças culturais e revelando a ausência de uma filosofia que oferecesse um caminho alinhado com a modernidade. Logo, a consolidação da noção de indivíduo moderno está estreitamente relacionada a uma revolução intelectual, proposta pelo filósofo e matemático francês René Descartes (1596-1650) em 1637, no livro *Discurso do método*, que sugeriu o rompimento com a tradição escolástica, a implementação de um novo modo de pensar e a constituição de uma teoria original do conhecimento. Em linhas gerais, Descartes (2001, p. 5) defendeu que, por meio da razão, seria possível distinguir o verdadeiro do falso e o único modo de alcançar a verdade seria duvidando das “verdades” anteriormente impostas, sem duvidar, no entanto, da própria dúvida:

[...] enquanto queria pensar que tudo era falso, era necessariamente preciso que eu, que o pensava, fosse alguma coisa. E, notando que esta verdade – *penso, logo existo* – era tão firme e tão certa que todas as mais extravagantes suposições dos cétricos não eram capazes de a abalar, julguei que podia admiti-la sem escrúpulo como o primeiro princípio da filosofia que buscava. (Descartes, 2001, p. 38, grifo do autor).

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148 Segundo o historiador britânico Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012), no âmbito econômico a crise foi motivada sobretudo por uma crise de produção: ao passo que a Itália e partes da Alemanha, França e Polônia demonstraram uma espécie de retrocesso em termos de industrialização, a Suíça, Inglaterra e Suécia apresentaram um rápido desenvolvimento. Hobsbawm, E. (1954). *The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century*. *Past & Present*, 5(1), 33-53.

149 Expressão introduzida pelo filósofo francês de origem russa Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964) em 1939 e difundida posteriormente pelo físico e filósofo estadunidense Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996).

No século seguinte à primeira publicação de *Discurso do método*, entre as décadas de 1760 e 1770, o matemático e engenheiro escocês James Watt (1736-1819) e seu parceiro comercial, o inglês Matthew Boulton (1728-1809), assentaram mais um tijolo na construção do edifício da modernidade: ao desenvolverem a máquina a vapor moderna<sup>150</sup> contribuíram substancialmente para a Revolução Industrial, que despontou na ilha da Grã-Bretanha, rompeu com as condições históricas anteriores e, posteriormente, disseminou-se pelo mundo. De acordo com Hobsbawm (1996, p. 28-29), a década decisiva para o que teria sido a primeira fase dessa Revolução, em que ocorreram transformações “qualitativas e fundamentais”, foi a de 1780, quando alterações irreversíveis modificaram não só o modo de produção vigente, mas as relações de trabalho. Tais mudanças exerceram um impacto direto e significativo nas sociedades da época, que testemunharam, além da modernização da indústria, o crescimento desenfreado das populações urbanas e a difusão do capitalismo. Hobsbawm aponta que as Revoluções Francesa (1789-1799)<sup>151</sup> e Industrial são praticamente inconcebíveis sob qualquer forma que não a do triunfo do capitalismo liberal burguês<sup>152</sup> e que

A grande revolução de 1789-1848 foi o triunfo não da *indústria* como tal, mas da *indústria capitalista*; não da liberdade e igualdade em geral, mas da *classe média* ou sociedade *burguesa liberal*; não da *economia moderna* ou do *estado moderno*, mas das economias e dos estados em uma determinada região geográfica do mundo (parte da Europa e algumas porções da América do Norte) cujo centro eram os estados vizinhos e rivais da Grã-Bretanha e França.<sup>153</sup> (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 1, grifo do autor).

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150 De acordo com o químico holandês Paul J. Crutzen (1933-), a criação da máquina a vapor teria dado início ao período chamado de Antropoceno, que se refere à atual época geológica, marcada pela intensa e predatória ação humana sobre a Terra. Crutzen, P. J. (2006). The “Anthropocene”. In: Ehlers, E. e Krafft, T. (orgs.). *Earth System Science in the Anthropocene* (p. 13-18). Berlim, Heidelberg: Springer.

151 Período caracterizado por uma grande agitação política e social na França que ocorreu entre 1789 e 1799. Segundo Hobsbawm (1996, p. 53-54), essa revolução foi “mais fundamental” e teve consequências mais profundas que as outras que estavam acontecendo no mundo, tendo sido por meio dela que a “ideologia do mundo moderno” penetrou pela primeira vez nas civilizações antigas, que até então haviam resistido às ideias europeias (“*The ideology of the modern world first penetrated the ancient civilizations which had hitherto resisted European ideas through French influence. This was the work of the French Revolution. [...] The French Revolution may not have been an isolated phenomenon, but it was far more fundamental than any of the other contemporary ones and its consequences were therefore far more profound.*”).

152 “*It is equally relevant to note that they are at this period almost inconceivable in any form other than the triumph of a bourgeois-liberal capitalism.*” (1996, p. 2).

153 Do original: “*The great revolution of 1789-1848 was the triumph not of “industry” as such, but of capitalist industry; not of liberty and equality in general but of middle class or “bourgeois” liberal society; not of “the modern economy” or “the modern state”, but of the economies and states in a particular geographical region of the world (part of Europe and a few patches of North America), whose centre was the neighbouring and rival states of Great Britain and France.*”.

O conjunto de transformações advindas das revoluções dos séculos XVIII e XIX representam o que os pensadores prussianos Karl Marx (1818-1883) e Friedrich Engels (1820-1895)<sup>154</sup> entendiam, de modo geral, por modernidade. Em meio aos conflitos urbanos da Revolução de 1848<sup>155</sup>, esses autores publicaram o *Manifesto do partido comunista*, uma análise crítica da Revolução Industrial então em curso que defendeu a existência de uma sociedade sem classes e apontou a necessidade de reformas sociais. Para eles, a história legada pela escrita de todas as sociedades até 1847 era a da luta de classes. Na Inglaterra industrial moderna, os indivíduos se organizavam em relações de produção de bens que acarretavam a contínua exploração do proletariado – a classe dos “modernos operários assalariados” – pela burguesia – a classe dos “modernos capitalistas” e “proprietários dos meios de produção social” –, acentuando a diferença classista (1998, p. 42). Essa questão havia existido desde épocas remotas, pois em quase todos os lugares encontrava-se uma estruturação completa dos corpos sociais em diferentes estratos. Nesses corpos sociais, opressores e oprimidos estiveram em contínua oposição uns aos outros de modo que esse embate terminava, a cada vez, com “uma reconfiguração revolucionária de toda a sociedade” ou “a derrocada comum das classes em luta”; logo, a “moderna sociedade burguesa”, emergente do declínio da sociedade feudal, não aboliu os antagonismos classistas, mas apenas inseriu novas classes, condições de opressão e estruturas de luta no lugar das antigas (Marx e Engels, 1998, p. 7-8).

Os pensadores destacam ainda que a época em que o manifesto foi escrito era caracterizada como a da classe burguesa, que, onde quer que tenha chegado ao poder, “dissolveu a dignidade pessoal em valor de troca” e não deixou nenhum outro laço entre os indivíduos senão o “insensível pagamento à vista” (1998, p. 10). Nesse sentido,

Ser capitalista significa assumir não apenas uma posição meramente pessoal na produção, mas também uma posição social. O capital é um produto coletivo e só pode ser posto em movimento mediante a atividade comum de muitos membros, e até mesmo, em última instância, mediante a atividade comum de todos os membros da sociedade. O capital, portanto, não é uma potência pessoal, ele é uma potência social. (Marx e Engels, 1998, p. 22).

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154 Cabe sublinhar que esses autores desenvolveram a concepção histórico-sociológica que receberia a alcunha de materialismo histórico, inflexão na evolução do pensamento dos fundadores do marxismo marcada em *A Ideologia Alemã* (1932), conforme aponta o historiador e cientista social brasileiro Jacob Gorender (1923-2013) na apresentação da edição de *O Capital*, publicada pela Editora Abril Cultural em 1983.

155 Acontecimento caracterizado por uma série de revoluções decorrentes de crises econômicas, entre outros fatores, na Europa Central e Oriental. A esse respeito, as análises de dois pensadores se destacam: *O 18 Brumário de Luís Bonaparte*, publicado em 1852 por Karl Marx (1818-1883), e *Lembranças de 1848: as jornadas revolucionárias em Paris*, publicado em 1893 pelo pensador político e estadista francês Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859).

Dezenove anos depois da divulgação do *Manifesto do partido comunista*, Marx apresentou um exame mais profundo dessa questão ao publicar o primeiro volume de *O Capital*<sup>156</sup>, que propôs uma análise crítica do sistema econômico capitalista e lançou as bases do pensamento socialista marxista. Segundo o autor, o dinheiro é a primeira forma de aparição do capital e a circulação de mercadorias é o ponto de partida deste; cada novo capital adentra em primeira instância o mercado, que pode ser de mercadorias<sup>157</sup>, trabalho ou dinheiro, que, sempre primeiramente como dinheiro, deve transformar-se em capital por meio de determinados processos (1983, p. 125).

No âmbito do que poderia ser chamado de modernidade filosófica, destaca-se o pensamento do filósofo alemão Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), que, tendo feito uso das ideias de Descartes, publicou em 1907 o livro *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, reunindo cinco lições que examinaram a questão da verdade a fim de fornecer bases incontestáveis à ciência por meio de um novo método: o fenomenológico. A abordagem fenomenológica na investigação filosófica buscava reduzir o conhecimento científico a uma espécie de fenômeno puro, uma essência, que se daria intuitivamente na consciência humana. De acordo com Husserl (2008, p. 21-22), a fenomenologia é “a doutrina universal das essências em que se integra a ciência da essência do conhecimento”. O pensamento filosófico é definido pela posição perante os problemas da possibilidade do conhecimento, e a teoria do conhecimento é a tentativa de tomada de posição científica perante esses problemas; a ideia da teoria do conhecimento é a de uma ciência que os resolva, além de fornecer uma intelecção clara da essência do conhecimento e da possibilidade da sua efetuação. A crítica do conhecimento é, nesse sentido, a condição da possibilidade da metafísica<sup>158</sup>.

A obra do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) também é fundamental para uma descrição do panorama filosófico do século XX. Heidegger foi aluno de Husserl e não só seguiu a abordagem fenomenológica nas suas investigações como desenvolveu a fenomenologia enquanto

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156 Publicado em 1867, foi o único volume que Marx lançou em vida. Os dois volumes seguintes foram publicados por Engels entre 1885 e 1894; e o quarto (e último), pelo filósofo tcheco-austriaco Karl Johann Kautsky (1854-1938) em 1905.

157 Segundo Marx (1983, p. 45), uma mercadoria é um objeto externo que, pelas suas propriedades, satisfaz as necessidades humanas de qualquer espécie, podendo ser originadas, sem alterar esse objeto, “do estômago ou da fantasia”.

158 A metafísica seria um estudo do ser em sua totalidade. Para o filósofo grego Aristóteles (c. 384-322 a.C.), o primeiro a tratar sistematicamente dessa questão, a metafísica seria uma espécie de filosofia primeira, disciplina fundamental da filosofia. No início do quarto livro de *Metafísica* (c. 350 a.C.) há o que talvez seja a primeira definição desse termo: “[1003a21] Há uma ciência que estuda o ente enquanto ente e aquilo que se lhe atribui a em si mesmo. Ela não é idêntica a nenhuma das assim chamadas ciências particulares: de fato, nenhuma outra examina universalmente a respeito do ente enquanto é ente, mas, tendo recortado uma parte do mesmo, estudam o que decorre a respeito dela, por exemplo, as ciências matemáticas.” (2007, p. 13). Aristóteles. (2007). *Metafísica*, Livro IV (Gamma) e VI (Epsilon). *Clássicos da Filosofia: Cadernos de Tradução*, 14, 13-34.



método. Ao filósofo interessava a Ontologia<sup>159</sup>, que propõe o exame de questões relacionadas ao ser humano e sua existência, tarefa empreendida no livro *Sein Und Zeit* (1927); nele, o autor apresenta uma análise do ente (ser humano) não a partir do mundo exterior, mas de uma perspectiva interna, perguntando-se, sobretudo, como era o ser humano, em vez de o que este era. Heidegger defendia que, para que fossem examinadas as questões do ente, ele deveria começar examinado a si próprio. De acordo com o professor de filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná André Duarte (2006, p. 99), o filósofo pensou a modernidade como uma época determinada por um novo projeto metafísico fundamental, isto é, uma interpretação inédita do ente na totalidade, e por uma nova apreensão da verdade. No ensaio *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* (1938), encontram-se as primeiras formulações mais precisas acerca da concepção heideggeriana sobre as relações entre modernidade, técnica e ciência:

A metafísica estabelece uma época ao dar-lhe o fundamento de sua forma essencial por meio de uma determinada interpretação dos seres e de uma determinada concepção de verdade. Esse fundamento prevalece em todos os fenômenos que caracterizam a época. Por outro lado, o fundamento metafísico deve ser reconhecível nesses fenômenos para uma reflexão suficiente sobre eles. [...] A ciência pertence aos fenômenos essenciais dos tempos modernos. A técnica de máquinas é um fenômeno igualmente importante em termos de classificação. [...] A técnica de máquinas continua sendo o rebento mais visível da essência da técnica moderna, a qual é idêntica à essência da metafísica moderna<sup>160</sup>. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 75).

O filósofo francês Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), influenciado por Husserl e Heidegger, desenvolveu a fenomenologia na primeira fase da sua obra não mais no âmbito da Ontologia, mas no da Ética, que, de acordo com ele, deveria ser o ponto de partida de toda filosofia, a filosofia primeira. Em *Totalité et Infini* (1961), um dos seus principais escritos, Levinas aponta que fenomenologia husserliana possibilitou a passagem da ética para exterioridade metafísica; uma vez que a “verdadeira vida é ausente”, a metafísica surge e é mantida nessa asserção, pois volta-se para

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159 Do grego *ontos* (“ser”).

160 Do original: “*Die Metaphysik begründet ein Zeitalter, indem sie ihm durch eine bestimmte Auslegung des Seienden und durch eine bestimmte Auffassung der Wahrheit den Grund seiner Wesensgestalt gibt. Dieser Grund durchherrscht alle Erscheinungen, die das Zeitalter auszeichnen. Umgekehrt muß sich in diesen Erscheinungen für eine zureichende Besinnung auf sie der metaphysische Grund erkennen lassen. [...] Zu den wesentlichen Erscheinungen der Neuzeit gehört ihre Wissenschaft. Eine dem Range nach gleichwichtige Erscheinung ist die Maschinenteknik. [...] Die Maschinenteknik bleibt der bis jetzt sichtbarste Ausläufer des Wesens der neuzeitlichen Technik, das mit dem Wesen der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik identisch ist.*”

o “outro lugar”, a “outra forma”, o “outro”<sup>161</sup> (1987, p. 15-21). Os últimos exemplares da obra levinasiana trataram do que o filósofo chamou de ética da alteridade, que se traduz na responsabilidade incondicional do Eu pelo Outro<sup>162</sup>, talvez propondo uma dissolução do individualismo humano<sup>163</sup>, isto é, a tendência de viver somente para si mesmo. Levinas não foi o primeiro a desenvolver a ideia de alteridade, mas influenciou profundamente pensadores que viriam a desconstruir a metafísica logocêntrica do pensamento ocidental.

Tendo como pano de fundo a mudança de paradigmas nas ciências humanas que emergiu na França a partir de 1950, o filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984) sugeriu que, na tradição europeia, a atitude perante a alteridade assenta-se na fissura que estabelece a distância entre a razão e a não razão<sup>164</sup> (Foucault, 1973, p. IX-X), conduta que já existia na Antiguidade ocidental, mas que somente a partir de Descartes assumiu papel decisivo como critério de exclusão (Kroflíč, 2007, p. 35). A ideia geral dessa questão foi transposta para a arquitetura por Foucault de modo inédito: em 14 de março de 1967, o filósofo proferiu uma conferência na instituição francesa Cercle d'Études Architecturales que originou um pequeno texto intitulado *Des espaces autres*, escrito na Tunísia no mesmo ano, mas publicado originalmente em outubro de 1984, no quinto número da revista *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité*. Nesse texto, Foucault trata de dois grandes tipos de “alocações”, que, para ele, estavam ligadas a todas as outras alocações e, ao mesmo tempo, as contradiziam:

[...] as utopias [...] são as alocações sem lugar real. São as alocações que mantêm com o espaço real da sociedade uma relação geral de analogia direta ou invertida. É a própria sociedade aperfeiçoada, ou é o inverso da sociedade; mas, de toda forma, essas utopias são espaços fundamentalmente, essencialmente, irrealis. [...] Por serem absolutamente outros quanto a todas as alocações que eles refletem e sobre as quais falam, denominarei tais lugares, por oposição às utopias, de heterotopias. (Foucault, 2013, p. 115-116).

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161 “La phénoménologie husserlienne a rendu possible ce passage de l'éthique à l'extériorité métaphysique. [...] ‘La vraie vie est absente.’ Mais nous sommes au monde. La métaphysique surgit et se main tient dans cet alibi. Elle est tournée vers l'‘ailleurs’, et l'‘autrement’, et l'‘autre’.”

162 Como diz o filósofo (1987, p. 54) em *Humanisme de l'autre homme*: “O Eu diante dos Outros, é infinitamente responsável.” (do original: “Le Moi devant Autrui, est infiniment responsable.”). Levinas, E. (1987). *Humanisme de l'autre homme*. Paris: LGF - Livre de Poche; Biblio/Essais édition.

163 Cabe apontar que, para Heller (1982, p. 15), o individualismo já estava presente na “sociedade burguesa amadurecida”, mas pouco teve em comum com o comportamento (cada vez mais) individualista do período do Renascimento.

164 Do original: “What is originative is the caesura that establishes the distance between reason and non-reason; reason's subjugation of non-reason, wresting from it its truth as madness, crime, or disease, derives explicitly from this point.”

Esse segundo grupo é descrito por meio de cinco princípios; entre eles, destaca-se o que diz respeito ao funcionamento “preciso e determinado” de cada heterotopia<sup>165</sup> no interior de uma sociedade, pois aquela pode, conforme a sincronia da cultura em que se encontra, ter um ou outro funcionamento ao longo da história. Para exemplificar esse princípio, o filósofo aponta o espaço cemiterial, que, na cultura ocidental, sofreu transformações importantes: até o final do século XVIII, era situado no centro das cidades, ao lado da igreja e configurado hierarquicamente: havia a vala comum, onde os mortos perdiam a individualidade; as sepulturas individuais e, por fim, as sepulturas no interior da igreja. No final desse século e início do século XIX, os cemitérios foram expurgados para as margens das cidades, sendo precisamente esse o momento em que houve a “individualização da morte”<sup>166</sup> e a “apropriação burguesa do cemitério”<sup>167</sup> (2013, p. 117-118).

No pensamento foucaultiano, a noção de individualidade<sup>168</sup> associa-se à do poder<sup>169</sup>,

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165 Junção entre hetero (do grego *héteros*: “outro”, “diferente”) e topia (do grego *topos*: “lugar”).

166 Essa “individualização” diz respeito ao enterramento dos mortos em covas separadas.

167 Foucault provavelmente refere-se ao fato de que nos cemitérios construídos no século XIX, em geral, se buscava a utilização de monumentos tumulários e outros dispositivos a fim de registrar e ressaltar a posição social dos mortos.

168 Em 28 de novembro de 1971, Foucault mencionou essa questão em uma entrevista, conduzida pelo filósofo holandês Fons Elders (1936-) e transmitida pela televisão holandesa, em que reforça a sua crítica ao “humanismo”, mais explicitada na sua obra a partir da década de 1960: “Costumamos pensar que a expressão da individualidade, por exemplo, ou a exaltação da individualidade é uma das formas de libertação do homem [...] Mas eu me pergunto se o contrário é verdadeiro. Tentei mostrar que o humanismo era uma espécie de forma, de fabricação do ser humano segundo um certo modelo e que ele não funciona de forma alguma como uma libertação do homem. Ao contrário, o humanismo funciona como um aprisionamento do homem a certos tipos de moldes que são todos controlados pela soberania do sujeito.” (do original: “*We are used to thinking that the expression of individuality, for example, or the exaltation of individuality is one of the forms of man’s liberation [...] But I wonder if the opposite is true. I have tried to show that humanism was a kind of form, was this sort of fabrication of the human being according to a certain model, and that humanism does not work at all as a liberation of man, but on the contrary works as an imprisonment of man inside certain types of moulds that are all controlled by the sovereignty of the subject.*” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzoOhhh4aJg>). Para o filósofo Luiz Damon Santos Moutinho (2004), a crítica foucaultiana do “humanismo” foi longamente preparada por um aprofundamento da noção de “negativo” e vem desse aprofundamento a possibilidade de pensar uma “experiência sem sujeito” até o ponto limite em que a identidade seja rompida e o “humanismo” possa ser superado.

169 A noção de poder, central no pensamento foucaultiano, foi mais profundamente examinada quando o filósofo já possuía maturidade filosófica. Para ele, “[...] o que define uma relação de poder é que ela é um modo de agir que não atua diretamente e imediatamente sobre os outros. Ao contrário, ele atua sobre suas ações: uma ação sobre outra ação, sobre ações existentes ou sobre aquelas que possam surgir no presente ou futuro” (do original: “[...] *what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.*”). Foucault, M. (1982). *The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry*, 8(4), 777-795. Nesse sentido, sendo uma espécie de feixe de relações não negociáveis que se desenvolvem de modo assimétrico, o poder está presente em todos os âmbitos, atua sobre todos os indivíduos e age em todos os espaços. A filósofa e pesquisadora da Universidade Bar-Ilan (Israel) Miri Rozmarin (Rozmarin, M. (2005). *Power, Freedom, and Individuality: Foucault and Sexual Difference. Human Studies*, 28, 1-14.) diz que, segundo Foucault, a dinâmica aberta de efeitos entre indivíduos é uma condição necessária para a constituição do poder e que, em vez de explicar os efeitos das ações dos indivíduos por meio de algum mecanismo abstrato, a definição foucaultiana de poder envolve uma noção de individualidade que estaria embutida neste: “O indivíduo é um efeito do poder e é, ao mesmo tempo, na mesma medida em que é um efeito seu, seu intermediário: o poder transita pelo indivíduo que ele

entendido a partir do rompimento com a tradição marxista clássica: diferentemente desta, que compreendia aquele dentro da esfera econômica e associado à questão das classes sociais, Foucault o entende como uma relação que se exerce de modo assimétrico, sendo que nenhum indivíduo está isento das relações de poder. O filósofo analisou o “poder sobre a vida” no último capítulo de *Histoire de la sexualité: la volonté de savoir* (1976), apontando que a partir do momento em que se descortinou o “limiar de modernidade biológica”, o homem moderno passou a ser um “animal” em cuja política sua vida estava em questão<sup>170</sup> (1976, p. 188). Segundo o autor, essa implicação da vida biológica humana nos cálculos e mecanismos de poder não era novidade, já que, por muito tempo, um dos privilégios característicos da soberania fora o direito de vida e morte, que derivava da *patria potestas* romana, exercício exclusivamente masculino que concedia ao pai de família o direito de dispor sobre a vida de seus filhos e escravos. Esse dispositivo significava poder “causar a morte ou deixar viver” (Idem), que, no Ocidente, a partir do período clássico, passou a ser complementado por um dispositivo que funcionava de modo inverso: tratava-se de “causar a vida ou devolver à morte” (Ibid., p. 181), destinando-se a “produzir forças, ordená-las e fazê-las crescer mais do que barrá-las ou destruí-las” (Ibid., p. 179), pois tais vidas representavam força de trabalho<sup>171</sup>, que, para Marx, era a mais importante das forças produtivas. Assim, o poder moderno focava basicamente na gestão produtiva da vida humana, que seria útil somente se fosse dócil e disciplinarizada; tendo como objetivo fortalecer o sistema capitalista, essa gestão ordenava os vivos conforme seu valor e utilidade para o Estado.

De acordo com Foucault (1976, p. 179-180), até o século XIX as guerras eram travadas a fim de proteger os soberanos; a partir de então, passaram a ser em nome da existência de todos e mais violentas que antes, quando “os regimes nunca haviam praticado holocaustos<sup>172</sup> em suas próprias populações”, como ocorreu no século XX. Segundo o sociólogo polonês de origem judaica Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017), o Holocausto que aconteceu na II Guerra Mundial se trata de um “fenômeno tipicamente moderno”, que não pode ser compreendido fora do contexto das tendências culturais e realizações técnicas da modernidade e que representou um encontro entre antigas tensões

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constituiu.” (do original: “*The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.*”). Foucault, M. (1980). Two Lectures. In: Gordon, C. (org.). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (p. 78-108). Nova Iorque: Pantheon Books.

170 “*Mais ce qu'on pourrait appeler le 'seuil de modernité biologique' d'une société se situe au moment où l'espèce entre comme enjeu dans ses propres stratégies politiques. L'homme, pendant des millénaires, est resté ce qu'il était pour Aristote: un animal vivant et de plus capable d'une existence politique; l'homme moderne est un animal dans la politique duquel sa vie d'être vivant est en question.*”.

171 Em uma nota da edição inglesa de 1888 do *Manifesto do Partido Comunista*, Engels diz que a vida da classe dos “modernos operários assalariados” (o proletariado), que não dispunha de meios de produção próprios, dependia da venda da sua força de trabalho (Marx e Engels, 1998, p. 42).

172 “*Jamais les guerres n'ont été plus sanglantes pourtant que depuis le XIXe siècle et, même toutes proportions gardées, jamais les régimes n'avaient jusque-là pratiqué sur leurs propres populations de pareils holocaustes.*”.

– que esta não soube resolver – e instrumentos da ação racional<sup>173</sup> criados pelo desenvolvimento moderno<sup>174</sup> (1997, p. 18-19). Esses fatos culminaram nos acontecimentos da I e II Guerra Mundial e do Holocausto judeu, eventos que, para o arquiteto Fernando Fuão (2019, p. 21), devem ser entendidos como um “projeto” de “higienização do mundo e purificação de raças”. O pensamento de Levinas, que foi judeu, lituano e viveu o Holocausto, pode ser interpretado como uma resposta a esse genocídio. Tanto Levinas como Heidegger influenciaram fundamentalmente o filósofo de origem judaica nascido na Argélia Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), cujo pensamento desconstrutivista<sup>175</sup> abalou as estruturas da arquitetura filosófica ocidental na segunda metade do século XX. Nesse contexto, sob o pano de fundo pós-estruturalista<sup>176</sup>, o filósofo desenvolveu noções fundamentais para que as sociedades, cidades e arquiteturas contemporâneas<sup>177</sup> pudessem ser repensadas.

Quando Derrida tinha vinte e quatro anos de idade, foi iniciada a corporificação de uma ideia que, em poucos anos, culminaria em uma das mais representativas concretizações da modernidade de um contexto político, social, geográfico e cultural muito distinto daquele em que o filósofo vivia. Em 4 de abril de 1955, o então candidato à presidência da república brasileira Juscelino Kubitschek (1902-1976) fez duas importantes promessas no primeiro comício da sua campanha, em Jataí-GO: a de transferir a capital do Brasil do Rio de Janeiro para o Planalto Central e a de construir Brasília, que seria a nova sede do Poder Executivo. Ao assumir o governo no ano seguinte, Kubitschek deu início à “audaciosa tarefa” – nas suas palavras – representada pela interiorização da nova capital; a garantia de uma mudança processada em “bases sólidas” seria

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173 O filósofo e sociólogo francês Gérard Rabinovitch esclarece que, no livro *Modernidade e Holocausto* (1989), as expressões “velhas tensões” e “ação racional” se referem, respectivamente, a “antissemitismo” e “esquema cultural, enquistado em conseqüências mentais, do ‘espírito da racionalidade instrumental’.”. Rabinovitch, G. (2003). Preocupa o teu próximo como a ti mesmo: notas críticas a modernidade e holocausto, de Zygmunt Bauman. *Ágora*, 6(2), 301-320.

174 Do original: “[...] *el Holocausto fue un fenómeno típicamente moderno que no puede entenderse fuera del contexto de las tendencias culturales y de los logros técnicos de la modernidad. [...] fue un encuentro singular entre las antiguas tensiones, que la modernidad pasó por alto, despreció o no supo resolver, y los poderosos instrumentos de la acción racional y efectiva creados por los desarrollos de la modernidad.*”.

175 Em linhas gerais, a desconstrução derridiana poderia ser compreendida como uma tentativa de questionar e rejeitar modelos previamente instaurados pela metafísica logocêntrica do pensamento ocidental. O *Glossário de Derrida* (1976, p. 17) apresenta a desconstrução como uma “Operação que consiste em denunciar num determinado texto (o da filosofia ocidental) aquilo que é valorizado e em nome de quê e, ao mesmo tempo, em desrecalcar o que foi estruturalmente dissimulado nesse texto. A leitura desconstrutora da metafísica ocidental se apresenta como a discussão dos pressupostos, dos conceitos dessa filosofia, e portanto a denúncia de seu alicerce logo-fono-etno-cêntrico.”. Santiago, S. (org.). (1976). *Glossário de Derrida*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Francisco Alves.

176 De modo superficial, trata-se do movimento que emergiu na segunda metade do século XX, na França, que representou a tentativa de superação do estruturalismo, já que este, para Derrida, estava associado à metafísica logocêntrica. No campo filosófico, teve como representantes (além de Derrida): Foucault, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998).

177 As palavras contemporânea(s), contemporâneo e contemporaneidade serão empregadas aqui de modo generalizado, referindo-se àquilo que teve lugar na história humana a partir da segunda metade do século XX e/ou perdura até os dias atuais.

fornecida pela construção de uma cidade “moderna” e “urbanisticamente revolucionária” (Kubitschek, 2000, p. 5). O presidente deu prioridade máxima à construção de Brasília durante seu governo, pois justificava, entre outros argumentos, que a cidade iria produzir uma nova época para o Brasil, incorporando o interior do país à economia e sendo o marco decisivo na trajetória temporal brasileira rumo a sua emergência enquanto uma grande nação (Holston, 1993, p. 25).

Para que Brasília fosse construída, Kubitschek decretou a publicação do edital do Concurso Nacional do Plano Piloto da Nova Capital do Brasil no Diário Oficial da União em 20 de setembro de 1956. A proposta vencedora foi a do arquiteto e urbanista nascido na França Lucio Costa (1902-1998), que já havia trabalhado na década de 1930 com um dos membros do júri do concurso, o arquiteto carioca Oscar Niemeyer (1907-2012), em duas ocasiões: no seu próprio escritório (Niemeyer fora estagiário de Costa) e na elaboração do projeto do Pavilhão Brasileiro na Feira Mundial de Nova Iorque. Nesse período, os dois profissionais tiveram contato pessoal com o arquiteto franco-suíço Le Corbusier (1887-1965), que, durante o IV Congresso Internacional de Arquitetura Moderna (Grécia, 1933), elaborou a Carta de Atenas, manifesto que lançou as bases para o urbanismo moderno do século XX. As características formais que determinaram o Plano Piloto e os primeiros exemplares da arquitetura pública brasiliense<sup>178</sup> estavam rigorosamente alinhadas com esse manifesto<sup>179</sup> e com as aspirações do programa de metas do governo Kubitschek, que visava ao desenvolvimento do país e à superação do passado colonial deste. No Relatório do Plano Piloto (RPP), redigido por Costa para se inscrever no concurso<sup>180</sup>, Holston (1993, p. 67) argumenta que a fundação de Brasília é apresentada como se ela não tivesse história e que são ocultadas as intenções da mudança social defendida pelo arquiteto sob uma “mitologia de princípios arquitetônicos universalizantes”, de cidades e técnicas de planejamento consagradas.

Inaugurada em 21 de abril de 1960, em menos de quatro anos desde o lançamento do edital do concurso, Brasília foi a maior cidade construída no século XX, representando a espacialização da ordem e, aos olhos dos envolvidos na sua construção, a garantia do progresso e do nascimento de

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178 Projetados por Niemeyer, que, no pequeno livro *Conversa de arquiteto* (1999, p. 50-51), diz que a profissão da arquitetura exige contatos com “homens do governo, das indústrias e do poder” e que Kubitschek considerava-o seu “elemento chave” na construção de Brasília. Niemeyer, O. (1999). *Conversa de arquiteto*. Rio de Janeiro: Revan.

179 Brasília foi uma das duas cidades do mundo plenamente configuradas e construídas com base nos princípios da Carta de Atenas. A outra foi Chandigarh, Índia, cujo projeto urbanístico foi elaborado em 1951 pelo próprio Le Corbusier.

180 No edital do Concurso Nacional do Plano Piloto da Nova Capital do Brasil (seção I, item 3), consta: “O Plano Piloto deverá abranger: a) traçado básico da cidade, indicando a disposição dos principais elementos da estrutura urbana, a localização e interligação dos diversos setores, centros, instalações e serviços, distribuição dos espaços livres e vias de comunicação (escala 1:25.000); b) relatório justificativo.”. Edital para o Concurso Nacional do Plano Piloto da Nova Capital do Brasil. (20 de setembro de 1956). *Diário de Notícias*, Rio de Janeiro, p. 5.

uma nova era brasileira. Conquanto imersa nessa ideia de gênese, a cidade não pôde escapar da presença da morte: tal como as demais urbes já construídas, houve a necessidade de implantar em Brasília um cemitério, cuja área foi demarcada pelo engenheiro agrônomo carioca Bernardo Sayão (1901-1959) provavelmente entre 1956 e 1958. Ao terminá-lo, Sayão perguntou a um de seus ajudantes: “quem será o infeliz que vai batizar esta terra?” (Kubitschek, 2000, p. 227). Tragicamente, foi ele mesmo: em 15 de janeiro de 1959, o engenheiro veio a óbito ao ser atingido por uma árvore no município de Açailândia-MA, precisamente no trecho entre Imperatriz e Guamá, durante os trabalhos de abertura da rodovia Belém-Brasília. Seu corpo foi transportado para Brasília de avião e sepultado no então alcinhado de cemitério sul, inaugurado antes mesmo da nova capital, em 1959<sup>181</sup>. Kubitschek sugeriu que esse cemitério fosse chamado de Campo da Esperança em 2 de novembro do ano seguinte durante a primeira missa dos mortos da nova capital (1960, 4 de novembro), rezada pelo então arcebispo católico de Brasília, o carioca D. José Newton de Almeida (1904-2001). O cemitério sul, primeiro e único construído no Plano Piloto e elemento da configuração da escala bucólica<sup>182</sup> de Brasília, foi projetado por Costa, que o mencionou no item n. 19 do RPP, onde constam as diretrizes gerais que deveriam nortear sua arquitetura:

Os cemitérios localizados nos extremos do eixo rodoviário-residencial evitam aos cortejos a travessia do centro urbano. Terão chão de grama e serão convenientemente arborizados, com sepulturas rasas e lápides singelas, à maneira inglesa, tudo desprovido de qualquer ostentação. (Costa, 1991, p. 13).

Segundo Foucault, os cemitérios adquiriram feições completamente diferentes nas sociedades modernas; quando se passou a expurgá-los para as margens das cidades, a partir do final do século XVIII, foi sob a justificativa de salvar os vivos das doenças supostamente trazidas pelos mortos (2013, p. 117-118), fato que ocorreu inicialmente nos cemitérios europeus e posteriormente no Brasil<sup>183</sup>; em ambos os casos, esse afastamento espacial estava relacionado ao

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181 De acordo com Kubitschek (2000), a inauguração do cemitério foi, na verdade, dupla: Benedito Segundo, motorista de Sayão, ao saber da morte do patrão, morreu de infarto. Companhia Urbanizadora da Nova Capital do Brasil. (1959). *Revista da Companhia Urbanizadora da Nova Capital do Brasil*, 3(25), Brasília.

182 No RPP, Costa propõe quatro escalas para a cidade: residencial, monumental, gregária e bucólica.

183 A obrigatoriedade de construir cemitérios a céu aberto no Brasil foi imposta na Lei de 1º de outubro de 1828 (Art. 66, § 2º), promulgada por D. Pedro I, que originalmente diz: “Sobre o estabelecimento de cemiterios fóra do recinto dos templos, conferindo a esse fim com a principal autoridade ecclesiastica do lugar; sobre o esgotamento de pantanos, e qualquer estagnação de aguas infectas; sobre a economia e asseio dos curraes, e matadouros publicos, sobre a collocação de cortumes, sobre os depositos de immundices, e quanto possa alterar, e corromper a salubridade da atmospherá”. Brasil. (1828). *Collecção das Leis do Imperio do Brazil de 1828 – Parte primeira*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional.

discurso médico higienista que emergiu nesse período, marcado por epidemias. No século XX, Costa reproduziu essa marginalização do cemitério sul na proposta do Plano Piloto talvez não pela mesma justificativa, mas possivelmente porque, para o urbanista, o significado do espaço cemiterial era incompatível com o progresso e desenvolvimento almejados na construção de Brasília, já que o cemitério seria o repositório de parte daquilo que a premissa geral da cidade buscou rejeitar: a história, os costumes, o passado, a morte.

## 2. Espectro e Hontologia segundo Derrida

*I am thy father's spirit,  
Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night,  
And for the day confin'd to fast in fires,  
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature  
Are burnt and purged away.  
(Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Ato I, cena V).*

Trinta e três anos depois da inauguração de Brasília, foi publicado pela primeira vez o livro *Spectres de Marx*<sup>184</sup>, um dos principais textos da segunda fase da obra derridiana, iniciada a partir de meados dos anos 80; nesse momento, Derrida passou a refletir mais sobre questões voltadas para a ética, política e democracia. Valendo-se das palavras iniciais de Marx e Engels em *Manifesto do partido comunista*<sup>185</sup> e obsediado pela tradução da frase shakespeariana “*the time is out of joint*”, da cena V do Ato I de *Hamlet*, o filósofo aprofunda a questão do espectro, que é operado como fio condutor das suas reflexões e entendido como: “[...] uma incorporação paradoxal, o devir-corpo, uma certa forma fenomenal e carnal do espírito. Ele torna-se, de preferência, alguma ‘coisa’ difícil de ser nomeada: nem alma nem corpo, e uma e outra.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 21).

Para Derrida, o espectro (*le revenant*) está sempre por retornar. Esse retorno nem sempre acontece de modo amigável; na verdade, aquele geralmente volta para obsediar os vivos, configurando uma “obsessão espectral” que é histórica. Fuão (2019, p. 20) aponta que as “rondas espectrais” têm habitado toda a existência humana e todo o âmbito político desde tempos remotos; nesse sentido corrobora a filósofa Dirce Solis (2019a, p. 20), que vai além: para ela, espectros têm sua expressão mais profunda nas próprias mitologias originárias e fundacionais dos povos, e nas representações de toda ordem por estes engendradas, inclusive nos mais variados textos produzidos

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184 Resultou do colóquio internacional *Whither marxism?*, realizado na Universidade da Califórnia em 1993.

185 “Um espectro ronda a Europa – o espectro do comunismo.” (Marx e Engels, 1998, p. 7).



pela humanidade. Solis (2014, p. 242) destaca que, para Derrida, os textos da filosofia (principalmente os da modernidade) estão repletos de espectros.

Tudo começa pelo reaparecimento espectral e, mais precisamente, pela espera dele. O espectro não possui essência, existência ou substância, e jamais está presente enquanto tal; não está vivo nem morto, nem passado nem presente, mas sempre meio (*milieu*). É um “indecidível” e, por isso, coloca-se como ponto de partida para toda e qualquer decisão (Solis, 2014, p. 241). Falar de espectros é questionar a metafísica logocêntrica, que, para Derrida (1973, p. 53), determina o sentido do ser como presença. O filósofo defende que somente é possível aprender a viver por meio da morte e dos outros<sup>186</sup>, que não estão presentemente vivos, devendo-se considerá-los em nome da justiça; nenhuma ética e política parecem possíveis sem o reconhecimento do respeito por eles, quer estejam mortos ou ainda não tenham nascido, e nenhuma justiça parece possível sem o princípio da responsabilidade diante deles. Nesse gesto anacrônico de considerar os que não estão presentes – mortos ou porvir – residiria a possibilidade de ser justo e aprender a viver com esses espectros, o que configura uma “política da memória, da herança e das gerações” (Derrida, 1994, p. 10-12, grifo do autor). Assim, à perspectiva ética associa-se a dimensão política, uma vez que o filósofo coloca a questão da herança como essencial, pois é dela que decorre o compromisso com as causas dos outros (Rocha, 2010, p. 38). Ser justo para além do presente vivo, portanto, configura o que Derrida chama de:

Momento espectral, [...] que não pertence mais a esse tempo, caso se compreenda debaixo desse nome o encadeamento das modalidades do presente [...]. Estamos questionando neste instante, estamos nos interrogando sobre este instante que não é dócil ao tempo [...]. Furtivo e intempestivo, o aparecimento do espectro não pertence a este tempo [...]. (Derrida, 1994, p. 12-13).

Já que o reaparecimento do espectro é atemporal e não se pode controlar suas idas e vindas, para dar conta da “espectralidade” é preciso recorrer ao que Derrida chama de “hontologia”<sup>187</sup>, que, como esclarece Fuão (2019, p. 20), seria o estudo das assombrações, visitas espectrais e daquilo que retorna sob a forma de uma herança ou obsessão. Assim, a Ontologia dá lugar à Hontologia, baseada na leitura dos espectros: diferentemente daquela, que examina a questão do ente e este

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186 À guisa de exemplo, Derrida (1994, p. 12) cita as vítimas de: guerras; violências políticas; extermínios nacionalistas, racistas, colonialistas e sexistas; opressões do imperialismo capitalista; e todas as formas de totalitarismo.

187 Seria uma tradução para o termo derridiano “*hauntologie*”, que provém de um jogo de palavras entre o verbo em inglês “*to haunt*” (assombrar) e o seu correspondente em francês “*hânter*” (obsediar).

permite ser por ela capturado, a Hontologia não se deixaria capturar pelo estatuto do Logos (Solis, 2014, p. 245; Fuão, 2019, p. 20). Antes dessa captura, o espectro já desapareceu na sua aparição, mas, ao mesmo tempo, está lá e para Derrida o que mais importa são as condições em que se dá esse aparecimento. Todavia, o autor não deixa claro se o “aparecer” da aparição diz respeito a algo verdadeiro ou falso, pois, para ele, a distinção hierárquica da metafísica logocêntrica não cabe (Solis, 2019b, p. 55). Portanto, poder-se-ia pensar o espectro não só como os outros, que não estão presentemente vivos, mas também como uma “Coisa” – nas palavras de Derrida – representada por um conjunto de ideias, doutrinas, práticas, posturas, condutas etc. e sempre baseada nas questões da repetição, do retorno, da obsessão. Sendo ao mesmo tempo algo não identificado que aparece, mas que não se pode tocar, é possível sentir sua presença, pois, mesmo sem vê-lo, sabe-se que o espectro está lá, caracterizando o que Derrida chama de “efeito de viseira” ao apontar, a respeito daquele, que

Esta Coisa que não é uma coisa, essa Coisa invisível entre seus aparecimentos, não a veremos mais em carne e osso quando ela reaparecer. Esta Coisa olha para nós, no entanto, e vê-nos não vê-la mesmo quando ela está aí. Uma dissimetria espectral interrompe aqui toda especularidade. Ela dessincroniza, faz-nos voltar à anacronia. A isto chamaremos *efeito de viseira*: não vemos quem nos olha. (Derrida, 1994, p. 22, grifo do autor).

Nesse sentido, seria possível imaginar o espectro como uma corporificação inexistente que tem olhos de ressaca, oblíquos e dissimulados<sup>188</sup>, que, por ser anacrônica, percorre livremente o tempo histórico da humanidade. No Ocidente, tem coexistido com a questão espectral uma estreita relação entre as crenças referentes ao *post mortem* e os espaços de enterramento dos mortos. Segundo o historiador francês Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889), as mais remotas gerações, muito antes de surgirem os primeiros filósofos, acreditavam em uma segunda existência para além da vida terrena; no entanto, conforme as antigas crenças dos gregos e romanos, não era em outro mundo que a alma passaria essa existência, mas na terra, junto aos homens; acreditou-se, por muito tempo, que a morte não separava a alma do corpo e que ambos se encerravam no mesmo túmulo<sup>189</sup> (1900, p. 13). No período da Idade Média, do século V ao XV, sucederem-se e combinarem-se crenças

188 Referência à personagem de Machado de Assis (1839-1908) em *Dom Casmurro* (1899) Capitu, cujos olhos de ressaca arrastam tudo para dentro de si, denotando uma sagacidade própria de quem faria o que fosse necessário para conseguir o que quer: “Capitú, apesar daqueles olhos que o diabo lhe deu... Você já reparou nos olhos della? São assim de cigana oblíqua e dissimulada.”. Assis, M de. (1899). *Dom Casmurro*. Rio de Janeiro: H. Garnier, Livreiro-Editor.

189 “D’après les plus vieilles croyances des Italiens et des Grecs, ce n’était pas dans un monde étranger à celui-ci que l’âme allait passer sa seconde existence; elle restait tout près des hommes et continuait à vivre sous la terre. On a même cru pendant fort longtemps que dans cette seconde existence l’âme restait associée au corps. Née avec lui, la mort ne l’en séparait pas; elle s’enfermait avec lui dans le tombeau.”

tradicionais e rituais lentamente cristianizados diante da morte humana; nesse dédalo de atitudes, a sociedade medieval considerava a possibilidade do retorno dos mortos para visitar os vivos. Simultaneamente, importantes transformações das estruturas sociais levaram à redefinição das relações entre estes e aqueles, e essas relações se inscreviam nas realidades do espaço social pela articulação entre as casas dos vivos e o cemitério, que está, para o historiador medievalista francês Jean-Claude Schmitt (1946-), entre os lugares mais propícios às aparições dos mortos (1999, p. 18-204).

O tema dos espaços de enterramento e dos possíveis significados a eles associados tem estimulado o imaginário humano desde antes do período medieval, retornando frequentemente em representações artísticas. O próprio tema do cemitério é um espectro, já que na literatura da Idade Moderna ele apareceu em diversos gêneros e subgêneros narrativos: na tragédia *Hamlet*, coveiros cavam a cova de Ofélia<sup>190</sup> em um adro, pátio externo geralmente localizado ao redor das igrejas onde os mortos eram enterrados; no século XVIII, os poetas pré-Românticos ingleses Edward Young (1683-1765), Robert Blair (1699-1746) e Thomas Gray (1716-1771) e o irlandês Thomas Parnell (1679-1718) trataram, em seus poemas, dos temas do cemitério, da melancolia, dos fantasmas; no conto de horror *The Premature Burial* (1844), o escritor norte-americano Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849) explorou a questão do medo de ser enterrado vivo, comum durante o século XIX; em textos mais recentes, como no romance ficcional *Incidente em Antares* (1971), do escritor brasileiro Érico Veríssimo (1905-1975), e no best-seller *Pet Sematary* (1983), do norte-americano Stephen King (1947-), o cemitério poderia ser interpretado como o protagonista da narrativa. Cabe destacar que, em *Pet Sematary*, os mortos enterrados no antigo cemitério indígena voltam para assombrar e aniquilar os vivos sob a forma espectral de mortos-vivos.

Assim como a literatura, a arquitetura é uma arte com grande potencial simbólico, em que o discurso é elaborado principalmente com elementos construídos. De fato, aquela recorre a esta para engendrar as espacialidades imaginárias onde as narrativas se desenvolvem e, em ambas, é possível verificar a frequência espectral. De acordo com Fuão (2019, p. 20), quando Derrida inaugura a questão dos espectros considerando-os como um “outro totalmente diferente”, ele está induzindo a uma revisão da história, da cidade e da arquitetura por meio da lógica dos retornantes; o presente

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190 “A churchyard.

Enter two Clowns, with spades, &c

**First Clown**

Is she to be buried in Christian burial that  
wilfully seeks her own salvation?

**Second Clown**

I tell thee she is: and therefore make her grave  
straight: the crowner hath sat on her, and finds it  
Christian burial.” (Ato V, Cena I.).

estudo, apesar de tratar dessa questão na arquitetura, propõe um deslocamento do significado de espectro, que será pensado não como esse “outro” que não está presentemente vivo, mas um conjunto de ideias, propósitos, doutrinas ou desejos, que se traduzem e corporificam no espaço arquitetônico alterando negativamente a lógica destes. Essa transferência de significação representa justamente a proposta geral da desconstrução: assimilar um “texto” como algo inacabado que permite determinados deslocamentos (Rocha, 2010, p. 41). Nesse sentido, com apoio no pensamento derridiano, ao mesmo tempo em que se sugere esse gesto desconstrutivo pensa-se o cemitério como um texto<sup>191</sup> passível de ser interpretado e desconstruído, que será “lido” como o lugar onde as manifestações espectrais se materializam invisivelmente no espaço, podendo não só aparecer, mas habitar, dominar e interferir nas relações humanas que nele se desenvolvem.

Tendo como foco do estudo o caso do cemitério Campo da Esperança, os três espectros que se pretende examinar surgiram na (e em razão da) modernidade, aproximadamente entre os séculos XV e XX: o capitalismo, que envolve as questões da mercadoria, do consumo e do monopólio; o higienismo, fundamentado na ideia da limpeza humana como tentativa de eliminar o “outro totalmente diferente” do espaço; e a individualização, associada ao culto da própria individualidade e do Eu, atitude que é entendida aqui como um modo de legitimar, evidenciar e eternizar o poder. Pressupõe-se que tais espectros rondam esse cemitério e intervêm nas relações entre vivos e também entre vivos e mortos, obsediando aqueles, observando-os sem serem vistos e caracterizando o efeito de viseira sugerido por Derrida. A atemporalidade e anacronia espectral justificam a utilização dessas noções, que emergiram em séculos pregressos, para investigar uma situação contemporânea, já que neste estudo serão apresentados e examinados acontecimentos historicamente recentes. Por fim, a hontologia será operada como uma espécie de método (embora Derrida não fosse simpático a essa palavra) para identificar e interpretar esses espectros negativos da modernidade.

À vista disso, poder-se-ia conjecturar que tais espectros, na verdade, nunca deixaram de obsediar a sociedade moderna desde que surgiram, isto é: nunca desapareceram de fato. Sem nunca terem desaparecido, não poderiam ter retornado e, portanto, não seriam espectros. Porém, entende-se a construção de Brasília como um divisor de águas entre o passado e o futuro planejado, o antigo e o moderno. Sob a égide da modernidade, foi pretendido iniciar a escrita de uma nova história, o

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191 Para Solis, não há nada fora do texto arquitetônico (aludindo à frase de Derrida (1973, p. 119): “não há nada fora do texto”), que é passível de interpretação ao ser desconstruído. Nesse contexto, Derrida não se refere ao “objeto arquitetônico” enquanto desconstruído, mas ao acesso à realidade desse objeto, acessado por meio de quase-conceitos que incluem os sistemas de linguagem, cultura e representação marginalizados para além das fronteiras da razão logocêntrica do mundo ocidental. Portanto, a desconstrução “textualiza” as coisas. Solis, D. E. (2009). *Desconstrução e arquitetura: uma abordagem a partir de Jacques Derrida*. Rio de Janeiro: Uapê Sociedade de Estudos e Atividades Filosóficas.

planejamento de uma nova configuração social, em uma tábula rasa, limpa e nua. Nesse terreno vazio, esses espectros negativos retornaram e se materializaram dissimuladamente no espaço, obsediando os vivos sob o pretexto da construção de um Brasil desenvolvido. Presume-se que essa obsessão tem se agravado, sobretudo, no cemitério, espaço marginalizado e ambivalente onde há, ao mesmo tempo, controle dos corpos e ausência de zelo administrativo. Trata-se de uma heterotopia onde a frequência espectral tem conformado e dominado a própria lógica da arquitetura, alterando o modo como esta desempenha seu papel, se expandindo e determinando a dinâmica dos rituais fúnebres e o modo como os mortos são gerenciados.

### 3. Espectros da modernidade no cemitério Campo da Esperança

Espectros estão por todo o lado. Estão em todo o lugar, em todas as esferas do pensamento, são ideias, juízos, impressões, desejos, são retornantes (*revenants*). Estando por todos os lados e sendo retornantes, revivem, convivem em espacialidades. A espacialidade enquanto sentida, refratada, pensada possui dimensão espectral. (Solis, 2019b, p. 61).

Os homens vivem, então, num mundo de mercadorias [...]. O capital se encarna em coisas [...]. (Marx, 1983, p. XXXVII-XXXVIII).

Ao passo que, nas sociedades pré-capitalistas, eram várias as determinações que asseguravam as formas como os indivíduos realizavam os rituais fúnebres, nas capitalistas essas determinações foram, em grande medida, reduzidas a um fundamento: a mercadoria. Quando os corpos eram inumados em espaços eclesiásticos, até o século XIX, os rituais articulados pelas igrejas e suas irmandades já não eram isentos de alguma relação financeira; contudo, na contemporaneidade observam-se algumas peculiaridades: o progressivo estreitamento entre as temáticas da morte e do consumo e a transposição da lógica comercial de mercado às práticas funerárias tradicionais (Veras e Soares, 2016, p. 227). Essa lógica segue o padrão dos demais setores do mercado: no livro *L'Homme devant la mort*, publicado pela primeira vez em 1977, o historiador francês Philippe Ariès (1914-1984) afirma que os funerais “constituem uma indústria” cujos “chefes” são os “diretores funerários, importantes homens de negócio” que, como qualquer outro mercado econômico, adota os costumes do capitalismo (2014, p. 804-806). Atualmente, a preparação desses rituais pode envolver a aquisição de produtos e serviços complementares mediados por padrões de consumo<sup>192</sup> que celebram questões associadas à modernidade, como a

192 De acordo com Bauman, a sociedade do consumo representa “o tipo de sociedade que promove, encoraja ou reforça a escolha de um estilo de vida e uma estratégia existencial consumistas, e rejeita todas

necromaquiagem, procedimento que busca dissimular a morte por meio de técnicas cosméticas; os funerais virtuais, que recorrem a aparatos tecnológicos para a transmissão destes em tempo real; a espetacularização dos rituais por meio do uso de música, luzes e chuva de pétalas de flores; e outros. A aquisição desses produtos e serviços é estimulada pelas empresas que os comercializam.

Segundo a doutora em antropologia Isabela Morais (2009, p. 108) o processo do morrer se “empresariou” no Brasil a partir da segunda metade do século XX, mais precisamente após a década de 1980, com o surgimento de empresas privadas que iniciaram suas atividades administrando cemitérios-parque ou funerárias. Para a autora, a estrutura atual dessas empresas não se assemelha a organizações sociais de outrora, que, em geral, detinham intenções comunitárias para possibilitar o enterramento dos seus associados, pois naquelas o axioma principal é o lucro. De acordo com o Sindicato dos Cemitérios e Crematórios Particulares do Brasil, o faturamento anual do mercado funerário brasileiro soma cerca de R\$ 7 bi (AFFAF, 2020, p. 26), número definido por estatística que envolve serviços como sepultamento e cremação de corpos humanos, os elementos vitais para o funcionamento do “negócio” da morte<sup>193</sup>. Uma vez que esse mercado é altamente rentável, o esforço para acumular capital e obter lucro pode prevalecer sobre outros interesses. Para Marx (1959, p. 28), a desvalorização do mundo dos homens aumenta em proporção direta com a valorização do mundo das coisas<sup>194</sup>; essa ideia, que se encontra no cerne da sociedade capitalista ocidental (e, portanto, no funcionamento do mundo contemporâneo) atua como um espectro que ronda e convive com espacialidades, que, no caso deste estudo, são representadas pelo cemitério.

De início, não se pode ver o espectro: ele é quem vê primeiro e, sendo uma aparição “sensível/insensível, visível/não-visível”, sente-se sua presença (Solis, 2019b, p. 60). Embora a frequência espectral não siga a lógica imposta pelo calendário, supõe-se que a presença

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as opções culturais alternativas.” (Bauman, Z. ([2007], 2008). *Vida para consumo: a transformação das pessoas em mercadorias*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar). Nesse sentido, como apontam Veras e Soares (2016), refletir sobre o consumo em um período em que não são vendidos somente produtos, mas “estilos de vida”, abre caminho para pensar a mercantilização de produtos funerários como a comercialização de “estilos de morte”. Para o doutor em antropologia José Carlos Rodrigues (1983), uma consequência dessa comercialização está relacionada à lógica do sistema, que impõe a produção em série; assim, a criatividade tradicional desaparece e a morte se transforma em “catálogos que contêm tudo”: “modelos de sepulturas, de caixões, de epitáfios, de alças de metal, de cerimônias fúnebres, de coroas de flores, de anúncios fúnebres – tudo já preparado, em conserva (ou congelado), pronto para ser consumido.”.

193 Os pesquisadores Lana Veras e Jorge Coelho Soares (2016) analisaram as capas da Revista Diretor Funerário, periódico brasileiro especializado no setor funerário que existe há mais de vinte anos, publicadas entre 2005 e 2013 e, ao verificar a recorrência de termos como “tecnologia”, “modernidade”, “avanços”, “inovação”, “profissionalismo”, “capacitação” e “revolução”, concluíram que estes indicam a vinculação do discurso editorial a valores exaltados na modernidade: “A ideia de futuro bem-sucedido, construída no início do período moderno, exaltava o novo, a técnica, a razão e depositava na ciência a expectativa de resolução dos dramas humanos, de modo que toda ligação com o tradicional, com o artesanal, com a emoção ou com o familiar era percebida como sinal de atraso e defasagem.”.

194 “*The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.*” (grifo do autor).

dissimulada do espectro do capitalismo retornou ao Campo da Esperança por volta de 13 de fevereiro de 2002, quando esse cemitério passou a ser administrado pela empresa concessionária Campo da Esperança Ltda. O contrato de concessão assinado entre ela e o Governo do Distrito Federal visa, entre outros objetivos, à “modernização das instalações físicas” e “exploração econômica das atividades inerentes aos serviços públicos de cemitérios” (DF, 2002, p. 1). Segundo a jornalista Ana Maria Campos<sup>195</sup>, esse contrato entregou a um grupo privado um “negócio” que mais uma vez misturava uso do solo com interesses políticos, empresariais e sociais.

A Campo da Esperança Ltda. presta serviços funerários como velório, exumação e sepultamento; este é mais comumente realizado em jazigos, que são construídos lado a lado, de forma geminada. Atualmente, um jazigo de uma gaveta custa R\$ 824, 46 e funcionários dessa empresa são incentivados a vender jazigos de três gavetas, mais lucrativos que os de uma, além dos demais serviços oferecidos (Kokay, 2008, p. 50), representando um “pacote de serviços casados aparentemente mais vantajoso” que, efetivamente, torna a aquisição mais onerosa (DF, 2008, p. 42). Colocados na posição de produto de consumo, esses serviços e procedimentos funerários seguem os trâmites do mercado e podem se submeter, inclusive, ao lobby com os governos pela conquista e manutenção do monopólio sobre o direito a exercer essa lucrativa atividade (Veras e Soares, 2016, p. 227). Vale destacar que os seis únicos cemitérios ativos do DF, incluído o Campo da Esperança, são gerenciados por essa empresa, nos quais têm sido verificados possíveis “irregularidades e atos de improbidade administrativa” desde a celebração do contrato de concessão, de modo que em 18 de março de 2008 foi instaurada pela Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal (CLDF) uma Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (CPI) destinada a investigar essas irregularidades e os preços dos sepultamentos cobrados pela concessionária entre 1999 e 2007 (DF, 2008, p. 3-8).

A CPI dos cemitérios, fundamentada em matérias jornalísticas e denúncias recebidas pela ouvidoria da CLDF, culminou em um relatório publicado em 16 de setembro de 2008 que inicia apresentando um episódio ocorrido no ano anterior: ao visitar o local onde havia a sepultura do filho – localizada em área nobre, mas originalmente social, onde são sepultados gratuitamente indigentes e pessoas carentes de recursos financeiros, no cemitério de Taguatinga-DF –, os pais constataram que aquela havia dado lugar a uma calçada do novo cemitério-parque. Sem o consentimento prévio destes, os restos mortais do filho foram transferidos para um ossuário e misturados a outros ossos humanos, tanto embora o título de arrendamento do jazigo estivesse pago até 2011. Assim,

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195 Disponível em:

<[https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/cidades/2012/12/17/interna\\_cidadesdf,339553/cemeterios-do-df-tem-administracao-terceirizada-e-acumulam-reclamacoes.shtml](https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/cidades/2012/12/17/interna_cidadesdf,339553/cemeterios-do-df-tem-administracao-terceirizada-e-acumulam-reclamacoes.shtml)>. Acesso em: 28 jul. 2021.

Após verificarem o “erro”, o gerente do cemitério lhe ofereceu [ao pai] um túmulo novo, em outro local, de duas gavetas (porque não constroem mais campa de uma só gaveta), porém a família teria de comprar a segunda gaveta, sob a alegação de possível necessidade futura. (DF, 2008, p. 30).

O relatório aponta que eram demolidas principalmente sepulturas de uma gaveta, localizadas nas áreas de enterramento social, sob o argumento de que “era necessário abrir espaços para novos sepultamentos”. Nesses espaços foram construídos jazigos de três gavetas, vendidos a preços elevados; no ato comercial, havia pressão sobre as famílias para comprar esses jazigos com vistas à “utilização futura” (DF, 2008, p. 37-38). As áreas antigas do cemitério, pouco lucrativas por serem reutilizadas somente mediante exumações, encontravam-se abandonadas, embora muitas famílias pagassem a taxa de manutenção e conservação dos jazigos. Além de priorizar o serviço do sepultamento nas áreas-parque novas, mais onerosas, a concessionária impõe uma série de dificuldades para esse serviço nas antigas (Ibid., p. 38).

Conforme o entendimento da CPI, a concessionária acredita que problemas eventualmente surgidos podem ser contornados com “trocas”, “pequenas indenizações” ou “isenções de taxas e serviços”, pois a reparação do dano é “vantajosa financeiramente” se “comparada com o lucro na venda” de jazigos (DF, 2008, p. 31). Outras denúncias são apresentadas nos resumos dos depoimentos prestados à comissão e nas cópias de boletins de ocorrência registrados na Polícia Civil do DF, como o que relata um episódio ocorrido em agosto de 2007:

Compareceu a esta DP o comunicante [...] informando que sua tia [...] foi enterrada no cemitério do Gama [administrado pela empresa Campo da Esperança Ltda.] no dia 19/12/1966 [...]. No mês de agosto do ano de 2007, o comunicante foi convocado [...] para comparecer ao referido cemitério para realizar a transferência dos ossos para uma nova cova, e para isto, teria que ser paga a quantia de R\$ 2.539,78 [...] valor este que fora pago à vista, e parte através de cheques pré-datados. No dia 16/08/2008, quando foi até o local para assistir à exumação dos ossos, foi constatado que os referidos ossos haviam desaparecido, e ninguém sabia dizer o que havia acontecido. (DF, 2008, p. 245).

O relatório indica que a concessionária solicitou diversos reajustes na tabela de preços de serviços prestados entre 2003 e 2006 que, no entanto, não foram convertidos na execução das obras



de “modernização das instalações físicas” contratadas (DF, 2008, p. 43-44). Mais recentemente, entre 25 de janeiro e 31 de março de 2017, a Secretaria de Estado de Justiça e Cidadania realizou visitas e trabalhos de inspeção nos cemitérios do DF. Tais diligências culminaram no relatório de inspeção n. 02/2017, que indica a permanência das irregularidades relativas à prestação de serviços apontadas em 2009 e 2011, na Decisão n. 6371/2009 e na Informação n. 43/2011-TCDF, respectivamente. Entre elas, destacam-se a cobrança das taxas dos serviços de sepultamento e exumação sem previsão no contrato de concessão (DF, 2017, p. 32-46).

À época das averiguações da CPI, as áreas de enterramento social<sup>196</sup>, em geral, eram consideradas “nobres” em razão das suas localizações originais, que, por serem próximas da entrada do cemitério ou das capelas, mais valorizadas. De acordo com Kokay (2008, p. 37), essas áreas deram lugar a jazigos de valor elevado, seguindo a lógica da “privatização” dos cemitérios, prática que, no entendimento da deputada, tem a anuência do Poder Público, uma vez que a noção de concessão, entendendo-se como uma das espécies do contrato celebrado por parte da administração, pressupõe o consentimento do Estado em relação ao uso de bem e/ou exploração de serviços específicos e previstos no termo do contrato por outro sujeito de direito (DF, 2017, p. 42). Verifica-se, portanto, que o Estado possui um papel ativo na reprodução da lógica capitalista ao dispor de regulamentos legais que criam e mantêm condições para essa reprodução, além de exprimir e defender, por meio do seu poder decisório, interesses de determinados grupos hegemônicos. Longe de ser uma prática recente, eis aí a frequência espectral.

Tal vida, tal morte. Os pobres são enterrados sem a mínima atenção, como animais vadios. O cemitério dos pobres de Saint-Brides, em Londres, e um lodaçal sem árvores, utilizado como cemitério desde o tempo de Carlos II, cheio de montes de ossadas. Todas as quartas-feiras os defuntos pobres são deitados numa vala de quatro metros de fundo, o padre recita o mais depressa possível a sua litania, torna-se a tapar sumariamente a vala e, na quarta-feira seguinte, volta-se a cavar a vala enche-se de cadáveres a ponto de já não caber mais nenhum. O cheiro putrefato que deles emana empesta os arredores. (Engels, 1975, p. 355).

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<sup>196</sup> Segundo o relatório de inspeção n. 02/2017, “Não há justificativa para diferenciação existente entre os sepultamentos nas áreas destinadas aos enterros sociais e os sepultamentos realizados nas áreas novas (cemitério-parque). Nas áreas estruturadas como cemitérios-parques, os túmulos são construídos com dois ou três jazigos verticais lado a lado, apresentando cobertura vegetal (grama esmeralda) e adequada identificação dos sepultados, feita mediante placas de mármore e plaquetas de metal. Já nas áreas de sepultamentos gratuitas, construídas pela própria concessionária, cada cova recebe até três corpos sepultados na vertical, diretamente na terra sem haver, contudo, qualquer estrutura de alvenaria lateral.” (DF, 2017, p. 42).

O segundo espectro a ser examinado refere-se ao movimento higienista que emergiu na Europa no século XVIII, quando foi elaborada uma nova política pública baseada na higiene e no discurso médico. Na França, especificamente, essa forma de administração decorreu da Revolução Francesa (Costa, 2013, p. 52). Em meados do século XIX, congressos higienistas já aconteciam em Bruxelas; a partir daí a manifestação desse espectro como um ramo da medicina se disseminou na sociedade europeia, o que pode ser observado na publicação de estudos que se ocuparam a investigar o tema. Um deles foi a *Encyclopédie d'Hygiène et de Médecine Publique*, cujo primeiro tomo foi publicado em 1890, um ano depois da Exposição Universal de Paris, evento que reuniu higienistas do mundo todo. No prefácio desse tomo, escrito pelo médico francês Jules Eugène Rochard (1819-1896), verifica-se a relação entre o discurso médico higienista e a modernidade:

[...] a higiene, como é entendida hoje, é uma ciência moderna. É contemporânea das descobertas feitas nos nossos dias na física, química, fisiologia e história natural; foi desse movimento que ela saiu. [...] Os cientistas e especialmente os médicos entraram com entusiasmo por este novo caminho; pessoas do mundo os têm seguido, e a higiene não demorou a ter sua literatura específica, seus congressos, suas sociedades; ela recrutou auxiliares em todas as categorias e em todas as profissões liberais.<sup>197</sup>  
(Rochard, 1890, p. 1).

De modo geral, os higienistas buscaram eliminar as epidemias e as condições urbanas indesejáveis na Europa: era preciso limpar as cidades da insalubridade, que se concentrava principalmente no tecido urbano medieval. Os tratados de higiene pública passaram a determinar regras para a construção de novas moradias para os operários, que haviam sido removidos das suas habitações a fim de que bulevares modernos, ventilados e iluminados fossem abertos nas áreas urbanizadas. Esse objetivo foi atingido em planos de reformulação urbana como o de Paris, orientado pelo então prefeito da região do Sena Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809-1891) e executado entre 1853 e 1882. A busca pela higiene, que não era só física, mas moral, foi respaldada

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197 Do original: “[...] l’hygiène telle qu’on la comprend aujourd’hui est une science moderne. Elle est contemporaine des découvertes faites de nos jours en physique, en chimie, en physiologie et en histoire naturelle; c’est de ce mouvement qu’elle est sortie. [...] Les savants et surtout les médecins sont entrés avec enthousiasme dans cette voie nouvelle; les gens du monde les y ont suivis de loin, et l’hygiène n’a pas tardé à avoir sa littérature à part, ses congrès, ses sociétés; elle a recruté des auxiliaires dans tous les rangs et dans toutes les professions libérales.”

e legitimada pelas teorias científicas da época e estava fundamentalmente vinculada à tentativa de fragmentar socioespacialmente as cidades e impor distâncias físicas entre os indivíduos. De fato, esse movimento determinou vários aspectos da sociedade: a doutora em ciência da educação Christiane Gioppo (1996, p. 169) aponta que ele parece ter influenciado áreas em que as noções de organização e formação de mão de obra eram essenciais, como a industrial, em que tais conhecimentos eram importantes para a “construção” de um “operário padrão” cuja formação precisava ser guiada para que toda a sua vida estivesse voltada à fábrica. Nesse sentido, o higienismo foi o principal argumento para iniciar essa disciplinarização, que pretendia remodelar tanto o conjunto de hábitos tradicionalmente arraigados como o próprio operário, adaptando-o ao seu espaço de trabalho. Na década de 1920<sup>198</sup>, esse ideário estava em plena ascensão não só na Europa, mas em outras partes do mundo incluindo o Brasil.

Uma vez que os médicos e os higienistas normatizaram a organização das cidades com base em teorias que relacionavam as doenças ao meio ambiente, foram criadas regras para a construção de cemitérios; destas, talvez a principal tenha sido a marginalização dos espaços de enterramento nas periferias urbanas justamente para que a saúde da população fosse, em tese, protegida contra doenças que se acreditava serem transmitidas pelos cadáveres humanos. Assim, o espectro do higienismo retorna não só como estratégia para isolar os cemitérios no planejamento das cidades modernas, mas limpar os Outros do espaço cemiterial. A deputada federal Erika Kokay (1957-), que foi membro da CPI dos cemitérios, apresentou voto em separado sobre o relatório final desta; para ela (2008, p. 2), o diagnóstico das situações investigadas apresenta “antagonismo e a incoerência” entre os resultados, conclusões, recomendações, indiciamentos e encaminhamentos sugeridos pelo relator do documento, o então deputado distrital Benício Tavares (1956-), cujo mandato foi cassado em 2011 por captação ilícita de sufrágio e abuso de poder econômico. Nesse voto, Kokay menciona uma comissão que ocorreu em 1998, denominada Grupo de Trabalho de Necrópoles e Serviços Funerários, que constatou o iminente esgotamento das áreas de enterramento no cemitério Campo da Esperança; a concessionária, ao assumir a administração desse cemitério em 2002, conseguiu ampliar sua capacidade em vinte anos, acontecimento que, para a deputada, remete a “práticas

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198 Foi precisamente nessa década que Le Corbusier publicou pela primeira vez o livro *Vers une architecture* (1923), que buscou enaltecer o progresso científico por meio da arquitetura e propor a ruptura com os modos de vida tradicionais e com o passado histórico, cujas manifestações o autor qualifica como: “sujo”, “infecto”, “insalubre”, “fedorento”, “poeirento”, “podre”, “pútrido” e “tuberculoso” (1973, p. 7-195) (Le Corbusier. (1973). *Por uma arquitetura*. São Paulo: Perspectiva, Ed. da Universidade de São Paulo). Esse livro está estreitamente relacionado ao advento da arquitetura e do urbanismo modernos do século XX, que tem Brasília como exemplar. Também cabe destacar que a questão do higienismo foi posteriormente mencionada por Le Corbusier na Carta de Atenas, que diz: “As leis de higiene universalmente reconhecidas fazem uma grave acusação contra as condições sanitárias das cidades. [...] não basta [...] encontrar uma solução; é preciso ainda que esta seja imposta pelas autoridades responsáveis. Bairros inteiros deveriam ser condenados em nome da saúde pública.”. Le Corbusier. ([1933-1943], 1993). *A Carta de Atenas*. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1993.

ilegais” referentes à abertura de novas áreas de enterramento, denominadas “áreas-parque”, por meio da remoção irregular de restos mortais, do desaparecimento de ossadas humanas e da destruição de covas rasas, questões verificadas principalmente nas áreas destinadas aos sepultamentos sociais<sup>199</sup> (Kokay, 2008, p. 35-37).

Das denúncias que levaram à instalação da CPI, a maioria dizia respeito “à remoção não autorizada ou não comunicada às famílias de restos mortais de parentes enterrados em cemitérios do Distrito Federal” (DF, 2008, p. 17). O relatório aponta que essas remoções eram feitas por meio do uso de uma pá mecânica e que, em alguns casos, as ossadas humanas não eram separadas nem identificadas. Outra denúncia refere-se ao sepultamento de até três corpos de indigentes em uma mesma cova, o que é proibido por lei pelo decreto regulamentador e pelo contrato de concessão (Ibid., p. 40). Fundamentalmente, tais remoções e reutilizações de espaço – que a concessionária chamou de “reciclagem” (Ibid., p. 37) – configuram uma espécie de política do apagamento baseada na tentativa de higienizar o cemitério eliminando as pessoas carentes de recursos financeiros; estas, no entanto, não desaparecem por completo: elas também retornam sob a forma de espectros para obsediar os vivos e denunciar “violências políticas”, pois, como aponta Derrida (1994, p. 13), “justiça alguma parece possível sem o princípio da responsabilidade para com os que não estão vivos”.

[...] é a partir do século XIX que cada indivíduo teve direito à sua caixinha para sua pequena decomposição pessoal [...]. (Foucault, 2013, p. 118).

O terceiro espectro examinado refere-se ao desejo de individualização, associado ao culto da própria individualidade, e como ele se materializa no espaço cemiterial. Na Antiguidade ocidental, apesar da relativa familiaridade que os indivíduos tinham com os mortos, estes eram considerados impuros e mantidos distantes, em seus “devidos lugares”, a fim de impedir o risco de poluição e que voltassem para ameaçar os vivos; por isso, os espaços de enterramento eram separados das cidades. Na Roma Antiga, eram comuns o enterramento ao longo das estradas e a individualização das sepulturas, lugar normalmente marcado por uma inscrição expressando o desejo de conservar a identidade do túmulo e a lembrança do falecido. Por volta do século V, na alta Idade Média, essas inscrições desaparecem e as sepulturas tornam-se coletivas (ao menos para as pessoas

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199 De acordo com o Art. 9º do Decreto n. 40.569, de 27 de março de 2020, 10% da área do cemitério Campo da Esperança deve ser destinada ao sepultamento gratuito de “pessoas economicamente carentes e indigentes”, cuja situação precisa ser atestada por assistente social designado (a) pela Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento Social do Distrito Federal; no entanto, tais sepulturas gratuitas devem ser concedidas pelo prazo de até três anos, que pode ser reduzido quando: se tratar de crianças com até seis anos de idade; houver avaria no túmulo ou infiltração de água nos carneiros; houver interesse público comprovado, a critério da autoridade sanitária; ou houver determinação judicial (DF, 2020, p. 2-5).

economicamente carentes) e anônimas: os cadáveres seriam entregues à Igreja para aguardar a ressurreição. A partir desse momento, a distinção entre cidade e periferia, onde se enterravam os mortos, começou a desaparecer: depois do século VIII, aproximadamente, os cemitérios ao longo das estradas seriam inteiramente abandonados e o local da sepultura deveria ser próximo à Igreja, em um “lugar santo”, onde nenhum monumento ou inscrição celebraria a individualidade do morto (Rodrigues, 1983, p. 121-122).

No período pré-capitalista, aqueles que detinham o poder (imperadores, reis, papas, nobres) foram os primeiros a individualizar suas sepulturas. Entre os últimos séculos da Idade Média e os primeiros da Moderna, por volta dos séculos XII e XVI, o túmulo individual, a inscrição funerária e a representação individual e realista da figura do morto na estatuária fúnebre significavam alguns dos sintomas de um movimento de valorização da individualidade, que foi moroso e diretamente associado ao conjunto de transformações que operavam ao nível do sistema econômico. Nas imediações do século XV, o processo do morrer era carregado de um sentido dramático, vinculado a alterações nas concepções de morte e vida; nesse contexto está o aparecimento das biografias, nas quais a identidade pessoal se eternizaria após a morte. Basicamente, a construção de túmulos individualizados expressava uma tentativa de assegurar o morto na Terra (Rodrigues, 1983, p. 127-139), isto é, imortalizá-lo na arquitetura cemiterial: ele excederia a presença por meio do seu túmulo, que perenizava a lembrança das suas realizações, das suas ideias e do que ele representava para os vivos.

Entre os séculos XVII e XVIII, os indivíduos começaram a buscar o ancoramento das suas identidades nos cemitérios extramuros, que, cada vez mais populares, passaram a espelhar as cidades, marcadas pela propriedade privada, de um modo quase que direto. Não possuir uma sepultura individual no século XIX era inadmissível e ter uma concessão perpétua no cemitério representava uma espécie de título de nobreza, de modo que, assente no desenvolvimento da noção de indivíduo e na imposição desta sobre todas as dimensões da sociedade ocidental, a alma converteu-se em “quintessência da individualidade”, reproduzida nas fileiras de sepulturas particulares dos espaços cemiteriais. A essa altura, as sepulturas cobriam-se de monumentos tumulários, muitas vezes verticalizados, e o fausto da individualidade das classes dominantes era ressaltado pela singeleza dos túmulos das pessoas economicamente carentes (Rodrigues, 1983, p. 165-182). Em 1889, com a Proclamação da República e o subsequente processo de laicização do Estado brasileiro, acentuou-se o debate em torno da administração do espaço cemiterial, que até então possuía um estreito vínculo com a Igreja. Embora ainda existam cemitérios administrados por

congregações religiosas no Brasil, aquele debate determinou o caráter público e secular dos cemitérios do DF (DF, 1999, p. 1), construídos entre as décadas de 1950 e 1970.

Em 22 de agosto de 1976, JK e seu motorista, Geraldo Ribeiro, vieram a óbito após um acidente automobilístico no quilômetro 165 da rodovia federal Presidente Dutra, que atravessa a parte leste do estado de São Paulo e a região sudoeste do estado do Rio de Janeiro. O corpo do ex-presidente foi velado, primeiramente, no saguão do edifício da revista Manchete, no Rio de Janeiro; na tarde do dia seguinte, ao chegar a Brasília, foi conduzido à Catedral Metropolitana Nossa Senhora Aparecida, projetada por Niemeyer e inaugurada em 1970, onde o velório prosseguiu. O sermão foi proferido pelo arcebispo D. José Newton e, o esquife, coberto com a bandeira nacional. Estima-se que o cortejo fúnebre foi acompanhado por cerca de 100 mil pessoas, que gritavam:

“O povo leva, o povo leva”. E o povo levou o esquife [...] nas mãos, até sua última morada: o cemitério Campo da Esperança, ao lado da sepultura de Bernardo Sayão [...]. O cortejo levou três horas e meia para chegar ao Campo da Esperança. [...] O corpo baixou à sepultura às 23h55. O povo gritava: “Viva J.K.”, “Viva a democracia”. As luzes dos edifícios públicos permaneceram acesas durante toda a noite. (Viana, 2006, p. 105-106).

O acontecimento da morte pode trazer uma espécie de suspensão temporária da razão, faculdade enaltecida pelos primeiros defensores da arquitetura moderna, resultando no ilógico, no absurdo. O povo levou o esquife de JK a pé, percorrendo aproximadamente 7,8 km, em uma cidade planejada para o automóvel. Os cemitérios foram localizados por Costa nas extremidades do Plano Piloto para evitar nele o cortejo, que, ainda assim, aconteceu. Essa cerimônia fúnebre, tradicional nos séculos pregressos e banida da cidade modernista, voltou como um espectro para assombrar o idealizador do seu plano urbanístico. O acontecimento da morte, portanto, nem sempre é um fim; pode ser um meio para transgredir determinações impostas e consagradas como regras incontestáveis. O cortejo na cidade, marcado pelo caráter cívico e pela comoção popular, já havia acontecido na ocasião do suicídio do ex-presidente Getúlio Vargas (1882-1954) e aconteceria novamente com a morte de Tancredo Neves (1910-1985), presidente eleito, mas não empossado. Para o antropólogo e sociólogo Edgar Morin (1921-), a cidade oferece ao cidadão uma compensação para a morte, e este pode extrair da participação cívica uma força capaz de dominá-la; a cidade representa a soma de todas as individualidades cívicas e contém em si a fonte que nutre cada individualidade (1997, p. 45).

Os restos mortais do ex-presidente foram mantidos no Campo da Esperança entre 1976 e 12 de setembro de 1981, quando foram levados para o Memorial JK, edificação também projetada por Niemeyer e situada no ponto mais alto de Brasília, no qual foi rezada a primeira missa da cidade, em 3 de maio de 1957. Quase dez anos exatos após a morte de JK, em 14 de setembro de 1986, o deputado mineiro José Aparecido de Oliveira (1929-2007), então governador do DF, assinou o decreto que deu o nome de Praça dos Pioneiros ao local desse cemitério onde esteve sepultado o ex-presidente. Nessa localidade, parte integrante das Áreas Especiais do Setor “A”, também estão os túmulos de pioneiros<sup>200</sup> e outros envolvidos na construção da cidade. O capítulo IV do Decreto n. 40.569, de 27 de março de 2020, discrimina as autoridades a cujos sepultamentos a Praça se destina: “o Presidente da República; o Vice-Presidente da República; o Governador do Distrito Federal; o Vice-Governador do Distrito Federal; os Ministros de Estado; os Ministros dos Tribunais Superiores; os Desembargadores do Tribunal de Justiça do Distrito Federal; os Secretários de Estado; os Ministros do Tribunal de Contas da União; os Parlamentares; o Arcebispo de Brasília, o Bispo Auxiliar e outras autoridades religiosas de hierarquia equivalente.” (DF, 2020, p. 2-3).

Tal como não haveria distinção entre classes sociais em Brasília, conforme sustentado pelos envolvidos na sua construção, no plano teoricamente utópico de Costa o Campo da Esperança seria isento de ostentações, já que o arquiteto orientou que os cemitérios do Plano Piloto tivessem “sepulturas rasas e lápides singelas, à maneira inglesa, tudo desprovido de qualquer ostentação”; esta, impedida de ser verticalizada, foi horizontalmente moldada na linguagem modernista da cidade. A figuratividade da estatuária tumular, presente nos cemitérios dos séculos progressos, foi abstraída, geometrizada, simplificada e adaptada para o cemitério da nova capital. Segundo o historiador e crítico de arte baiano Clarival do Prado Valladares (1918-1983), o Campo da Esperança foi imposto a Brasília na época da sua concepção como forma de evitar o “mau gosto” predominante nos cemitérios do resto do país; o autor afirma que, no entanto, os planejadores da cidade conseguiram evitá-lo somente na vertical (1972, p. 1119).

Tradicionalmente, lápides são elementos de pedra colocados sobre sepulturas nos quais geralmente se inscrevem as datas de nascimento e falecimento e o nome do indivíduo. Não há lápides tradicionais na Área Especial do Campo da Esperança: as inscrições são gravadas no próprio plano horizontal do túmulo e geralmente exibem a profissão que o falecido possuía em vida. Existe certa variação de linguagem entre as sepulturas dessa área, talvez representando uma tentativa discreta de individualização, mas, em geral, elas se assemelham em forma, tamanho e material construtivo. Todas respeitam o gabarito de altura imposto, já que as edificações tumulares

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200 Palavra usada para designar os primeiros habitantes de Brasília, a qual se refere, em geral, a técnicos, funcionários públicos, engenheiros, arquitetos etc.

verticalizadas são características dos cemitérios do século XIX, que a premissa geral de Brasília buscou superar. Nessa área há dois túmulos que, no entanto, se destacam: o do ex-governador Joaquim Roriz (1936-2018), que cumpriu quatro mandados no DF, e o de JK, projetado por Niemeyer e revestido com o mármore de Carrara remanescente da construção da Catedral Metropolitana Nossa Senhora Aparecida. Um dos modos pelos quais o poder se apropria da morte é por meio da arquitetura cemiterial, que eterniza o indivíduo poderoso; não coincidentemente esse túmulo foi feito de pedra, material perene e resistente ao tempo e às intempéries. O espaço cemiterial é repleto de forma que são conteúdos e que por isso negam o vazio da sepultura, povoando-a de signos que parece cobrir o vácuo sobre o qual se apoiam; por essa razão, não é preciso haver um cadáver para que exista uma sepultura, porque não é isto que se supõe existir nela (Rodrigues, 1983), tanto que hoje os restos mortais de JK estão em uma edificação maior e com mais chances de ser visitada pelos vivos, que cultuarão a memória do ex-presidente por meio do seu acervo pessoal de fotografias. Tanto nessa edificação como na Área Especial do Campo da Esperança, verifica-se o papel social dos túmulos e sua função moral como monumento à glorificação de mortos ilustres – que, nesse caso, são representados por Governantes, membros do governo, detentores de cargos públicos de alto prestígio e líderes religiosos – no sentido de realçar a importância civil da morte (Motta, 2009, p. 62).

De modo similar ao acontecimento trágico de Sayão, que demarcou a área do cemitério que ele mesmo inaugurou, JK cumpriu a promessa de construir uma cidade cujas vias foram posteriormente o palco para o espetáculo da sua morte. Suas realizações históricas – com destaque para o que foi talvez a maior concretização do ideário da modernidade em solo brasileiro, símbolo e promessa de progresso e de rompimento com o passado colonial – o garantiram um local eterno na Área Especial do cemitério Campo da Esperança. Os vivos buscaram imortalizar o ex-presidente destinando-lhe um lugar proeminente nesse cemitério, mas, antes disso, é possível que JK estivesse tentando imortalizar a si mesmo na história por meio da construção de Brasília. Fato é que o ex-presidente excede a presença de modo espectral por meio do seu túmulo, cuja dimensão física, materialidade construtiva e opacidade radiante do mármore de Carrara o distingue dos demais.

Só viram ali modernidades, quando essa não passa de um verniz sobre um fundo antigo. (Ariès, 2014, p. 804).



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**IV.**

**MONTAGEM**

**MONTAGE**

### 13. Constantinos V. PROIMOS

## Architecture as Theory of Communicative Design

Roger Scruton's *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (1979)<sup>201</sup> is widely recognized as a reference book for all those interested in philosophy of architecture. In this seminal book, Scruton, in his typically direct and explicit manner, confronts the problem of the essence of architecture, namely what architecture is and what it amounts to. Scruton devotes an entire chapter, chapter 3 specifically, to the question of whether architecture has an essence and arguably throughout the book this question surfaces again and again. It is curious indeed that while Scruton diligently examines architecture from many points of view and with regard to the concomitant theories that sustain them, he finds them all wanting.

Scruton examines functionalism, the view that the building is a means for achieving a function, the utility of the building which he deems a weak doctrine. He considers space, and in particular the view attributed to Bruno Zevi that the essence of architecture is "space as enclosed"<sup>202</sup> but finds his view as well as that of Siegfried Giedion "vacuous and circular" and furthermore that it fails "to provide an account of *all* that we appreciate in buildings."<sup>203</sup> What he then terms as *Kunstgeschichte* is a theory based on the Hegelian concept of history and the spirit or idea that underlies it, but Scruton finds the theory useless for "it denies itself even the ability to ask what is fundamental to our experience of architecture."<sup>204</sup> Proportion, or the ancient theory that the Renaissance revived and Le Corbusier modernized via the Modulor claims that architecture is a system based on mathematical relationships. Scruton deems it "useless" because it provides "no general aesthetic of construction" and because the rules of proportion are a posteriori and are derived

from some discovered criterion for its application (...) How then can any purely mathematical theory be used to predict a "harmony" that is in essence visual, dependent on the aspect of the building from many points of view in space?<sup>205</sup>

Despite finding all these well-known theories wanting, Scruton does not seem to wish to cast them completely aside. For him it is the experience of architecture and its description that need to take precedence over its abstract principles. These do not seem to be entirely wrong, are useful

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201 Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1980.

202 Ibid. p. 43.

203 Ibid. pp. 48, 44.

204 Ibid. p 55.

205 Ibid. pp. 63, 66, 65.

and have a role to play, but they are “premature.”<sup>206</sup> The experience of architecture is imaginative in character for it is imagination that prevails in this experience, Scruton claims.<sup>207</sup> Architectural experience is “inherently interpreted,” “becomes modified through argument” and acquires the status of a symbol.<sup>208</sup> I attempt to single out three decisive moments in the history of modernity, reading them backwards, from our present time to the beginning of twentieth century, with an intermediate stop in 1972 in which architectural experience is inherently interpreted, becomes modified by argument and acquires the status of a symbol, in order to add to Scruton’s list for the essence of architecture its communicative aspect, the aspect that emphasizes understanding and negotiation of human needs and desires.<sup>209</sup> I would like to argue that in what is termed as folded architecture since the 1990’s, in the seminal study manifesto of Denise Scott Brown, Robert Venturi and Steven Izenour *Learning from Las Vegas* (1972) as well as in Le Corbusier’s manifesto of modern principles *Toward an Architecture* (1923), architecture needs to be considered as a theory of communicative design, a term inspired by Jürgen Habermas’s *Theory of Communicative Action*.<sup>210</sup> This is clearly a view that Scruton comes close to, via the notions of interpretation, argument and symbol that he employs in the context of architectural experience, but he never examines architecture as theory of communicative design explicitly and as such, a task that I endeavor to undertake. Of course Habermas’s theory involves a great deal more than his communicative model of action that involves language, like his critique of instrumental reason<sup>211</sup> etc but at this stage, I simply wish to point to the centrality of communication and its vital role in defining architecture in three important moments in the course of twentieth century history of architecture.

### ***Communicating with Diversity. Folded Architecture***

The notion of folded architecture stems from the concept of the fold as this was developed in Gilles Deleuze’s volume *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, originally published in Paris in 1988.<sup>212</sup> The fold is meant as a cultural force that is arguably active in every era of cultural development but originates in the Baroque.<sup>213</sup> The fold represents constant movement, continuously refers to other folds and constantly generates other folds in an infinite work in progress.<sup>214</sup> The

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206Ibid. p. 70.

207Ibid. pp. 260, 261.

208Ibid.

209Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, vol. 1, transl. Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2004, p. 95.

210Ibid.

211Ibid.

212Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, transl. Tom Conley, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993. The original edition in French was published by Minuit. See Gilles Deleuze, *Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque*, Paris, Minuit, 1988.

213Deleuze, *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, op. cit., p. 18, 3.

214Ibid. pp. 12, 8, 10.



infinite variation of folding means constant fluidity and curvilinearity or an infinite series of curvatures and inflections<sup>215</sup> reflected in architectural design in three dimensional structures whose parts form mutual relationship in space and are generated by several materials like reinforced concrete or prefabricated parts.<sup>216</sup>

The conception of folded architecture questions the long-held value of *firmitas* originally professed by Vitruvius and reinstated by Alberti. *Firmitas* means “strength,” i. e. static perfection and stability, but also endurance in time and is inseparable from the other two Vitruvian values of *venustas*, “beauty” and *utilitas*, “utility.”<sup>217</sup> The prototype for *firmitas* is the Egyptian pyramid, aiming at safeguarding the rule and reign of the king at eternity (Fig. 1, Great Pyramid of Giza, 2580-2560 BC, 4<sup>th</sup> Dynasty).



Folded buildings like the Tel Aviv Museum of Art designed by Preston Scott-Cohen, 2007-2011 (Fig. 2) or the Klein Bottle House at Rye, Victoria, Australia, designed by Charles Ryan McBride in 2008 (Fig. 3) need constant and high maintenance in order to be preserved intact and,

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215Ibid. pp. 24, 3, 4.

216See Nenad Sekularac, Jelena Ivanovich Sekularac, Jasna Cikić Tovarović, “Folded Structures in Modern Architecture” in *Architecture and Civil Engineering*, vol. 10, no 1, 2012, pp. 1, 2.

217See Constantinos V. Proimos, “Architecture at the Age of its Digital Production: The Force, Differentiation and Humanity of the Fold as an Architectural Principle” in Constantin Boundas and Vana Tentokali, eds, *Architectural and Urban Reflections After Deleuze and Guattari*, London, Rowman and Littlefield International, 2018, pp. 153-162.

more importantly, are generated as an architectural response to the increased desire and need for flexibility in design.<sup>218</sup>



The desire and need for flexibility in design means the ability to correspond to changing circumstances which reflect the social perplexity of contemporary multicultural societies and is made possible by the increasingly digitalized means that dominate architectural design.

Luke Feast in his 2006 article “The Discrete and the Continuous in Architecture and Design” argues for an immanent ethics of sustainable design issuing from the fold. The flexible complexity

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218Ibid.

that folded architecture espouses is ecological because it is open and welcomes change in order to correspond to the increasing complexities of today's societies. The design ethics is immanent to the design process: the designer is a conceiver of morphogenetic scenarios devoted to strategic planning and social intervention. The designer is thus less of a producer of material forms and more someone with an ethos of care, privileging becoming rather than being and engaging with duration through the virtual rather than through the actual. Sustainability means the ability of architectural systems to maintain a dynamic stability which enables them to constantly adapt to changing circumstances and thus continue over long periods of time. Design products involve "individualization" and "personalization" as they are less conceived as finished forms and entities but rather as assemblages of elements which evolve in time through upgradability and repair, exactly like computer software, to meet people's changing needs and desires. The flexibility of folded architecture is a direct response to complexity, namely to the uncertainty to future situations and to the unforeseeable array of events, constantly emerging in contemporary societies by the actions of minorities and other social groups and entities.

It thus becomes clear that the principle of *firmitas*, strength, longevity or endurance is revised on account of a communicative strategy that the architect must assume in an effort to correspond to societal demands. The architect needs not only to be in contact with these demands but has to maintain a constant state of alertness so as to understand, negotiate and accommodate individual and group claims which are sometimes conflicting. Such individual and group claims are expressed subjectively but are also embedded and grounded in language and rational action as Jurgen Habermas has pointed out.<sup>219</sup> The expanding workings of the market and bureaucracy authorities threaten the specifically human communication structures and day to day social relationships with erosion and thus need to be countered by reasoned argument, consensus and cooperation, to reach a common understanding and a concomitant collective coordination of actions.<sup>220</sup> In today's complex societies the architect must develop a sensitivity to such reasoned argument, consensus and cooperation in order to readily correspond to individual and group claims that she/he may accommodate by flexible communicative design. Furthermore, architects need to train in sociology and the rest of human sciences in order to readily grasp emotional and behavioral difficulties and problems which again may be tended by flexible communicative design.

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219See Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, op. cit., p. XIV.

220Ibid. p. 86.

## *Sufficiently and Mutually Understanding the Commonplace*

*Learning from Las Vegas* is the title of the famous study conducted by Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour that led to the book bearing the same title, published in 1972 and containing the first questioning of modern architectural orthodoxy.<sup>221</sup>



Las Vegas is chosen precisely because it is the most commonplace urban environment. The stake of the authors is to research whether there is something to be learned from the commonplace. However to learn from the commonplace one first needs to sufficiently understand and mutually accept it by examining it non-judgmentally, for what it is. This non-judgmental view is already a departure from the purist, progressive, revolutionary and utopian modern architecture which is, in principle, dissatisfied with what exists<sup>222</sup> and therefore has an often utopian vision of changing it. Being more understanding and less authoritarian, allows an alternative perspective in architecture, one that enables communication with the inherent meaning of existing forms.<sup>223</sup>

Las Vegas may be viewed as a flamboyant urban system in which communication prevails

<sup>221</sup>Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas*, revised edition, Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1977.

<sup>222</sup>Ibid. p. 3.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid. p 7.

over space and the landscape, through signs (Fig. 4).<sup>224</sup> Modern architecture is relying on “structure, form and light at the service of space” but the Las Vegas strip is essentially a sign-dominated complex urban continuum.<sup>225</sup> Its experience reveals the symbol, rather than form, to dominate space<sup>226</sup> and become thereafter more important than form. This domination of symbol over space, form and finally architecture, serves the intensity of communication along the highway which is filled with automobiles.<sup>227</sup> Symbols and signs are changing all the time reflecting the dynamism of the strip. They use mixed media like words, pictures and sculpture in order to persuade, advertise and inform<sup>228</sup> on the level of three message systems: the heraldic, composed by the signs, the physiognomic, composed by the building faces and the locational, composed by the location near the most important buildings.<sup>229</sup> Symbols rhetorically occupy the front of the building and leave the back to more conventional arrangement. Architecture becomes iconographical, a decorated shed with a rhetorical front or a shelter with symbols on it.<sup>230</sup> Instead of heroic and original, wanting to change the world, reformist and progressive and expressive through the “skillful, accurate, and magnificent play of masses seen in light,” as the typical modern architecture, Las Vegas architecture becomes ugly and ordinary, explicitly serving commercial communication<sup>231</sup> and the interests of a silent-white-majority middle class.<sup>232</sup> The need to communicate with this middle class from the members of which most of the clients are, remains. For the most part, such communication of the architect with the middle class client is not heroic and cannot simply promote space and articulation to the detriment of symbolism and ornament.

For as the example of Las Vegas demonstrates, oppressed symbolism and ornament returns to haunt the modernist architectural consciousness. One way to account for this return is to explain Las Vegas as the paradise of unprohibited communication with the desires and needs of the middle class which for a long time was forced to fit in the corset of ascetic architectural modernism. These desires and needs in Las Vegas have gone wild and Venturi, Scott Brown and Izenour are right in pointing out that architects and philosophers need to peruse them in a collected and careful manner so that to get the lesson of miscommunication with the desires and needs of the people in which modern architecture has long been trapped, after its first heroic phase before the Second World War.

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224Ibid. p. 9.

225Ibid.

226Ibid. p. 13.

227Ibid. p. 18.

228Ibid. p. 52.

229Ibid. p. 73.

230Ibid. p. 90.

231Ibid. p. 103, 116.

232Ibid. p 155.

***Le Corbusier on How to Avoid Revolution***

Le Corbusier's insistence that his magnum opus *Towards an Architecture* (1923) be printed in the exact same order as it was delivered to the publisher, both in terms of content and images, is



well documented (Fig. 5).

It testifies to the righteousness of a man who left nothing to chance. It is also an indication of the importance he accorded to his first book that heralded the advent of a new architecture which,

according to him, is a pure creation of spirit.<sup>233</sup> An aspect that has not been accorded the attention it merits, is the way Le Corbusier opens his book with the dilemma “Architecture or Revolution.”<sup>234</sup> This aspect surfaces at the very beginning of the book and recurs also as its last chapter. Judging from its placement alone, at the beginning and at the end of his book, this dilemma “Architecture or Revolution” must have had a great importance for the author.

Le Corbusier introduces the subject of this dilemma, architecture or revolution, in the context of the industry and the engineering that steers architecture to new achievements and feats, the most notable of which is perhaps the increased standardization of production, applying both to details and to the whole of construction and leading to a revolution in the methodology and scope of construction businesses.<sup>235</sup> In his last chapter, entitled “Architecture or Revolution,” Le Corbusier is even more explicit: the steel and the cement have revolutionized architecture by imposing a stoppage in its slow gradual development, along the centuries and by erasing styles in favor of a new building system that emerged in twentieth century industrial societies.<sup>236</sup> Society is in turmoil and the several social classes demand a home worthy of their dignity and available to cater for the worker and the intellectual alike, especially during their free time. It is not solely therefore the sheer need for a dignified shelter but also the free time that needs to be accommodated in a morally appropriate way<sup>237</sup> as well as the basic family needs that have to be satisfied; people need to be warm, to have access to natural light, to clean air and live in their own place. Most of the societal demands have to do with the satisfaction of these basic essential needs and these demands can be accommodated through architecture. “We can avoid revolution” once we satisfy the societal demands but in order to satisfy them we need to understand, accept and realize them and the only way to realize them is to keep open the communicative contact with the working classes and the intellectuals.<sup>238</sup> Architecture is therefore not solely the prerogative of the wealthy classes but a right extended to the working classes too and this right to architecture may help society adopt social change in a smooth, progressive and communicative way and not in the abrupt, violent manner that social revolutions imposed until now.

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233Le Corbusier, *Vers une architecture*, Paris, Flammarion, 1995.

234According to Simone Brott the original title of Le Corbusier’s book was to be *Architecture and Revolution* and the title changed the very last minute before the publication. Brott presents Le Corbusier’s utopian project of social redemption as a despotic theory of revolution issuing from German philosophy and specifically from Hegel and Nietzsche as well as from the architect’s admiration of the Italian fascist revolution. She concludes that fascism was not the enemy of modernism in architecture but its principal technique. See Simone Brott, “Architecture et revolution. Le Corbusier and the fascist revolution” *Thresholds*, 41, Spring 2013, pp. 146-157, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/thld>, accessed 13/4/2021. Contrary to Brott, in his text “Architecture or Revolution?” Neil Leach proclaims architecture as an indirect democratic force of social reform. See <https://neilleach.files.wordpress.com/2009>, accessed 13/3/2021.

235Le Corbusier, *Vers une architecture*, op. cit. p. XXI.

236Ibid. p 228.

237Ibid p. 233.

238Ibid. p. 243.

Le Corbusier's conviction is that we can avoid revolution via communicative action on the one hand and communicative design on the other. Le Corbusier lent an ear to the perturbation of his times, to the horrible perspective that the industrial society may destroy the family and to the need of workers and intellectuals alike to have a standard of living that matches the technological prowess and achievements of industry. The success of his designs are due to this communicative correspondence from his part to the needs and desires of the lower working classes of his time.

### *In Place of a Conclusion*

The reason why I singled out three moments in the history of twentieth century architecture was to reveal the importance accorded in each of these to communication of the architects with the society that envelops them. As the discipline of architecture changes once again due to the digital revolution that the western world undergoes, it is important to remember what is essential in it. We cannot, as Scruton claims, extract this essence by "drastic strokes of elimination" of all false theories on it, for "then it is hard to see what will remain at the end."<sup>239</sup> Scruton's criticism of functionalism, *Kunstgeschichte*, architecture as space, the proportion theory does not aim, in my view, to eliminate all these theories as merely false but to preserve them as doctrines that are weaker than what they initially were purported to be. It seems that all the theories he criticizes are inevitably part of the essence of architecture. Furthermore, architecture needs to be considered as a theory and a practice of communicative design, especially in its modern denomination, if architects wish to maintain close ties with the society for which they work and with which they interact. This was the necessity that the present paper wished to proclaim.

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<sup>239</sup>Scruton, op. cit. p. 45.



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#### 14. Carlo *DEREGIBUS*

### **Designing toward the future. The project as a tactical tool.**

#### **The problem with design**

While the philosophical implications of architecture have often been inquired, and from different points of view – with the aesthetical one being the most diffuse – the philosophical turn in design studies is relatively recent (Deregibus, 2018). One could be bewildered by the fact that, while the artistic side of architecture has raised so much interest, architectural design has been treated mainly by specialists, just as it was a procedure, a facility or a technical application, more than the *constitutive* part of architecture.

This misconception reflects a traditional corporative vision, with a pupil learning from a mentor, gradually mastering tools and finding his own way after a decade of apprentice (Greene, 2012). Just as a painter learns to paint or a sculptor learns to sculpt, an architect learns to “designs”, one could say. But the difference clearly emerges in the lack of correspondence between the name and the verb: quite all artists’ names have a clear connection with what they actually do (e.g., painting>painter, sculpting>sculptor, dancing>dancer, playing the piano>piano player or pianist, composing music>composer, photographing>photographer, directing>director), but this rule does not work for architects – having “designer” a different and broader meaning. Such correspondence often has a strong relationship with specific tools (a painter uses brushes, colours and canvas, for example): but the rule doesn’t apply to architects. Even if tools have a dramatic relevance, as often underlined (Ford *et al.*, 2017), architectural design cannot be described as an application, nor does architecture depend on its technical base. On the one hand, because the technique is quite unclear in architecture: should it refer to technological and structural knowledge or form and shape, to the ecological footprint of his building or its urban impact, Or to all these things, and even other ones? On the other hand, many renowned architectures show critical technical fallacies, so it is challenging to see technical value as essential for architecture (Deregibus, 2020a). Architecture could even exist regardless of the technique, as shown by the utopic architecture - from the cases of Jacques-François Blondel, Etienne-Louis Boullée and Claude-Nicolas Ledoux to Archigram, Cedric Price and Kiyonori Kikutake (*ibidem*). And even if, most usually, architectures require to be built and that constructive side is crucial – think about Santa Maria del Fiore in Firenze, the Sydney

Opera House, the Pompidou Center or the Meiso No Mori (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2020) – this practical side does not seem to raise much attention. It is considered a matter of competence at most. This conception confirms a romantic view of architecture, where the artist imagines the final building from the very beginning, and the main problem is to follow his indications (as obscure as they may be, as masters are notoriously cryptic). Technical matters would then be nothing more than the *management* of the translation of concepts into forms.

Strictly connected to this vision is the tendency of seeing the conceptual phase as the product of a single, inspired mind, clearly positioned in time and space. We are so used to thinking that architecture is conceived by an individual or a single entity (whether it is Michelangelo or MVRDV) that we frankly ignore all the other involved actors, even if they quite entirely take on the project. We continue to look at the artist as the master though in most architectural firms, nowadays, even the conceptual phase is shared – that’s the essence of the brainstorming stage. Authorship seems to imply an individuality of some kind. And this author seems to live outside the world, fully displaying his own artistic concept with no constrictions or limits imposed. Narrations look at the result as it was the pure effect of the artist’s will even when the projects are strongly influenced (in other words: always) by the clients (Clemente, 2000) or by others (for example, the changed economic conditions, as happened to many skyscrapers in the mid-east). The same happens when an architect inspires the preliminary design of a project that is then developed by others (for example, the Pompidou Center was conceived by Renzo Piano, Richard Rogers and Gianfranco Franchini, but was then entirely developed by ARUP). Or when the architect designs a part of a complex but is considered the primary author of the whole intervention (for example, Torino Esposizioni is known as work by Pier Luigi Nervi even if the concept and the general plan are by Ettore Sottsass and Roberto Biscaretti di Ruffia). Reflecting on authorship shows that many people could claim a kind of partial authorship. For example, the client commissioning the work, the planner setting the urbanistic rules that allowed (or not) some shape, the building company proposing some variations (Deregibus, 2020b) are actual “authors”, as they genuinely influenced the final result - perhaps even dramatically.

Furthermore, a specific problem of architectural design is time. Even a work of non-architectural art could last ages or even centuries: to name an extreme example, the piece “Organ<sup>2</sup>/ASLSP” by John Cage was designed to be played “As SLOW as Possible”, and also if a nine-hour recording could sound long enough, a performance started in 2001 in Halberstadt was designed to last for a whopping 639 years. But buildings’ construction typically lasts for years, often decades and seldom centuries: in general, the timescale of architecture tends to be very long (Deregibus, 2020a). Think to the polemics about the Sagrada Familia (for instance, Bohigas i Guardiola, 1972): could we continue to say, after its more-than-150-years construction, that its author is Antoni Gaudí?

Moreover, even if the author remained the same, a so long timing changes the relationship between the concept (the designed architecture) and the final building (the actual one): the world will have changed meanwhile. For example, an economic crisis could stop the construction or impose massive changes, as happened for the Jeddah Tower and similar projects (see Deregibus, 2020b). In such cases, we should even say that those changing elements gained a kind of authorship on the final building.

Lastly, it's worth noticing that even if the term design concerns all fields, and that's why so much has been said about it, the architectural design seems to be inextricably related to a stylistic question (see Margolin, 2015; Buthayna, 2018). The attention tends to shift toward the *results* of the design activity more than the design activity itself (e.g., Modern design produces Modern architecture; the experimental design by Gregg Lynn produces Blob architectures). This is a peculiar way of looking at the conceptual side of design, as if the relation between aesthetic and sense, and between inspiration and result, was crystal-clear (Buchanan & Margolin, 1995).

These reasonings lead us to say that the ontological nature of architectural design concerns not only its result and its authorship but also the way the design deploys and the project can actually influence the process, *all along* with its own definition. Obviously, such an idea relies on, or rather, deal with the radical heteronomy of architecture – architects usually don't pay, nor authorise, nor build their building, nor do they calculate the structures or the systems (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2020): thus, anyone believing that architecture can be described and qualified on a pure compositive and stylistic way may find our proposal incomprehensible, if not totally senseless. Conversely, from the ontological relation between the act of designing, the product of this act – which is a project and, eventually, a building – and architecture, a tactical and strategic potential emerges: and design becomes the exploiting of this potential.

## **A matter of future**

Essentially, design is about imagining something in the future: something new or different than usual. Typically, in our life, we act by devising routines (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2020), exploiting our analogical skills (Melandri, 1968) for dealing with events. For example, tomorrow morning, you will probably wake up, wash you and have breakfast just like any other day. But when something changes our patterns, or when we need or want something new, we also plan the way to get it. Indeed, it's easy to see that in the purpose itself – e.g. the will to try a new restaurant for dinner – there is a part of design – we have to choose the place, evaluate if it fits our schedule, if we have money enough, how going there and so on. Some of these problems can be easily managed, while others require accurate planning: then, most obviously, unexpected events may change or

invalidate our plan. Because, indeed, the main problem of the future is that, well, *we do not know it*. We cannot decide it, nor can we invent it: and that's precisely why we continuously plan it.

Therefore, *design* is about making predictions based on the knowledge of the purpose of the system (Dennett, 1987) – indeed, what Dennett calls design refers to a fusion of form and functions, while titles what we mean *intentional stance*. So, anytime we desire or need something, design is about making rational hypotheses for changing this intention into reality.

From this point of view, designing is not (just) about concepts: it is a practical need, for any action requires some management of its development. But this management does not come *after* the conceptual phases: indeed, it innervates it, and the problems we hinted at immediately become evident. It has been said that, as the project is made by documents and communicated using documents, design activity is all about producing documents (Armando & Durbiano, 2017) that are relevant due to their being a trace of the process' evolution (Ferraris, 2009). For example, the agreement between the client and the contractor is made possible by documents describing the result – something that stays on the “practical need” side of design: these documents may be sketches, technical drawings, writings, images, simulations, tables or similar. I disagree with this interpretation. The documents will change during the process: their value depends (for the most) on the relative power of the actors of the process itself (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2019). They do not fix any point, nor do they prove anything. Instead, they are a punctual representation of a *work-in-progress* state whose evolution could either follow an evolutionary line, or not. In other words, more than about producing documents, design is about controlling what makes the documents effective and meaningful.

Then, even if we could look at the project's development as an almost continuous progress, the process is usually divided into a sequence of phases. There are various design levels, from preliminary concepts to construction drawings, even in small projects like house renovations. Obviously, the articulation of these levels and their afferece to different systems (normative, social, economic and so on) is much more complex when actors and stakeholders increase. Still, the concept itself doesn't change too much: in the first phase, when the design is preliminary, some very tedious initial verifications join with the creative moment of the process. By one or more proposals, the architect develops the so-called *concept* of the project, that is, the general vision of what the result will be. Or rather, what it should be. Using the terminology of system theory, we could say that this concept implies a first act of distinction (Luhmann, 2002) between the project and all the other, endless, unexpressed and even unexplored alternatives. In other words, any act of design is both a decision and a threshold. For example, by proposing a tall building in a preliminary phase, without even designing any further detail, the architect (or is it the client?) already excludes a vast series of alternatives: a smaller facility, a horizontal development, a hypogeous solution and

many other solutions. This distinction becomes very clear if we consider that, habitually, there is even a pre-preliminary phase. Indeed, feasibility studies orient the design among the endless alternatives, whose exclusion relies either on the intentional stance or the ability to make rational analogies with other cases. Hence, by making this distinction, the architect defines a *desired state in the future*, defining its *expected* qualities and, by contrast, the *unacceptable* one. The terms are here quite relevant: indeed, as we cannot predict the future, the project is more a hope than a promise. A whole series of accidents could change the project's conditions so that the *unacceptable* qualities could become *unexpected but required*, so *accepted*, affecting the entire project and even causing its complete revision (Deregibus, 2020b).

Maybe one could be tempted to think that accidents and unexpected events are pretty rare: perhaps even that they be avoided with reliable risk management. But this wishful thinking must be halted forthwith. In any project, there are many unexpected events: it's an ontological condition, and for architecture, compared to other arts, the unexpected plays a much more prominent role. Yet, not all things are unexpected! We (almost) know how a beam works, so we're reasonably able to predict its behaviour in quite all conditions, and the same happens with system engineering. Most important, we are pretty capable of predicting the actual appearance of the building. Generally speaking, we could say that it's possible to predict those things with a solid scientific and technical nature, like structural calculations or renderings. However, even in those cases, something can go wrong, like in the case of London *Millennium Bridge*, where the crowd's effect was spectacularly underestimated, or the tragic fire of the *Grenfell Tower*.

More specifically, a design could (possibly) work within its system – the system constituted by its initial conditions and distinctions: therefore, accidents coming from inside the system can be somehow predicted or, at any rate, supposed. But when unexpected come from the *outside* of the system, that is, from other systems – which are indeed the environment of the project's system – consequences cannot be even imagined (Deregibus, 2021a). Examples of these external systems are rules and norms, budget, stakeholders' rights, political changes, to name a few. For example, in Italy, in 2018, there was a normative change concerning how to calculate structures for resisting earthquakes: the new norm came after a series of disasters, so it could appear to be a *good* accident. But the problem is that the new safety level was so difficult to achieve that, in many cases, respecting it became too expensive or complicated. For example, a massive project for renovating *Torino Esposizioni*, a 60.000mq structure built between 1940 and 1960, stopped because the new requirements would have doubled the renovation cost. So, an accident coming from an external system influenced the design so much that it failed.

## The dark side of the models

As we saw, we can reasonably say many things about the future, but it's impossible to predict it: thus, the project is ontologically lacking. But the problem with design is precisely that, traditionally, *the project aspires to be a prescriptive model of the future*: the project's concept acts like a relatively undefined but ideal architecture, so the project becomes a model (in scientific terms) of that ideal. Town plans are probably the best example of this prescriptive model: they last and work for a long time, during which the conditions that led to the original design (and initial strategic decisions) cannot but change: thus, they will provoke variations to that original design which, like a waterfall, will lead to even further changings. Then, if the aim was to describe and norm the future – that is, precisely the supposed aim of town plans – then the design would be ontologically wrong, as it would impose fixed points which couldn't fit the unexpected evolution of the present. In other words, it would model *an ideal future-of-the-present*: a deeply desired, but impossible, state. Such design would oppose (or better: would like to oppose) the project to the events: any variation could only be a problem, a deviation from the ideal project (Jullien, 2004), and would clash with the prescriptive project. Clearly, it is possible to anticipate acceptable variations or define how to manage changes in the project: but just as clearly, changes could be way greater, thus constituting a forced deviation from the ideal path. In all the traditional projects, the sequence of phases strives to be an incremental and gradual approach *toward that ideal project* (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2021): or rather, the architect hopes that they will be as such.

But, as we saw, as unexpected as possible, from an ontological point of view, design is traditionally more steered at defining prescriptive models of the future than refining architectural features (i.e. the shape). This means that, in the case of unexpected events, the first qualities to fall will be precisely the aesthetic ones, as they quite exclusively rely on the designer's artistic status rather than objective arguments, are the first to fall (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2019). In other words: we mainly characterise architecture on its aesthetic quality, but these qualities are the weakest ones, as they don't have a scientific, normative background. If a structural or a safety norm changes, the shape will most commonly change as well, maybe in a dramatic way. Only rarely do aesthetic features outlive significant changes, winning the “opposition to the events” – as it happened for the Sidney Opera House. Quite never – just for important historical monuments or very symbolic buildings – there will be a derogation to the rule for preserving the architectural features.

This *weakness of the form* directly comes from the combination of the traditional idea of design and

the sequence of phases we hinted at: in fact, the sequence of acts of distinctions of the project gradually (inconstantly) defines a system whose complexity we systematically simplify in a model. With the result that the project *becomes* that model. Think to a usual design process, analysing it using system's theory as defined by Luhmann (2002). From the very first line, the architect starts making distinctions (for example, the line could represent a wall, or a street, in some scale and with a certain degree of approximation); the second sign (the second distinction) both rely on and tests the validity of the first one, and so on. Each distinction limits in some way the endless possibilities of the open world, narrowing them and inferring some acceptable or unacceptable character of the project (for example, that the wall can stay here, more or less, but not too distant from here). These distinctions gradually define a system, that is, an interrelated series of constraints that fix the project's features. Sometimes, a new distinction will be incompatible with the new one, and the whole system will have to be adapted, recanting some of the assumptions and rebuilding the system again. At the end of the process, the system will be entirely consistent with the actual building (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2021). But this kind of design process (the traditional one) has a dark side. Any time we make a distinction, we take for granted the previous ones and tend to consider more a constraint than an opening; more a definition than a field of validity; more a prescription than a potentiality. In other words, we tend to consider the position of that wall as shown by the sign, even if we already know that we can safely change it: *we stop thinking of the sign as a phenomenon and transform it into a fetish* (Husserl, 1970). That's when we start building a model instead of designing.

The problem is that models are ontologically fragile: they (possibly) work just *within* the system. Or rather, the model defines a new system by *excluding* all *unexpressed* potentialities of the acts of distinction. Indeed, we can see that a distinction indicates all possible futures-of-the-present (Luhmann, 1996), i.e., all possible evolution of the present situation that fit a field of validity implicit in the sign itself. Conversely, in a sneaky way, the model imposes a present-of-the-future, i.e., a specific evolution of the present whose reliability can be hoped at best (Deregibus, 2021a). Consequently, it conceals all other potentialities of the situation. As long as we consider the system itself, the trick could work: maybe the design will be less than successful, but we will not even be sure about that – in fact, we wouldn't see any alternative. But, as we said, problems typically come from irritation *between* systems, i.e. from outside the specific system of architectural design (or, to be more precise, the specific system defined by the design distinction as taken on before the unexpected problem). And due to the extreme heteronomy of architecture and the number of possible irritations, then we can say that the distinctions of the project, by defining a model, *at the same time* originated the conditions for the failure of the project itself, for example, when a stronger actant (Greimas, 1987) bursts into the process, or a norm changes. Because these unexpected events



will be ontologically out of the model, both during the design process (Deregibus, 2021a) and after the building: affecting the way the building will be unexpectedly lived (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2021). This means that the project does not truly model the future, since it obviously cannot predict it: but rather, the *expectations toward a desired future*: consequently, it is ontologically *false*. Hence, models result from an illusion of control, and the traditional nature of design – that is, to build models – is also the leading cause of its failure.

### **From *ideal* to *ideals***

It could now seem that this “modelling stance” of design should be contrasted in any way: furthermore, it could seem that, as predictions are impossible, design was senseless or, at least, irrelevant. Obviously, this is not true. Just as relativity theory didn't necessarily impact all the fields of traditional physics – as its effects were valid at the infinitesimal scale – the traditional way of design still works quite well. That's why, every day, buildings spring up, cities develop, and bridges or towers do not collapse. No model can avoid the unexpected, but we can be quite sure about a beam's resistance (thanks to safety factors and continuous experiments). But speaking about architecture and architectural design, as architects' role lost much power from the postmodernity onward (Deregibus, 2018), modelling design is a problem more than a resource. In fact, modelling reflects a problem-solving attitude, as beam design clearly shows. But in the case of architectural design, in competitions and private works, “questions” (e.g. which shape a building should have) are always vague and ambiguous. The low quality of too many buildings (i.e., the vagueness of their design) is a consequence of considering architecture like decoration of a solution. If the problem is uncertain, the solution will equally be weak and prone to many changes: subsequently, architects will be less and less considered (Deregibus, 2021b) precisely due to their inability to face problems by giving realistic, credible answers, and this professional deficiency makes their aesthetic proposal even weaker.

Therefore, either we accept this inefficacy, reducing the project to a mere base for its own variations (as they say: “plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”): or we change the usual way of intending design. And the first pass toward a new way of intending design is to avoid *the ideal of ideal*.

We said that the so-called conceptual phase likely tends to crystallise an ideal building. Simultaneously, the sequence gradually should increase the project's precision, pushing the event toward that precise design. It's worth noticing that even that primitive, original, ideal project comes from a blurred request, a continuous shifting between various hypotheses on the future. Is it better to build a new library or a theatre? Is it preferable to make it on the seaside, or to respect some

distance? Is it desirable to spend less or have a better building? Theoretically, architectural contests and competition seem to attest that it is possible to answer such questions way before the design's conceptual phase: accordingly, architecture should likely shape these answers more than the questions. Nevertheless, most times, even in competitions, there are many changes between the victory and the actual completion of the building (an extreme example is the *Piedmont Region Headquarters*, in Torino, which moved 5 kilometres away from the competition site). Most obviously, in all cases, such as the renovation of buildings or cities, or new complex or public buildings, or even smaller, private interventions, such variations are unavoidable and even predictable. The whole process then assumes a radical contingent nature (Deregibus, 2020b), in the sense that in every moment, everything can change so that the *whole* process could deviate – or rather, the entire system of the process is irritated. Rules can change, people and stakeholders – even unknown ones – can intervene, and accidents can reduce the budget or increase timings: all the project's supposed invariants can move (Deregibus & Giustiniano, 2019). In such a situation, architects' possibility to have a role depends on their ability to be significant, that is, to find the right questions more than the correct answers: but the modelling attitude only allows a rough definition of questions, being so concerned with answers.

Therefore, the usual way to face this indeterminacy is risk management, usually seen as project management's essence (Frohnhofer, 2019). We cannot here discuss the whole theory: nevertheless, we will hint at the critique by Luhmann (1996), who stresses the risk/hazard distinction – where risk is dependent on someone's choice, while hazard is not. Risk management tries to assess risk sources, or rather, the possible known risk sources: this means that while the identifiable dangers are those that someone's decisions already changed into risk, other potential risk sources remain unnoticed. Indeed, the way hazard transforms into risk is vastly underestimated. Most management tends to hide the (ontological) possibility of failure by masking unwanted events using percentages – that is, with an apparent control over those events, something that immediately should recall the so-called Murphy's law (Bloch, 1977). The effect is that we manage the so-called *known knowns* – which is obvious: but such an approach cannot truly help against the unexpected – the *unknown unknowns* (Okashah & Goldwater, 1994). Again: risk management is not senseless and can be very useful – just as models. Only, it cannot overcome the idea of controlling the future and the approach toward an ideal project.

Another possibility is the participatory way of design, as the design thinking method exemplifies. As other methods, design thinking was born as an effective way of managing and innovating companies, industries, and processes (Martin, 2009; Brown, 2009). Then, architects borrowed this method, applying it in architectural design: but differences are obvious – the first is that doing a project is so complex that users' choices are always inducted (Hill, 2012). Therefore, such a

method's efficacy in architectural design can be high, at least in small contexts, but it cannot face complex processes or unexpected situations (Deregibus, 2021b). Moreover, the results will go toward a safe mediocrity, as compromise relies on reciprocal clearing – or, in other words, on a shared and diffused level of dissatisfaction. Therefore, architects would inevitably evolve from legislators to interpreters (Bauman, 1987), as the results will always be within the premises: within actants' prejudices and fetishes.

However, there exists another possibility: to skip the whole idea of ideal, going beyond the modelling approach by looking at design as a continuous management of the *radical contingency* (Deregibus, 2020b) of the process for exploiting the potential of the situation. “Radical contingency” means that everything can be different, since no element of the projects is fixed or indisputable: or rather, that considering some factors as fixed is always a choice and not a matter of fact. Such an approach does not look at the phases as they were a gradual approach to the result precisely because everything can revolutionise the project *at any time*. So better would be to develop a design approach flexible enough to question any project element, with the only precept of avoiding their *facticity* (Meillassoux, 2008). Like the Husserlian fetish, facticity is the tendency to give for granted the appearance of a phenomenon. An example could be the tendency (and temptation) of applying norms most slavishly, neglecting the fact that the norm is a distinction itself: so, there are endless things that do not break the rule, without at the same time reflecting its facticity (see Derrida, 2003). Another example could be the infatuation of architects for their first design, as it was the only possible one, even if many alternative designs could work: as any competition shows, many different projects answer the very same question with various shapes. Being strongly concerned with modelling, facticity fosters the opposition between the project and the events, forcing them to become consistent (Deregibus, 2020b). Even more, rarely this consistency can be compelled – even Frank Lloyd Wright had to give up the golden finishing of the Kaufmann house despite his immense influence: budget control won against aesthetics. Thus, a more effective architectural design requires *renouncing the ideal*, accepting and even exploiting the fact that *there are many ideals*, depending on the moment and the changes. As the ideal always has a referent (with reference to something or someone), and the reference is contingent, then the ideal must also be contingent. Therefore, design must change from the construction of prescriptive models to a flexible, continuous act of shaping – we could say, “from walking to sailing” (Shrivastava & Persson, 2014).

## Shaping the future

For passing from *ideal* to *ideals*, a *continuously variable ideal*, the design must develop coherently with the so-called potential of the contingency, instead of modelling the contingency and its future. Among all the plausible evolution of the contingency that can be foreseen or hypothesised (the futures-of-the-present), the “potential” is the development that seems *the most favourable one*, as the contingency shows a *propensity* toward it (Jullien, 2004). In other words, the potential is the best *future-of-the-present* merely because it has the highest possibility to become the *present-of-the-future* (the actual evolution of the present as it will be). At any moment, in a process, it is possible to “sense” this propensity – is the client more or less disposed to expend? Is there any social tension toward or against some buildings? Is there an inclination for implementing technological innovations? Anything can influence this propensity, and that’s why it continuously varies: consequently, it cannot be forced nor modelled (Deregibus, 2020b). At the same time, design, other than following the stream, chasing the changes and trying to limit them, can influence them by using the project itself: or rather, precisely by evolving the project all through the process. In other words, *it is possible for design to continuously set inceptions of potential in the process*. Obviously, this capability comes at the price of renouncing the idea of an ideal starting concept to reach. Quite the opposite, it requires to move the ideal, even dramatically changing it when needed – that is, when the propensity of the situation goes against the previous ideal concept. Hence, instead of defining an initial model for an ideal architecture, the project happens together with the process, adapting itself to the ever-changing contingency while, at the same time, influencing it. Therefore, the project develops its strategic value by turning its weakness – its ontological indeterminacy – into its most effective resource (Deregibus, 2021b).

In the last four years, this approach has been studied and practised by the *Masterplan*, a research group of the Politecnico di Torino whose name intentionally refers to what usually is a document (a “masterplan”) and changes it into a design process (De Rossi & Deregibus, 2020). At least three things of tactical design must be highlighted.

The first is the importance of time and timings. As the propensity may change at any moment, the project too must pass from the strict sequence of incremental phases to a continuous shaping, continually discussing previous steps along with the changes. The attitude should be *formative* (Pareyson, 1954), in the sense that the design should define its rules all along the process, revealing its validity at its end. Admittedly, the phases continue to exist from the practical

and normative perspectives. Still, the design attitude must overcome their division for anticipating possible accidents, or rather, as predicting is impossible, for making the project *flexible enough* to overcome accidents. Consequently, a swift, ideally continuous re-design is essential.

The second is the political value of such an attitude. In simpler processes, *spatialising* – or changing the requirements into spatial, architectural features – is essential not only for proposing solutions but also for understanding the client's deepest desire. And even if architects are not usually conscious of the tactical power of the project, they actually exploit it quite habitually. In more complex cases, spatialising the various stakeholders' positions can highlight their most genuine intentions and interests, as all actions affect space and spaces. In these situations, architects tend to use the project more to propose an image of the final building. Instead, they could exploit the tactical dimension of the project for influencing and even orienting the process. For example, for introducing the topic of quality of public space from the very beginning, they could suggest imaginaries or highlight less evident elements. Even better, they could use architectural solutions that can improve the quality of public space for spatialising *other* requirements: thus using the polyvalence of the space for incepting a character (e.g. the quality) into the project while “following the stream”.

The third is the peculiar relation between design and form. As we have seen, traditional design is mainly concerned with the style of architecture: thus, the obsession with the shape. But accepting the contingent nature of the project clarifies that the result can be, at most, *conjectured*, not *decided*. This assumption could lead to a pretty frustrating consequence: the renounce of the importance of the form. It could seem, in other words, that any form fitting the process would be good enough (Carpo, 2017). Why spending energies and money for producing an architecturally relevant shape if the process could dramatically influence it? Better could seem to plan buildings as a result of the external suggestions, whatever could it result. This approach is much more widespread than it could appear: indeed, quite all the buildings' production works this way. But this cynical vision comes from the misunderstanding and underestimation of the tactical potential of the project. The form has its own meaning: on the one hand, it is the physical convergences of the different needs; but on the other, it goes beyond these instances, gaining an autonomy given by the fact that, *after* the process, its life will continue, alone (Moneo, 1989): the form itself, thus, becomes a need. Hence, exploiting the tactical and strategic dimensions of design does not exclude architecture's creative, formal dimension. Instead, it frees it from being self-referential (and therefore weak), as orienting the whole process allows the architect to shape the form *while* shaping its conditions of possibility. The shape continues to be the last referent of design: but in a tactical approach, instead of a single, ideal form, there will be several ideal ones. Instead of an abstract, pre-imposed aesthetic ideal, the ideal must rise all along the process: otherwise, the result will be a building, but not architecture.

## Shaping utopias

History shows that the utopian concept weakened in the last century, shifting toward the nostalgic recollection of a past as legendary as false. At the same time, the negative view of the future, the dystopia, pervaded imaginaries (Bauman, 2017). This change follows the evolution of post-modernism, the gradual mistrust of the future, the so-called end of ideology (Bell, 1960) and the raising individualism that hamper a shared view of the world: to the point that, from being the shape of an ideal future, utopia became a way for violence (Popper, 1986). Again, the problem is the concept of *ideal*: utopia, or the expectations of a better future, has too often been the way for justifying even violent and extreme actions. All the ideologies of the last century relied on the premise of a better world, an ideal one indeed: and the same could be said for religious extremisms. Thus, the relation between utopia and traditional design is much stronger than it could appear, as *both aspire to define an ideal future*: we could even say that the conventional project continues to pursue utopias, as anachronistic and ineffective as it could be. However, the fall of utopias corresponds with the rising of dreams of a different kind: small-scale, minimalist utopias, whose horizon is not the ideal world but the individual's scale (Zoja, 2013). Such mini-utopias cannot but spread in our society, even if they rely on a (quite overoptimistic) irenic ethical ideal. In fact, the basic idea is that endless small actions can change the world step by step, no matter what they are aimed at: the individual utopias should ideally join somewhere, in an ideal world impossible to pre-determine, but that must be gradually discovered. Obviously, some trends can orient single thoughts, like the ecological utopia described by Callenbach (1975). Still, the difference is that this new version of utopias could likely avoid the totalitarian pretension of classical utopias reported by Popper. Now, it seems that these minimalistic actions could automatically produce a better future – that's the "protopia" concept (Kelly, 2016), indeed a quite problematic vision, not by chance coming from the wealthiest part of the world. Interestingly, just as the traditional utopias corresponded with the traditional design, these new minimalistic utopias match the tactical design. Only the ability to shape the future with a multi-idealistic approach is consistent with the mini-utopias, since it does not aim for a mere agreement between the stakeholders, but mutual reinforcement of the requirements.

Space constitutes the sole joining between the actors. Thus, a tactical design, instead of picturing an ontologically false future – the traditional utopias – can exploit the ever-changing potential of the situation for *designing toward that future*, shaping utopias all along any process.

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15. David *ÁLVAREZ*

## **Civilizing sheds: Autopoiesis and the cosmopolitical assemblage of the city**

### **INTRODUCTION**

A political philosophy of the city may sound like a redundant concept, after all, “political” comes from *polis*. But modern politics is filtered by the political imaginary of the sovereign territorial national state while by “polis” we tend to translate “city-state,” as it conveys local density and self-government. Our cities, however, fall in the middle between the formal sovereign self-government of the state on the one hand, and the local conditions of dense interaction and public participation on the other. Modern “citizenship” is therefore a remnant that no longer refers to a city but to state-nationality. In fact, by belonging in a city we are all just “residents,” which is both an administrative status and a temporary condition.

Even in a so called “urban age” of demographic urbanization and cosmopolitan metropoleis the specific conditions of coexistence, coordination, and cooperation in the city are being filtered through the lens of the sovereign community. The statist frame still makes a lot of sense considering that it is our most clear institutional reference for the foundational Platonic quest for the just society. We have in the Platonic Republic a clear structure that can translate principles into a social order. Our cities, on the other hand, have limited self-government and are subordinated to state authorities even if their infrastructural networks and connections exceed the limits of the territorial state (Brenner, 2019). According to Saskia Sassen (2006), they are best conceived as “complex and incomplete systems,” while for Niklas Luhmann (1997), the scope of the system is actually global and although we cannot talk about of a world-state we can nevertheless conceive our urban system as global in reach.

According to Sassen’s diagnostic, our networked global cities are the product of a process of denationalization driven by the states themselves, which create the coordinating agencies that configure a localized cosmopolitan order within the state’s territory. Transnational corporations and other global institutions take advantage of these conditions and press to extract further concessions from local authorities that in turn compete for the attraction and accommodation of these global players. Even if a more flexible division of labor calls for the decentralization of the classic command and control headquarters, global actors still depend on a localized infrastructural nest of supporting services (legal, consulting, accounting, auditing, translation, logistics, etc.) that can only

thrive in the critical mass of global cities. These shifting local conditions of hyperdensity and hyperdiversity create specific challenges for our conceptions of real freedom, equality, recognition, justice, membership, and solidarity that do not always fit in the inherited political imaginary of the nation-state. For instance, there are spatial, material and infrastructural conditions that are specific to city-life as a “form of life” (Jaeggi, 2018, 66-75).

The urban dimension of the built environment is here crucial. In particular, from a perspective of political philosophy, if buildings in the city have an impact on the civic-political life then they have to be considered “civilizing sheds”. That is, if they have some degree of agency -be they Latourian “actants,” or material realizations of Foucaultian disciplinary institutions, or assembled parts of a Deleuzian society of control; then they must be “civilized.” That is, put in minimal and negative terms, they cannot undermine the social and infrastructural fabric on which they depend. It is therefore important to explore the connections of the political philosophy of the city and architectural theory and urbanism.

In this text, I will focus on one particular conception of architecture, the Autopoiesis of Architecture and the particular proposal of Parametric Urbanism, both elaborated by Patrik Schumacher and exemplified in many of the projects by Zaha Hadid Architects (ZHA).<sup>240</sup> In particular, there are two points that are problematically interesting. First, the autopoietic conception defends the autonomy of the architectural discourse from its political dimension based on a system-theoretic account that defines architecture as a closed and self-referential system of communications regulated by its intrinsic code of Form and Function. Second, this autopoietic conception identifies one particular design trend (“Parametricism”) as the hegemonic and epochal style that subsumes and neutralizes its main rival theoretical currents and practices, in particular, Deconstructivism and Assemblage Theory.<sup>241</sup> I will argue that buildings that count as “civilizing sheds” enter in a relation with the city in which they nurture the infrastructure that sustains them by allowing critical

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240 While the system-theoretic conception of the autopoiesis in architecture is an original and colossal contribution by Patrik Schumacher in his two great volumes (2011 and 2012), the branding and elaboration of Parametricism as a research program (style) agglutinates work by different theorists and practitioners with a similar approach to technology applied to design. Schumacher reads commonalities that he captures in his multiple publications, manifestos, and teaching activity but not all practitioners feel represented in this particular vision or in the politics it favors. See for instance the debates in Leach (2009a), Poole & Shvartzberg (2015) or Schumacher (2016a). Not even Zaha Hadid herself felt fully identified with this conceptual portrait. Interesting as they are, the family discussions within Parametricism are critical but too parochial, therefore, by Parametricism I will refer to Schumacher’s program -unless stated otherwise, as is presented in his more consolidated texts.

As a gifted polemicist, Schumacher also entered into other theoretical debates, for instance with Graham Harman and the Architecture of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), claiming that this philosophical and practical current could be also assimilated as a sub-branch of Parametricism (Schumacher 2018). Harman emphatically objects (Harman 2018). This is a very enlightening debate but independent from the critical political point of this text, so I will limit the discussion to the frictions with Deconstruction and Assemblage in the context of the city.

241 The claims of epochal hegemony may sound exaggerated frequently relativized as part of the ambitious agenda and exuberant personality of Patrik Schumacher, but beyond their theoretical interest, the fact that it is a digital tool-based thinking, that it has an expansive and integrative agenda for all design activities, that it proclaims a natural affinity with the neoliberal ideology, and that it aspires to model architectural firms along the big corporations they serve, all these factors combined call for a prudential judgment. There are precedents of underestimation of emergent nature of technological-corporate assemblages and their destabilizing power for our political order.

engagement of affected actors. Zaera-Polo's Birmingham Station and Zaha Hadid Architects' DDP in Seoul are two exemplary cases.

## **I. AUTOPOIESIS OF ARCHITECTURE: The Emergence of Framing-Sheds.**

When Niklas Luhmann developed his theory of social systems he did not consider specifically the case of architecture. We have to thank Patrik Schumacher for his great contribution that adopts, adapts, and makes sense of the history and social function of architectural practice through this very technical framework. In this regard, his strategy relies on previous analysis of the relation between architecture and social communication, emphasizing its framing effect. In short, buildings become "framing-sheds," included within the wider array of social communications that are systematized in Luhmann's theory.

However, in order to produce an explanation of social coordination through different communicative systems, Luhmann had to provide a prior explanation of the production of stable meaning among communicative attempts between different parties. These parties, as persons, are closed systems in themselves (both somatic and psychic) and they stay therefore in relative isolation from each other. Their communicative attempts are just irritations from the periphery of the system that can only become successful coordination when they are coded and decoded in a regular way. The radical significance of Luhmann's enterprise is that persons, as subjects, are not conceived as belonging to the system of social communication. They remain at the margins, in the environmental periphery of social communications. Additionally, and more significantly for the theory, the stabilization of meaning and reference that are the preconditions for coordination between these external parties, is postulated through a "double contingency" (Schumacher, 2011, pp. 378-389). With this radical contingency Luhmann aspires to avoid any strong commitment with foundationalist conceptions of human nature or with any metaphysical conception of reference and meaning. For Luhmann, communication can be postulated as the product of permutation and chance over time, and it is therefore contingent on an evolutionary process similar to a Darwinian evolution. Once communication appears, however, it reveals itself as an emergent property with unprecedented and unpredicted consequences. Systems of social communication evolve, grow in complexity, and are reproduced overtime, relying on the contingent factor of social convention, like the traditions in which individuals are socialized as semantic actors. Luhmann's framework offers a temporal and conceptual reconstruction of the emergence of meaning and communication in very abstract terms. Schumacher's originality consists on spatializing this contingency by the introduction of the built environment, which emerges as the material memory of society that helps frame the meaning of the communications that it hosts. This frame allows semiotic agents to

coordinate using these shared reference points that materialize social institutions in their built volumes.

In Schumacher's account, architecture emerges as an autonomous system after the internal differentiation of the system of art. When with modernism the artistic practice makes explicit its goal of creating art for art's sake, it becomes an autonomous and self-reflective system, independent of external justificatory functions. The artistic code then prescribes the pursuit of beauty itself, unburdened by any other functionality. Art becomes useless and therefore, alienated from utilitarian design. Therefore, architectural communications cannot be ruled only by the aesthetic code of expressive authenticity, as the beauty of architecture is conditioned by its function. In this regard, in order to properly understand the social-systemic approach that Schumacher adopts we should recall two interesting factors. First, that this characterization comes from a spatialization that Schumacher applies to the more temporally oriented conception of Luhmann, which was itself also an alternative solution to the social evolution of cultural values in Parson's functionalism (Schumacher 2011, p. 387). The second aspect is that the autopoietic conception of architecture presents a binary code that simplifies and stylizes the traditional Vitruvian triad of Beauty, Utility and Firmness (Schumacher, 2011, p. 228). Firmness has fallen from the characterization of the values of architecture because "architects don't build." Architects draw, design in paper and digitally, write manifestos, perform presentations, practice criticism, etc. The logical corollary of this distinction seems to be that the built work itself does not belong to architecture, if the practice is understood as a specialized system of social communications. The building would be itself the object of architectural communications that are themselves independent from the technicalities of structural engineering. Consequently, in Schumacher's periodization proper architectural discourse and practice starts in the Renaissance. Only in this period we can find treatises and communications in which the art of design is not subsumed into the practice of building. The self-referential closure of this system comes to its explicit realization with the emergence and proliferation of digital tools and programs that allow for direct visualization and manipulation of parameters regulated by pure considerations of functional beauty and originality.

This all leads to an interesting problem about the place of buildings in architecture. Schumacher himself seems to be at two minds regarding this issue as his position oscillated during the drafting of the epilogue of his Volume II (Schumacher, 2012, pp. 726-230). Buildings are first taken for granted and later critically questioned because objects of communication are relegated to the environment of the communicative system, just as persons are in social communications. This seems consistent with Luhmann's a radical approach, but under further scrutiny Schumacher decided to modify his position again and to include the building within the proper domain of social communications. The arguments adduced are analogic and refer to other social systems in which the

product or social deliverable is itself considered a type of social communication: “binding decisions” in the political system, “court decisions” in the legal system,” updated representations of the world” in the mass-media system, etc. This, in addition to a re-evaluation of the semiological dimension in the architectural interactions, supports the conclusion that “buildings/spaces should be theorized as communications, as framing communications that operate as permanently broadcasted premises for social interactions that are to unfold within their ambit.” (2012, p. 719)

### **SIMULATED SEMIOTIC AGENCY: Uneventful Sheds.**

This point nicely recaptures the question of the spatialization of double contingency in social communications by anchoring a framing reference in the shared built environment. The semiological dimension is better understood if we have in mind that Schumacher is a strong advocate of the use of virtual simulators of the behavior of users in the designed environment (2016a; 2016b). This trend implies a further step beyond the common use of crowd models in architecture. These early experiments tried to recreate the behavior of masses of people in crude terms that replicate those of the physical flows through infrastructure. But this oversimplified approach has limited use beyond very strictly channeled environments like airports or emergency exits. In fact, the representation of highly sophisticated communicative agents, like socialized individuals, in terms of physically determined vectors is a paradoxical trait in a conceptual framework that is premised on the reconstruction of a social order as systems of communications. In this regard, the incorporation of simulators into digital modeling constitutes a qualitative change in the possibilities of design that has been emphatically embraced by Parametricism. However, this attempt to capture the sophisticated agency of communicative actors leads to a problematic concern at the intersection with a political philosophy of the city: at what point designing for simulated semiotic agents becomes asking rhetorical questions?

For Parametricism, modelling is not just the re-creation of a form that expresses a function. The understanding that buildings frame social communications implies that there is a semiotic interaction between the users and the material design. In particular, here modelling does not communicate about expected “behavior,” since that was the mechanical presupposition behind flow management that reduces agents to vectors. In contrast, virtual modelling aspires to capture “agency,” and by that it means the interactions of complex agents equipped with the capacity to read their surroundings, navigate them, adapt or modify them accordingly. The relation with these surroundings is more properly depicted as one of interaction, since the building design in the digital medium establishes a frame for the communications of the architectural team that reacts to the simulated responses of the users. That is, in order to be accurate the modeling has to confirm

predictive success with real life duplicates, and then adjust the design through this feedback. The more feedback is entered into the design, the more control is introduced in the virtual experimental conditions. This in turn leads to a surprising regression: the more accurate the modeling of the communication within the design, the more it resembles the mechanical model of flow management. Does it make sense then to keep talking about the semiotic agency of socialized individuals? When one can anticipate the answers, questions become rhetorically redundant. They need no reply. That is, if anticipation becomes prediction then agency can be reduced to mere behavior.

We can interpret this predictive success of virtual simulation in two ways. The first and more basic one just takes the simulated behaviors as highly accurate reproductions that can be efficiently accommodated in the design. In this regard, a model is a highly detailed scaled prop. The second sense takes “modeling” as a verb, as in “shaping,” where the interaction is rhetorical because one party displays persuasive clues that influence the actions of the other in an expected direction. As a result, the consequences of the combined dimensions of virtual modeling of semantic agency lead to a paradoxically “uneventful architecture.”

By an “architecture of event” we can identify the design theories that try to translate the anti-hierarchical ideas of the philosophy of deconstruction into space. This current emerges from the collaboration between designers like Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman, and the philosopher Jacques Derrida. According to Tschumi, the event is an activity that cannot be designed, it cannot be programmed, it can only be allowed by avoiding the imposition of function in rigidly ordered spaces. With too much modeling and anticipation we minimize the occurrence of events and, as a consequence, design becomes “successfully uneventful.”

## **AUTOPOIESIS AND DECONSTRUCTION: Critical Sheds.**

Luhmann considered that Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction could be explained within his system as a perspective of second order observation (Luhmann 1993). It is all about relevant distinctions that mark inclusions and exclusions, and their reproduction. In Schumacher’s adaptation we start with the spatialization and materialization of social institutions as forms that frame the reproduction of different social communications.

Similarly, Derrida also characterizes architecture as a frame, as an inherited *constructum* that we inhabit, and as the last fortress of Western metaphysics, perpetuated in the concrete materiality of its forms (Derrida 1986). Derrida summarizes in four main invariable points the elements that construct our world as meaningful: the experience of meaning is dwelling, or inhabiting an order; it occults and legitimizes the foundational myth of the city; it subscribes to a functional teleology of

service; and finally, this order depends on the value of beauty, harmony and totality as reworked by the fine arts through their historical manifestations.

The point of Deconstruction is then to expose this naturalized frame through a series of juxtapositions and dislocations, and to capture it in thought. In this regard, we should remember that deconstructivist architecture has a consistent vision orienting its practice, one that targets established institutions of the hegemonic order with an architecture that is called to reveal their faulty foundations. . Observing the frame therefore, reveals the arbitrary behind naturalized distinctions. It is worth quoting in length:

Deconstructions would be feeble if they were negative, if they did not construct, and above all if they did not measure themselves against institutions in their solidity, at the place of their greatest resistance: political structures, levers of economic decisions, the material and phantasmatic apparatuses that connect state, civil society, capital, bureaucracy, cultural power and architectural education (...). (Derrida 1986, p. 70)

This, of course, differs from a positive programmatic agenda for architecture since the point is not a substantive goal but one that mutates with the historical configurations of hegemonic institutions. It is also detached from the nostalgia for an architecture entrusted with the function of providing ethical orientation on dwelling, something impossible in our plural and fragmented societies (Harries, 2018; Lilla, 1997). However, Karsten Harries, commenting on the classic Heideggerian fragment on the Greek temple, summarizes the thought in an interesting way:

Transporting human beings into the presence of a god, the temple lets them experience a particular place as holy, this providing their life with a focus. So understood, architecture, as opposed to mere building, has an essentially public function: its task is to help gather scattered individuals into a genuine community by presenting the powers that preside over its life. Architecture is the presentation of the divinities. (Harries, 1997, p. 279)<sup>242</sup>

The building frames and reveals, but for Derrida, it reveals the powers that make impossible the idea of a proper community. Bernard Tschumi himself, looking back 20 years after the work that prompted Derrida's text, concedes that today, digital tools would have changed the appearance of his project but the conceptual question, which is its true form, would remain largely intact (Costanzo 2009, p. 26). Alternatively, we could hold that in a context of social dissolution, an architecture of clear and rigorous forms could be institutionally challenging and still deconstructive

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242 Between Harries's nostalgia and Lilla's disenchantment, Arturo Leyte reminds us that Heidegger never actually discussed his contemporary modern architecture -neither the works nor the designers, in his work about building, dwelling, and thinking. For instance, Leyte notices how a modern masterwork like Mies's Farnsworth house, sits at the river bend between the revealing Greek Temple and the well-adapted vernacular palafito (stilt house), capturing there the impossibility of fully dwelling that marks the condition of *da-sein* (Leyte, 2005, pp. 76-85). However, Leyte criticizes the use and abuse of Heidegger's images and examples when they are isolated from the general plan and development of his work on the origin of the work of art. For his masterful commentary, see his *Post Scriptum* (Leyte, 2016), for the fragment on the Temple, see his own bilingual edition (Cortés & Leyte, 2016, pp. 66-85).



in concept (Fontana-Giusti, 2016).

Both currents, Deconstruction and Parametricism stand in a complex relation as both are defined by their reaction to modernism, but where Deconstruction adopts the constructive possibilities of digital technology while consciously avoiding the discourse of progress, Parametricisms in turn, aspires to supersede modernism as a new epochal style for the post-Fordist urban economy. In this regard, Schumacher considers Deconstruction as a limited transitional style with no positive agenda that has been practically subsumed into Parametricism. This is consistent with Schumacher's critical take on the critical role of architecture and his defense of the need to present a neutral conception that could accommodate the agendas of the real players (clients) that have the power to get things done. Despite it all, one could argue that this is a "political turn", political realism by another name.

### **THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE: Nudging Sheds.**

At this point and from a political point of view, it is difficult to avoid the latent dystopian concern about the desirability of total modeling (Simone & Pierterse, 2017, pp. 77-88). The integrated power of social platforms and big-data has triggered already reasonable concerns not only in relation to our market behavior but also in connection with an alleged capacity of influence of electoral decisions targeting specific segments of the demos –like in the Cambridge Analytics case. The consequences of incorporating these powerful tools should be examined explicitly. "Nudging" users into the desired decisions had been consistently advocated by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler as an exercise of "libertarian paternalism" by the government and in favor of the best interests of the citizenship (Thaler, Sunstein & Baltz 2013). Nudging works through the careful manipulation of the "architecture of decision," so citizens feel they exercise their control over their lives because they can chose and make decisions despite the fact that the selection and presentation of the options have been arranged in order to incentivize the "correct" one. This "architecture of decision" also has spatial translation in some cases, like in the program for incentivizing healthy eating habits in public canteens. Sunstein and Thaler defend their approach as a legitimate counter-attack, as fighting fire with fire, aware as they are of the power of advertising, of persuasive communication, and of the superabundance of hyper-technical information, coupled with the inability of most users to navigate these complex scenarios. The potential integration of these technologies along with other trends like smart cities and neuroarchitecture can evolve into a problematic architecture of nudging. This raises questions about ethical and political agency that the architecture of autopoiesis cannot answer. This is so because it is presented as an auto-limiting frame that favors a neutralist conception of architectural theory. On the other hand, it is paradoxical

that the actual design of the *polis* through continuous architectural practice could be defended as an intrinsically *apolitical* agency.

For Parametricism the explanation is straightforward: those decisions that do not conform to the code of beauty and utility are non-architectural in nature. This way, the closure and autonomy of the system is ideally preserved through this analytic art of distinction. Proper political decisions (macro-politics) are located in the official political system and consist only on those collectively binding. This ideal separation of spheres provides analytical rigor for the reconstruction of social order but not so much in order to track “the political.”

It is plausible to accept that “there is no political architecture” in the sense that architectural form does not determine a political ideology. The example provided by Jameson of the democratic repurpose of Ceausescu’s monumental *House of the People* in Bucharest is clear enough (Leach 2015, p. 59). Elaborate ideologies and political positions resonate more clearly at the symbolic and semantic level but not at the purely formal. However, it is still possible to admit that we are affected by some forms or spaces that are experienced as imposing, oppressive, inviting or deterring regardless of their official designation. It is true that there is not an architecture of Hobbesian Absolutism, but we cannot make sense of Hobbes’s political thought without the experience of fear. The disposition resulting from these exposures affects us, and its impact on agency in the polis is political. However, Schumacher only considers as properly political the issues that become politicized when they enter the communicative space of the political arena. He concedes that there is a Foucaultian level of urban micro-political form of social power related to the organization of space in the architectural domain, but this level is defined away as non-political social power. He then argues that the architect’s expertise in evaluating micro-political impacts is limited and strictly dependent on the specificity of the clients’ communications, and that it is the professional’s duty to interpret and translate them to the best of her skills. All other (political) responsibility belongs to the client or to the political sphere, and is therefore alien to architecture (Schumacher 2014-b, 472-477). This neutralist conception ignores two relevant questions of urban life: that our formal political order is shaped by the political imaginary of the nation-state; and that city-life is marked by conditions of informal but intense interactions that do not register into the formal macro-political arena.

### **LIBERTARIAN URBANISM: Swarming Sheds.**

In order to avoid a determinist connection between the internal logic of the autopoietic system of architecture and his personal libertarian militancy, Schumacher explains the correlation between architecture and free-market urbanism in terms of the natural co-evolution of the economic

and architectural systems. Co-evolution evokes affinity and mutual influence in a way that doesn't apply to the political system (2012, pp. 676-700; 2015; 2016c). While the market system is presented with the stereotypical virtues of efficiency, the political system is presented as an imperialistic domain that speaks a bureaucratic logic alien to the code of architecture. However, the natural affinity attributed to the market and architectural systems is not proper to the logic of architecture but more specifically to that of Parametricism. Schumacher draws here a correspondence between the swarming variety of elements spatially related through parametric connections and the Hayekian metaphors of hiving orders of spontaneous individuals in unplanned coordination.

This is another paradox since some recent megaprojects that are presented as exemplars of Parametric urbanism are superblock complexes and macro urban redevelopments that take place under authoritarian regimes (China and Turkey). It is important to notice, however, that the affinities that Schumacher presents between a free-market libertarian approach to urban development and Parametric Urbanism are more analogical and rhetorical than conceptual. The Hayekian order that emerges spontaneously from freely interacting individuals is supposed to be an order of economic efficiency. Parametric urbanism, in contrast, is defended because it imposes a unifying visual language on the city. Swarming and variation within specific parameters are then the intended goal, not an unintended emergent side-effect. Free market urbanism has no quarrels with visual chaos or with the aesthetic incoherence of the city because untamed diversity and visual noise may be just epiphenomena that express a deeper rational functionality. Let's remember that the hand is *invisible*, like the deep efficiency below the apparent chaos of street markets in Lagos praised by Rem Koolhaas (Godlewski, 2010). One may argue that by imposing unifying parameters, the competitive dynamic among private actors is being subordinated to the aesthetic imperatives of the architectural system. By definition, emergent properties cannot be planned. One may learn to appreciate their logical beauty and grow fond of it but market agents are not Leibnizian monads because unstable equilibria do not enact some pre-established harmony. At the end, and despite of all the Darwinian talk of adaptation and systemic co-evolution, Parametric Urbanism seems closer to a secular branch of (highly) Intelligent Design than to a real Hayekian order.

### **PARAMETRIC IMPERIALISM: Integrated Sheds.**

This is one of the tensions between the overall framework of Autopoiesis of Architecture and Parametricism as a programmatic proposal for a hegemonic global epochal style (Schumacher, 2012, pp. 622-2016a). While the autopoietic description presents itself as ideally self-referential and autonomous from the political system, the Parametric program is expansive and imperialist. It

applies to all design practices, from clothing, to furniture, to architecture, and to urbanism. Its reference is the world-shaping power of Bauhaus modernism as the last truly epochal style. However, the driving force of the modernist program was the industrial culture, the machine era, and the division of labor. This was an order where functional design shaped the forms, and social organization replicated standardized, modular, homogeneous products of all kinds. Seeing like a modern state implies a zenithal perspective of geometrical visual order that makes the territory readable (Scott, 1999). In contrast, Parametricism is a style that emerges from digital tool-thinking proper from a post-Fordist, networked, and globalized society. It is a different context but part of this difference relies on that this is not an industrial and productive society focused on the problems of market supply. In our case, our digital environment revolves around the creation of demand, on the subjectifying effects of the shaping of desires, on the architecture of our choices, and on the promotion of an entrepreneurial and managerial attitude to one's life (Brown, 2015; Spencer 2016). Parametricism is tool-thinking and as such it doesn't seem to differ greatly from BIM design (Leach 2015, p. 69). However, unlike modernism, the specificity of Parametricism consist on the emerging capacity to modify, variate, adapt, and replicate a design keeping certain parameters constant. The values of "maximal diversity with maximal continuity" are in fact the expression of its morphogenetic engine. This same approach applies to all designed elements in the environment, furniture included, that are actually incorporated into the general design and its related variations. We can talk of actual *incorporation* as the furniture and other spatial elements are also parametrically modified in their simulated interaction with virtual users. As we can see, in the modernist case all elements keep a uniform formal style through the imposition of some common external design guidelines, but in Parametric design the relational element springs from a single algorithmic dna that expands across the designed environment –just like all lava flows share a common magmatic source. This is an order that mistakes diversity for mere variation. It is an application of the principle of continuity over that of accommodation. And finally, it presupposes a relational ontology "of the same" that excludes real otherness. Escalating this program to city-size brings problematic questions for political philosophy.

### **PARAMETRIC SUPREMATISM: Post-critical Sheds.**

A last point that I would like to analyze is the hegemonic pretension in the Parametric program as elaborated by Schumacher. Again, as we briefly mentioned before, in Schumacher's approach there are two different projects that are presented in an intertwined way –the conceptual redefinition of contemporary architecture according to Luhmann's social system theory (autopoiesis), and Parametricism as the final stage and most sophisticated realization of this

systemic evolution. In particular, I would like to focus now on the quasi-Hegelian way in which Schumacher explains the superiority of his formulation of Parametricism in relation to Deconstruction and Assemblage Theory. The strategy consists on presenting the convergences as a definite sign of assimilation while the divergences are characterized as architectural dead-ends.

As we saw, the point of Deconstruction is to *defamiliarize* our bodies with our spatial dispositions and show their contingency by designing “otherwise than usual,” and by allowing unexpected engagements with the environment. As the creation of these experiences relies on complex and unusual spatial designs, the resort to digital tools marks a clear confluence with Schumacher’s Parametricism. But in contrast, the purpose there is to expose the “double contingency” of social communications reinforced through the spatial framings on the ground. Accepting Parametricism as the neutralizing assimilation of Deconstruction implies assuming a formally elegant but utterly uneventful architecture.

The other contending current is what Schumacher comprises under the general category of Assemblage –by Assemblage Theory we can consider the highly influential ontology of Deleuze and Guattary, its adaptation to geography and urbanism by Manuel Delanda, but also the relational theory of Bruno Latour and its application to Action-Network Theory (ANT). Its most salient practitioner in terms of architectural projects and theory is Alejandro Zaera-Polo (AZP/FOE). His work shares with Parametricism the emphasis on a spatial order of fluid continuity and the resort to digital tools in order to generate and visualize these shapes. However, Zaera-Polo’s production is also characterized by an explicit reflection about the impact and consequences of building and its embeddedness in the urban fabric. His highly influential “The Politics of the Envelope” (2008; 2009) presents a typology of buildings according to their interfacing qualities and magnitudes in relation to the surrounding city. Envelopes are there explicitly defined as “political agents,” which makes sense when we consider that they constitute the porous membrane that regulates the interaction with and through the public space and at the same time, they express the visual identity of the building. These typologies respond to a ratio between the exposed surfaces in length, height and width: Flat-Horizontal (Lose fit), Spherical (Relaxed fit), Tight-Vertical (Tight fit/slab), Vertical (Slim fit). Each of these typologies has a particular affinity with corporate projects, with institutional commissions, with public infrastructure, or with private purposes. They express through their volumes and skin, a capitalist or civic relation with the surrounding public space. Through their fenestration or lack of, through their openings or their insulation, they also articulate prevailing discourses of securitization, surveillance, privatization or sustainability. The theoretical formulation of Zaera-Polo’s position embraces this relational feature as part of an onto-political reality that articulates a multiplicity of elements, building links and alliances among them. The most explicit formulation comes under the label of “Cosmopolitical Design” and it is elaborated in

tandem with architectural ethnographer and critic Albena Yaneva (2015) and under a strong influence of Latour's Action-Network Theory. *Cosmopolitical Design* tracks down and makes explicit the constructive articulation of a plurality of actors (*actants*) and their correlative effects and interactions. The network is the register of these alliances across multiple domains. The compositional program behind this approach is deeply relational, cosmopolitan in its inclusive (flat) ontology, and "political" because it reconstructs an order of interactions in which the integrity of entities is defined according to their capacity to influence others.

As we can see, this cosmopolitical formulation is relational in a profound way, and differs from Parametricism's characterization of connectivity in a fundamental sense. In Schumacher's case, as we have seen, we cannot strictly speak of "deep relationality," as the variety of distinct elements share an inner identity and in many cases are in fact splinters from a common core. It is therefore more proper to speak here of continuity throughout controlled variation. This principle of continuity is not in itself "political," as there is no ethical or political value in inclusion. It is singularly aesthetic. It is just a firm formal preference that constitutes a style because this visual coherence and connection provides order and harmony over urban cacophony and chaos. It is easy to link visual continuity and functionality through the practical value of spatial orientation but, although highly plausible a connection, it can be argued that it is still a contingent one. To be sure, we can articulate continuity among a heterogeneous diversity of elements without presupposing parametric commonality, for instance, in Maki's seminal studies in collective form (2008).

### **PRESCRIPTIVE ARCHITECTURE/URBANISM: Style as Fate.**

One of the problems of relying so heavily on a socio-theoretical conception, even if it is one so abstract and philosophical as Luhmann's, is that it can only aspire to produce rational reconstructions after an empirical social reality. In systems theory the dynamic of social systems is explained in relation to a postulated intrinsic trend towards homeostasis in the exchanges with the environment. Simplification and differentiation are means to achieve this equilibrium in situations where growing complexity implies chaos and confusion, which are minimized when an emerging organizing principle guides transformations in a functional direction –in the case of architecture, through the organization of space.

However, social systems are not pre-existing metaphysical constructs. They are immanent, material realities that only exist in the moment they are actualized through particular operations. Systems theory tracks regularities and evolutions, like, for instance, the drive for internal differentiation within the social systems of the modern world in order to cope with its growing complexity. But this epochal trend is historically specific. It is related to the crises of hierarchical

and rigid systems of social integration and the emergence of horizontal and egalitarian orders. This reconstruction makes sense to explain the emergence and expansion of the modern territorial state as the hegemonic political form, but perhaps not so much to explain the persistence of cities that thrive in complexity. However, this social evolution is not a normative theory. It is only constative, not prescriptive. It cannot anticipate a normative direction, neither aesthetically nor politically.

So when we see Schumacher taking an observer position and making distinctions about the epochal evolution of architecture we may agree or disagree about the characterizations, but we have shared historical records to interpret and to argue about the soundness of the description. In contrast, when he talks about Parametricism as a new and emerging epochal style, his owl is flying before dusk. His observations are not really descriptive since he is presenting a programmatic and normative conception of the practice. What is *in* and *out* in an emerging system-differentiation is itself a matter of more or less plausible stipulation, but in matters of style, distinctions cannot avoid revealing to us, when we observe the observer from a second order position, that there is too much room for discretion about where the lines are drawn. Even more when the theorist is himself an influential educator and practitioner. In this case, his observations may very well become self-fulfilling prophecies. Second order observations on the Parametric program are critically deconstructive in Luhmann's sense because they expose that the discourse about the decline of Deconstructivism may be actually more related to the capacity to forge hegemonic alliances with powerful players that determine what is actually built in accordance with the stability of the dominant forces of the system. If we can really see this at work in the Parametric discourse of the neutralization of critique and on the technical assimilation of Deconstructionism, then, paradoxically in a very Derridean sense, Deconstruction is realized in the observation of the death of Deconstructionism by exposing its red-handed factual killer.

### **IRREDUCIBLE CITY: It's Complicated.**

Complexity is the mark of the metropoleis. They are in fact defined as “complex and incomplete systems” (Sassen 2006) in contrast with the sovereign modern state, and conceived as even global in their scope (Luhmann 1997). The principle of visual continuity advocated by Parametric Urbanism is incorporated within a general defense of a free-market approach to urban development because on this context it can deliver the maximum of variation with unity, while it combines both an aesthetic and a functional justification. On the one hand it is presented as the aesthetic solution to the fragmented and confusing urban landscape by producing a coherent and harmonious urban visual language. On the other hand, it is justified in functional terms by providing orientation and direction in our interaction with the urban environment. However, even if they

might contingently converge in their final expression, these are two heterogeneous principles. In the case of the imposition of an urban visual unity we are dealing with a principle that is external to the logic of each single building and that is not justified in the style. In the second case, the functional principle of orientation also exceeds the defining purpose of the singular building. This order is in fact a purely civic, political code that helps mediate and articulate single architectures and urbanism. The city then, appears as a set of material statements that frame the buildings that in turn frame social communications. However, buildings frame but they are also being framed by the discourse of the polis –even if this lacks an adequate translation in the formal macro-political sphere.

One plausible consequence of this need of articulation is the admission that the code of architecture cannot exclude the political dimension of urbanism, as “permanently broadcasting premises on the ground.” This means that we need criteria to identify “good design practice” that cannot probably be reduced neither to the spontaneous emerging orders of the market, nor to rigid and centralized urban planning.

These criteria are independent of mere “client’s preference satisfaction,” irrespective of its public or private nature. Similarly, they are also independent of citizen or user preference satisfaction. The reason is that these are purely procedural criteria that do not necessarily avoid the same unsatisfying outcomes that we resent in our urban environment. Unlike what Schumacher states, when an architect mediates between these two dimensions, the building and the city, architecture and urbanism, he is not doing politics, or not politics understood as a separate an independent system of participation into binding decision making. This politics is part of architecture as an art of diplomatic articulation of the best interests of two masters. The architect is the necessary part in this discussion because he has the know-how competence that opens the range of possible realizations beyond the stated goals of the parties. This is nothing new, this constant negotiation is common practice but it is obscured in Schumacher’s account of the profession and by his simplification of the code ruling the architectural system.

The simplification of architecture into Form and Function, Beauty and Utilitas, expels from the system any other normative consideration because the functions are restricted to the client’s demands. The justification given, as we saw, is paradoxically, a political one, that realism and professionalism implies accepting that the relevant actors nowadays are private agents and global corporations. The hegemonic style is the style of the hegemonic clients. However, since Pikety’s masterful account, libertarian free-market and neoliberal discourses cannot be defended resorting to some individualist meritocratic ideology. Today, it is not possible to deny that our order is one dominated by accumulation and transmission of wealth (inheritance within the family) and that professionalism cannot fulfill anymore the promises of social integration and prosperity. Not even



the most recalcitrant of libertarians can deny that the power and influence of our contemporary caste system is incompatible with the promise of modernity. In our cities, the increasing precariousness of the job market, real estate speculation, and the privatization of the urban space prevent any meaningful measure of social integration for large portions of the population. This situation in turn fuels radical polarization, unrest, and social instability worldwide. And here we arrive at a fundamental contradiction: modern social system-differentiation emerges as a reaction to the crisis of integration of the traditional hierarchical society, and Parametricism as an epochal style is presented as the most accomplished stage of this evolutionary dynamic, but the radical avant-gardism of this streamlined conception that rules out any ethico-political concern in architecture, together with its pairing as a co-evolutionary complement of the market economy, leads to the dysfunctional scenario that we had just described. System differentiation is not an end in itself, it is only functional when it leads to new levels of social stabilization through the reduction of dysfunctional complexity. But when system autonomization just means economic colonization with little social control, a radically autonomous architecture just becomes part of the problem. Urban complexity is not in itself intrinsically dysfunctional, it is in fact one of the reasons of the successful historical resilience of this social formation through its many transformations while other more powerful organizations declined. In fact, it is not at all clear -despite Schumacher's insistence otherwise, that the vividness of city life could prosper or even survive under Parametric Urbanism. The same thing could be argued about the supposed assimilation of Assemblage Theory, Folding, or Cosmopolitical Design by Parametricism.

### **COSMOPOLITICAL DESIGN: Networked Sheds.**

In the Cosmopolitical approach advanced by Zaera-Polo, it is accepted the central role of the market as the central mechanism for providing social coordination and eliciting a greater degree of participation through entrepreneurship. It is however, presented as a means to give expression to the wider plurality of social initiatives. Despite this embracement of the role of the market in our societies, for Zaera-Polo this realistic concession does not prevent him from defending a political role of architecture, as the *political* in "Cosmopolitical" shows.

We can summarize this politically engaged approach in relation to the city as the awareness of two transformative trends that justify correlative reactions. First, the awareness of the growing percentage of urban space that is under private control or management. Second, an increasing sensitivity to the way that new technologies and materials applied to the facades impact on the quality of the urban space. On the first case, in the absence of effective official policies that counter the exclusionary effects of the privatization of public space, it is the duty of the cosmopolitical

designer to try to find and argue for the design solutions that maximize the degree of accessibility and use by the general public. In the second case, when we are aware that the different typologies of envelopes express a political function by acting as membranes that filter the interactions of the building with the environment, users and public, it is the duty of the designer to take into account these affected parties as matters of concern, and facilitate their association with the project at their highest agency.

### **POLITICAL SURFACES: Shallow Criticism.**

In this simplified account I tried to capture the attitude of concern for all entities entangled with the project and the relational-flat-ontology that is common ground for the philosophies behind these design approaches. This approach has been criticized, however, because the political impact of architecture is mostly explained in terms of “affect,” and understood in a non-cognitive way (Spencer 2016, pp. 141-158). Douglas Spencer accurately advises of the risks of our times where the weakness of emancipatory paradigms clears the terrain for the colonization of our cities with an “architecture of neoliberalism.” He argues that neoliberalism, as both the “ideology of no-ideology” and a form of governmentality (Foucault), works best through modes of subjectivation that conform to the architecture of choice of the market and a managerial attitude to the self. In parallel, affect-oriented architectures provide new forms of immersive experience for users that lack both the reflective dispositions to filter the sensorial overload, and the critical discourses to expose it. The outcome, he claims, is a market-friendly architecture of compliance and control.

It is difficult to resist the poignancy of Spengler’s diagnosis along with his reminder that we can no longer aspire to any totalizing critique of our social order without opening the way to accusations of totalitarianism. But Spengler’s analysis may incur in the same danger of “totalizing critique” that he exposes. On the one hand, he accurately denounces the selective instrumentalization of philosophical works by designers; on the other he blurs together a series of previously and carefully drawn distinctions between design orientations and their inspiring philosophical frameworks, under the categorical label of “architectures of neoliberalism. The subtitle is even more devastating: “how contemporary architecture became an instrument of control and compliance,” as throws all contemporary baby-designers out with the bath water. If this diagnostic applies to all “contemporary architecture,” in theory and practice, without gradations, then he is becoming complicit with what he denounces, that is, that the materialist, emergentist, immanentist, affect-oriented positions in fact capture our complex reality in a positive and productive way. There would be no point in criticizing the real: “it is what it is, and you better embrace it.” This is precisely the culmination of the neoliberal discourse: “there is no alternative,”

which sounds like the resigned version of Schumacher's triumphant discourse. Alternatively, we can acknowledge the penetrating points made by Spengler but nevertheless try to rescue the critical and political aspects of these theories and philosophies. This way we can show that (a) that the validity of the critical philosophies behind Deconstructivism and Cosmopolitical Design is independent and not reducible to the factual success of practitioners and studios; (b) that there is no base for the evolutionary and assimilationist program postulated by Parametricism; (c) but concede that we cannot capture the complexity of our urban world and its forms of domination with the ontologies inherited from modernism; and (d), recognize that these emerging ontologies may be used against themselves to extend their emancipatory potential (Owen, 2018), or (e) be supplemented with other sources for criticism, for instance, for the identification of latent forms of urban socialization (Purcell, 2016, p. 108),

Affect has always been an integral part of the architectural experience, what is of relevance now is its active embracement on part of the theoretical discourse that discovers the enhanced expressive possibilities brought by the new materials and technologies that produce fully enclosing envelopes, membranes, skins, and screens. There is a transformation in architecture that takes notice of the increasing impact on those surrounding it, and this transformation is elaborated within the general context of a sociocultural moment dominated by of media and political landscape driven also by the immediacy of affective contagion. Zaera-Polo and other sympathetic designers embrace this affective potential as part of an alternative political approach that adopts an attitude of creative affirmation within an ethos of pluralization, as a reaction against a paradigm marked by a paralyzing emphasis in nostalgic negativity, against totalizing abstract reconstructions that cannot duly appreciate the richness of the particular, and against ideological formations and narratives that are utterly hopeless against the pre-linguistic, non-cognitive power of affect. If this is so, in what regard is Cosmopolitical Design a "political" alternative? We could argue that in two main ways. First, the more Deleuzian side embraces the virtualities latent in our social environment to foster pluralization within market capitalism but against the homogenizing forces of global markets, and it embraces affect as a legitimate medium of social transformation. Second, the more Latourian side, exemplified by the elaborations of Albena Yaneva (2017), emphasize five ways to make architecture political (explicitly), which encompass attentiveness to the connecting and mediating qualities of objects, sensitivity to the multiplicity of actors involved in the design process, respect to the entanglement of the city with the practice and multiple ontologies that sustain it, receptiveness to the reactive agency of buildings and sites, and acknowledgement and promotion of the engagement of multiple perspectives and design publics.

## **CIVILIZING SHEDS: Sustaining the City.**

Accordingly, Yaneva analyses Birmingham's New Street station by Alejandro Zaera-Polo as an optimum case-study. This is a fascinating example, also analyzed by Spencer, because the project is not a totally new design but an upgrade of the existing station (the most hated one in the UK). The solution consists on a spectacular wrapping envelope that also incorporates a new adjacent shopping-mall --this is a sign of the times, when public projects depend on parallel commercial enterprises for its financing. The resulting form of the envelope combines the spherical typology of the mall with the typical long-flat volume of public facilities and infrastructure. The wrapping skin is a polished metallic surface that reflects its environment but that has been shaped in studied angles in order to avoid reflecting the surrounding buildings. Instead, and that is the animating idea of the proposal, it is conceived so in order to articulate in its mirroring effect Birmingham itself. That is, a post-imperial, post-industrial metropolis of the service and technology sectors, that has become a communication hub in the Midlands. The envelope captures the agents assembled in this stable formation, for instance, the surrounding light, a sky that is no longer clouded by the smoke of chimneys and factories, the train-tracks passing through, the commuting public, and the IT screens embedded in the skin that update and keep in sync the public with the train-schedules (but also with the commercials from the mall). The form assembles the actors but the actors also dictate the form. However, can we really say that this project is "representing" Birmingham? Actually not, because neither of these very characteristic local elements play a symbolic role. They are not embedded as iconic tokens. They do not stand for anything; they are not in place of anything else. On the contrary, they are actually assembled as material actors, with their local qualities and intensities. The station does not represent the city because it just articulates it, or a part of it. At most, we could argue whether this actual part of Birmingham is representative of the whole, but only as a way of assessing whether the elements assembled are commonly found in the whole. There are other critical questions to be answered, for instance, is whether all the relevant actors involved are properly acknowledged, if we do justice to them or whether the network of assemblages is cut unjustifiably short by unjustified exclusions. One could reply that if this is an immanent framework, then "it is what it is," in the sense that there is no point in invoking any external principle to validate it. But within the same logic one can claim that there are alternative modes of assembling networks of actors, and some are more powerful than others. For instance, incorporating the commuters as mere physical flows, as vectors channeled through lanes and escalators is a weak way of considering the agency of these actors. The design itself may even induce these actors to become crowd, mass, and to inhibit their dispositions to interact as actual persons to each other. In contrast, when confronted with the multitude reflected through the agency of the envelope, one is forced to

admit the diversity of Birmingham’s population and therefore the cosmopolitical dimension actualized in that place -which is also a hub of tracks that extend and connect with other hubs in a network that links territories and populations, one is pressed to make sense of the particular demographic of this postcolonial city (Henry, McEwan & Pollard, 2002; Myers & Grosvenor, 2011). The experience of being among those fellow commuters affected by this mirroring reflection, as an instantiation of an *I* in a *We*, makes also evident that the city as such, as a territorial unit, is itself an ideological mirage, because it cannot be thought without a larger network of relations across territories that sustain the practices that keep it going. By articulating this point, the station may become a target for some other networks that reject that reflection; or alternatively an ally, for instance, for social movements that see the station as an articulation of an extended and thick web of relations and connections that provides a stronger account of the urban fabric. This is a personal hypothetical reconstruction of how a cosmopolitical, immanent account may provide a critical and political function. It differs from traditional critical theories in that it is not elaborated as negativity, and it is not driven by an external normative principle or procedures of intersubjective justification. It is politically “realist” because its final test is the capacity to assemble and articulate networks of alliances that thrive because they are stronger and more stable. It is only a contingent fact that successful emancipatory struggles may derive from universalizing the recruitment of actors, recognized in their most empowered version, within a mobilizing construction of the facts on the ground, and a credible account of an alternative future assemblage of things. Notice that, at the end of the day, in this chain of alliances, the strongest mobilizing account is probably the one that ultimately resists the hardest and more critical scrutiny.



The images show Birmingham’s New Street station, by Alejandro Zaera-Polo, and Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP) in Seoul by Zaha Hadid Architects. In this case they are both public commissions. DDP is a piece of “architectural landscape” with multiple functions, housing shops, a design museum, and serving as public plaza and pedestrian passage-way in a busy intersection.

Commissioned as an iconic landmark for Seoul by the authorities, the shapes of this fascinating blob succeed in attracting visitors that want to capture the image in a picture. However, as a public utility it is felt imposing and alienating and remains underused (Kim, 2018). Paradoxically, it works at its best when is taken back by the swarming and popular street-market that had been ousted from the original site. It is difficult to deny, not even for Schumacher, that this cosmopolitical market-extension enhances both the project and the city. Both buildings are, to my account, examples of “civilizing sheds” as both, in their way, produce strong cosmopolitical articulations of entangled and affected actors while they also enact critical resistance, by actually reflecting the real diversity of a post-imperial metropolis, and the resistance against the neoliberal logic of expulsion and the political marketization of iconicity –in this case, re-marketized by the returning street vendors.

## CONCLUSION

Buildings with the capacity to affect the city the way we saw are “civilizing sheds.” Projects can be evaluated according to their capacity to interact with the city, and one can argue that achieving this kind of effects enhances the quality of the project, even if these performances were not included in the client’s specifications. In addition to Form and Function, this criterion of perfectibility, “good urban form,” has a validity that is independent of the tradeoffs that the original project has to undergo in its multiples negotiations. It is the responsibility of the designer to argue convincingly for the best and more complete articulation of these principles. Otherwise, the practice is self-defeating, as it would contribute to undermine the complex urban network on which every project depends. In a world of global metropoleis, life is ordinarily cosmopolitical. Parametric Urbanism, however, reveals itself as a limited frame to make sense of the emerging political challenges of this new order of spatial coexistence. The assemblage of civilizing sheds is, more than ever, a political imperative of architectural practice.

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16. Thomas *FROY*

## **Dwelling Today: *eruv, sukkah*, Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida**

### **Introduction**

When we think about what it means to be at home, to dwell, it is difficult to think of fixity, stability or security. In these disrupted times, we are experiencing a number of major crises – the climate crisis, the migrant crises, even the Covid crisis – which call into question the very possibility of dwelling. Our dwelling places have shifted from being places we call ‘home’ – places of comfort, relaxation, hospitality, ease – to being places of confinement, restriction, even imprisonment. At the same time, working and living from home have allowed us to ‘meet’, communicate and attend events with people on the other side of the globe. In complex ways, the present moment has been one in which our conception of what it means to dwell, to be in a house, to be at home, have been thrown ‘up in the air’.

It’s no longer possible, at it may have been in the past, to think of the dwelling as that simple place of ‘origin’. The traditional narrative of modernity, which Zygmunt Bauman describes as a process of ‘uprooting’ (Bauman 2013: 28), has long dispensed with the idea that our dwellings are located in areas of ‘belonging’: I dwell where I belong, I belong where I originate. Where once we might have understood our identity on the basis of our origins, Bauman claims that we have long uprooted ourselves from place-based identity (2013: 15-16). So what does it mean, today, to dwell uprooted from, or even without, a place of originary belonging?

When we think about dwelling today, then, we can no longer think of originary belonging; nor, however, can we simply serenely drift into exile, atopia and placelessness. A number of contemporary theorists, among them Giorgio Agamben, advocate versions of what might be termed ‘negative dwelling’. Instead of dwelling in a place of originary belonging, we dwell ‘without place’ – in ‘atopia’: in a brief reading of a letter written by Paul Celan to Max Frisch explaining Celan’s plans for to spend “Jewish Easter” with his aunt, Agamben draws our attention to Celan’s ambivalence with regard to the Judaism of his Easter. Unlike those Jews who escaped with Moses from Egypt, Celan does not “recall ever escaping from Egypt” (Celan & Bachmann 2010: 257). Agamben interprets this non-recollection as indicative of Celan having “positioned himself ... before or anyway outside of the exodus” (Agamben 2020: 73). Eliding the aspect of the letter which deals with memory (Agamben does not problematise what it means ‘not to recall’ Exodus), Agamben plays on, or perhaps effaces, the difference between the time and space of Exodus,

between ‘being before’ and ‘being outside’ of Exodus: this occurs in Agamben’s interpretation of Celan’s non-recollection of escape as indicative of a position “before or anyway outside of the exodus”. This play or effacement of the difference between ‘being before’ and ‘being outside’ allows Agamben to subsequently claim that Celan’s poetry “communicates in ... atopia” (2020: 75). Celan, Agamben claims, cannot call any place – Paris, London, Czernowitz or Jerusalem – ‘home’ (Ibid.).

Agamben’s reading leaves open what it means to dwell in ‘atopia’: to dwell, presumably, ‘a-topos’, that is, ‘without place’. Is this still dwelling? Does dwelling without place remain dwelling? It’s not at all clear that the activity in which Celan’s poetry and life exist in ‘atopos’ can be described as dwelling in any positive sense of the word. Agamben’s description of dwelling, I suggest, can be recognised as a ‘negative’ description of dwelling. This is apparent in the simple difference between, on the one hand, what Bauman describes as pre-modern ‘rooted’ dwelling, which provides a positive, productive or generative relation between birth, origin, place, belonging and identity, and the placelessness described by Agamben, according to which Celan has no place, no homeland, nothing to call his own. Celan’s life and work, for Agamben, fail to constitute any sense of what it means to dwell, to be at home, to have a place. Agamben describes a mode of dwelling which lacks, which is negative.

Negative theorisations of dwelling, such as Agamben’s, can be found in the work of a great number of contemporary thinkers: in the Introduction to her book on Zionism, *Parting Ways*, Judith Butler proposes that when we think of what it means to dwell in today’s world, “we cannot assume a single, continuous and stable geographic ground” (Butler 2012: 8); this non-assumption has spatial and temporal consequences, too, since Butler’s project proceeds “only through a series of displacements and transpositions” (Ibid.) in space and time. Butler associates the forms of dwelling instantiated by the modern Israeli state with those notions of origin, essence and rootedness present in Bauman’s depiction of premodern dwelling: hence, her project is aimed at departing from dwellings which *can* “assume a single, continuous and stable geographic ground”. As such, like Agamben, Butler does not develop what it means to dwell without the assumption of a “single, continuous [or] stable geographic ground”: her project is aimed at critically departing from those premodern, rooted traditions of dwelling described by Bauman, and instantiated – in her view – by modern Israel. There is no examination or depiction, therefore, of what it actually means to dwell without a single, continuous or stable ground; Butler is not required to unpack what is required by dwelling in a series of displacements and transpositions. Butler’s project consists only in the departure – the critical or theoretical negation – from those modes of dwelling associated with roots, origins and essence.

From the accounts given by Agamben and Butler, among others, one might assume that we do not dwell at all; rather, we exist without place or time, atopically and atemporally. In order to deliver us from the evil of ideologies from advocate for rooted belonging, it appears to have become necessary to dispense with dwelling entirely; if we dwell at all, we dwell in placelessness, in exile, in atopia, in atemporality. And yet we do dwell. We dwell in close confinement, tightly within the walls of our homes; we dwell with and can meet with others far away, in virtual spaces; we dwell with the thought of homes past and future; we dwell when we invite guests over for a meal, and we dwell when we are guests in others' homes.

When we think about what it means to dwell today, then, we cannot simply shift the dial from rootedness to rootlessness, from place to non-place, to origin to nowhere. It does not suffice, when it comes to thinking of dwelling, to dwell in negativity. This is not to say that there is not an experience of dwelling in placelessness, or of dwelling 'out of joint' with the time of another, or of exilic dwelling. All of these experiences are experiences of dwelling.

To be precise, what I suggest is lacking in accounts given by the likes of Agamben and Butler is a recognition that, even if we are in exile, or between places, or homeless, or in confinement, yet we dwell. Bauman's narrative of uprooted modernity does not inevitably lead to the disappearance of dwelling; no longer rooted, nor longer originary, dwelling remains. If Celan does not recall ever having escaped Egypt, this does not mean that he is 'outside' dwelling, that he does not dwell; rather it means that his dwelling is 'before' exodus. It would be necessary, therefore, not to abandon dwelling but to ask what it means to dwell 'before' – before Exodus, before escape, before arrival, before stepping over the threshold of the home, before becoming rooted, and so on. Similarly, if we dwelling today occurs through a series of displacements and transpositions, it will be unnecessary to understand what takes place or what is given by dwelling as displacement. How and where does displacement take place, and what kind of dwelling is made possible by displacement?

These questions are demanded by today's dwelling: certainly, it is no longer possible to think of originary, rooted dwelling; nor is it sufficient to theorise what it means to dwell today by simple negations of rootedness. The three texts examined in this paper present what I understand to be a 'third way' between or beyond, on the one hand, rootedness and dwelling in origins, and on the other hand, negative dwelling.

## I.

Martin Heidegger's description of dwelling, as it appears in the 'Letter on Humanism', might be understood as representative of – or perhaps nostalgic for – the modes of dwelling described by

Bauman<sup>243</sup>. Heidegger's thinking, especially in the period in which the 'Letter' was written<sup>244</sup>, was concerned with the originary dwelling place of being: the proper activity of existence, for Heidegger, is dwelling in that which belongs to its essence. In a sense, Heidegger is an archetypal anti-modern: modern ways of thinking, according to Heidegger, conceal the proper essence of things. Modern thinking conceals the essence of things and has left us unable to think – to dwell – on things in the way proper way. A key aspiration of Heidegger's thinking, then, is to 'un-conceal' the essence of things from the way they appear to be today and to dwell on what is essential and original. The unconcealment of the essence of things will, subsequently, lead us to understanding that – the central statement of the 'Letter' - "Language is the house of being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of the home" (Heidegger 1993, 189).

These three sentences are not immediately inviting: the dense cluster of words does not invite immediate comprehension. It appears that "the house" (das Haus") is the proper place in which we find language ("die Sprach"); we also find man ("der Mensch") dwelling in the house; finally, there are guardians or 'watchers' ("die Wächter"). If man dwells in the house of being, he thinks in the proper way; conversely, if he fails to think in the proper way, he fails to dwell, and as such, he is homeless.

Approaching the Heideggerian house from the outside, we first discover or encounter the watchmen – who think and create – before entering the dwelling place of the 'Mensch'. Do the guardians stand outside of the house? What is the spatiality of their preservation? Do they guard the house as watchmen, standing at a vantage point? Perhaps they stand before the house, guarding against the forces of concealment, preserving the essence behind them, within. Perhaps they stand on the threshold, half in half out, governing the flow of language. Perhaps the guardians constitute the threshold insofar as they protect what is within against the dangers of that which is without. Perhaps they stand before those who would enter: they are the threshold appearing before all those who would enter. This would make sense if we take the threshold to be that which governs flow: all things – be they men, women, guests, strangers, gods or animals – which arrive or depart must cross the threshold. Arrivals and departure may be barred from entry by the guardians: this barring would happen at the threshold.

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243Heidegger – his thought and himself – is frequently associated with conceptions of dwelling which privilege 'rootedness' and belonging; for examinations of this interpretation, see Edith Wyschogrod 'Autochthony and welcome: discourses of welcome in Levinas and Derrida' (*Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments* (2005): 53-61), and Samuel Moyn 'Judaism against Paganism' (*History and Memory* 10, no. 1 (1998): 25-58.)

244The 'Letter', written in 1945, sits at the crossroads of Heidegger's thinking in many ways, incorporating elements from the lectures on Nietzsche and Hölderlin he had been giving in the late 1930s, and anticipating the works on the task of thinking which would appear in the 1950s (see John Caputo's, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (1993; see especially p170-185) for the 'Letter's place within Heidegger's own work, and Ethan Kleinberg's *Generation Existential: Heidegger's Philosophy in France 1927-1961* (2018; see especially 157-206) for the 'Letter's place in contemporary French and German philosophy.

On the one hand, we might consider the ‘Letter’ to be exemplary of Heidegger’s nostalgic aspiration to return to the simple dwelling of the premodern period: the task at hand, then, is to depart in order to construct a rigorous border between all things essential and original, and all things inessential and non-originary. On the other hand, we might recognise the essential ambiguity at play in Heidegger’s description of the dwelling place. Is there a fixed threshold which governs the flow of traffic? Or do the guardians occupy an unclear inside-outside threshold border location<sup>245</sup>?

In order to begin to answer these questions, and get on our way to understanding what Heidegger thinks it means to dwell, we need to focus on crossing the threshold. What happens, what or who comes, at the threshold? That is to say, who or what dwells outside of the house of language? We know that ‘man’ – the “Mensch” – dwells inside the house; but what dwells outside, beyond the border, beyond the threshold of the house? What is foreign to the house of language? Who or what comes, in such a way that their coming requires guardsmen to watch the threshold?

Perhaps the foreign – the foreign man – is linguistically foreign: perhaps he doesn’t speak German. He doesn’t dwell in the German language. The German language is not his home, nor does it welcome him into the fold. This would certainly be consistent with the text: writing in German<sup>246</sup>, Heidegger claims that “Language is the house of Being”. Does this mean that the foreigner is foreign to language as such, or merely to the German language? If the foreigner does not dwell in the Heideggerian house of being, this could mean that there are other houses in which one can dwell properly. The foreigner may be foreign to the German language, but at home in, say the French language. French is in the family, at home, in the Romantic languages; German is a Germanic language. They are foreign by virtue of being of different families. This unfamiliarity would constitute an essential distance: that which is foreign to the house of being is essentially unrelated. So, what are the watchmen for? Why do they guard the threshold?

Perhaps the man who is foreign by virtue of his language is not one simply foreign to German, or to the family of Germanic language. Perhaps the man who is most foreign to the German language is not he who is unfamiliar, but he who is close by; as Heidegger frequently remarks, we should not accept everyday definitions of what is ‘near’ and ‘far’. What is essential is nearby, but far from everyday human being (1993: 252). What is essential is nearby, and so perhaps what is essentially foreign will not simply be distant, vague or unknown, but nearby. This, then, explains the necessity of the

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245A reading, according to which Heideggerian dwelling is not, or not exclusively, nostalgic and exclusive, but rather contains fundamental ambiguities, has achieved more widespread acceptance in recent years, especially following the publication of *Remembrance* (see, for example, Eliot Wolfson’s *Heidegger and Kabbalah: Hidden Gnosis and the Path of Poiesis* (2019: see especially p338-352) and Elad Lapidot’s *Jews Out of the Question: A Critique of Anti-Anti-Semitism* (2020: see especially p293-297). To a greater extent than the ‘Letter’, Heidegger’s lectures on the poetry of Hölderlin, present Heideggerian dwelling in a light which excludes simple originariness in favour of the ambiguities posed by notions of ‘threshold’, ‘departure’ and ‘homecoming’. This paper focusses on the notion of threshold as it appears in the ‘Letter’; a further examination would demonstrate more explicitly the continuity between the threshold in the ‘Letter’ and the threshold in the Hölderlin lectures.

246At another stage, it would be necessary to consider the original languages, and the language of translation, in which the ‘Letter’ appears (French quotes, originally a French letter, read in English, interspersed with Greek and Latin)

watchmen. They need not guard against that which is inessentially distant and far off; instead, they guard against the nearby, the neighborly. What or who, then, is essentially foreign in his linguistic dwelling is one who dwells nearby. The foreign language will not simply be ‘unfamiliar’; the language will be essentially ‘familiar’ – of the same family as, or related to German. Perhaps a kind of hybrid. A kind of Creole, or perhaps even Yiddish<sup>247</sup>.

## II .

Having thrown this highly speculative remark into the Heideggerian dwelling, it will be necessary to focus even more closely on the threshold. What does it mean to cross the threshold, either in arrival or departure? To go over to the other’s house, or to invite the other over: what does this require? What is demanded of the threshold such that it make hospitality or departure possible? In order to answer these questions, I turn to Jacques Derrida’s ‘No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture’. My reading begins with a few descriptive remarks. I’m reading Derrida’s ‘No (Point of Madness) – Maintaining Architecture’, published in a collection of texts entitled ‘Psyche. Inventions of the Other. Volume II’ in 2008. This is a text which was originally published in (the words of the editors, Peggy Kamuf and Elisabeth Rottenberg) “[devotion] to the work of the architect Bernard Tschumi, and more precisely to the *Folies* project, which was then [which refers to the year 1986] under construction at the Parc de la Villette in Paris. It was first published in a bilingual edition in Bernard Tschumi’s *La case vide: La Villette*” (Kamuf & Rottenberg 2008: 87n1). This is a text whose author is an Algerian-French Jewish man who lived in France and the United States, writing on the work of a Swiss-French man, who also lives in Paris and New York. This is a text written in French and English. Finally, this is a text which begins “Maintenant: this French word will not be translated” (Ibid.).

The text begins with what appears to be a ‘stop’<sup>248</sup>. The very first sentence takes the appearance of negation: Derrida refuses to translate the word – ‘now’ – which begins the text. It would appear, then, that this text, which will deal with the originary relation between architecture and dwelling, will take the same direction as that taken by the likes of Agamben and Butler, by outlining a negative project. This appearance is easily complicated if we pay attention to the second feature of

<sup>247</sup>The extent of Heidegger’s hospitality toward the Yiddish language is, perhaps, measured by his host-age of Paul Celan in 1967 – did Celan receive the words (of welcome) he expected?; we might also think of the hospitality shown by Jewish languages to Heidegger and his work (see, for example, Daniel Herskowitz’s ‘Heidegger in Hebrew: Translation, Politics, Reconciliation’ (2018) for a little known history of Shlomo Zemach’s translation and publication (in Israel) of the *Origin of the Work of Art* into Hebrew; in addition, we might think of Martin Buber’s rejection (from Israel) of Heidegger’s hospitality at a conference scheduled to be held in Germany in 1958 (for more on Heidegger’s personal and intellectual relationship with Martin Buber, see Paul Mendes-Flohr’s ‘Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber in Dialogue’ (2014).

<sup>248</sup>In a number of texts (including *Of Hospitality*, *Aporias*, and indeed, ‘No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture’), Derrida highlights the identity of the French ‘not’ (‘pas’) and ‘step’ (‘pas’); although the text begins with a not, a negation, this does not – as we will see – mean that Derrida describes dwelling in negative terms.

the start-stop sentence: translation. The text was, as editors note, “first published in a bilingual edition”: as such, “Maintenant: this French word will not be translated” remains in an ambiguous time and place. The linguistic field of the sentence proliferates unclarity: does Derrida mean that ‘this French word’ will not be translated ‘now’ (‘maintenant’), but perhaps later? Will Derrida explain, not now but in a moment, why it won’t be translated? The bilinguality of the original edition adduces further difficulties: does the word ‘Maintenant’ gain a kind of guest status in the English language (like so many other French and Old-French words: maintain, maintenance, host, hospitality, refuge, refugee, etc)? Does Derrida’s refusal to translate the word mean that it becomes a guest in English, or perhaps that ‘maintenant’ refuses to be entirely accommodated by the English language? All of this remains undecided.

Derrida’s text starts with a stop. To give an analogy, one might say that Derrida’s text begins like a camping trip which begins with a disaster. We arrive at the campsite, and start to unfurl the tent only to realise that the cables are entirely tangled. They are mixed up in a knot of such a complex nature that even though they are the wires and fabric and hands fingers are mixed up together, some lines will be tangled with others with which they make no contact. They are inextricable from each other but not actually connected to each other. The binding is so complex and inextricable that the wires remain tied together but not actually together.

This tangle of knots resembles – to some extent – the structure of which Derrida speaks: Bernard Tschumi’s construction in Parc de la Villette in north-east Paris. A great jumble of bright red structures, towers, struts, walls and stairs. Derrida speaks of a fabric, or better a ‘weaving’. The architect – and it’s not impossible that (in one way or another) speaks of himself at this moment in this text – “weaves, twining the threads of the warp; his writing holds out” (Ibid., p98). Derrida describes Tschumi’s work as the work of a weaver; this work is a weaving.

But what does the weaving hold out for? What fabrications are held out in Parc de la Villette?

Posing the possibility that Tschumi’s work can be considered a deconstruction of architecture, and of dwelling in general – via a dislocation or displacement of the system, or systematicity – Derrida dismisses or brackets such a possibility, claiming that “no work<sup>249</sup> can result from a simple

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249Following a thread which leads beyond the confines of this paper, Derrida’s ‘No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture’ is – besides being an examination of translation, architecture and the work of Martin Heidegger – also represents a return to the early work of Michel Foucault. Derrida’s original, and most widely read, engagement with Foucault’s work on madness appeared in *Writing and Difference* in which Derrida did not, as some scholars (see, example, Jean Khalifa’s introduction to *History of Madness* (2013: xiv)) assume, dismiss Foucault’s project, but rather considered it to be “impossible”. It is precisely this ‘impossible’ work – the work, or oeuvre of madness – to which Derrida returns in ‘No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture’ in order to reconsider Foucault’s charge (laid out, as a response to Derrida’s *Writing and Difference*, in ‘My Body, This Paper, This Fire’) that Derrida’s entire philosophical project depends upon the ‘elision of events’ (2013: 573), and thus amounts to the same metaphysics which Derrida aims to criticize. It is in response to this charge, then, that Derrida poses the primary question of ‘No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture’ which allows him to gather those threads which constitute the essay – his concern for architecture, his confrontation with the work of Martin Heidegger, the possibility of translation, and a return of Foucauldian madness: namely, “Is an architecture of the event possible?” (2008: 88).



displacement or dislocation alone. One must thus invent. One must clear a passage to another writing... this writing maintains the dis-jointed as such” (Ibid., p99). The questions presented here will not be resolved by means of a series of displacements and transpositions alone; more will be demanded.

Here we find Derrida writing about a certain writing which cannot be alone. A being which cannot, or must not, isolate itself. Not only, then, can we identify, here, a disavowal of those modes of dwelling which would insulate themselves in the (false) security of origins, belonging and birthplace: this mode of dwelling would be an impossible existence. It would be – literally – unworkable<sup>250</sup>; the “thinking and speaking” in Heidegger’s dwelling is not enough to make it work. The Heideggerian man, who dwells alone with his thoughts and speech, lacks the capacity to dwell. Derrida does not, however, advocate leaping and throwing oneself into the world; one must translate oneself, but this does not consist forcing one language into another, but rather “clearing a passage for another writing”. Neither can we dwell alone, nor can we throw or force ourselves onto others.

I recall that Derrida’s text begins with a stop: “Maintenant, this French word will not be translated”. No translation arrives. This is not a simple translation of French to German, or German to Hebrew. One must translate oneself, certainly, but no translation is guaranteed safe arrival. Derrida disavows the possibility of living apart, but he also appears to leave open the question of how to approach the Other.

Derrida writes that we must “clear a passage to another writing” (Ibid.). This directs us beyond a “simple displacement or dislocation alone”. A simple displacement or dislocation will not “clear a passage to another”. Writing, dwelling, translating: neither can these things be achieved the lonely Heideggerian thinker and speaker who keeps watch over the German language, nor can they be achieved, as Butler proposes, by “a series of displacements and transpositions”.

Here, I find the answer to the questions with which I begin my reading of Derrida’s text: why does ‘maintenant’ remain untranslated? Following what I interpret to be a disavowal of both Heideggerian dwelling (understood as the lonely maintenance of the originally essential German dwelling) and also of the kinds of negative dwelling described by Butler and Agamben, Derrida gives his answer in strikingly programmatic terms: he writes “... this writing maintains the dis-jointed as such; it joins the dis- by maintaining the gap” (Ibid.,). This word will not be translated because it will maintain a gap; the word will dwell in maintaining a gap. This is not a home which

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<sup>250</sup>Here, for example, I interpret Derrida as making a clear return to Foucault and the ‘impossible’ work of madness. However, the reader might also detect an engagement with the work of Maurice Blanchot (in particular, his *The Space of Literature* (2015)) and, hence, Blanchot’s dialogue with Jean-Luc Nancy (in *The Inoperative Community* (1991)) and Giorgio Agamben (in *The Coming Community* (1993)) on the notion of ‘work’, ‘unworking’ in the context of the debate on ‘community’; for Agamben and Nancy, in particular, the notion of the threshold is at the centre of their understanding of community.

needs to be protected; not a joint which gathers together the walls of the home; not a departure from place, or a negation of dwelling in any place. Instead, this dwelling is the maintenance of a gap, which remains cleared for a passage.

How can we describe this cleared passage? It seems appropriate to recognise the place in which Derrida's text begins: the tangle of structures, cables and wires which constitute Tschumi's architecture. Tangled, jangled and jumbled, weaved. Perhaps what we have here is not a roadmap for going out to the Other, but rather the tangle of cables and wires which provide, provisionally, a gap for passage.

This tangle of cables and wires resembles, I think, an eruv: a construction originating in halakhic law, which simultaneously constructs and conceptually erases a series of borders, consequently delimiting a space of passage. An eruv is an area, demarcated by a number of cables or wires tied between poles, made for the purpose of allowing items to be carried on the Sabbath which would otherwise be prohibited. This is achieved by conceptually erasing the border between house-thresholds, thus allowing Jews to carry things between houses without disobeying Sabbath laws. This erasure does not, of course, erase the physical borders of the homes. In this way, the construction of the eruv simultaneously retains existing borders (the walls and thresholds of the homes remain in place), while erasing conceptual borders (allowing Jews to pass between homes), and creating new borders (a new threshold is created between the inside and the outside of the eruv).

The cables which demarcate the area of the eruv do not designate the path by which Jews must carry things across the demarcated space, merely the limits within which the passage must pass; of course, Jews may also leave the eruv space, provided they do not carry anything over the border. Furthermore, since the eruv originates in Jewish law and only applies to Jews, non-Jews may cross and carry whatever they like within the eruv borders; the eruv border is not guarded or policed, merely maintained by the local rabbi.

The eruv space, therefore, achieves something quite comparable with the Derrida's thinking on dwelling: a number of threads – is Derrida really talking about dwelling, or writing, or architecture, or translation, or something entirely other, or are these all tangled and weaved together? – which intends to allow for a passage, which might be a sharing of common property<sup>251</sup> without designating the precise means, direction or language by which this sharing is to be achieved. Sharing is required, because a single work is insufficient for dwelling; but this sharing will amount to nothing more than the clearing of a passage for another work. Rather than dictate the proper passage, dwelling will simply consist of the maintenance of the gap: perhaps this is performed by that most

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<sup>251</sup>Here, again, Derrida is in dialogue with Jean-Luc Nancy's work on community: like Derrida, and perhaps even more than Derrida, Nancy's *The Inoperative Community* situates the 'sharing' – 'partage' – of the common at the centre and the limit of the community.

quotidien activity of opening the door in order to sweep the threshold with a brush.

### III.

Before closing, we need to visit Emmanuel Levinas' home, and read his book 'Difficult Freedom'. Where do we place Levinas' 'Difficult Freedom'? It is a collection of texts which are neither exclusively philosophical, nor religious. That is to say, it's a collection which does not conform to the pattern in which all of Levinas' 'philosophical' texts were published at a separate publishing house from all of the 'Talmudic' texts. It's something of a halfway house, in that respect.

In my reading of Heidegger's 'Letter', I identify, on the hand, an exemplarily anti-modernist, nostalgic conceptualisation of dwelling, founded on origins and essence; on the other hand, by looking particularly at the guards who keep watch over the house of language, I locate a certain ambiguity with regard to the location of the threshold. It wasn't clear what requires the guards to keep watch over the threshold; nor where the guardians stand with regard to the threshold, and that which crosses it.

In my reading of Derrida's 'Maintenant', I identify something which has the appearance of being a description of dwelling – or perhaps writing, or translation, or architecture – consonant with what I term the negative dwelling described by figures such as Agamben and Butler; however, on closer inspection, I suggest, we find a rejection of simple displacements alone. One must translate oneself over to the other (rather than insulate oneself within one's own), but translation is no guaranteed arrival. In this regard, then, Derrida at once distances himself from Heidegger – dwelling cannot be achieved alone; and yet returns to Heideggerian dwelling, and the ambiguity of the threshold.

Certainly, Heidegger and Derrida think of the threshold differently – for Heidegger, a danger zone which mandates protection; for Derrida, a gap which needs to be maintained for others – but it is clear that the threshold is a key term in their thinking on dwelling.

Levinas' contribution to this rethinking of dwelling otherwise than Heideggerian-origins can be identified with what I have termed 'negative dwelling': in 'Heidegger, Gargarin and Us', he writes that "Judaism has always been free with regard to place" (1990: 233). This phrase is cited by scholars such as Sarah Hammerschlag, supporting a claim that, unlike Heidegger who thinks of origins rooted in the German language and soil, Levinasian dwelling begins with "rootlessness" (Hammerschlag 2010: 137); understood in this way, Levinas would be understood as a thinker of negative dwelling. As in my reading of Derrida's 'No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture', I detect, in Levinas' thinking a conceptualisation of dwelling which differs from Heideggerian dwelling, while remaining irreducible to negativity.

In 'A Religion for Adults', Levinas writes: "The Jewish man discovers man before discovering

landscapes and towns. He is at home in a society before being so in a house... He is in a sense exiled on this earth... Man begins in the desert where he dwells in tents” (Levinas 1990, 22).

«L’homme juif découvre l’homme avant de découvrir les paysages et les villes. Il est chez soi dans une société, avant de l’être dans une maison ... L’homme commence dans le désert où il habite de les tentes»

In this first sentence, Levinas recites the ‘before’ which has been a key term of this paper: the Jewish man discovers man *before* landscapes and towns. Between the discovery of man and of landscapes and towns, there is a threshold. The Jewish man approaches, from afar, and crosses the border or threshold into an encounter with man before crossing into a landscape or town.

How should we understand this ‘before’? Understood temporally, we would read that the Jew discovers man *before subsequently* going on to discover landscapes and towns. He meets man prior to the town. Understood spatially, the Jew meets man in one location and further down the line he discovers landscapes and towns. Perhaps the man and the town are connected: the man is like a lookout or watchman, outside the town, at a vantage point – ‘a vantage’ – on the edge. Perhaps the men confront each other with hostility, asking ‘what have you come here for?’. Or perhaps the man is discovered ‘before’ the landscape and town because he is ‘outside’, without shelter or a place to dwell. Or perhaps the Other man welcomes the Jew across the threshold<sup>252,253</sup>.

Perhaps – what seems most likely – is that Levinas is gesturing at is a humanity or humanism – or Judaism, or even a ‘Jewish humanism’<sup>254</sup> – which privileges its relations with Other men over its relations with buildings. That is, Levinas wants to privilege human to human relations over and before human to architecture relations. Architecture, thus, is an obstacle to human relations. Man’s existence is “free with regard to architecture” (Ibid.). Perhaps it gets in the way. It’s a barrier to meeting Other men. Or perhaps architecture is a threshold over which man must step to reach the Other man.

The man is at home in society *before* he is at home in the house. Man’s most natural state – where he is before being anywhere else; the most homely belonging-place for man; the place he is most properly chez ‘nous’, ‘chez soi’ – is among other men. The building comes afterwards.

The exemplary dwelling – where, Levinas writes, “man begins” – is in the desert. He “dwells in tents” in the desert. What does this mean?

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252It is these possibilities, among many others, which are effaced by Agamben’s playful “before *or anyway outside of* Exodus” (deployed in order to situate Celan in atopia).

253In this regard, Levinas’ work, too, stands in dialogue with Agamben’s thinking on dwelling and the threshold; given, however, Agamben’s effacement of the condition of being ‘before’ exodus’ in favour of being outside exodus (hence, without place – no place, nothing place), it is perhaps unsurprising that his work on the threshold does not consider the threshold to be a place for hospitality or welcome, but a border onto ‘nothing’ (see, especially, *The Coming Community*, Section XVI).

254Although delivered in a different tone – primarily historical, rather than philosophical – Levinas explicitly calls “For a Jewish Humanism” later in *Difficult Freedom*; however, this second text retains little of the analysis of architecture – in particular, a humanism which privileges interhuman relationships over and before human-building relationships – which is present in ‘A Religion for Adults’ and the focus of this paper.

That man begins in the desert in a tent serves as a clarification for the previous sentences' declaration that "Man is, in a sense, exiled on this earth"; such a declaration, if left unqualified, would suggest that Levinas negates those kinds of place-based descriptions of dwelling of which Butler and Agamben are so critical. Since, however, the declaration is followed by what appears to be an explanation (that his exile, in a sense, mirrors or bears an analogy with Israelite desert-dwelling), we can see that Levinas is neither a thinker of place and origin-based dwelling – unlike, I suggest, Heidegger – nor is he a thinker of simple negative dwelling – unlike, therefore, Agamben or Butler. Instead, Levinas claims that man begins by dwelling in tents in the desert.

To be more precise, the kind of desert-dwelling to which Levinas refers<sup>255</sup> is the kind remembered and commemoratively practised in the Jewish festival of Sukkot; the festival which recalls man's primal dwelling place, in tents in the desert: a dwelling of the most fragile, insecure, vulnerable, precarious kind. A construction barely standing upright. A structure tied down by the thinnest of threads. The loosest of connections with the ground, the soil, beneath our feet. Connection of the most provisional kind: perhaps we could say that the tent pegs form a kind of provisional root. A root which allows he who puts down roots to pick them up again and be on his way with only a moment's notice. An enrootedness which privileges and facilitates movement.

Levinas does not, therefore, retain a theory of dwelling which places origin and identity in essential correlation; nor, however, does this lead him to a theorisation of negative dwelling. Man most certainly dwells: his originary dwelling place 'begins' in the moment of, or perhaps immediately following, exile; the dwelling place itself is precarious, but this precarity is not a negative condition but one which privileges movement. The sukkah, for Levinas, should not be understood as a critical or negative counterexample to the landscape or the town. Instead, Levinas finds in sukkot an articulation of what is fundamental to dwelling, and fundamental even to human being: that being human is provisional<sup>256</sup>.

### III.

#### Conclusion

Beginning with Heidegger and arriving at Levinas, I trace a shift away from those modes of dwelling which begin with a return to roots and a move toward dwellings which prioritises others,

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<sup>255</sup>That Levinas is referring to Sukkot is made, a few lines later, in the reference to "the festival of cabins" (1990: 23).  
<sup>256</sup>Not only is 'provisional' used with reference to the temporariness of dwelling in the tents – the Israelites dwell there between exile and arrival in the Promised Land, but also because when Jews celebrate Sukkot, it is a time of hospitality and therefore the provision of foods. Sukkot immediately follows Yom Kippur, which includes the practice of fasting; not only this, but Sukkot is coincides with the harvest season: the celebration of Sukkot, then, is a celebration of food, hospitality and the possibilities of provision – being provided for by the fruits of the earth, providing for others, be they friends or strangers, and ultimately the provisionality of dwelling on this earth.

other people, other languages, other modes of dwelling. To some extent, these readings indicate the distance Levinas and Derrida take from Heidegger – I attempt to show that Levinasian and Derridean dwelling certainly do not privilege rooting oneself in a place and dwelling on the proper. However, this distance taking is incomplete, insofar as I claim that both Levinas and Derrida remain concerned with the notion of ‘threshold’. It is perhaps this incomplete distance taking which marks Levinas and Derrida as thinkers ‘in step’ with the narrators of modernity, such as Zygmunt Bauman: it is part of what makes their thinking instructive that, unlike Heidegger, they are committed to thinking about what it means to dwell today, rather than in (a real or imagined) yesterday. Yet, this commitment does not lead them, as it does Butler and Agamben, toward a negation or negative theories of dwelling. It will not be sufficient, today, to theorise dwelling by means of a simple displacement or disjointure, or by means of departure into atopia.

It might have been possible to show that, as is particularly clear in Heidegger’s readings of Hölderlin which deal extensively with the threshold<sup>257</sup>, Heidegger is not only concerned with dwelling in essence, but also with departure and return<sup>258</sup>; on this basis, the distance-taking performing by Levinas and Derrida would have been even narrower than I estimate it to be in this paper. Indeed, such a reading has become increasingly widespread among certain scholars: it remains unclear from this literature, however, the extent to which Heidegger can theorise dwelling as provisional in the sense that Levinas and Derrida do<sup>259</sup>. Would those who think and speak in the guardianship of the dwelling of language *also* be the man discovered before landscapes and towns? Would these men be willing or able to offer hospitality? Would their thinking and speaking pay homage to the essentially provisionality of human existence?

While these questions might provide food for thought, I propose that leading Heidegger’s texts in this direction might demand such a degree of hermeneutic force (or even violence), that the purpose of such a reading is unclear; put more simply, while it might be possible to force Heidegger to think about hospitality or sharing, it’s not yet clear to me whether Heidegger himself has anything to give when it comes to dwelling today. Instead, in the texts provided by Levinas and Derrida, we find a much clearer answer to the question of what dwelling means today. This is an answer, on my readings, which passes beyond Heidegger without entirely departing from his thinking, insofar as there is a disavowal of dwelling in proper roots, and yet retention of the notion of the threshold; this departing retention does not, however, conclude with simply negative theorisations of dwelling.

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257See, for example, *Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine”* (2014: especially p152-156)

258This is the focal point of Robert Mugerauer’s *Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings* (2018) and reflects the aforementioned trend, among certain scholars, to represent Heideggerian dwelling as concerned with more simple essence and property.

259This paper is limited in the sense that, although it does not present Levinas and Derrida as proposing the same theorization of post-Heideggerian dwelling, nor does it characterize the precise differences between Levinas and Derrida with regard to Heidegger or each other – differences which were clear right from the beginning, as early as ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, in which Derrida casts doubt on the extent to which Levinas’ Judaism allows him to radically depart from the Odyssean return (see ‘Writing and Difference’, p412, footnote 92)

Instead, Levinas and Derrida provide the reader with complex and ongoing thoughts on the necessity of hospitality, and of providing for others when we share our dwelling spaces with them. When Derrida claims that we must “clear a passage to another writing”, this “clearing” does not wipe away the dwelling; nor, when he writes that this “writing maintains the dis-jointed as such” is the question settled with simple disjointedness. Dwelling, for Derrida, is the maintenance of this passage to another writing. When Levinas claims that “Man begins in the desert where he dwells in tents”, this does not mean that we simply dwell in exile or atopia; rather, wherever we dwell, it remains provisional. Certainly, both Levinas and Derrida take a certain distance from Heidegger’s theory of dwelling; but this does not prevent them from providing their own understandings of what it means to dwell.

Alongside these readings, I identify two pieces of what might be termed ‘Jewish architecture’ which – insofar as they privilege provisional crossing (the eruv allows Jews to carry and share items, for example food, across borders which would usually be prohibited on Sabbath, while the sukkah provides man with a dwelling place while remaining provisional with regard to place) – instantiate what I find to be most instructive in Levinas and Derrida’s work: a theorisation of dwelling which moves beyond the high privilege Heidegger gives to property and place, without simply falling into negativity.

I find this to be instructive because it allows us to think, today, about what it means to dwell. For we do dwell. We may dwell in different places; we may dwell on the move; we may have our dwelling places removed. Today’s dwelling places may not remain static and secure; they remain in motion. None of this, however, constitutes a negation of dwelling. Thus, when it becomes necessary to think about dwelling today, we need more than a negative theorisation of dwelling.

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
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